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ABSTRACT
Historians have written little on sports in the United States compared to other topics.
They have had even less to say about tennis than other popular sports in large part because the
original research necessary to complete a full treatment of the history of the game appeared too
daunting to undertake. By contrast, this study has made use of over a dozen archival collections
around the country, many of which researchers have never used before, to tell the story of how
tennis went from an amateur sport closely guarded by economic elitists and cultural purists to a
professional sport thoroughly democratized and inclusive of individuals regardless of their
financial standing or social position. That change connects a variety of heretofore unconnected
developments beginning in the French Revolution and ending in the present: European
aristocracy and Continental cultural exports; amateur athletic associations in cities and suburban
country clubs; New Deal programs and urban recreational reform; the impact of World War II on
the careers of global athletes; postwar prosperity in the United States and the growth of
America’s entertainment economy; race, ethnicity, and class in twentieth century athletics;
cultural competition during the Cold War; tax policy and the globalization of professional sports;
the cultural production of celebrity athletes; professional sports touring and stadium
construction; as well as masculinity, femininity and gay and transgender athletes. Dozens of
characters, both notorious and obscure, make this story as much about people as about social
processes and places. Many of the important stops along the way from amateur to professional
tennis took place in the United States, but given the global popularity of the game, this study
takes a transnational perspective to analyze the professionalization of this world sport.
viii

INTRODUCTION
THE LONG ROAD TO PROFESSIONAL TENNIS
The scoreboard at the U.S. National Championships in August 1949 read 16-18, 2-6, 6-1,
6-2, 5-4. After more than four sets and more than four hours of grueling play at the West Side
Tennis Club in Forest Hills, New York, veteran Ted Schroeder and the twenty-one-year-old
Richard “Pancho” Gonzales were locked in a winner-take-all fifth set to decide the best amateur
tennis player in the world. While the youthful Gonzales reigned as the current U.S. champion—
owning the title after his breakout victory the previous year—Schroeder remained the favorite in
this clash. He had dominated Gonzales in their previous head-to-head matches. He was fresh off
a recent Wimbledon title won in England a month earlier. He hungered for the crown after he
had skipped the U.S. Championship the previous year. The work he did at his refrigerator
business and the time he wanted to spend with his family took precedence. Schroeder was the
ideal amateur.
The combatants were a contrast in style off and on the court. Schroeder lived the life of
an all-American hero. He hailed from the California coast, where his middle-class family ran a
local refrigerator business. He looked like the veterans on morale posters from World War II. His
blond hair sat tightly cropped against his angular jaw and high cheekbones. Tanned from the sun
but not too dark, he possessed naturally lean and muscled limbs without giving the impression of
having worked at it. In fact, he emphasized how little time he spent on the court. He was a small
business owner and a family man, after all. He and his lovely wife Brenda had two young
1
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children, whom both parents hoped would carry on the family business when they were old
enough. Their attractive two-bedroom house sat on a modest suburban street. Schroeder spent
most of his time at work or at home. He played tennis well, but just for fun.
Gonzales, by contrast, was just barely older than a teenager. He literally carried the scars
from a troubled urban adolescence on his face. His Mexican parents had fled revolutionary
Mexico separately and met in the barrios of East Los Angeles. There they worked hard as
farmers, seamstresses, and hired hands in the fledgling Hollywood movie studios. They raised
four children in different apartments throughout the ethnic communities of Southern California.
They knew the intolerances their children would face from neighbors and municipal authorities
because they lived and continued to live a life of struggle. They were not surprised when their
oldest son Richard, whom everyone called Pancho after the machismo Mexican-American
“Pachuco” youths, encountered trouble with the truant officer at his junior high school. They
were surprised and troubled when he came home one day with a gash across his face that
resembled a knife wound. A string of burglaries put the teenaged Gonzales before a local
delinquency court, where the presiding judge removed him from parent custody and placed him
in a notorious youth prison hundreds of miles away. Released only to serve in World War II,
how could this juvenile delinquent become the standard bearer for U.S. tennis?
Back on the manicured lawns of the Forest Hills Tennis Club, Gonzales knuckled down
and began to fight out of a two sets to love deficit. Only four players in the sixty-year history of
tennis in America had made such a comeback. None ever did it as a defending titleholder of a
major amateur championship. This particular tournament, the U.S. Nationals, made the pressure
even more palpable. The fifty thousand spectators far exceeded that of most of the other summer
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tennis tournaments combined. Unlike the baseball bleachers, the football stands, or coliseum
seats of America’s major cities, viewers at Forest Hills sat and walked around the grass courts
right next to the competing players. Journalists too fluttered around the edges of the court in
numbers not seen at any other tennis match.
The architecture and very history of the Forest Hills Tennis Club added to the millstone
on the players’ shoulders. Built in the 1881, this New York mainstay was the cradle of tennis in
the United States. The normal exclusivity of Forest Hills put the class differences between the
players on the court and the members in the clubhouse into sharpest relief. Players like Gonzales
could not afford to stay in a hotel; they relied on patronage to eat and sleep near the Forest Hills
courts. Officials from the International Lawn Tennis Federation, the United States Lawn Tennis
Association (USLTA), and the sixteen geographic sections of the USLTA all watched the
matches, ready to decide which players they would continue to sponsor and which players would
be put out to pasture. To hold both the trophy and the respect of the United States Lawn Tennis
Association, Gonzales needed to overcome youth, self-doubts, sports history, as well as the
expectations of failure from fans and the tennis establishment. He needed to serve out the
match. 1
His own body’s ability to move in the patterns of play that made up the game of tennis
was the only thing Gonzales ever relied upon. As an adolescent, other boys mocked him for his
size, another reason for the Pancho nickname he carried with him from youth. In adolescence, his

1

Steve Snyder, “Gonzales Proves He Is Top Net Amateur,” Olean Times Herald, September 6, 1949, p. 10; Pancho
Gonzales and Cy Rice, Man With a Racket: The Autobiography of Pancho Gonzales (New York: A.S. Barnes and
Co., 1959), 90-92. Gonzales preferred ending his name with an s rather than the z favored by Chicano activists who
also called him Ricardo and used his middle name of Alonso rather than Pancho, as he was popularly called. The
spelling used here will reflect the time and tenor of the source.
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210 pounds of weight filled out across a six-foot four-inch frame. His arms were long, his
quadriceps, hamstrings, and glutes taut, his calves like the trunks of a hardwood, his hair black
and wavy, and his skin dark. He moved quickly across the court with a surprisingly low center of
gravity. He could change directions in a split-second after returning a shot by driving the ball of
one of his size-twelve feet against the surface of the court, rotating his hips, planting his opposite
foot, and pushing off with explosive force to recover to the middle hash-mark of the court. His
quick movement often surprised spectators and opponents. The ferocity of the pace of the ball
moving from one of Gonzales’s serves, however, filled opponents with dread and spectators with
awe. He was ready should his opponent return the serve.
Most of this happened in too short a time for the gallery to see. Their view of Gonzales
was obscured. 2 Gonzales broke Schroeder’s serve at 4-4 in the fifth set, raising the stakes for the
longest championship match in United States tennis history. A tense game ensued. A far cry
from a stoic competition, 13,000 mostly East Coast fans chattered loudly between points. A
routine hold for the strongest server in the game turned into an opportunity to look past the
points at hand and to the significance riding on the match. As amateurs, neither player would
receive any prize money for the victory; however, the chance for tennis to become the livelihood
of one of the two players did rest on the server’s shoulders. Bobby Riggs, the promoter of the
professional tennis tour, waited in the wings to sign Schroeder to a $75,000 contract to play the
reigning professional champion, Jack Kramer, in a one-hundred plus match barnstorming circuit
across the U.S. and the rest of the world. Trailing early in the game through a double-fault, an
2

Gayle Talbot, “Pancho Gonzales Defeats Schroeder for Net Title,” Hagerstown Morning Herald, September 6,
1949, p. 11.

5
unforced error, and striking a shot that would have fallen out, Gonzales leveled the game at
deuce through a combination of big serves and Schroeder errors. Another winner, and Gonzales
stood at match point. With his opponent in deep concentration across the net, Gonzales kissed his
racquet before delivering one final serve and charging to the net. Schroeder swung for a downthe-line forehand that at first appeared in as a puff of chalk-dust floated into the air. A linesman
called the shot out, however, and the young Mexican-American had upset the best laid plans of
the amateur and professional tennis promoters. Even commentator Vin Scully could hardly
believe his eyes, speaking in a surprised and slightly derogatory tone: “If you’re still not sure, we
thought we’d show you the shot over again…Keep your eyes on the right side-line. Convinced?
Can’t believe that call, can you?” The excuses to justify Gonzales’s victory began before the
players reached the locker room. 3
Half a century after Gonzales played Forest Hills as an amateur tennis player for the last
time, more spectators attend the United States Tennis Championships held at Flushing Meadows,
New York, than any other annually contested sporting event in the world. 4 The tournament is the
high-water mark on the entertainment calendar of the world’s most cosmopolitan city. Despite
the unrivaled popularity of the two-week-long tournament, few of the hundreds of thousands of
fans who crowd the United States Tennis Association (USTA) Billie Jean King National Tennis

3

Pancho Gonzales Interview, Oral History Collection, International Tennis Hall of Fame (ITHF), Newport, Rhode
Island; Bud Collins, History of Tennis: An Authoritative Encyclopedia and Record Book (Chicago: New Chapter
Press, 2010), 454-64; Oscar Fraley, “Kramer Professes Sorrow at Schroeder’s Setback, though He Gains $50,000,”
Reno News, September 11, 1949, p. 15; Gonzales Man With a Racket, 93-97; The Big Moment, “Sports Newsreel
from Hearst Metrotone—with Bug Palmer,” Metrotone Collection, Movies and Television Division, Library of
Congress.
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Rob Steen, Floodlights and Touchlines: A History of Spectator Sport (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 33-37.
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Center know anything about the history of the sport in America. And why should they? Those
whose job it is to write that story have largely missed the major points or have chosen simply to
focus on other subjects.
The standard accounts of the professionalization of tennis are those written by sports
journalists filled with rich detail on the years immediately leading up to the summer tournaments
of 1968 when amateur players and professional players first competed openly in famous events
like Wimbledon. These accounts then go on to follow important moments over the next decade
or two, where “Open Tennis” worked out the difficulties that went along with becoming the last
of the world’s major sports to allow unfettered competition between amateurs and professionals. 5
Some sports writers tend to focus on a particular match or particular player—often times with
great perception but without a view to how and why tennis moved from an amateur to a
professional sport. 6 Others tend to look at tennis from a literary point of view and thus forgo
archival research in favor of published fiction and nonfiction accounts that shed light on the
meaning of the sport. 7 In a similar vein, great novelists have made the sport of tennis a setting to
explore broader themes such as entertainment and capitalist competition—the best recent

5

Richard Evans, Open Tennis, 1968-1988: The Players, the Politics, the Pressure, the Passions, and the Great
Matches (New York: Viking, 1989); Herbert Warren Wind, Game, Set, and Match: The Tennis Boom of the 1960s
and 70s (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1969).

6

John McPhee, Levels of the Game (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1969); Marshall Jon Fischer, A Terrible
Splendor: Three Extraordinary Men, A World Poised for War, and the Greatest Tennis Match Ever Played (New
York: Crown Publishers, 2009); Frank Deford, Big Bill Tilden: The Triumphs and the Tragedy (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1976).
7

Elizabeth Wilson, Love Game: A History of Tennis from Victorian Pastime to Global Phenomenon (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2016).
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example being David Foster Wallace’s magnum opus Infinite Jest. 8 The few professional
historians who have studied tennis have tended to publish work with relatively narrow focus: the
European origins of the game; the celebration of amateurism in the elite clubs and associations
on the American Eastern Seaboard; the events that immediately led up to the first “Open”
Wimbledon Championship in 1968; the impact that the Billie Jean King versus Bobby Riggs
1973 Battle of the Sexes match had on women’s sports in late twentieth-century America; how
Arthur Ashe used his status as a tennis champion to become a civil rights leader. 9
By contrast, “Pancho’s Racket” is a historian’s view with a wider and a longer look at the
professionalization of tennis. It is not the biography of a particular player; it is the narrated
analysis of how tennis went from a cloistered amateur game to a more inclusive and thoroughly
professionalized international sport. Explaining that means telling the individual yet interlocking
stories of dozens of players, promoters, associations, agents, social policies, and sporting venues
across the twentieth century and around the world.
In his masterful three-volume social history of African American athletes, the late tennis
champion and world humanitarian Arthur Ashe used the symbol of the “road” to explain the
struggles African Americans endured as part of the sporting tradition of the United States. 10

8

David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest (Boston: Back Bay Books, 2006), 3-4, passim.

9

Heiner Gillmeister, Tennis: A Cultural History (London: Leicester University Press, 1998; E. Digby Baltzell,
Sporting Gentlemen: Men’s Tennis from the Age of Honor to the Cult of the Superstar (New York: The Free Press,
1995); Kevin Jeffreys, “The Triumph of Professionalism: The Road to 1968,” The International Journal of the
History of Sport 26, no. 15 (2009): 2253-69; Susan Ware, Game, Set, Match: Billie Jean King and the Revolution in
Women’s Sports (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Eric Allen Hall, Arthur Ashe: Tennis and
Justice in the Civil Rights Era (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).
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Arthur Ashe, A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the African American Athlete, 1619-1918 (New York: Amistad
Press, 1993); Arthur Ashe, A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the African American Athlete, 1919-1945 (New

8
Ashe’s road is an apt metaphor for understanding the interplay of race and sport in America, but
it is also more than that. The touring professionals who drove the most to arrive at Open Tennis
literally spent most of their careers on the road because amateur officials barred them from
playing the courts that hosted the sport’s most prestigious tournaments. “Pancho’s Racket”
follows the important stops they took to get to the professional game as it is played today.
The genesis of lawn tennis as a sport first and foremost for women is the subject of
chapter one of this study. The large number of women who played tennis when compared to
other sports meant that, statistically speaking, the first professional tennis player of any influence
stood a good chance of being a woman. In her 1926 American tour, the Frenchwoman Suzanne
Lenglen set a pattern for barnstorming professional tennis that continued until the game fully
opened to amateur and professional players in 1968.
The movement of tennis from East Coast clubs to Southern California is the topic
addressed in chapter two. Hailing from genteel and wealthy backgrounds, the men who founded
the early tennis clubs that formed the United States Lawn Tennis Association believed in
absolute amateurism within the sport they sought to control. At the same time, they enforced
their code of amateurism selectively across the country. This allowed affiliated tennis clubs in
different areas of the country freedom to promulgate their own junior development programs
outside of the control of the national office. The best of these juniors turned professional in the
late 1930s and 1940s. .

York: Amistad Press, 1993); Arthur Ashe, A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the African American Athlete, Since
1946 (New York: Amistad Press, 1993).
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Chapter three places the evolution of professional tennis firmly in the twentieth-century
American city and moves alongside the work of urban historians and sports historians who
describe popular amusements, urban recreation, and athletics as primarily an urban
phenomenon. 11 The New Deal transformed tennis at its grassroots. City space was reorganized
during the 1930s when broad-based efforts to manage urban youth aided in the evolution and
partial democratization of elite amateur sports to classes and ethnic groups who previously
thought little about such competitions. Tennis players of that generation benefited from a
recreational revolution that swept America during the first half of the twentieth century. Taken
together, these first three chapters form a sort of prequel to professional tennis whereby the
amateur origins of the game remained but were eroded through a combination of popular
individual players, specious administration on the part of the game’s amateur associations, and
an influx of new people to the game thanks to infrastructure spending on urban recreation.
Part II of “Pancho’s Racket” is a close examination of professional tennis from World
War II into the fifties and sixties. Chapter four traces the effects of the recreational revolution on
American and international tennis from the late thirties through to the war’s conclusion. A whole
new generation of American tennis players with names like Bobby Riggs appeared with a view
to challenge the amateur rules of the game. The war modified the careers of these players just as
the construction of public park courts gave them the opportunity to play the game in the first
place, and tennis players, like athletes across the country, joined the American war effort as
soldier-entertainers both on the home front and overseas. The increased mobility of people
11

Frederic L. Paxson, “The Rise of Sport,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 4 (1917): 143-68; Melvin
Adelman, A Sporting Time: New York City and the Rise of Modern Athletics, 1820-70 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1986), 2; Steven Riess, City Games: The Evolution of American Urban Society and the Rise of Sports
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 2.
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spurred by the war thus created conditions that better suited professional tennis tours than
amateur tournaments held in elite private country clubs.
Chapter five picks up that theme of mobility and money in tennis by recounting the
barnstorming tennis tours of the fifties. The postwar years saw remarkable changes in living
standards, spending habits, family life, gender relations, transportation, housing, race relations,
and leisure time, and savvy tennis player-promoters like Jack Kramer recognized that
professional tennis could earn a tidy profit if managed correctly. At the same time the nation’s
economy and infrastructure boomed, a half-dozen tennis professionals led by Kramer drove
around the country playing for a new crowd night after night. In so doing, they further
popularized the idea of professional tennis players competing openly with amateur tennis players
in the minds of people across the United States and around the world.
Much of the burden of the barnstorming tour fell on the World Champion who year after
year lived the peripatetic lifestyle of the barnstorming professional. Pancho Gonzales’s heritage,
if not his personality, made him an enigmatic standard-bearer for professional tennis before
1968. Class background and ethnic identity guided much of Gonzales’s life whether he wanted it
to or not. His perch at the top of the professional game for a decade also warrants a closer look at
his life than that afforded to other characters in these pages. The sixth chapter of this study shows
how Gonzales’s childhood in Depression-era Los Angeles gave him both opportunities to play
tennis not available elsewhere in the country while at the same time his adolescence there
branded him as an irascible individual—a stereotype that existed for the entirety of his amateur
and professional tennis career. At the same time he solidified his position as the most visible

11
representative of his sport, Gonzales remained beholden to his tour promoter, his fellow players,
and the reality of professional tennis before the sport opened to full competition in 1968.
The final third of this study recounts how professional tennis exploded in commercial
popularity right at the moment when the barnstorming professionals of the postwar period could
no longer compete at the highest level. Well past his playing prime, Gonzales missed taking
advantage of the regular tournament schedule, higher prize money, product sponsorships, and
player unions that set professional tennis on the path to becoming a world sport in the seventies.
Sports journalists have given a preliminary sketch of the after-effects of Open Tennis beginning
in the summer of 1968, but have said little about the long-term and proximate causes of the
International Lawn Tennis Federation vote authorizing that change in the spring of 1968. 12
Chapter seven uses well known and untapped sources to go behind the scenes of that important
year in sports history. The rest of the chapter examines how old and new stakeholders such as
World Championship Tennis owner Lamar Hunt both built upon and departed from the
barnstorming tours from the past to adapt to the expanded economic outlook for the sport.
Beginning in the 1960s, a new breed of sports agents led by Mark McCormack and his
International Management Group (IMG) made individual athletes into commercial celebrities
without rival. The pioneering sports marketing firms such as IMG and Donald Dell’s ProServ
began with athletes from individual sports such as golf and tennis who made sports into the
moneymaking enterprise that is ubiquitous today. That is the subject of chapter eight, which
explains how and why they created the most visible of sporting spectacles.

12

Evans, Open Tennis, 1968-1988, passim.

12
The most striking of developments actually took place in the most personal of places.
With a few important exceptions, commercial sports had long belonged almost exclusively to
men until women professionals began playing tennis for money in significant numbers in 1968.
Over the next half-decade, women such as Gladys Heldman and Billie Jean King created a tour
of their own that rivaled the men’s game in popularity and prize money while differing in
substance and style. Whereas historians of women’s tennis in the seventies emphasize change,
the final chapter of this study suggests more continuity than change and more compromise than
courage on the part of these women’s sports player-promoters.
Tennis, which originated in Britain, grew first on the American Atlantic Coast before
moving west, where it found a home along the Pacific. All the while it remained a sport that
separated amateur and professional players—at least in the minds of the clubs and associations
who ran the game for the first half century of its existence. Government and individual responses
to the major upheavals of the Great Depression and World War II greatly undermined the
authority of those associations by creating conditions in which a whole new generation of players
with social backgrounds different then the men who ran the amateur associations could take up
the game. The best of those players held far more liberal views when it came to money in their
sport and they shared those views across the country and throughout the world year after year on
professional barnstorming tours in the late forties through mid-sixties. The visibility and viability
of those tours eventually coaxed reluctant amateur association members to vote to allow the
opening of tennis’s major tournament venues to professional players in 1968. Almost
simultaneously, sports marketers, professional promoters, and sports publishers popularized the
game into much the same form that it retains today.

13
Twenty years after his five-set victory over Schroeder at Forest Hills, Gonzales played an
even more grueling match. The All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club, which hosted the
Wimbledon Championships, had begun allowing professional players such as Gonzales into
Wimbledon the year before. In the 1969 Championships, Gonzales made the most of that
opportunity. On opening day the veteran professional met the talented Puerto Rican player
Charlie Pasarell, fifteen years his junior. Pasarell won the first set 24-22, more games than most
matches. The second set went fast to Pasarell. Gonzales refused to quit. He knew how to fight
because circumstances had forced him to fight his entire career. 13
Facing match points, Gonzales managed to break Pasarell’s serve and win the third set
16-14. Darkness descended on the court, and the umpire halted play until the next morning. “I
went home and I immediately flashed back to Forest Hills and the finals against Ted Schroeder
when I lost the first two sets and I tried to say to myself, well if I wasn’t nervous then why
should I be nervous now,” said Gonzales. As the oldest player in the tournament Gonzales
certainly had experience, but much of his career was filled with bitter experience. He “enjoyed
the competition” but he also continued to play because professional tennis “was still a source of
income” much needed. 14
His effort in the final two sets against Pasarell showed just how much of that history he
actually lived. After 111 games and two days of play, Gonzales won his eleventh game in the
fifth set to Pasarell’s nine games. That two-game margin gave Gonzales the final set 11-9 and the
match three sets to two. Five hours of play, 112 games for a first round match, one of 64 first
13
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round matches, six more rounds to go if Gonzales was to win the Wimbledon Championships.
“I’m one of the fortunate ones to know what a Bill Tilden was like, to know what a Don Budge
played like, to know what it was like on the early days of the pro grind, to know what it was like
at the beginning of the Open tournaments and to know what it’s like today,” said Gonzales. 15
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CHAPTER ONE
LAWN TENNIS AND THE LADY SUZANNE LENGLEN
European kings popularized the progenitor of the modern sport of tennis. Court tennis
began in continental Europe in the fourteenth century. Sometime before 1400, the game crossed
the channel from France to England and grew into a favorite pastime of English aristocrats in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The game spread in popularity as the nobility from emerging
nation-states aligned through marriages, treaties, and cultural missions. Nobles would square off
on either side of a three-foot-high net that divided a rectangular court seventy feet long by thirty
feet wide. The court sat indoors with walls on all sides. A wood paneled floor made for a soft
surface for the round felt-covered ball, roughly the size of a plum. Players swung racquets, which
were between three and four feet long and woven with string made of cat guts, to generate the
force that propelled the ball over the net and against the back or side-walls, or onto the floor on
the opponent’s side of the court. Before the ball bounced twice on their side of the net, a player
would redirect the ball with their oak or maple racquet back over onto the opponent’s side of the
net. A player earned a point for every failure of his opponent to hit the ball from their side of the
net before a second bounce. A stroke into the net would also result in a point for the opposing
player.
The nobility and their courtiers referred to court tennis as the “sport of kings” because of
the game’s popularity with the Bourbon dynasty in wealthy France. That popularity extended
beyond aristocrats so that by the early seventeenth century, an estimated 18,000 courts dotted the
15
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French nation. In their love for the game the French stood apart from other countries only in the
early date at which they embraced the game. By the second half of the sixteenth century, Italy
boasted courts of their own along with professional guilds to instruct the wealthy leaders of
Italian city states. Fifty years earlier, France’s first well known tennis professional, Pierre Gentil,
gave the same sort of instruction to Louis XIII in exchange for annual payment of 500 francs.
Gentil belonged to a court tennis professional’s guild that by the 1600s stretched back a full two
centuries—close to the recorded beginning of the game. The French King Charles IX gave royal
blessing to those guilds in 1571 when he issued monopoly protection to the Corporation of
Tennis Professionals who, over the following two decades, standardized the game’s rules. 1 Since
near its inception, then, court tennis played by aristocratic amateurs grew up with professional
players willing to share and exhibit their own talents for payment.
The blurred lines between amateurism, professionalism, and aristocracy in the formative
years of court tennis gave the game an illicit underground and criminal element. Royals such as
Duke of Lorraine, Henry VIII, and the Earl of Essex would strike their lesser or even their equals
with palm, ball, or racquet. Verbal abuse proliferated. On rare occasion, disputes on the court led
to death. The Italian artist Caravaggio, for example, recreated the violence of his Biblical
paintings when he murdered a court tennis partner over an on-court dispute. 2 The tennis court
thus became a mock royal court, where aristocrats could mete out rewards and punishments
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while minimizing the political repercussions that accompanied the real day-to-day decisions they
made for their realms.
Not surprisingly, European nobility created and kept for themselves most sports prior to
the nineteenth century. England famously executed peasants who hunted game on the lord’s
lands. The means and rights to race horses and chase foxes belonged exclusively to the wealthy
and landed. When the everyday people of the seventeenth century threw quoits, hurled weights,
or batted and fielded rounders, they did so under the watchful eye of the gentry who understood
the cathartic role leisure played in forming social cohesion and avoiding societal anomie. Up
until around 1900, sports could not survive without the financial sponsorship of elites because
rural people lived too far apart to congregate in numbers substantial enough to stage contests
funded by attendee admissions. In London and the few other cities sprinkled throughout England
and the European continent, the landed gentry’s grip on the leisure activities of the common
people loosened. The urban working class wagered on racehorses and fighting cocks, picked
champion pugilists in contests of brawn, and washed it all down with ales from local taverns.
Away from their social betters, working-class men cherished their amusements and forged a
masculine solidarity apart from and over their families. 3
The new and radical perspectives in the Enlightenment that swept through Europe did not
directly break down class barriers in recreation and sport. In fact, as European powers expanded
their colonial holdings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, settlers strove to recreate the
social structure they were familiar with by using leisure and games to reinforce the hierarchy in
3
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much the same way that they had back in Europe. 4 In the seventeenth-century Chesapeake, for
example, a rigid class divide between a small number of wealthy tobacco planters and a growing
number of indentured servants prompted social unrest that culminated in the class uprising
known as Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676. In the aftermath of the Rebellion, the tidewater gentry
understood that sharing a passion for horse racing and wagering could help them perpetuate their
class position and stave off further civil unrest. Their gamble paid off in spades, as they enjoyed
a remarkable degree of social stability and consolidation of power during much of the eighteenth
century. 5
In the eighteenth century Atlantic world, where people’s leisure time was largely shaped
by patriarchy and aristocracy, one of the most serious challenges to these old orders literally
played out on the court tennis court. The calls for liberty, equality, and fraternity that swept
revolutionary France in 1789 found clear expression on the very tennis court where Louis XVI
and the leading nobility of the First Estates swung their racquets. After having found the doors
barred to their entry by the king and his noble allies, members of the Third Estate representing
nearly the entire population of France took over the king’s court on July 20, 1789, where they
drafted The Tennis Court Oath, the manifesto outlining the political principles of what became
the French Revolution. 6 In a profound moment of historical irony, the sport most associated with
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monarchical and aristocratic power and privilege served as the setting for the radicalism that
most undermined the power and privilege of monarchies throughout the Atlantic world.
A second and in many ways more epochal revolution further eroded the aristocratic
stranglehold that gripped court tennis and other sports in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Industrialization, taking root first in eighteenth-century Britain, and then in America
and continental Europe, catalyzed the popularity of sports with a growing suburban and urban
working class. The specialization of labor, a hallmark of the industrial revolution, bled into
athletics where just as workers became increasingly skilled in fewer and fewer tasks, so too
athletes became more and more skilled in the rather limited skills of the one game they chose to
play. 7 For aristocrats whose wide-sampling of leisure activities marked their elite social status,
the focus on one sporting activity to the exclusion of all others smacked of class heresy. That
reluctance on the part of elites thus allowed some working-class men with far less time to spare
for training to become widely regarded champions in sports such as boxing, running, and football
in the first half of the nineteenth century. Class conflict continued to underpin sports throughout
the nineteenth century, however, and with the diffusion of Victorian culture throughout the
British Empire and America during the second half of the nineteenth century, a whole host of
new sports developed by and reserved for elites arose. Croquet, polo, and lawn tennis were three
sports that began on the private leisure grounds of British lords and ladies. 8 Of the three, only
lawn tennis became available to the middle and working classes—and then only after three-
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quarters of a century and a third revolution—the subject of a later chapter. In the interim, the
sport of tennis went green.
The first game of lawn tennis took place on the expansive green lawns of a Welsh
country estate in the late summer months of 1873. Major Walter Clopton Wingfield patented his
game in February 1874 with a rhomboidal rather than rectangular court demarcated by taped
lines and a triangular net strung between two posts hammered into the ground at a distance of
twenty-one feet apart. His patent proposed the spread of the game throughout the British Isles,
and he purported that his new design took tennis outdoors for the first time and thus “placed
within the reach of all” a game that only Europe’s wealthiest had previously enjoyed. His patent
approved, Wingfield wrote the earliest tennis rulebook, where in that pamphlet’s second and
third editions, he changed the name of the game to “sphairistikè” before he finally settled on
calling it lawn tennis in the fourth edition. In addition to patenting, writing the first rules, and
titling the game, Wingfield produced the first pieces of tennis equipment for commercial
consumption. His kits came in a wooden box large enough to fit four racquets, a net, two net
posts, two tennis balls, and a rule book. Favorable press coverage helped Wingfield sell over a
thousand of his tennis sets in the first year. 9 Britain’s colonial possessions meant the game, like
cricket, would spread quickly to most of the globe. 10
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The ways the game’s early players interacted with their racquets revealed the earlier roots
of lawn tennis and its subsequent spread after 1874. During the first few years of the sport, most
lawn tennis players held their racquets with a continental grip, which allowed for both forehand
and backhand strokes without moving the hand position of the index-finger knuckle-pad on the
second bevel of the racquet’s handle. 11 The grip’s name reflects the antecedents to the British
lawn tennis found in the games of racquets and court tennis originating on the European
continent. Played mainly in France, these games required participants to execute strokes off a
wall or close to the ground, therefore necessitating a grip that positioned the racquet at such an
angle so as to not scrape the ground. 12
Like the physical racquet, the early manufacture of tennis balls made plain the origins of
the global spread of tennis in British colonialism. The felt and stitching of the ball were all white.
The cost of the balls prohibited all but the ruling class from purchasing them. The balls even
carried names like the “Hard Court” ball that signified where a player should play and the
“Demon Ball” that signified what kind of player should hit with them. The manufacturers made
those linkages between British colonialism and British sports explicit in an advertisement for
Slazenger’s “Colonial Ball” made specifically for humid conditions in places such as “India,
Australasia, Africa, and South America, and indeed all Countries situated at a great distance
from where the Ball is made, and where extremes of temperature have to be contended with….Its
reputation, however, is world-wide, and it is an admitted fact that our Colonial Ball will retain its
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resiliency and wear longer than any other Ball produced.” 13 The players themselves hoped the
same could be said for their colonies.
The British Empire did not include the United States in the second half of the nineteenth
century, but during those decades cultural exchange remained strong. As the ranks of the middle
class swelled in Victorian America, a tension between a belief in personal industriousness and
the desire of members of the middle class to define their identities as separate from the growing
urban working class became more pronounced. Urban and rural recreation, restorative practices,
and leisure were major avenues in which people could promote their class distinctiveness. Prior
to the Civil War, most Americans never ventured much beyond their local county seat. The
improved transportation network and homestead legislation passed during the war stimulated
settlement west of the Mississippi River. More importantly, travelers west brought back fantastic
stories of the wonders of the frontier to share with people living in the Midwest and the East.
These stories in turn encouraged the growing middle class to travel on the developed rail-lines to
sites of natural beauty and a burgeoning network of camps and resorts in scenic locales. The
American vacation was born. 14
In the cities, the Gilded Age and Progressive Era were moments for the first massive
reorientation of the nation’s recreation space by newly trained planning experts. Frederick Law
Olmsted, the era’s foremost landscape architect, designed America’s most famous urban leisure
ground in New York City. Occupying 843 acres of Manhattan real estate, Central Park embodied
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the growing importance urban planners, municipal reformers, and city residents alike assigned to
restorative and open space in ever more crowded cities. Moreover, urban parks could mirror
class relationships found in neighborhoods, the workplace, and all walks of life. Central Park
itself featured no fewer than four separate entrances, each for a different rank of person entering
the park. In Chicago special promenading thoroughfares and private beaches were designated for
the city’s elites, while the city did not have a public swimming area along the lake until Lincoln
Park opened one in 1895. The city center of Denver, the boomtown of the mountains, featured
wide walking paths for the conspicuous walking of the city’s new money merchants. In the last
two decades of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century, cities
from Boston to Cleveland, and Kansas City to Los Angeles increased their park land by up to
600 percent, a massive reorientation of space catalyzed by a burgeoning middle class interested
in assuming some of the authority to plan and the pleasures to play previously enjoyed only by
elites. 15 Within the cities themselves, parks simultaneously met the leisure needs of everyone and
also reminded everyone of their particular position in society.
In a far more discreet way, urban elites had long hidden themselves away in private
men’s clubs. In the first third of the nineteenth century, private men’s clubs usually took the form
of militia companies. Some exceptions, such as New York City’s Union Club, were more social
in nature. Beginning in the 1840s and 1850s, cricket clubs sprouted along major thoroughfares
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and in wealthy pockets of cities such as Boston, Philadelphia, and New York. In these cities and
secondary cities such as Chicago, baseball also grew in popularity, especially with the cadres of
clerks and manual laborers who formed clubs and leagues comprised wholly of white-collar
workers and mechanics. 16 Shooting and hunting clubs such as the New York Sporting
Association had origins in the antebellum years, but by the late nineteenth century, game was
increasingly scarce in all but the farthest afield areas of the country, leaving wealthy men with
little alternative but to seek other recreational outlets. 17 These clubs shared a fondness for sport,
they helped to reinforce male solidarity, and they expressed the awareness of class boundaries
within urbanizing America. They also exposed the physical limits of recreation in the city.
Genteel resorts such as White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and Newport, Rhode
Island, recreated and even enhanced class solidarity among the wealthy and socially connected
when these people traveled away from home. Moreover, while most of the social clubs and
workplaces in Eastern cities practiced rigid gender segregation, resorts brought women and men
into daily contact on the croquet pitch, in the mineral spring, and on the dance floor. Starting
around the turn of the century and continuing through to the Great Depression, many members of
the urban working class increasingly looked to recreation outside the city in addition to the
amusements they enjoyed within. Recent immigrants and African Americans also considered
rural vacations viable, either by camping or renting a room in an inexpensive boarding house.
The oldest and most established resorts remained firmly in the hands of the upper and middle16
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class elites, a grip that tightened when the Depression eliminated the little extra income most
Americans relied upon to visit an attraction. 18
The same decades that witnessed the growth of scenic urban parks, secluded elite resorts,
and middle-class vacations also saw a remarkable upswing in betting and games of chance. The
Gilded Age gambler shot pool, rolled roulette, blew dice, and flipped cards, all the while
pursuing a pay-off through what historian Jackson Lears identified “providential arrangements of
rewards and punishments” not unlike the creed espoused by the era’s most notorious robber
barons. 19 In growing cities, gambling dens catered to men of all classes. Blueblood resorts also
indulged this ethos by building casinos and race tracks that catered to the wealthy people’s
appetites for cash and chance. In the millionaire’s playground of Newport, Rhode Island, for
example, craftsmen laid the last shingle on the magnificent Newport Casino in the summer of
1880, with the gaming tables opening to immediate acclaim. There the country’s wealthiest men
and women threw money hand over fist decade after decade until the music finally slowed with
the onset of the Great Depression. 20
At the same time that games of chance proliferated, a countervailing trend that
championed games of skill took shape. Mastery of mind and body through vigorous exercise had
origins in religious convictions such as the “muscular Christian” tradition that began in England
during the first decades of the nineteenth century before making it to America during the Civil
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War and in the post-bellum years. No reformer espoused exercise for everyone more vigorously
than Diclesian Lewis, who, during the 1860s and 1870s, championed a “New Gymnastics” with
men and women alike stretching limbs, grasping rings, lifting wooden dumbbells, and swinging
Indian clubs. Exercise advocates suggested that team sports such as football instilled young
white-collar workers with industrious habits that led to a more productive workplace. Children
too were encouraged to participate in structured play so that they could learn what it meant to be
an American. Living in squalid tenements, recent immigrants and many in the working class felt
the ability for self-betterment through athletics even more strongly. For these young men,
individual accomplishment in team sports such as baseball and individual sports such as boxing
served as a way to earn respect in a highly localized ethnic community, and, in rare cases, a
means of financial improvement for the most talented athletes. Throughout American cities,
ethnic athletic clubs proliferated. The farthest reaching consequences of the trend for masculine
martialism came in the realm of foreign policy, where leaders of the United States believed
outdoor exercise connected to the expansion of an American Empire. 21 Tennis stood within all of
these broader contexts of class, gentility, and leisure with one important exception. Women had
played the game of lawn tennis from the beginning, and they would continue to play as the game
grew in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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The conventional story of the spread of lawn tennis to America credits a woman. In under
a year Major Walter Wingfield’s sphairistikè had gone out from his Welsh garden party to the
British Caribbean with British military officers and colonial officials. In April of 1874, Mary
Ewing Outerbridge left Bermuda to return to the United States with a lawn tennis kit that
included racquets, balls, net posts, and a net. Stateside, she introduced the game to her brother,
A. Emilius Outerbridge, who directed the Staten Island Cricket and Baseball Club and arranged
for the marking of a section of the club’s grounds for a lawn tennis court. Over the next two
decades, the club grew from a dozen or so founders to six hundred members, many of whom
competed in the yearly handicapped tennis tournament that compensated for differences in player
skills by gifting weaker players a score advantage at the beginning of every game against
stronger players. Much like getting strokes in match-play golf based on players’ eighteen-hole
handicap, handicapped tennis tournaments were the norm rather than the exception in the late
nineteenth century because grinding players’ ability to the lowest common denominator rather
than forcing players to play up to the skills of the best player in their group encouraged the
growth of the game during its infancy. Over those same years, America’s well-to-do continued to
bring back lawn tennis kits from their transatlantic travels and mark off courts on the grounds of
their sporting clubs like the Germantown Cricket Club of Philadelphia, while in other instances
they built private courts on their private estates. 22
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By 1880 the popularity of the game with the leisure class had risen to a degree that
private courts and cricket clubs with a single lawn tennis court could no longer accommodate
demand. Tennis-specific clubs began to proliferate in American cities where a great density of
wealthy citizens with the disposable capital necessary to purchase and hold large swaths of real
estate in the quickly urbanizing United States could be found. This meant most lawn tennis clubs
concentrated along the Eastern seaboard of the Mid-Atlantic and New England. The West Side
Tennis Club was one of the first and most prominent clubs in the country. Founded in 1882, the
Club had expanded to two locations by 1904. The clubhouse was located in the Bronx at 238th
Street and Broadway where members could also play on several courts. Lady members had first
claim on the courts at 117th Street and Amsterdam Avenue on Morningside Heights. Men were
allowed to play there only through a formal petition to and with the approval from the clubs
governing board. Victorian women generally had more opportunities to play tennis than other
games offered by athletic clubs in America. 23
The Club capped total membership at 550, with the only stated requirements that a
potential member be older than sixteen and that two or more current members vouch for her.
While not overtly stated, in practice this application process effectively barred African
Americans from joining the Club, as the all-white membership listed on the club’s membership
rolls perpetuated year after year until at least the eve of World War I. A similar class barrier was
also in place, albeit with a little more malleability as players who proved themselves talented in
the many sanctioned tournaments held under the auspices of the Eastern Lawn Tennis
Association and Metropolitan Association sometimes found their names listed on the
23
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membership rolls regardless of their personal equity. The wrong color skin or the wrong family
kept someone out of the tennis club, but being a woman did not. 24
Women members were in fact a draw to elite tennis clubs. In August of 1890, along with
benches full of male and female spectators, an elderly woman sat on a porch and watched four
ladies play a doubles match on the lawn tennis court. The venue was the Brighton Beach Hotel, a
popular spot with the Manhattan Park Avenue crowd. The woman grew frustrated with the
women’s poor play and divided attention. She believed the players were too interested in the
glances of the young beaus watching the game; however, her scorn centered less on the
“attention” they sought and more on the cumbersome outfits that hamstringed their tennis
strokes. Their Victorian outfits fit so inappropriately that the servers used underhanded strokes as
the tight-fitting sleeves restrained the extension and pronation of the arm necessary for an
overhand service. “Hampered by graceful, but far too heavy skirts, big knotted sash, jaunty
jacket, and a hat which will not sit just exactly straight if the head is moved violently,” she
wrote, how could these ladies play any better? Her observations revealed the competing
ideologies of style and success in the sport of tennis. 25
Grace did not equal performance, but measures of both categories depended on whether
the players were women or men. F. A. Kellogg, a leading writer on recreation and editor of
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Outing Magazine, considered tennis an exceptional sport in three ways: first and foremost, tennis
was the “youngest of athletic” sports popularized by the British that had spread to much of the
world by the late nineteenth century; second, more than most sports, tennis espoused refinement
in the people who played the game and deserved to be played by the refined themselves—the
lawyer, the doctor, the university student, the clergyman, and the college professor; third and
most uniquely, the pioneers of tennis had from the beginning stressed the suitability of the game
for “the gentler sex” and had worked tirelessly to make sure women participated. 26 Thus, from
the earliest days of the sport as a game for ladies, play, fashion, and gender fused, and the
evolution of this relationship revealed the increased sexualization of women in the American
public sphere during the decades that birthed mass culture. That 1920s sexualization did not
establish professional tennis in its present form, but it did nudge the sport in that direction. Forty
years later, a new group of women players would complete the professionalization of the game.
What mattered in the meantime to tennis followers was that the game had always welcomed
women at the same time that it shunned playing the game for money. A woman disrupted that
balance and thus brought the innocent infancy of the game to an end.
Tennis player Suzanne Lenglen became a worldwide sensation during the first half of the
twentieth century. Through her style of play, choices of fashion, and indelible charisma, the
French champion was the game’s first sex symbol. Other women athletes such as the Texan Babe
Didrikson Zaharias and the Czech Eliška Junková competed hard as athletes in the twenties:
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Didrikson in track and field and seemingly every other sport; Junková in Grand Prix racing. 27
Yet neither held quite the charm and force of personality that Lenglen emanated to audiences.
Lenglen garnered a transnational following by winning five consecutive Wimbledon titles
between 1919 and 1924. Despite dominating the amateur game, Lenglen cared little for the allmale officials of the French Tennis Federation and International Lawn Tennis Federation,
headquartered in London, who dictated who could play and when, and even went so far as to
equate her newly realized freedom as a professional with “an escape from bondage and slavery.”
Her European reputation informed her 1926 American tour—the first professional tennis tour—
where fans and the press alike welcomed her as the most cosmopolitan of athletes. Such a high
profile leant special weight to Lenglen’s every word and deed. In an interview with the New York
Times, Lenglen stressed the importance of “control” if a young tennis player were to succeed in
the increasingly competitive game. 28 Her intended emphasis was on a player’s shot selection;
however, her remarks implied a broader definition of the individual’s command of self
constitutive with the groundswell of social and cultural changes associated with the “new
woman.” 29 As the first tennis player and the first woman to unashamedly make money off the
game in the most public of ways, Lenglen’s decision to turn professional symbolized the greater
role women assumed in the public sphere.
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Lenglen was born on May 24, 1899, the only child of a cycling-crazed French father and
an un-athletic French mother. While accounts differ in designating her birthplace—Paris or
Compiègne, France—Lenglen’s real home was the French Riviera, where she lived for much of
her childhood and teenage years. Her family had money, but not the kind of money gambled
every evening at the fashionable Casino de Monte-Carlo, where the wealthiest of Europe’s
wealthy gathered every winter and early spring during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. Charles (Papa) Lenglen both doted on and drove his daughter to live an active lifestyle
with gymnastics, outdoor play, bicycling, and dance. Living in Nice, Lenglen drew crowds of
tourists and passers-by who watched her play the juggling game diablo along the Promenade des
Anglais—performances her father encouraged. She enrolled in the Institute Massena to study
classical languages and dance. In 1910 Papa gave his daughter a toy tennis racquet that she
batted about with in the family backyard. The father wanted to see great potential in his elevenyear-old, however, and he soon gave her a full-sized racquet that she swung with such great
fluidity that by her third month of playing she earned second prize the Chantilly Lady’s Singles
Championship. 30
Most tournaments during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided a
tournament umpire who handicapped different players based on their records, experience, and a
quick observation of their play in order to facilitate greater competitiveness between two
unequally matched players. For example, in playing against women over twice her age, the
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young Lenglen might begin a match with a 30-Love advantage in every game against her more
seasoned opponent. Within two years, the handicapping swung in the opposite direction with the
now fourteen-year-old Lenglen beginning most of her matches down Love-30 each and every
game, after having assembled an impressive spate of wins that included the Picardy Regional
Championships and the Nice Lawn Tennis Championships. On the insistence of her father, the
Nice Lawn Tennis Club granted Lenglen an exception to the no-children rule, which then
allowed Lenglen to practice on courts frequented by many of the world’s best players who
wintered in the Riviera. 31
All the top tennis players in the late nineteenth century played on the French Riviera
because all players of any standing at that time came from enough wealth to make the trip to
France’s Mediterranean Coast in order to live the lifestyle of the world’s elite. The French Rivera
ran from Cannes east to the Italian border and included Cannes, Nice, Monaco, Monte Carlo, and
Menton. Prince Rainier and Princess Grace of Monaco took the first step in making this area into
a gaming destination, and François Blanc, the man responsible for building Hamburg’s gambling
reputation, planned and built the Casino on the Monte Carlo plateau that opened June 1, 1866.
This spurred other Riviera cities such as Cannes and Nice to build their own casinos. Luxury
hotels sprang up with the casinos along the Riviera coastline, making the Riviera into the highest
concentration of exclusive accommodations and playgrounds for the wealthy in the world. Not
known as a gambler, Britain’s Queen Victoria also helped to popularize the French Rivera as a
destination with British elite and with royals across Europe. Those same English and Continental
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Europeans of aristocratic backgrounds also enjoyed lawn tennis in the same years in the late
nineteenth century, but the strongly seasonal and wet weather in their home countries meant that
they could only play the game with any regularity for at most three months out of the year. 32
English revelers built the first French lawn tennis courts in the South of France at the
Beau Site Hotel of Cannes in the mid-1880s. Within the decade the popular Renshaw brothers,
Ernest and William, who had done so much to popularize lawn tennis in the United Kingdom,
had traveled regularly to Southern France to show spectators there what the pinnacle of tennis
play looked like. Around 1890, those in the American monied class would travel to the French
Riviera to mingle with European aristocrats, and top American tennis talent, names such as the
Doherty brothers, would accompany this migration. Both the good and the bad played on
manicured courts baked year-round by the warm Mediterranean sun, situated in grows of trees
and flowers, and scented by the mistral winds that blew herbs and lavender across Provence. 33
In 1912 many of those talented players took a train to Paris to compete in the first World
Hard Court Championships under the auspices of the embryonic International Lawn Tennis
Federation (ILTF). Representatives from twelve founding nations waited to meet at the Union
des Sociétés Françaises des Sports Athlétiques to officially form the first international governing
body of the sport of lawn tennis in March 1, 1913. The communication among different national
tennis societies and the exploratory committee for the first World Hard Court Championships in
1912 led directly to the formation of the ILTF. The French Championships had existed for men
since 1891 and for women since 1896, with matches played at either the Club Stade Français, the
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Cercle des Sports de l’Ile de Puteaux, or the Racing Club. From the 1880s through the 1900s, the
All England Championships, the French Championships, and the United States Championships
were, as their titles implied, tournaments for the best players within a particular nation. While lax
enforcement of the rule barring competitors with outside citizenship may have allowed the
occasional foreign national to compete in a country’s championships, the 1912 World Hard
Court Championships—played, confusingly given the Hard (asphalt) Court title, on the red clay
courts of the Stade Français in Saint-Cloud, Paris—was the first grand tournament that
encouraged international competition among the best amateur players throughout the world. The
World Championship series took place on grass, clay, and covered (indoor) courts. Alternating
the location and the surface of the tournaments fostered a feeling of congenial competition and
internationalism among amateurs. The rotation continued until 1923, when, in a successful effort
to attract the United States Lawn Tennis Association to join their organization, the ITHF made
the U.S. Championships a “major” tennis tournament. 34 With the acceptance of the Australasian
Championships as the fourth Major tournament in 1924, the ITHF had established the prime
amateur competitions in the sport—competitions whose specifics changed but whose
fundamentals did not until 1968.
From its first years, however, the World Hard Court Championships invited women to
compete against their peers from across the globe. At age fifteen, Lenglen entered the 1914
tournament and won handily over her twenty-seven-year-old countrywoman, Germaine Golding.
She seemed primed to rise, but the coming of the Great War halted tournament play in Western
Europe and put tennis far from most people’s minds. Top male amateurs entered military service,
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and top female amateurs assumed jobs that aided in their respective nations’ war efforts—though
Lenglen spent her War years practicing on the Riviera’s courts. 35 Wimbledon, meanwhile, went
uncontested for five summers. Ironically, one of the few people with tennis on their mind in 1918
and 1919 was one of the people most responsible for the outcome of the war. Vice-Admiral Sir
David Beatty of the Grand Fleet and the second-in-command of the British ships in their defeat
of the German navy at the Battle of Jutland—the largest naval battle as measured by vessel
tonnage in world history—was a major tennis enthusiast who did not let time on the high seas or
war prevent him from practicing. With the fleet stationed at Scapa Flow and the Firth of the
Forth in Scotland, Beatty constructed lawn courts for himself. When American sailors joined the
Grand Fleet in 1918, Beatty sought out American shipmen with tennis talent, eschewing the
traditional boundaries between officers and enlistees. Ensign Francis Townshend Hunter, fresh
from a successful tennis career at Cornell University, thus found himself taking a water taxi from
his battleship to the admiral’s tennis court for daily doubles matches. 36
For practically everyone besides the ensign and the admiral, play resumed after a fiveyear pause. In the first Wimbledon after the War, the defending Champion Dorthea Lambert
Chambers faced off against the young Lenglen, twenty-one years her junior. The two were a
study in contrasts. Chambers had won Wimbledon a handful of times; Lenglen was competing in
her first Championships. Chambers also held the Olympic gold medal, while Lenglen had never
played a match outside of France. Lambert was married with a family; Lenglen was essentially
still a teenager. These differences were not lost on fans and fellow competitors alike, but simply
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noting obvious differences belied the very real overlaps between the experienced Chambers and
the youthful Lenglen. 37 Chambers herself developed these linkages in her best-selling 1910 book
Lawn Tennis for Ladies, in which she skewered claims that young women should avoid athletics.
Chambers flatly dismissed the first argument—that women need pass on athletics as a health
precaution—as nonsense without merit. Addressing the claim that athletic participation made a
woman less of a woman, Chambers admitted that may be so if frailty constituted the essence of
“womanliness.” Citing a heroic example of the participation of women in battle, Chambers threw
out the simple gender binary of strong men and weak women in favor of a simpler
complementary relationship rooted not in fundamental difference but in what she saw as, at least,
a kernel of equality. With this belief in mind, Chambers brushed away the last major claim
against lawn tennis for women—that is, that athletics made women less sexually attractive. The
instant of a camera flash often caught both male and female athletes in a moment of unflattering
concentration, yet attendees in sporting events seemed to enjoy the play of women as much as
the play of men. Rather than shying away from competing hard, Chambers emphasized that
viewers might find “real pleasure” in watching women play not a dainty game but with “signs of
excitement,” lean “muscles,” and “her face set.” 38
The riveting 1919 final match certainly gave spectators much to feel good about.
Chambers held two match points which the youthful Lenglen fought off, eventually overcoming
Chambers 8-10, 6-4, 7-9 in the longest Wimbledon title match in the tournament’s history. The
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back and forth of the match was only part of the drama, however, as Lenglen’s bold fashion
departure turned heads and moved sports fashion in a bold new direction in line with that of the
new woman. 39 For her part, Chambers bristled at primped outfits that restricted movement,
instead stressing modesty and functionality in dress. Lenglen, by contrast, preferred outfits that
accentuated the movement of her body on the court rather than cloaking it. The debut of her
“half-calf” dress at Wimbledon tolled the death knell of the traditional ankle-length tennis dress.
And like her career itself, the ability to push sartorial boundaries arose from the European-wide
reorientation of gender boundaries following World War I. With the major European nations
mustering between 15.4 percent and 22 percent of their male populations, millions of women
took up war industries work in factories. Such labor required that many women literally wear
pants for the first time. The trouser became a legacy of the war for women who entered the
postwar period with a new horizon for work, in no small part due to the roughly 9.3 million
soldiers killed during the War (or between 20 percent and 40 percent of the military-eligible
male population killed, leaving roughly a third of Western European women widows), and a new
fusion of form and functionality in their dress. 40
Over the next seven years, Lenglen dominated tennis in Europe and carved a name for
herself as the first continental superstar in women’s sports. Spectators, the media, and fellow
competitors often likened her movement on the court to that of a ballerina. In so doing, they
projected their own assumptions of French national identity onto the Frenchwoman Lenglen.
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Fellow players like Kathleen McKane Godfree, comparing her to other ladies on the tour, noted
Lenglen’s “nice figure” accentuated by her revealing mid-calf dresses. Her focused grey eyes
were said to haunt opponents and bedazzle fans close to the courts where she strode. She always
wore white dresses and tops, occasionally a cardigan sweater, and the vibrant blue, orange, or red
chiffon scarf which held back her hair and punctuated her otherwise white attire became her
fashion staple. Remarkably, her popularity and sex appeal existed in spite of her widely
discussed plainness in terms of facial features. What actually enhanced her charm was the
combination of her athletic movement and her confident personality. Technically, she could play
every shot in what decades later professionals came to call an all-court game. “You never knew
what’s coming next,” remarked one opponent, discussing a match against Lenglen. This variety
of shot-making enthralled spectators, who felt they were watching a graceful and new creation
every time Lenglen stepped on the court and moved to hit the ball. But that same thrill of the new
also cut in a different direction as American audiences were quick to accuse Lenglen of Frenchfickleness. In 1921 the French Tennis Federation pressured Lenglen to travel to the United States
to compete against Molla Mallory in the American Championships. 41
Mallory, born Anna Margrethe Bjurstedt in Mosvik, Norway, on March 6, 1884, took up
tennis on the indoor but poorly lit courts of Christiania (Oslo). During her teenage years she
quickly established herself as the best player in Norway, woman or man, and Mallory played
regularly throughout Scandinavia including with the dignitary and tennis enthusiast Crown
Prince of Sweden Gustav Adolf. Like many women in the Nordic countries, Mallory trained “as
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a masseuse,” after which she went to London to give massages at private lawn tennis clubs and at
the same time work on her game. She also played tournaments in Germany before moving back
to Norway and competing as that country’s lone entry in the 1912 Olympics. In October of 1914
Mallory immigrated to the United States and worked as a masseuse. Living in New York City,
Mallory watched the players compete in the Men’s National Tennis Indoor Championships held
at the Seventh Regiment Armory and told herself that she belonged on the tennis court again.
She entered the 1915 Women’s National Tennis Championships, the most important women’s
tournament in the United States, hosted every year since the event’s inception in 1887 by the
Philadelphia Cricket Club. In the finals, Mallory defeated Hazel Hotchkiss Wightman—a threetime event champion, the most dominant American player up to that point, and an outspoken
advocate for the presence of women in competitive public sports. Mallory built on her national
title in the coming years by winning tournament after tournament across the United States. 42
Since she had not played in Europe since 1914, though, questions remained on both sides of the
Atlantic who the best player in the world was following the end of World War I.
Having won Wimbledon in 1919, 1920, and 1921, and the Olympics held in Antwerp in
1920, Lenglen still had not answered that question to the satisfaction of American spectators
when she undertook her first trip to play tennis in the United States in the late summer of 1921.
Her visit caused more confusion for herself and for tennis enthusiasts than it clarified, because
the seemingly unbeatable champion in London, in Paris, and on the Riviera lost in the most
embarrassing of ways to Mallory. With 8,000 New Yorkers filling the West Side Tennis Club
stadium court beyond capacity on August 13, 1921, for the Frenchwoman’s second-round match
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against Mallory, Lenglen quit not long into the match as the disgusted crowd howled “cough and
quit” to the shocked champion. Lenglen’s refusal to play on fit with an American stereotype of
French athletes and by extension French people who surrendered to defeat when confronted with
the slightest challenge rather than persevere in the face of adversity. British audiences likewise
struggled to move past hackneyed opinions of the Frenchwoman Lenglen. In a particularly
galling case, a Wimbledon referee scheduled Lenglen to play a cakewalk singles match in the
1926 Championships immediately before a competitive doubles match. Lenglen messaged from
the locker room that she would play the doubles first and the singles after, or would need more
rest in between the matches. When she arrived early for her doubles match she found an irate
official, an angry crowd, and a disappointed monarch in Queen Mary, who had not received
Lenglen’s request for a postponement of her singles match. The hissing crowd forced Lenglen to
retreat to the locker room, where she broke down in tears and decided not to play Wimbledon
ever again. 43 As an international amateur champion, Lenglen still answered to the nationalistic
perceptions people expected her fulfill.
Lenglen proved far more successful in challenging the prevailing parameters of the
female breadwinner in the West during the 1920s. Her 1926 American tour marked a turning
point in both professional tennis and the history of women in sports. The tour opened on
Saturday October 9, 1926, at 8:30 p.m. at New York City’s Madison Square Gardens—just three
short months after Lenglen had sworn off the grandest amateur tournament, Wimbledon. People
thought she was a beauty, aside from her buckteeth. Photographs of Lenglen had long found their
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way to America, to the delight of fans in the United States. Seeing her live, with her body in
motion, was even better. While Lenglen’s talent made sure people paid for a ticket, Charles C.
Pyle made sure that Lenglen and her five fellow players had a stadium to fill. 44
Working in the entertainment business as a theatre proprietor in the teens and twenties in
Champaign, Illinois, Pyle used his connections at the University of Illinois to convince the
standout running-back Harold “Red” Grange of his earnings potential in professional football. In
1925 Pyle steered Grange into a lucrative contract with the Chicago Bears that earned the
“Galloping Ghost” and his manager Pyle $100,000 between the two of them in only four months
of professional football. At the same time Grange’s career took off, Pyle also experienced
financial troubles in founding the New York Yankees football team, his unsuccessful bid to bring
his franchise into the National Football League, and his subsequent founding of the American
Football League that floundered in its first and only season in 1926. 45
Pyle’s move to professional tennis in the summer of 1926 was an attempt to regain
momentum after his football franchise failure. His tennis venture succeeded in that it secured his
public perception as a visionary sports promoter willing to take on and defeat conservative
elements in America’s athletic associations. As he had with his Red Grange California Tour,
Pyle relied on the Hollywood entertainment promoter William “Champ” Pickens to convince
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Lenglen to agree to tour the United States as a professional. Pickens met with Pyle in Chicago to
make clear that they better have at least $15,000— unheard of pay for a single athlete at the
time— to persuade Lenglen to turn professional, which Pyle readily accepted. Pickens apprised
officials of the United States Lawn Tennis Association of his and Pyle’s plans, only to face a stiff
rebuke from secretary Edward Moss, who explained that the Association would do what they
could to undermine any efforts by anyone outside the USLTA for Lenglen to play tennis in
America. Threats only emboldened Pyle, Pickens, and the press with newspaper editorials
stoking excitement among the American and European public by suggesting that Pyle would pay
Lenglen a quarter of a million dollars for her tennis and Pickens would produce another
$100,000 for movie contracts. In France Pickens promised Lenglen Broadway roles, ghostwritten
newspaper columns, readings for her novel The Love Game, and his best efforts for a Hollywood
studio contract. The two settled on $200,000 for the United States tennis tour with any additional
money Lenglen earned from outside entertainments going directly to her. Then the back-andforth with Lenglen’s entourage began, and Pickens needed Pyle to finalize the arrangement. 46
Pyle quickly regained his reputation for flair that he had lost during the failed American
Football League plan by pioneering the public contract signing of star athletes. He did this by
personally traveling to France in July 1926 where he dotted the agreement with Lenglen.
Newsreel crews and print journalists surrounded Lenglen and Pyle sitting in a Pourville, France,
garden as the athlete and her new promoter painstakingly read over the contract point by point.
For Pyle, the signing presented him to the world as the diligent manager more akin to a business
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executive than the less scrupulous entertainment promoters associated with prizefight gambling,
seedy theatre reviews, and jazz nightclubs. As a player forsaking the popular amateur
tournaments for an upstart professional circuit, Lenglen’s image did not come across as well
during the signing, foremost because many people thought that with her turn to the heretofore
unknown professional competition, they would not get to see her perform on the court. Pyle’s
outsider status as an American who planned for most of the tennis to take place in the United
States further stoked the anxieties of Europe’s tennis society. On an unspoken level, Lenglen’s
paragraph-by-paragraph study of her professional contract projected an image of her as a capable
breadwinner more than able to earn a living from her trade and look after her own finances rather
than relying on the patronage of wealthy tennis fans. By signing the contract, Lenglen announced
in the most public of ways her willingness to play tennis not on someone else’s terms but on her
own. 47
Lenglen opined forcefully that financial remuneration primarily motivated her to forsake
amateur competition for Pyle’s professional tour. She complained that having dominated her
fellow opponents while at the same time having commanded the public’s attention when it came
to tennis for the last dozen years, she deserved some of the “millions of francs” that French
Tennis Federation, the International Tennis Federation, the British Lawn Tennis Association, and
the United States Lawn Tennis Association all collected off the sweat of her back. That labor
helped Wimbledon bring in $150,000 in gate receipts alone for the 1926 Championships while
the Riviera tournaments that Lenglen headlined leaned on her star appeal even more heavily to
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get people into the stands. She also paid fees to play tournaments for which she received no
prize-winning compensation. While she had certainly accepted more money by covert means
than the $5,000 lifetime earnings she admitted, Lenglen would undoubtedly have earned a great
deal more had amateurism not prohibited competitive tennis from meeting a player’s fiduciary
duty to themselves. Lenglen argued that tournament and association officials were the ones who
broke their responsibility to tennis by charging high ticket prices for tournaments in order to
subsidize their private clubs. She suggested they put the money back into growing the game for
everyone rather than for a select few who had the money or the connections to belong to those
clubs. With Pyle’s help, the Frenchwoman appealed to Americans’ deep-seated distrust of
inherited wealth, a shared heritage of democratic “revolution,” and a belief in the “equality” of
opportunity in order to justify professional tennis where it had previously not existed. Spurned
by the European tennis establishment at the 1926 Wimbledon Championships, Lenglen expected
America to reward her talent and industriousness as Europe had not. 48
The reality of the professional tour quickly confronted her with the challenges of holding
a primary stake in a fledgling sports enterprise. As the headliner of the event, her performance
mattered more for the bottom line of the tour than that of her fellow professionals Mary Browne,
Vincent Richards, Paul Feret, Harvey Snodgrass, and Howard Kinsey—who rounded out the
tour. The match format varied slightly across the dozen cities the troupe barnstormed across, but
the general program pattern featured Richards versus Feret in an opening singles match, followed
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by Lenglen versus Browne in the main event singles match, next a men’s doubles of Richards
and Snodgrass vs. Kinsey and Feret, and a mixed doubles finale pairing Lenglen and Richards
vs. Browne and Kinsey. Such a schedule, if the matches went to a third set of play, could mean
more than four hours of tennis for spectators who paid between $2.00 and $5.50 to watch the
professionals compete in an indoor and rowdy environment far removed from the gentility of the
private clubs that hosted the U.S.L.T.A’s amateur lawn tennis tournaments. Association officials
would not countenance Pyle’s tour and did what they could to hamstring it by encouraging their
members not to attend and by forbidding their own chair umpires and linesmen from calling the
matches. Pyle solved the logistical problem of finding venues that allowed his group to play by
an inventive homemade transportable tennis court that workers could lay on the floor of any
municipal auditorium or city armory; nevertheless, he often had to scramble at the last minute to
find officials capable of keeping the tennis on track. 49
Lenglen’s talent and temperament posed the bigger problem for the tour promoter Pyle.
Night after night she simply proved not just better than but much better than Mary Brown. With
steady and sensationalized coverage from the newspaper sportswriters, the professionals moved
from New York, to Toronto, back stateside to Baltimore, then to Boston, Philadelphia, Montreal,
Buffalo, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Columbus, Chicago, Denver, Victoria, Vancouver, Seattle,
Portland, San Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, Havana, Miami,
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Hartford, Newark, and New Haven, with the tour’s final engagement at Providence, Rhode
Island, on February 14, 1927. But that same coverage meant that as Lenglen won every single
match against Browne—thirty-eight in total by the end of the tour—and with notable exceptions,
such as Los Angeles, where around 7,000 fans crowded the Olympic Auditorium for the
December 28th match—Lenglen’s brutalizing of Browne contributed to the steady decline of
attendance and gate receipts as the tour progressed. As the tour began in the South and Florida,
Richards, the second draw-card for the tour, fell ill and began sitting out most of his matches,
while Lenglen followed suit as the barnstormers entered their final Mid-Atlantic and Northeast
leg. While past champions helped fill the seats in tournaments, a professional tour that paired the
same players against one another night after night meant less drama than the more wide-open
tournament draws. That fans continued to show up in the thousands even though the results of
the night’s matches had become a forgone conclusion exemplified that people agreed to pay not
to see competitive tennis but to be entertained by the bodies on what amounted to a stage. In
giving that sort of performance, Lenglen was truly unrivaled. 50
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Newsreels showed Lenglen moving like a dancer when she played on the tennis court. A
BBC newsreel put Lenglen’s accomplishments as a sportswoman and sports-growing impact in
society on a par with the work done by women reforming gender practices in work, healthcare,
education, and politics. One spectator at Lenglen’s matches also hinted that fans enjoyed seeing
Lenglen’s body in movement because her strides often produced unclothed views of her je ne
sais quoi, to the delight of those seated courtside. Having observed most of Lenglen’s matches,
Ted Tinling recalled that Lenglen’s breasts appeared outside her dress with such regularity that
male spectators had given them the nicknames of “Mary” and “Jane.” 51
Lenglen’s cavalier approach to a predominantly conservative sport and her blasé attitude
toward conventional dress and codes of conduct on and off the court set an example few of her
contemporary competitors emulated. Far less flashy but a far better embodiment of the prevailing
notion of amateurism was the famed American Champion May Sutton Bundy, who won her first
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Southern California Championship in 1900 at the age of fourteen. Twenty-eight years later at the
age of forty-two, Sutton won her last Southern California Championship. Over the course of her
three-decade-long career, she won the United States Championship in singles and doubles as
well as lifting the Wimbledon singles trophy twice. She never thought about turning
professional, and outside of a little teaching that she despised, Sutton never accepted any direct
money for her tennis skills. With financial support from her family, a career as an amateur
worked fine. Moreover, Sutton, as did all the very top American amateurs, accepted the
USLTA’s travel funding for competition in Wimbledon and on the Wightman and Davis Cup
teams. In the USLTA, experience meant as much as or more than compensation because it
offered cultural vistas otherwise closed to teenagers or players in their early twenties. Sutton
recalled, all with fondness, the ocean liner cabin for the Atlantic crossing, a hotel room for
several weeks in London, meals covered, and the possibility for additional European destinations
if the match schedule aligned—on balance, a real degree of encouragement for women athletes
not found in other sports at the time. In 1905, that seemed a pretty sweet deal for the teenager
from Southern California. In a related vein, Sutton agreed that the ankle-length dresses worn by
the ladies into the twenties seemed a bit silly but were not worth fussing over because they did
not affect her ability to move on the court. This more traditional approach to women in tennis
and tennis in general would encounter resistance from those that followed Lenglen’s example,
but would remain more or less intact for the next two decades. 52
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Thanks to Lenglen, elements of the stodgy paternalism in the administration of the game
came under increasing fire in the early thirties while traditionalists tried with greater difficulty to
remain resolute. Women and on-court fashion again became one of the chief areas of contention
when reports came from across Europe in 1930 that Lenglen had designed what the newspapers
called “Suzanne Shorts” that sat about an inch higher than the kneecap. 53 American National
Champion Helen Hull Jacobs abandoned the tennis dress and courted controversy when she
embraced these Bermuda shorts in the 1933 United States Championship at Forest Hills. Played
in close proximity to the 1933 Wightman Cup match contested in New York, the English team
captain Tim Horn refused to allow his players to wear shorts despite Jacobs’s insistence that
“they’re so comfortable” and eliminated the not-infrequent occurrence of skirts blown up headhigh on windy days. If modesty mattered, shorts proved the preferred sartorial statement. That
reasoning did not persuade the English Wightman Cup handlers, and the British ladies wore
dresses in 1933. A year later, though, this time playing in London, the English team wore shorts.
Needless to say, these shorts were far from the Lycra form-fitting styles popularized in the 1970s
and worn by female athletes the world over since then. What came later, however, in no way
diminishes the sex appeal of the Wightman Cup players’ Bermuda-style shorts to contemporary
audiences in the mid-thirties and forties. From then on, women players from across the world
often opted for comfortable shorts over the more restrictive dresses. 54
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Pushing fashion boundaries was just one of the ways women players expressed their
solidarity across national and against the traditional paternalistic elements of the national tennis
establishments. Another important way were informal mentor and mentee relationships outside
of official tennis federation channels. Here as elsewhere, Lenglen set the trend. During her years
of competitive play, Lenglen pummeled players so mercilessly that her opponents bragged
among themselves about how many points rather than how many games, sets, or matches they
had won against the Frenchwoman. But after her retirement from professional tennis, Lenglen
proved far less self-absorbed and more nurturing of fellow tennis players than sportswriters and
spectators had given her credit for. Helen Hull Jacobs recalled with fondness hours after hours of
rallying in Paris with a retired Lenglen, who helped Jacobs reach top form. Even in practice,
Lenglen “was really an experience,” Jacobs said. In the minds of International Tennis Federation,
French Tennis Federation, and United States Lawn Tennis Association officials, once a
professional always a professional, meaning these practices flagrantly violated their rules
prohibiting the mixing of amateurs and professionals. For Lenglen and Jacobs, these practices
were nothing of the kind; rather, they were the sharing of wisdom from the revered retired
champion to the heir apparent—sisterhood and solidarity among sportswomen. 55
Lenglen looked to share her tennis expertise with an even wider audience when she
partnered with the print division of the world’s leading sporting goods manufacture—A. G.
Spalding & Bros. In 1920, American Sports Publishing Company distributed Lawn Tennis for
Girls, featuring an inside cover photo of Lenglen dressed glamorously and provocatively with
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her bandeau and wrapped in a fur cloak with jewelry and piercing eyes. The firm Albert
Goodwill Spalding was founded in Chicago in 1876 and continued to grow after his 1915 death
by extending their women’s athletic market share by converting sections of their flagship
department store on Fifth Avenue in New York City into lady’s athletics. They also built
“beautiful women’s sports specialty” stores on 211 South State Street in Chicago as well as
throughout the Midwest, mid-Atlantic, New England, and Pacific Coast. Lenglen became an
important poster child for Spalding’s push into women’s sports, although when it came to
athletic wear, the company recommended ladies dress more conservatively than what Lenglen
actually wore on the court. Women should follow her advice, though, on the game itself, urged
Spalding. In fact, the preface to the American edition of Lawn Tennis for Girls claimed that
Lenglen knew more about tennis than any man, praise supported by the convenient omission—
from the book’s introductory biography—of the male teaching pros Lenglen regularly trained
with on the Riviera courts. Her dad taught her a little tennis, and she taught herself the rest, the
personal history read. The remainder of the book described Lenglen’s playing philosophy, stroke
mechanics, and match strategy. All of that was orthodox for the time except for the particular
stress Lenglen placed on movement—a far more forward looking emphasis that future
champions took to heart. 56
Lenglen also conveyed her accumulated tennis wisdom to men. The subordination of the
conventional male realm of athletics by a woman champion elucidated the femininity of tennis in
reciprocity to the genesis of most other organized sports. Widely considered the greatest student
56
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of top players’ technique and tactics, the French champion René Lacoste warmly recollected that
he in fact benefited from the tutelage of Lenglen when it came to confronting challenging
opponents. Lacoste enjoyed a storied transatlantic rivalry with the American Bill Tilden
throughout the twenties in part because Lenglen herself had grown familiar with Tilden’s game
from her professional tour through the States in 1926. Afterwards she shared ways to exploit
Tilden’s weaknesses with her compatriot. Lacoste took her advice to heart and gained better
results against the American before the Musketeer retired from competitive play in 1930
following his French Championship victory. He went on to control a sportswear multinational
after having created the iconic alligator logo that adorned the ubiquitous polos bearing his
name. 57
Male players even decided to forsake their own amateur careers in favor of professional
tennis because they believed that their own financial situations could benefit from Lenglen’s
appeal, which was raising the profile of professional tennis. Vincent Richards, Paul Feret,
Harvey Snodgrass, and Howard Kinsey all felt that way enough to tour with her, but in that
decision they failed to calculate what would happen to them when Lenglen decided she did not
want to travel across America anymore. From the beginning of the tour in October 1926, Pyle
had promised his players would travel across the Atlantic to bring professional tennis to
Europeans. By the start of 1927 that pledge had become impossible to fulfill because of mistrust
between Pyle and Lenglen. For her part, Lenglen was more than ready to return to Europe, but
not necessarily to play tennis for Pyle. For his part, Pyle had grown tired of Lenglen’s personal
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demands and the growing number of followers drawn into her inner circle, each with an opinion
on what was best for Lenglen. So on February 16, 1927, Pyle simply announced he would not
take his players for a European tour and that he would no longer promote professional tennis in
any capacity. Whether or not he had taken any concrete steps to make a European tour a reality
did not seem to matter to Lenglen, who took the $100,000 she had made on the tour and left for
France less than a week after the conclusion of the tour. Richards earned around $35,000,
Browne around $30,000, Snodgrass, and Kinsey likely much less—at least certainly when
compared to the $100,000 Pyle cleared for himself on the tour. The first professional tennis tour
in the world had grossed around $500,000, but that came at a big cost for all the players who
could never go back and play the amateur tournaments or compete for their country in the Davis
Cup. Lenglen’s departure left Vincent Richards to lead the few professionals into the early
1930s. He did what he could in founding an association of professional players in the fall of 1927
to organize the few tennis players unable to abide by the USLTA’s strict amateur code, and he
organized America’s first professional tennis tournament. Yet more or less by himself, Richards
did not have the ability to more than annoy the USLTA officials, who knew that without a
Lenglen, amateur tournaments would continue to attract more spectators than the upstart
professional events. 58
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a New York City-based coffee company
published a series of trade cards that looked at the sporting traditions of fifty different nations.
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France received the credit on the cards for popularizing tennis, even though the story of the early
years of tennis was more complicated: French developed the progenitor of lawn tennis in court
tennis; the British transformed lawn tennis into a recognizable form that then spread across the
Crown’s colonial possessions; the first professional tennis tour of any consequence took place in
the United States with a Frenchwoman as the headliner. What the card got right was that the
sporting history of France, at least as the rest of the world viewed it, had an element of
“pleasure” constitutive of that broader French cultural characteristic. 59 Lenglen appeared to take
pleasure in playing tennis, and the people that watched her took pleasure in her play. Her game,
her fashion, her personality, her willingness to perform in the most public of ways, Lenglen
masculinized the feminine sport of tennis in the twenties and set the stage for the development of
the modern sport in the next several decades. Tennis began as a sport that welcomed women, and
it was a woman who did more than anyone else to bring the unwelcome professionalism into the
sport.
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CHAPTER TWO
TENNIS AMATEUR ASSOCIATIONS ON AMERICAN SHORES
From the 1880s through the 1920s women played tennis in numbers that rivaled men and
surpassed female participation in any other spectator sport. Women headlined the most
publicized competitive matches in the world during the same decades, but men ran the private
clubs and tennis associations that controlled the game. In America the exercise of that control
formed what amounted to a tennis establishment guided by an absolute commitment to a precept
of amateurism in the game that prohibited money in any form from finding its way to the
players—be they women or, increasingly, men. 1 These dyed-in-the-wool men of various genteel
tennis clubs could not separate their love of the game from their love of near total control over
the game. They were the principal foes of Suzanne Lenglen, C.C. Pyle, and Vincent Richards, all
of whom had and continued to push for professional tennis. These men outlasted those
challenges and kept firm control of the game through the 1930s. Maintenance of that control
came at the cost of willfully allowing more money into the amateur sport at the same time that
they attacked professionalism of the game in all its guises.
Lawn tennis competition at and between urban athletic clubs and suburban country clubs
was less well organized than cricket and baseball competitions because of the comparative
novelty of the game compared to those older sports. That changed on May 21, 1881, when
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representatives from prominent athletic and country clubs sat in the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New
York City and charted the United States Lawn Tennis Association. 2 The principal reason those
thirty-four East Coast and mid-Atlantic clubs agreed to meet in 1881 owed to a tennis match, or
rather lack of a match, the year before. After visiting the Staten Island Cricket and Baseball Club
for an interclub meet, Bostonians James Dwight and R.D. Sears refused to compete in singles
when they found the balls the New Yorkers proposed to play with were far short of what they
played with in New England. Other equipment differences concerned the nets, which varied in
height, and the shape of the court, which varied in size. Different clubs even counted score in
different ways. Staten Island Cricket and Baseball Club secretary Outerbridge realized that
without a codification of rules and equipment, interclub matches would suffer, and without
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interclub matches, the game had little chance of growing as it had in England and throughout the
British Empire. 3
Outerbridge actually found the garnering of support from different clubs easy. Their
boards of directors shared membership rolls that resembled one another’s in terms of wealth and
community standing. “I knew many of the members and some of the officers and directors of
most of the clubs where lawn tennis was then being played, as most of them were cricket clubs,
and I had been playing matches on their grounds as a member of the Staten Island Cricket Club,
which practically every year visited Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore to play such matches,”
said Outerbridge. Urban elites along the Eastern Seaboard showed that shared leisure time
reinforced their social and commercial networks when they quickly replied that they would
attend Outerbridge’s Fifth Avenue Hotel meeting. Chaired by the Staten Island Cricket and
Baseball Club’s George Scofield, the attendees ratified the constitution that created the United
States Lawn Tennis Association in under half an hour. Most of the rest of the meeting then
addressed the standardization of equipment and rules: the ball would now weigh between 1.87
and 2 ounces and have a diameter between 2.5 inch and 2.56 inches; all clubs would use the rules
developed by the All-England Club at Wimbledon village that the USLTA would distribute in
pamphlet form; and the USLTA Executive Committee would decide further tournament policy as
the association grew. Fifteen additional clubs joined the association via proxy. 4
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Four years later the Association had grown to include fifty-one member clubs who
competed in association-sanctioned tournaments and a yearend Championship. By 1893, 107
clubs belonged to the Association with each and every one of them subscribing to the amateur
ideal first discussed at the Fifth Avenue Hotel first annual meeting. At the same time the
Executive Committee made Music and Drama: A Journal Devoted to Sport, Music, the Drama,
and Other Things the official publication of the Association. While that publication never really
covered tennis, resulting in the Association quickly finding another publication to serve as the
USLTA’s official organ, such short-lived action nonetheless revealed the degree to which the
society types who ran the USLTA thought of tennis not so much as a competitive sport but as
just one other leisure activity on their social calendars. 5
In May 1882, at their first annual meeting, association members concerned themselves
with the boundaries of amateurism and professionalism in the fledgling sport of lawn tennis.
“None but amateurs shall be allowed to enter for any match played by this Association,”
members voted emphatically. Such a ruling positioned who and who was not an amateur in the
early moments of the organization, both a symbolic and practical measure of the seriousness with
which USLTA officials meant to patrol the social boundaries of the sport. The top of the
organization, the Executive Committee of which Dr. James Dwight was elected president,
reserved for themselves the ability to rule on the issue of amateur status. Throughout the end of
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the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, the most senior members in the association
would use their changing definition of amateurism as the gatekeeper that opened the sport of
tennis to some and kept it closed to others. 6
In their first decade of existence, the USLTA laid out five basic provisions that if violated
forfeited a player’s amateur status and therefore removed the guilty member from the
association. First, the guidelines prohibited a member from accepting any money in exchange for
playing tennis for the enjoyment of others. Second, a member could not compete against a
professional in any sort of public match that involved any recognition of a winner and a loser
even without the involvement of money. Third, the teaching of tennis, or any other sport, fitness,
or health routine for that matter, was prohibited. Fourth, a player associated with a tennis club, as
all players were in the 1890s, could not remain a member of a club if the player’s association at
the respective club benefited the club or the player financially in any way. Fifth, a player could
not work for a sporting goods company because of his or her skills in tennis or any other sport.
Immediately members challenged the amateur requirements with questions such as whether or
not a sports writer, employed by a newspaper but participating as a player in an association
tournament, violated provisions against material “gain” from tennis, and in their replies,
Association leaders such as James Dwight set the precedent of a hard-line policy against money
in tennis with the flexibility on the Association’s part to enforce that prohibition selectively. 7
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Criticism of the USLTA’s draconian stance against any money in the sport grew as the
game grew. The most effective critique labeled the association as classist, a claim that prompted
defensiveness from Executive Committee members. In 1899, Valentine Hall, the USLTA
secretary, addressed that criticism on behalf of the Association, when he published Lawn Tennis
in America, whose central section not only defended the amateurism of the game but celebrated
the aristocratic “parentage” that lawn tennis in the United States enjoyed from European court
tennis. Hall went beyond royalty to draw connections between Greek and Roman Republican
virtues and the character of the USLTA player-leadership who had popularized the game in
America: Richard Sears, a Boston Brahmin and 1880 Newport Champion; Henry Warner
Slocum, Jr., son of a Union General of the same name and reigning national champion; Robert
Livingston, born into a dynasty of political leaders and financiers, himself an active member of
the New York Stock Exchange at the same time he served the USLTA; Dr. James Dwight, a
scion of the game both in America and during his lengthy holidays in England; Howard Taylor,
Harvard graduate and distinguished lawyer; and a dozen other players of tennis talent and
equally high social standing who ran the Association. Taylor’s legal background prompted Hall
to solicit a treatise on amateurism from the lawyer reprinted in full in the book. Taylor reminded
readers that tennis had grown as a sport with laws against professionalism on the books, and that
to loosen the amateur codes by obfuscation or by outright elimination would dilute the purity of
tennis to the level of some other sport in the eyes of the public both at home and abroad. If
people from his own privileged status faced the temptation of accepting free balls, racquets, or
hotel rooms, how then could people from middle-class or working-class backgrounds resist such
temptations? Keeping tennis reserved for “gentlemen,” Taylor suggested, would actually protect
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“the growing hybrid class” from the corrupting nature of money in sports. The amateur rules, in
the eyes of the Executive Committee at least, expressed the benevolent paternalism USLTA
officials believed they exhibited. These men wished to extend the social and class positions they
learned and practiced in the business world to that of the tennis world. 8 But conflict was
inevitable; this was the Gilded Age, after all.
Conflict between the United States and Spain almost killed tennis in America before it
began. While the growing popularity of golf had taken some of the wind out of tennis’s sails in
the mid-1890s, the war fever that followed the sinking of the Maine on February 15, 1898, led
association membership to shrink from 106 clubs to 44 clubs. Just as internationalism in the form
of conflict negatively affected tennis in the United States, so too did internationalism in the form
of cooperation positively affect tennis at the beginning of the twentieth century. The first
internationalism in tennis came back in 1885 after the USLTA leadership approved allowing
foreign players to participate in the United States National tournament, yet the important moment
did not come until 1897 when the St. Louisan turned Harvard tennis player Dwight Davis first
voiced willingness to financially sponsor a visit from England’s top players to the United States
to compete against America’s best. That offer went unaccepted on the part of the British Lawn
Tennis Association, although three British players did travel to the United States on their own
after they received an offer to play not in a team match but in the United States Championship at
Newport, Rhode Island. The international players finished third, fourth, and fifth. 9
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The excitement that private visit caused convinced Davis to redouble his efforts to
inaugurate an international team competition between the British and American players. Davis
further realized that such private tours would continue by foreign players unabated; better for the
Association to sponsor them so that they could control the game and keep hold of what would
likely prove a revenue source for the USLTA. To accomplish that objective, in 1900 Davis
donated a silver trophy first called the “International Challenge Cup” but later named after its
bequest the Davis Cup. The hardware incentivized the British Lawn Tennis Association to send
Arthur Gore, Ernst Black, and Roper Barrett to play the one-time Harvard players Holcombe
Ward, Malcolm Whitman, and Davis for the Cup. Contested on the lawns of the Longwood
Cricket Club in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, the Americans swept the British. The real test
came not on the court but in the second match between the British Isles and the United States.
That tie took place in 1902 at the Crescent Athletic Club in Brooklyn, New York, with the
Americans again victorious. Attendance was excellent at both matches, and the second Challenge
could have gone either way. A rivalry blossomed, with the British winning their first Davis Cup
in 1903—a victory that solidified the longevity of the competition. The Cup single-handedly
enlarged the USLTA’s treasury from $271.04 in February of 1900 to $2,458.48 in 1904.
Association membership likewise climbed to eighty-three clubs and twelve sub-associations by
1900. Attendees at the USLTA’s 1901 Annual Meeting reached the consensus that the Davis
Cup “put lawn tennis on a higher plane and assured its permanency as a sport.” 10
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That elevated position seemed constantly under threat with no foe scarier than the
fledgling sporting goods industry. The explosive growth of the first truly national market for
consumer goods in the final two decades of the nineteenth century left the USLTA fearing that
“dealers” might get their “crack” players addicted to money in the game. From the colonial
period, up through the young republic, one made, shared, or bartered for recreational equipment.
In the 1850s, for the first time, cricket bats and hunting equipment went on sale in numbers
noticeable enough for historians to date the beginnings of a market for sporting goods. In the
1880s and piggybacking off of the growth in baseball after the founding of the National League
in 1876, major sporting goods firms such as Albert G. Spaulding’s company began to make and
market bats, gloves, and all sorts of equipment in quantities big enough to help make baseball a
$10 million business in 1890. The 1890s also marked the appearance of the nation’s first truly
mass manufactured good in the bicycle through its complete interchangeability of parts, that in
turn propelled a bicycle bonanza that lasted until about 1900 and netted the sporting goods
industry $100 million. 11 Though never approaching the production levels and the payoff of
baseball or bicycling, the game of tennis required equipment of just the right size and the right
pricing-point for the fledgling sporting goods industry. All that was needed were contacts
familiar with this new and relatively unfamiliar game, but the USLTA took steps to prevent such
a partnership between its members and for-profit companies from becoming too strong. While
not banning players from working for a sporting goods company, the USLTA did cap a
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member’s tennis goods sales at half or more of his total accounts. Likewise, tournaments could
receive no sponsorship from sporting goods firms. 12
Such a strong-handed move into the livelihoods of association members, not to mention
the material growth of the game itself, was a bold attempt on the part of the USLTA to regain
control over the explosive growth of the game in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
For example, the USLTA stood alone among national tennis associations and apart from the
International Lawn Tennis Federation in its prohibitions against members working for sporting
goods firms. The effectiveness of such rules was another matter, however. In 1919, a full third of
the thirty highest ranked male players worked for sporting goods companies. Sporting goods
companies would, more often than not, grant employee-players long vacations with pay during
tournament times, while the amateur rules did little to dissuade sporting goods companies who
actively sought the best players to work for them. 13
Ineffective rules prompted the USLTA to devise narrower restrictions. Players soon faced
an age restriction of thirty-five and a minimum employment period of ten years at a sporting
goods firm if they wanted to maintain USLTA tournament eligibility. A member could also lose
USLTA eligibility if he or she availed themselves of any article of sportswear, shoes, or tennis
gear outside of racquets and strings. Furthermore, racquets could only find their way into an
Association member’s hands if the member’s sectional association certified the racquets direct
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from the manufacturer and restricted the amount of string the player received. The Association
certified a maximum number of only six racquets when these rules came into effect after World
War II, even though a top caliber player might go through a half-dozen racquets during a single
match. Instead of taking the view that the growth of the American sporting goods industry could
promote the growth of tennis by making sure the best American amateur players came outfitted
for every match with new equipment and clothes, USLTA officials prioritized their own control
over the marketing opportunities accruable by their sport’s biggest personalities. 14
USLTA national officials, committed to amateurism in every aspect of tennis, also balked
at the rise of the sports press. The penny press papers of the antebellum and postbellum decades
made a point to cover contests such as boxing popular with the working classes, thus helping to
create spectator sports in the fastest growing cities of the North. The scale and the scope of
spectatorship grew dramatically in the 1880s with sporting male weeklies such as Richard Fox’s
National Police Gazette selling into the hundreds of thousands of copies for issues that covered
highly anticipated fights. On the other side of the class divide, magazines such as Lippincott’s
Monthly Magazine, Outing, and North American Review ran articles on sports that catered to
wealthy and middle-class men. For their part, city newspapers reported the latest schedules and
scores on special pages dedicated exclusively to sports. 15 On the pages and behind the lines of
these newspapers and magazines, the most prominent American tennis player of the twenties,
William “Big Bill” Tilden, challenged the USLTA’s amateur by-laws that barred association
members from tennis journalism.
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Tilden played a great game of tennis and wrote prose about the matches he played in the
pages of glossy magazines. In 1925 the USLA threatened to ban Tilden from tennis if he refused
to stop writing about his matches. The opposing sides reached an uneasy compromise not long
after, in which a player could receive some monetary compensation for an article so long as he or
she did not play in the tournament they planned to report on and did not promote their own tennis
skills in their journalism and media productions. Despite his apology letter kowtowing to the
Association, Tilden had no intention of giving up his syndicated columns in outlets such as the
San Francisco Chronicle and New York World. 16 The Executive Committee continued to warn
Tilden until his match reporting as player-captain of the 1928 Davis Cup Team embarrassed the
USLTA to the degree they felt they had no recourse but to suspend Tilden on July 19th, just days
before the upcoming semi-final tie against Italy “because of [Tilden] having exploited for
pecuniary gain his position as a tennis player, or because of having acted in a way detrimental to
the welfare of the game.” The USLTA Amateur Rule Committee and Executive Committee may
have congratulated themselves on the fairness of their ruling, but the fact they issued a six-page
press release that detailed the string of events leading up to Tilden’s Davis Cup suspension
revealed just how much they realized a significant number of American sports fans might find
the Association’s amateur principle absurd if its enforcement actually meant sidelining the
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country’s top tennis talent from the most important international competition. The USLTA
viewed Tilden’s defiance as an internal membership issue. The outcry raised by sportswriters
made the issue much more public than the USLTA wanted. 17
The rising popularity of tennis quickly escalated Tilden’s case from an internal issue to a
national and international brouhaha. After defeating Italy on July 22, 1928, the United States
Davis Cup team prepared to face off against the French champions in the Davis Cup Final
beginning on the 29th. The French Tennis Federation knew Tilden’s popularity and lobbied
Myron T. Herrick, the U.S. Ambassador to France, to confront the USLTA about Tilden’s ban.
Herrick agreed with the French Tennis Federation’s argument that the USLTA’s ban on players
as paid writers—a strict rule the ILTF had not adopted—amounted to a “selfish” position apart
from the thirty-two other nations that played in the Davis Cup. Herrick worked to convince
USLTA President Collom to permit Tilden to participate in the match against France. With such
controversy swirling, the United States lost pathetically to France, and the USLTA promptly resuspended Tilden from Association-sanctioned tournaments. Howls of protests from within
USLTA member clubs and from sports fans reached the Association’s national offices in the
form of letters supporting Tilden and urging the USLTA to reconsider their ban. For his part,
Tilden appealed his suspension while he served it, returned to amateur tennis in February of
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1929, and continued to write and spar with the USLTA before turning professional at the end of
1930. In a later irony indicative of the 1928 suspension and the sources of the support he did and
did not receive, Tilden continued to garner more support from the tennis federations of other
nations than from his own country’s association. 18
The significance of the 1928 Tilden controversy was twofold. Concretely, the USLTA
wanted financial control over the tennis talent in America, but the 1928 Davis Cup ban also
highlighted another serious threat to amateur standards in a sport whose international footprint
had grown to the point that the best players spent much of their years not only playing tennis but
competing in other countries. USLTA officials could not regulate players representing the
Association abroad to the degree that they could in the United States, because in America all of
the clubs that hosted tournaments belonged to the USLTA. That belonging gave the Amateur
Rule Committee and the National Executive Committee eyes and ears at every match.
Understanding the impossibility of enforcing a ban against accepting money in other countries
governed by different tennis associations, the USLTA enacted an “eight tournament rule” in
which a player would have to pay their own way in all but eight tennis events a year. Given that
the United States tournament calendar alone totaled dozens of matches, that rule essentially
meant that any foreign tournament a player traveled to could not provide the player with travel,
lodging, or meal expenses because the player would have already exhausted his or her
tournament expense quota domestically. The Amateur Rule Committee and Executive
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Committee members congratulated themselves on another compromise between the pecuniary
temptations facing players and the necessity of maintaining the integrity of amateur sports.
USLTA officers suggested that the absence of specific penalties and the discretion the Executive
Committee could exercise in not punishing certain players from extending their season at certain
tournaments would stave off flagrant violations of the Amateur by-laws; but in reality, violations
proliferated with such selective enforcement. For example, in 1948 the United States’ best
doubles team of William “Billy” Talbert and Gardnar Mulloy asked the USLTA to grant special
permission for the payment of expenses related to the Rio Plata Tournament in Buenos Aires,
despite the fact that the tournament both took place outside the normal tournament calendar for
which the USLTA authorized expenses and exceeded the number of eight events for which
Talbert and Mulloy had already received expenses paid. Members of the Amateur Rule
Committee griped about Talbert and Mulloy “living off the game” but allowed the players to
take the money. 19
One of the principal ways tournament players “lived off the game” was by instructing
less capable players. Teaching and coaching could keep a top player on the court in order to keep
their own game in shape while at the same time creating relationships with wealthy members of
private clubs all too eager to hit a few balls with the country’s best racketeers. The USLTA did
not allow members to earn income from teaching tennis—be it at a university, in a physical
education class, park district, or private club—until the 1950s. Officially, there were no paid
tennis teachers in America before 1910. Through the teens and mid-twenties, some players
19
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accepted money, club dues, and travel expenses under the table in exchange for teaching wealthy
club members. That pay for instruction arrangement became official in 1927, when the
Professional Lawn Tennis Association (PLTA) formed after a meeting in New York. 20 USLTA
officials so abhorred the idea that anyone should get paid to play tennis, even if payment was
made to members of a different organization whose sole purpose existed to promote the
livelihood of tennis instructors and thus grow the game, that the Association Executive
Committee banned any competition between USLTA amateurs and PLTA teaching
professionals. As with all of their “no money in the game” rules, the Amateur Rules Committee
enforced the disassociation between PLTA and USLTA members selectively so that when the
United States Military asked the Association President Lawrence Baker for his approval of interservice matches that involved both professionals and amateurs, the Amateur Rule Committee
gave the military the Association’s blessing. 21
That lax enforcement had less to do with USLTA benevolence and more to do with the
reality of how tennis had worked in America from the very beginning. Many clubs essentially
sponsored top players whose association with the club brought prestige and potentially new
members. Since the turn of the century, many clubs had ignored a player’s class background so
long as he or she delivered on the courts. Local clubs preferred flexibility; the national
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association preferred policy. As the profile of the game increased, clubs poured more resources
into the practice time and travel expenses of their top players while forgetting to mention this
support to the USLTA. These omissions flew in the face of USLTA rules that since the 1880s
had strived for a complete accounting of players’ tournament expenses. USLTA officials had
floated a ban against all player expenses without success, and thus found themselves constantly
checking in with private clubs about members’ expense accounts. Unreliable assistance in
enforcing player expense accounts exemplified the Executive Committee’s and the USLTA’s
Amateur Rule Committee’s heavy reliance upon private sports clubs enforcing rules that often
hurt the member clubs’ bottom lines despite the national office’s claims to the contrary. Counting
a famous player as a club member was more important to most club managers than keeping a
USLTA official in the national New York offices happy. The Association’s top amateur tennis
talent felt the game “owed them a living,” and all but the most genteel of club members were
prepared to provide them with that living, albeit with a nod and a wink, while simultaneously
espousing the “high ideals of sportsmanship and amateurism” the Association stood for, wrote
Holcombe Ward at the conclusion of his decade as USLTA President. 22
The USLTA’s commitment to amateurism created more opportunities for tennis players
willing to play by the Association’s rules. By 1908 the USLTA sanctioned ninety tournaments in
the summer season alone. Leaders in the USLTA national office formed a committee that
strenuously advocated junior development by pressuring reluctant private clubs to host junior
tournaments and matches. The Association also advocated for the creation of an intercollegiate
22
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tennis league that many universities embraced. For instances, by 1908 Harvard claimed a fortycourt facility at Soldiers Field in Boston. A dozen years later, Charles S. Garland of Yale won
the first Intercollegiate Championship endorsed by the Association. The USLTA also encouraged
new players both abroad and at home. On May 1, 1908, the Mexico City Country Club hosted
the first Lawn Tennis Championship in Mexican history with a dozen or so of America’s best
players traveling south of the border for the tournament—thanks in large part to the USLTA’s
encouragement and financial assistance. Unlike opportunities found in many team sports, women
could find tennis matches and tournaments endorsed by the Association and covered by the
USLTA’s official publication. “These women can play tennis, tennis such as the novice would
marvel at, swift and accurate and, indeed, far superior to the game that the ordinary man who
thinks that he can play some, is capable of,” said one such report on a 1908 women’s indoor
tournament in New York City. Players in most parts of the country could also find a tournament
to test themselves from rural California to the Northeast. 23
Such opportunities came with a cost for participants. Players needed to submit to the
Association’s desire for control over every aspect of tennis. Nowhere did that exercise of control
appear in starker terms than within the Eastern Lawn Tennis Association that dominated the
national course of amateur tennis from the start. While the ELTA officially formed in 1922,
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tennis officials from around New York City first organized themselves in the Metropolitan Lawn
Tennis League on March 15, 1904. That organization consisted of the West Side Tennis Club,
the New York Lawn Tennis Club, Kings County Tennis Club, Montclair Athletic Club, New
York Athletic Club, Crescent Athletic Club, and the Englewood Field, with the League
functioning until 1912 as an arbiter of tournaments and matches between the clubs’ teams and
players. A similar league appeared four years later in the Metropolitan Association that
organized a Round Robin Tournament among Metropolitan tennis clubs. In 1914, the West Side
Tennis Club found a “permanent home” in Forest Hills, New York, and that same year the Club
hosted the Davis Cup Challenge Round between the United States and Australia. The financial
success of that match prompted the relocation of the National Championships from the Newport
Casino to Forest Hills for the 1915 tournament. 24
The money made at popular events seldom reached far beyond a narrow orbit of clubs
clustered along the Atlantic Seaboard. The few officers and permanent employees such as Field
Secretary Paul B. Williams originated from those parts of the country and preferred to funnel
dollars back to the clubs to which they belonged. At about the time of the 1915 Forest Hills
Championship, the ELTA began a junior development program for players within their section
funded by a combination of national and sectional monies. The advantage of hosting the big
tournaments and running the Association’s day-to-day business mattered a great deal when
combined with the Association’s refusal to grant proxy voters from clubs who—because of their
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location far afield from New York City (the Midwest, for example)—could not send
representatives to Association meetings. A general pattern of setting agenda business at the
Annual meeting itself rather than informing member clubs ahead of time via the organization’s
official publication became commonplace. Those policies allowed New York City clubs to
exercise disproportional control over the national organization and ensured that the tournaments
that offered the highest rating points, and thus attracted the best players, who in turn brought in
the most paying spectators, stayed in the New York metropolitan area and kept the coffers of the
host clubs full when compared with clubs in other regions of the country. 25
World War I disrupted that pattern. The Association’s “Patriotic Tournaments” earned
money that did not go directly to the host clubs but went to a general fund for the War
Department. Nonetheless, at the end of World War I, the USLTA Eastern Section regained more
than its former strength by meeting on March 12, 1921, where thirty-four clubs passed a
Constitution and By-Laws that chartered the New York Lawn Tennis Association. Less than a
year later, on February 4, 1922, the USLTA’s membership accepted that body into the national
association at the annual meeting. While not officially called the “Eastern” Lawn Tennis
Association until February 5, 1927, the New York clubs effectively controlled their sectional
association, the national association, and by extension the game of tennis for the entire nation
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through the 1920s. 26 At the same time, the game was going in a different direction across the
country.
Since the 1880s, wealth and youth had moved into California. Tennis grew alongside this
migration of people with capital. The game first came to Southern California around 1880 when
the Canadian William H. Young settled in Santa Monica after having attended Oxford
University. Young befriended the Allen family who—on their own holiday travels—returned to
their home with one of Major Walter Wingfield’s lawn tennis kits. Two years after Young and
the Allen’s first match, tennis enthusiasts started the San Gabriel Lawn Tennis Club, the earliest
effort to organize California tennis along the lines of the East Coast Cricket Clubs. Mainly
women, the club sponsored their first tournament in June of 1882. Over the next five years,
several other clubs sprouted, including the Boyle Heights Club, the first tennis facility in urban
Los Angeles. The three most important of clubs in the area, Casa Blanca Club of Riverside, the
San Gabriel Club, and the Pasadena Club, chartered the Southern California Tennis Association
in March of 1887. The following year, the California Lawn Tennis Club of San Francisco put on
the Pacific Coast Championship tournament on the grounds of the Hotel Del Monte in Monterey,
California, marking the first time local tennis clubs hosted a tournament sanctioned by the
USLTA. The California Clubs mirrored their East Coast contemporaries by hosting more small
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tournaments and standardizing play on their uniquely year round courts. In the words of the
Association’s annals, “tennis had officially crossed the continent.” 27
One of the earliest organizations for lawn tennis on the West Coast began July 3, 1890,
when a group of Bay Area tennis clubs formed the Pacific States Lawn Tennis Association
(PSLTA). Much like on the East Coast, the PSLTA formed with a primary purpose of
standardizing the rules of the game among different member clubs, but the PSLTA differed in
the geographic scope in which it sought to standardize the game. “Any Lawn Tennis Club in the
States of California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, the Territories of Utah and Arizona and
British Columbia, shall be considered eligible to membership,” read the PLSTA’s Constitution.
The Association’s treasurer collected $5 in dues for clubs whose membership fell below fifty
players and an additional $5 in dues for each additional fifty members of a club’s membership.
Monies collected supplemented the various clubs’ hosting of tournaments and interclub matches
like on the East Coast. 28
The PSLTA’s by-laws detailed essentially the same definition of amateurism in force on the
other side of the country. A player could not compete in a PSLTA-sponsored event unless he or
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she belonged to a PSLTA Club, and he or she could not belong to a PSLTA Club if the player
had ever “taught any sport as one of his ordinary means of livelihood.” Following much the same
rules as clubs on the East Coast did not stop clubs in the American West from expressing pride in
their region in other ways. They held an annual championship attended by hundreds who paid
50 cents for day pass admittance. PSLTA member clubs partnered with local sporting good firms
such as F.M.L. Peters & Co. of San Francisco to manufacture racquets “expressly for the Pacific
Coast trade.” Racquets with names such as the “Pacific” featured “Oriental Gut” strings touted as
the best string for both playability and the economy of Pacific Rim Trade. Taken as a whole,
throughout the first two decades of the game, California tennis associations exercised a far
greater tolerance of money in tennis in their game than did the associations on the other coast,
even going so far as to allow some competition between teaching professionals and amateur
champions, such as when professional Joe Daily defeated Summer Hardy 7-5, 8-6 on the courts
of San Francisco’s California Club. Growth of the game of tennis on the West Coast went hand
in hand with the economic growth of places like the Bay Area. 29
The westward migration of the sport of tennis gained further momentum around 1900 and
reflected larger social migrations of people to places such as Southern California. During the first
decade of the twentieth century, Los Angeles’ population tripled from 102,479 to just over
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300,000. The beautiful climate, an agriculturally productive landscape, and a budding urban
economy provided city boosters with plenty of enticements to dangle in front of potential
settlers. 30 The physical environment in particular impacted the materiality of the tennis courts in
the West, where a Mediterranean climate made smooth lawns of green grass scarce. After the
first games on dirt lots, private clubs and later municipalities built courts with a concrete surface
because year-round warm weather prohibited lawn courts. 31 Beyond the steeper upfront cost,
hard-courts were a better investment because they required less maintenance, lasted longer, and
could be built on ground unsuitable for grass-courts. The materiality of the concrete courts
produced a higher bounce of the ball, allowing players to adopt a different style of play than
what worked on the lawns of the East Coast. Rather than the popular under-spin shots common
on grass, hard-court players favored flat or topspin shots—that is, shots that either moved the
ball across the net relatively parallel to the ground or lifted the ball high over the net before the
spin brought it quickly down on the opponent’s side of the court. To best accomplish the desired
ball-flight, players shifted their grip over to the fourth, fifth, or even sixth racquet bevel. The
revolutionary hand placement became so popular with the hard-court players of Southern
California that champions and tennis writers such as Bill Tilden came to call it the “western
grip.” A Philadelphia native, Tilden advocated the Eastern grip because of his own success in
winning the East Coast lawn court tournaments with a grip better suited to low skidding shots
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common on grass courts. 32 In short, the material conditions of the court established the styles of
players hailing from different regions of the country.
What Tilden failed to note was that Eastern USLTA sections tried to hold on to their
control over the game through the surface of their courts. Through a stranglehold on the grasscourt summer tournament schedule where players earned the most ranking points, the USLTA
leadership kept themselves relevant long after the rise of California tennis as the world’s
epicenter of competitive players, thanks primarily to the year-round competition afforded by the
weather. 33
California also held an abundance of open space for the construction of parks and tennis
courts when compared with the more densely populated Eastern Seaboard. While San Francisco
likely suffered the same parsimoniousness on some public improvements and wastefulness on
others that characterized the budgets of cities in Progressive Era America, the Bay Area
nonetheless got big parks built for their citizenry that afforded recreation for everyone who
visited. In the late nineteenth century the San Francisco Recreation and Park Department
operated a dozen or more courts in Golden Gate Park alone that allowed players of any income
level to hit a tennis ball. By the 1910s, tennis courts even appeared 4,213 feet up the side of
Mount Hamilton near San Jose in Santa Clara County, where astronomers played the sport when
not gazing at the stars through their telescopes at the Lick Observatory. Far from widespread
when compared to the tennis court building boom of the late 1930s, the comparative abundance
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of California courts prior to the Great Depression nonetheless set the West Coast apart from the
East Coast and the Midwest in the first few decades of the game of tennis in America. 34
Similar to the evolution of the game on the East Coast, private universities played a role
in growing tennis in Southern California. One such institution was the University of Southern
California in Los Angeles, whose most famous early twentieth-century tennis star was Ellsworth
Vines. Vines was born in Los Angeles in September of 1911 to tennis parents who enjoyed both
the readily available courts in Southern California and the blissful weather as compared to the
East Coast. Between 1877, the first year the U.S. Weather Bureau measured annual temperature
and seasonal rainfall, and 1930, the average daily temperature in Los Angeles hovered between
sixty and sixty-five degrees. In the same fifty-year period, rainfall exceeded twenty inches of rain
only five times. This remarkable weather made Southern California a veritable Eden for outdoor
activity, of which the Vineses and thousands of others took full advantage. Ellsworth’s father
gave the boy his first racquet at the age of five. Over the next dozen years Vines played in many
of the local tournaments for students in Southland. His success in high school tennis secured him
an offer to play for the Trojans, where he excelled during his freshmen and sophomore seasons.
Toward the end of his second year, Vines had played so dominantly that he attracted the backing
of the Southern California Tennis Association Director, Perry T. Jones, who endorsed Vines for
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a spot on the roster of the 1932 Davis Cup team. Vines accepted. He left the collegiate tennis that
had helped make him match-tough in order to begin international competition. 35
Another important institution that developed tennis players in California was Occidental
College, which produced later California singles champion and millionaire Bel Air East Los
Angeles real estate mogul Alphonzo E. Bell. 36 While exceptional male champions like Bell
existed and went out East to play in the major grass court events, most Californians and
Americans still considered tennis “a woman’s game” before the turn of the century. 37 The
gendering of the sport began to change with cross-continental competition between Eastern Ivy
League men and their hosts on the Pacific Coast. Dwight F. Davis, one the Harvard University
players who made the California trip, was particularly impressed with the stimulating
competition between players from different sectionals. Returning East during the middle of the
America’s Cup sailing races, Davis realized the potential for starting a transnational tennis
competition along the same lines as the sectional matches in which he had participated. Back in
Boston, he met with USLTA President Dr. James Dwight. His interest piqued, Dwight contacted
his British counterpart. A year later in 1900, an American and English team played one another
for the claim to a sterling silver cup Davis had commissioned for the match. The personal and
national pride of the male-dominated USLTA executive board soon elevated the Davis Cup to
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the pedestal of primary focus for the organization’s competitive player development efforts.
More than two decades passed before the dominant ladies champion, Hazel Hotchkiss Whitman,
convinced the USLTA and British Lawn Tennis Association (BLTA) leadership of the need for
an International match for women. In 1923, British and American players competed for bragging
rights and Wightman’s sterling vase. 38 While the Wightman Cup resembled the Davis Cup in
almost every way, the twenty-three years separating the start of the two competitions shifted the
USLTA’s earliest focus away from growing tennis as a leisurely game equally enjoyed by
women and men toward a new and more masculine sport defined by increasingly structured
competition.
Competition often took the form of city versus city in events such as the inter-city Church
Cup. Victories on the tennis court for teams made up of hometown champions were a way for
local business elites—who supported the teams financially, often captained the teams, and
sometimes played on the squads—to mimic victories in the capital markets. First founded in
1918, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston fielded teams that competed for the Church Cup in a
multiday contest. Teams traveled with substantial entourages, and the contests became
opportunities for visitors to the host club to critique and measure the local hospitality and, by
extension, the economic growth of the host city. While the courts on which the matches took
place were privately owned by the members of the host club, the all-hometown composition of
the squads and the fact that they were amateur players not beholden to play for whatever side
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paid them the most money gave these matches higher status than many professional contests
during the twenties—more on par with university football during this halcyon decade of amateur
athletics. 39
Nowhere was intercity and intra-regional rivalry more explicit than in fights over Davis
Cup hosting rights. As the oldest section with the greatest percentage of wealthy members, the
USLTA’s East Coast section controlled American tennis before 1941. Officials from the
Northeast and the Mid-Atlantic wanted tennis’s largest international competition played at clubs
to which they belonged for reasons of both pride and the publicity their clubs garnered by
playing host to such a high profile sporting event. Club members looked forward to the inquiries
made by potential new members after they saw, heard, or read about the Davis Cup matches.
Many of the USLTA’s East Coast Sections most senior members belonged to the West Side
Tennis Club, making it no coincidence that those courts traditionally hosted the Davis Cup
Challenge Round when the matches took place in the United States. These same officials
staunchly opposed letting another club host the tie (match) even when that club made a
significantly better financial offer to the Association for the rights to hold the competition on
their courts. Onetime USLTA President, Slew Hester, then a USLTA delegate from the Southern
Section, remembered casting the tiebreaking vote to accept a $100,000 offer from a Cleveland
Tennis Club to host the Davis Cup—$25,000 more than the best deal the Westside Club offered.
Eastern USLTA delegates and Westside Tennis Club members did not forget Hester’s vote.
“You have pulled the ivy off of Westside walls,” they remarked, not long before they informed
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Hester that he was not welcome to make use of their locker room facilities during a
tournament. 40
By the second decade of the twentieth century, California made a strong claim as the
producer of the greatest number of talented tennis players in the country. Whereas in the late
1880s through the mid-1890s, tennis in the American West had suffered from geography that
placed lawn tennis clubs too far apart for the best players from different cities to compete against
one another on a regular basis, by 1900 improvement in transportation infrastructure allowed for
not just greater competition among players in the West but yearly trips between “Pacific Coast
stars” and their peers along the Atlantic Coast. By 1908, the USLTA national office and Eastern
Sections sent their best players to compete in the Pacific Championship only to lose in the early
rounds to middling players by California’s standards. Lady players from California fared even
better overall than their male counterparts. In 1899 Marion Jones won the National
Championship and retained her singles title in 1902. After having won all the major tournaments
in the United States, in 1905 May Sutton, who had learned tennis on a court built by her father
on their Pasadena Ranch, traveled to England and became the first American to win
Wimbledon—man or woman. California women dominated the next decade of American tennis
with Hazel Hotchkiss of San Francisco, Florence Sutton of Pasadena, and Mary Browne of Los
Angeles beating all comers. Champions certainly came from other USLTA sections, but by the
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early 1920s the most competitive tennis matches in America often involved players from
Southern California versus players from the Bay Area. 41
Those players both benefited from the organization of the California Tennis Associations
and improved the ability of those associations to function by enhancing the prestige of the clubs
that made up those associations. The most important of these associations in terms of money,
players, and power was the Southern California Tennis Association (SCTA). A weak version of
the SCTA had existed in an unincorporated form since 1887, but the SCTA came into its own as
an influential tennis body on May 14, 1919, when tennis enthusiasts from Los Angeles, San
Bernardino, Riverside, San Diego, Imperial, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Kern, and Ventura
Counties met to elect directors for their newly incorporated nonprofit. These men had found
relying on numerous tennis clubs and local groups unwieldy in scheduling tournaments and
matches; avoiding “conflicting dates” thus proved a primary impetus in the formation of the
SCTA. 42
A more important reason soon became apparent with the shifting character of social clubs
in America. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, private groups such as the
Pacific Coast Sportsman’s Club featured a full spectrum of athletics, games, and hobbies to
attract members of high social standing regardless of their personal interests. By the early 1910s,
and even more so thanks to antebellum economic prosperity, there existed a class of nouveau
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riche without the same degree of deference to genteel tradition associated with older sports
clubs. Clubs no longer operated simply as a place for the leisured to meet and develop solidarity
among their class because, just like in the economy as a whole, competition had grown fierce
between different clubs competing for members and their money. Newer clubs thus tended to
offer a more limited range of athletics and activities—albeit in a more specialized and focused
way so as to attract people passionate about one certain activity. That focus meant tennis-specific
clubs—rather than sporting clubs that happened to offer tennis—sprouted all over the country.
For example, tennis clubs formed from Azusa to Balboa to Santa Monica in Southern California.
Even with clubs that primarily focused on offering tennis to their members, a degree of diversity
of purpose existed. Whereas the Azusa Tennis Association helped members organize social
tennis matches, the Santa Monica Club Company tried to operate as a for-profit real estate
development corporation whose subscribers wanted to see the game of tennis grow in Southern
California for the mixed reasons of pecuniary gain and the pleasures found in playing the game.
In either case, older clubs such as the Pacific Sportsmen’s Club that did not adapt to the new
needs of newer potential members closed their doors by the mid-1920s. 43
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The Southern California Tennis Association succeeded in growing their memberships
where many other sporting and tennis clubs failed because of the overlap in that organization and
the Los Angeles Tennis Club (LATC) founded by some of the leaders of the SCTA. A.C. Way,
who helped start the Los Angeles Tennis Club, chaired the meeting that formed the Southern
California Tennis Association. Roland Reinke likewise served as a founding director of both
organizations, and the rest of the SCTA’s nine founding directors all frequented the LATC’s
courts. The Los Angeles Tennis Club got its start in October of 1920 when, with eyes toward
attracting the Davis Cup tie to Southern California, a half dozen community leaders and past
tennis champions purchased five and a half square acres of unsurveyed land just south of what
would become Santa Monica Boulevard. The Club’s first directors—Thomas Bundy, Nat
Browne, Trowbridge Hendrick, Chester Lyday, Roland Reinke, Simpson Sinsabaugh, and
Claude Wayne—were moneyed men of great influence in the national tennis scene. Bundy, for
example, had made the finals of the United States Singles Championship in 1910, won the
United States National Doubles Title in 1912, 1913, and 1914, competed in the Davis Cup, and
married May Sutton—the most successful player of her cohort. Nat Browne, himself a fine
player, and Mary Browne, America’s first real professional player who lost to Suzanne Lenglen
in the first professional tennis tour in 1926 and 1927, were siblings. As the president of the
SCTA in 1920, Browne saw the necessity for a grand tennis club rather than several smaller
ones, so he coaxed his six fellow investors into paying $11,000 for the land out of which they,
three years later, sold a third for $70,000. With those earnings the group built two courts along
Melrose and invited roughly forty local players in chartering the Club in 1925. From the
beginning, members envisioned the Los Angeles Tennis Club as a place where the game’s best
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would compete. Before they built a clubhouse, locker rooms, or more courts, the Club
constructed bleachers capable of seating 530 people along Melrose Avenue. That was the
intention of the Club’s founding directors, who all thought of the LATC as both a place for
themselves and their friends to play tennis but also as a place to enhance their social reputation
and conduct business deals. 44
Mixing pleasure, work, and profitable entertainment created the problem of money and
taxes, which explained why the LATC affiliated with the SCTA. In 1926 the LATC lost an
average of more than $500 a month in addition to carrying a $30,000 mortgage, a $3,100 bank
note, and $1,500 in renovation costs. The Club opened itself to new members to address these
financial liabilities, and the increased revenue that came from 96 new members in 1927 stopped
the Club from losing money—although the large debt remained. Hosting tennis tournaments was
one strategy the LATC board took to service that debt, and in 1927 the Club’s seven-court
expansion, donated lighting system, improved heating and plumbing systems, Panatrope radio
system, expanded locker room, and wood-fenced perimeter all helped to hold tennis tournaments
that made rather than lost money. The LATC directors had incorporated their club as a nonprofit, but in beginning to operate very popular tennis and social events they in fact began to turn
a “pecuniary profit.” The money that they collected that went beyond what they could use for
improving their property could thus move into the SCTA’s coffers. That organization kept some
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and filtered the rest back into the LATC bearing the more secure not-for-profit imprimatur of the
SCTA whose charter explicitly championed the growth of tennis in Southern California
independent of the movement of money into the game in that part of the country. That
arrangement gave the leaders of tennis in Southern California secure finances and a great degree
of flexibility in moving money around to do the maximum amount of good for the game in their
territory. The LATC could stay a “social club” and avoid California franchise tax, while the
SCTA had a sugar-tree to shake any time their funds ran low. 45
SCTA directors did not personally profit from money in the game of tennis, but they did
want their tournaments to turn profits at the same time they railed against the touring
professionals Suzanne Lenglen, Vincent Richards, Bill Tilden, and later Donald Budge. In a
quorum held at the California Club in Los Angeles, board members explicitly reaffirmed their
commitment to amateur tennis by way of controlling the sport in ten Southern California
counties. That amendment only expanded their official influence over tennis by one county from
their initial chartering fifteen years earlier; however, the effect would prove far greater, because,
with the forthcoming construction of so many courts in Southern California, the supervision they
asserted essentially amounted to “control of the game of tennis” not just up the West Coast but to
a growing degree the county as a whole. SCTA Directors reinforced their regulatory capacity by
lobbying the USLTA national office for not only district but sectional status by which the SCTA
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could exercise greater autonomy throughout the year and marshal more votes for the national
Association’s annual meeting. By the mid-1930s the SCTA had grown into the most robust
tennis corporation—either for profit or non-profit—in the country short of the national office of
the USLTA. 46
That growth did not mean that everyone was welcome. Patricia Henry Yeoman, a
longtime LATC and SCTA member, noted that G. Allan Hancock, Thomas Bundy, Alphonzo
Bell, Harold Braly, William Garland, and Simpson Sinsabaugh—all important early members of
the LATC and SCTA—developed some of the most important real estate throughout Los
Angeles County, places like the “Miracle Mile” and Bel-Air Estates. These men thus well
understood that exclusivity and status made money in both real estate and in social club
memberships. They made sure only the right kind of people played on the LATC’s courts.
Members barred Jews from joining and ostracized Jewish players who occasionally competed in
SCTA tournaments hosted by the Club. The courts and especially the reputation of the Club’s
prestigious tournaments—which attracted important players, officials, and promoters from the
East Coast—could not be sullied by people from outside the proper sort, maintained the 260
voting members in 1929 who were all wealthy, white, male, and Protestants or Catholic. 47
Members and Club policies across the country discriminated against African Americans
in even more explicit ways. A case garnering international press coverage came in 1929 when
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USLTA officials barred Gerald L. Norman, Jr. and the African American junior champion
Reginald Weir from participating in the National Junior Indoor Championships held at the New
York City Seventh Armory. Under pressure from Arthur E. Francis of the New York Tennis
Association, the USLTA revealed they excluded the two players because of race, citing a need
for separate tournaments administered by the USLTA for white players and the American Tennis
Association for African American competitors. At first, the response left NAACP directors
confused as both Weir and Norman had competed in USLTA-sanctioned matches before. What
they quickly realized was that the December tournament the players tried to enter had national
visibility at a time when the USLTA looked to increase the popularity of the game in the South.
“Jim Crow Tournaments are not National,” the NAACP stated in a press release that essentially
called the USLTA un-American, class snobs, and scared that an African American player might
win the tournament. In spite of the protests, the USLTA continued to rely upon their by-laws
only allowing players belonging to designated clubs to enter the national tournaments. The local
enforcement of race and class kept African Americans out of the biggest tournaments during the
twenties, thirties, and forties at the very same time that women continued to participate fully as
tennis players if not as the directors of the amateur associations and private clubs. 48
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Just as Suzanne Lenglen pioneered professional tennis, so too was a woman behind the
first true commercial tennis tournament. Elizabeth “Bunny” Ryan grew up in Anaheim,
California, but spent most of her playing career living in England, where she partnered with
Suzanne Lenglen for five Wimbledon doubles titles between 1919 and 1925. Visiting her
Southern California home in 1925, Ryan met with Los Angeles Express publisher Edward
Dickson about organizing a tennis tournament in the area to rival that of the major
championships in Europe and the east coast of the United States. Dickson thought the idea could
boost the reputation of Los Angeles both in America and abroad if he convinced top international
talent to attend. A dozen men agreed with him. Thus was born the Tennis Patrons Association of
Southern California, whose purpose was “to bring Southern California national recognition as a
tennis center.” The Association’s directors explicitly saw the running of a highly profitable
tennis tournament with international caliber players as the means to achieve that end. The money
such an event earned would then go entirely back into Southern California tennis rather than get
spread around to other parts of the country, and that focusing of funds on junior development in
and around Los Angeles would repay the initial investment of their own money and their own
time by increasing the number of talented players in the area and thus give the Southern
California Tennis Association more pull at the national level. With the help of the top player in
the country and the bane of existence for the USLTA National Office, Bill Tilden, who attended
the Tennis Patrons Association’s first formal meeting at the Los Angeles Tennis Club in late
1926, the directors planned the first Pacific-Southwest Tournament. 49
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In designing their stadium, the LATC had one model example. In August 1923, the West
Side Tennis Club in Forest Hills, New York, completed their horseshoe-shaped stadium court
designed to host the United States National Singles Championship. That event had moved from
its first venue at the Newport Hotel and Casino to the West Side Tennis Club in 1915. Even with
World War I, the thousands who attended the tournament far outstripped available seating and
required the construction of temporary bleachers for every year’s event. By 1920 the event had
proven successful enough to require either a change of venue or an expansion. Club directors and
USLTA officials chose the latter course of action and temporarily moved the national
championships while construction of the 14,000-seat stadium and renovation of the West Side
Tennis grounds took place until completed in 1924. The Club sold five- to ten-year subscriptions
priced at $110 per seat with a goal of filling 1,500 of the stadium’s box seats on a pre-sale basis.
The USLTA and the West Side Tennis Club entered into an agreement that designated the Club
as the host for the Men’s National Singles Championship, the Men’s National Doubles
Championships, and the Davis Cup Final Matches. That contract facilitated the West Side Tennis
Club’s successful capital campaign to raise $150,000 for improving their facility’s amenities.
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West Side became the first tennis club in the United States to earn a profit from a two-week
tournament alone rather than an auditorium filled with activities the rest of the year. 50
The same directors in the Southern California Tennis Association served as officers in the
Tennis Patrons Association of Southern California in addition to belonging to the Los Angeles
Tennis Club. Those intersecting relationships meant that the Pacific-Southwest Championship
got both the royal treatment from the host venue but also remained insulated from the direction
of the USLTA national office, which looked to secure a sizable portion of the tournament
revenue for themselves. Autonomy came with the cost of less financial support from other parts
of the country when raising capital to get the tournament off the ground, but the LATC members
and their partners solved that problem by selling box seats as the West Side Tennis Club had
done. Given that the incentive for people to buy tickets in advance at Forest Hills existed because
patrons knew they were guaranteed to see the top events on the tennis calendar there, what could
the Pacific-Southwest offer that no other tournament could? LATC President William Henry
decided that people would buy expensive tournament boxes if he attracted the top players in the
world. He suspected correctly that a combination of Southern California’s beautiful weather and
beautiful people could convince the international stars to travel if they received free travel.
Henry personally visited France to gain assurance from the French Tennis Federation that three
of the famous “four musketeers”—Jacques Brugnon, Henri Cochet, Jean Borotra, and Rene
Lacoste—would play the Pacific-Southwest. The LATC president also brought top international
players from England, Italy, and Australia in addition to America’s best. To lure all these
50
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players, the Tennis Patrons Association agreed to spare no expense during the players’ stay in
Los Angeles. Members housed some players in their own homes, they hired cars to drive players
around Hollywood, they bestowed lavish banquets and dances, and they put some players and
their families up in fine accommodations such as the Ambassador Hotel. The hospitality
blatantly violated the USLTA’s amateur by-laws and stance against money in the game. 51
Keeping top players happy helped fill the stands, however. More importantly, it made for
a successful tournament. The pricey Championship Court renovation that expanded the
Grandstand to “800 seats with backs” came off well thanks to the pre-sale of the courtside boxes.
Standard bleacher seats sold out at $2.20 for weekdays and $3.30 for the weekend matches. The
Club’s proximity to Hollywood Studios added a further element of glamour because the Tennis
Patrons Association went above and beyond to make sure top movie talent attended. What better
place to put the stars than in the dozen or so private boxes LATC directors shared courtside. In
the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s anyone who came to the grounds of the Los Angeles
Tennis Club during the last week in September would find the best tennis players in the world
watched by the biggest movie stars in the world. British champion Fred Perry fondly recalled
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watching actors and actresses show up in the stands at the Beverley Hills located courts wearing
set makeup before returning to the nearby studios to shoot a new scene. 52
The movie and sports entertainment worlds blended further when film stars reciprocated
the favor. They often brought tennis players to backstage sets and glamorous post-production
parties. Top players such as Perry played social matches with top actors such as Ben Lyon,
Charlie Farrell, Fredric March, and Robert Montgomery. On occasion Hollywood talent such as
Theodore Von Eltz even entered the Pacific-Southwest Championships. All of that intermingling
of entertainment talent further enhanced the regional, national, and international reputation of the
West Coast’s great tennis venue. 53
Tennis fun in the California sun made a lot of money for the Los Angeles Tennis Club,
the Tennis Patron’s Association of Southern California, and the Southern California Tennis
Association. Perry Jones and Edward Dickinson, variously the treasurers and secretaries of all
three of those organizations at different times, kept meticulous notes on the interaction between
these organizations. Some of the records that survive are a complete accounting of the Tennis
Patrons Association and the Pacific-Southwest Tournament interspersed with partial records for
both the Southern California Tennis Association and the Los Angeles Tennis Club between
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January 19, 1931, to December 21, 1937: disbursements routinely found their way to top players
such as Don Budge and Gene Mako; accounts receivable revealed the tens of thousands of
dollars in profit the Pacific-Southwest made even during the Great Depression; and audits
proportioned half of those profits to the Southern California Tennis Association, a quarter to the
Tennis Patrons of Southern California, and a quarter to the Los Angeles Tennis Club with
nothing left over for the USLTA national office. Just as if not more important than the total
amount of money raised by the Pacific-Southwest Tournament was the amount of that money
that remained in Southern California to develop tennis players there. The coordination among
these different organizations shielded most of that money from finding its way back to the
USLTA in the form of assessments the national office required of district and sectional
associations. Tennis in Southern California during the thirties thus undercut the authority of the
USLTA national office in terms of making amateur policy and functioning as the central banker
of tennis in the United States. 54
Without access to the USLTA national office financial records, the exact amount of those
actions is hard to measure. But suffice to say for poorer district and sectional associations,
particularly in the South, Midwest, and West, the money sent to New York every year was not
insignificant. Pointing that out is not to suggest that the USLTA national office squandered all
the money they received from district and sectional associations; however, a close look at the
historical record, at least in the case of Southern California, produced dollar for dollar better
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results in terms of the total number of new players to the game and the total number of top
performing tournament players than a more centralized pooling of resources. 55
The success of the Southern California Tennis Association and the Southern California
Tennis Patrons Association sparked imitators across the state and the nation. In addition to the
names of the directors, the Incorporation Records of the Tennis Patrons Association of San
Diego and the Tennis Patrons Association of Santa Monica shared the same desire to “promote
tennis” and much of the same language with the SCTA’s, TPASCTA, and LATC’s articles.
What these other organizations lacked was the coordination between the amateur association and
a host club, and that separation initially cost the Tennis Patrons Association of San Diego the
California tax exempt status they wanted. The State of California based their tax policy rulings in
part on the Federal Tax Code that differentiated between “activities more recreational than
educational” when a corporation sought non-profit status as an educational institution. More
specifically, a prior tax law case had ruled against the West Side Tennis Club of Forest Hills,
New York, who sought tax exemption without success because in hosting the U.S. National
Championship, the Club made a great deal more income from non-members than from
assessments and monthly dues from members. With a few changes in language and accounting
but without any substantive changes to their incorporation records, the State of California’s Tax
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Board reversed their earlier decision and classed the Tennis Patrons Association of San Diego
“exclusively as a recreational club” and thus qualified for tax exemptions. The willingness of the
State of California to forego taxing tennis clubs compared to States such as New York who did,
created a climate for tennis in Southern California better than the sunny weather. Tennis clubs
that did not have a special tax arrangement faced a far greater chance of financial ruin than those
that did. 56
Previous work examining the amateur and professional tennis in the first half of the
twentieth century celebrated the “Code of Honor” that led these men under the direction of their
national association to create a “Golden Age” for lawn tennis. 57 In reality, competition among
rather than harmony between the USLTA sections and regional associations attracted large sums
of money into the game at the same time these same groups claimed loyalty to amateurism.
Opening that spigot watered seeds that later sprouted into a robust crop of professional players
who tipped the balance away from amateurism and toward professionalism. Tennis officials and
tennis amateur associations from California stimulated that process in that they presented the
strongest challenge to the Northeast and mid-Atlantic tennis establishment. By synergizing the
nonprofit organizations of the Southern California Tennis Association, the Southern California
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Tennis Patrons Association, and the Los Angeles Tennis Club, men such as Perry Jones laid the
groundwork for what would became the most important place for tennis excellence in the world
by 1940. Ironically, to make that happen, men who preached amateurism through and through
practiced professionalism in their tennis dealings when they effectively paid top players to attend
the Pacific-Southwest Tournament. The big crowds those players drew made that event into a
highly profitable venture whose funds Jones, in his positions as the treasurer-secretarytournament-director of the SCTA, SCTPA, and LATC, disbursed throughout the interlocked
organizations. Southern California thus developed the most robust player development program
in the world, thanks in no small part to monetizing the amateur game.
An even larger movement of largess into the amateur game of tennis came at about the
same time when the federal government built thousands of public tennis courts across the
country as one part of a broad initiative to develop the nation’s recreational infrastructure. Again,
Southern California was the epicenter.

CHAPTER THREE
THE RECREATIONAL REVOLUTION
Historians have written more on the New Deal than on any other subject in the history of
the twentieth-century United States. Their scholarship has generally addressed one of the three
Rs: relief, recovery, or reform. 1 Those formulations go far to explain Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s (FDR) ambitious programs to revive and reshape the nation faced with
unprecedented economic and social challenges; but in some ways and with some projects,
revolution is the R that more accurately analyzes what New Deal money and work actually did.
Nowhere did that appear in starker terms than in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), where a
congressionally created corporation electrified and industrialized an entire region and brought
millions of Americans out of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. The scale, the
creativity, and the longevity of the TVA has prompted historians to consider the public and
private cooperation that electrified much of Appalachia and the upper-South the best and the
boldest of what the New Deal did in America. The same grandness and uniqueness, however,
also makes the TVA a suspect revolution in that similar public and private ventures did not
spread widely across the country, and where such joint ventures did take place, their scales did
not approach that of the TVA. 2
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Revolutions that stick tend more often to take place in quieter ways and in subtler places.
Contemporary scholars understand in great detail the policies of New Deal agency leaders and
the big projects those agencies produced, but the processes of smaller projects remain
comparatively unexamined. One largely ignored project addressed athletics and sports in cities
rather than in the better understood state parks, national monuments, rural recreation, or cultural
leisure initiatives historians have noted. 3
During the thirties city dwellers in the United States exercised their voting strength over
the rest of the nation for really the first time. 4 One of the forms that political power took was that
of play. In cities across the country, a recreational revolution swept the nation between 1933 and
1941. The athletic fields, courts, pools, and playgrounds built in American cities permanently
altered the sporting opportunities of tens of millions of underprivileged youths and working class
adults. Unlike rural areas with relatively weak governments and comparatively few active
reformers, cities already housed dozens of reform activists, civic organizations, municipal
departments, county officials, and state agencies working to build new athletic infrastructures
and launch new sports initiatives before federal money and federal labor began flowing into
recreational projects in substantive quantities. 5 That movement of dollars and workers created
conflict among different players in the field of recreation, but more lastingly, it democratized
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sports to people who previously had been shut out. In the sport of tennis that democratization
undermined the authority that United States Lawn Tennis Officials and private lawn tennis club
members exercised over the game by allowing both more people to adopt the sport and more
competitors from diverse backgrounds to play tennis than during the previous half-century of the
game’s existence. Those new players in turn spurred the further erosion of amateurism in the
sport.
The recreational revolution took place nationwide and built new or repurposed old
facilities for every major sport in America. Each game mattered to the participants of each
particular pastime, but the sport of tennis was the most transformed. No other game so
exemplified how the recreational revolution opened a sport to individuals so clearly interdicted
from it before. Furthermore, the sheer scale of this revolution means analysis of the nation as a
whole and an accounting of every sport would necessitate a focus on the policy of agency
leadership rather than the actual projects and the everyday people those projects impacted.
Nowhere did the recreational revolution appear more conspicuous than in Los Angeles. 6 That
acuteness in the minds of recreational reformers owed to Southern California’s burgeoning
population that led up to and extended through World War II, along with the great diversity of
those new to the Los Angeles County, and, most importantly, the high number of unsupervised
youth who needed positive and controlled recreational outlets for their delinquent and potentially
dangerous energies.
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The revolution in recreation was one of the ways in which New Dealers looked to
channel the energy of frustrated youths and young adults away from unrest and violence.
Whether philosophers and social scientists today can agree to disagree about the catharsis of
sports did not matter to policy makers in the 1930s because they believed—a view that stretched
to some degree all the way back to colonial Anglo-North America—that athletics and fun
functioned as a safety valve for societal conflict. 7 In presidential politics, however, the
recreational revolution FDR initiated saw first iteration in Roosevelt’s cousin, the former
President Theodore Roosevelt (TR), whose signage of the Antiquities Act of 1906 capped a
career of devotion to the conservation of American land, albeit primarily rural land, for
recreational purposes. His son, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., inherited his father’s commitment and
put that into practice by chairing the Joint Committee on Recreational Survey of Federal Lands
(JCRS), presenting ongoing findings at the National Conference on Outdoor Recreation that first
met in 1924. 8
Under President Calvin Coolidge, the JCRS recruited organizations such as the Amateur
Athletic Association to membership in order to coordinate the nation’s recreation activities.
JCRS also mailed surveys, collected research, and issued reports on the extent of government
land ownership and the public’s use of that land for recreation. In 1926 that land amounted to
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183 million acres in the public domain, of which National Forests constituted 160 million acres,
National Parks ten million acres, with the remainder game preserves and Indian reservations.
Committee members channeled the spirit of Hot Springs, Arkansas in 1832 and the Forest
Reserve Act of 1891 that the threat of private interests required that the “Government should be a
permanent lawn owner for public benefit.” They reported that by 1925 California saw the
greatest number of people by state using public recreation land—six million a year. 9
Throughout its lifespan the JCRS prioritized recreation in the countryside over recreation
in the city. Committee members saw city parks and playgrounds as a municipal matter rather
than a federal one. Likewise, bigger parks and forest preserves needed county and state efforts so
that the Federal land ownership and development efforts could concentrate on “the remaining
wilderness of America.” In 1924 more than twelve million Americans had visited their country’s
federally protected wilderness land. Conference attendees recognized that number was a pittance
compared to the tens of millions more urban dwellers who needed recreation lands within and
close to their cities. But the fractured nature of city governance, political machinery, and
competing private interests frustrated the Municipal Committee, which could issue no concrete
policies for urban recreation compared to committees such as that addressing Federal Land
Policy, which put together a set of clear guidelines for the safekeeping of land for public
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recreation. In the mid-twenties Federal government coordination of urban recreation proved so
unworkable that, unlike other efforts undertaken by recreational reformers, JCRS members felt
they had no choice but to discharge their efforts at recreational expansion within cities by
delegating future coordination to the Playground and Recreation Association of the National
Recreation Congress. 10
On May 8, 1929, the Executive Committee of the National Conference on Outdoor
Recreation held their twenty-fourth meeting and dissolved the agency. Members congratulated
themselves on the ten major recreational and land use studies they had undertaken, but they
noted that four years of work had proven that top-down coordination of recreational planning
proved unworkable given the strong influence private associations such as the Playground and
Recreation Association exercised on local policies, where reports actually became recreational
facilities. The inventorying of the nation’s recreational infrastructure had found both deficiencies
in that infrastructure and no way to proceed with actual reform on the ground. 11
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The nationwide pattern of studying recreation without actually building new facilities for
urban recreation continued under President Herbert Hoover, whose administration further
bureaucratized the study of recreation spearheaded by the JCRS. Hoover is seldom remembered
as a proponent of national infrastructure when compared to the achievements of either his
Roosevelt predecessor or his Roosevelt successor, but that comparison overshadows the reality
that Hoover helped build major projects such as the Boulder Dam and the Los Angeles
Aqueduct. His even more obscure recreational reform legacy owes to the fact that he did little to
actually act on the recreational studies he commissioned when economic collapse forced his
hand to more pressing priorities. That said, mere weeks before the market plummeted on Black
Tuesday, top social policy researchers from across the country met under Hoover’s direction to
sketch out the findings they would publish four years later titled Recent Social Trends in the
United States. 12
In the report’s second volume, J. F. Steiner authored an influential essay titled
“Recreation and Leisure Time Activities.” Steiner opened with a frank acknowledgement that the
public’s burgeoning interest in “competitive sport” previously enjoyed by only the leisured class
posed a particular challenge from a recreational planning point of view because there simply
were not enough facilities near population centers to meet that need. Where there were facilities
for sports in cities, coordination among private associations, civic organizations, public schools,
municipal government departments, state bureaucracies, and ultimately the federal government
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lacked optimal cooperation. Imperfect coordination certainly seemed unavoidable because of the
change in belief among urban planners and landscape architects from the “horticultural” woods
and promenades of the nineteenth-century city parks to the “recreational” or “parks as public
playgrounds” of the first two decades of the twentieth century. Put into practice, that change in
mindset created a huge upswing in playground and recreational park construction across the
country with towns whose population exceeded 30,000 people raising their park land from
76,566 acres in 1907 by nearly two-and-a-half times to 258,697 acres in 1930. That rise outpaced
nationwide urbanization during the same years by roughly 65 percent, but the construction of
parks and playgrounds between 1900 and the 1930 still underserved the recreational needs of the
county’s urban dwellers in large part because those needs had long gone unmet before 1900 and
by the twenties, demand had simply spilled over. By the start of the Great Depression, three out
of four cities in America did not claim a single playground. When averaged across the country’s
population, those findings meant there were three thousand city children per playground. 13
The paucity of adequate recreation space across the nation’s cities owed first and
foremost to a host of specific political and commercial complications similar in character but
unique in kind to each municipality and not to the lack of ideas from recreational reformers. The
most important group of these reformers had first organized in April of 1906 in Washington D.C
to lobby President Theodore Roosevelt and Congress to give them space to build safe and
supervised playgrounds for children in order to keep the kids off the capital’s streets. Their
success in those efforts led to the formation of the organization most responsible for public
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athletics and leisure activities in cities across America prior to the WPA—the Playground and
Recreation Association of America. 14 The association’s officers included Progressive Era
reformers Luther Gulick of New York City, Henry B. F. MacFarland of Washington, D.C., Jane
Addams of Chicago, and Joseph Lee of Boston, along with honorary members Theodore
Roosevelt, Jacob Riis, and Baron E. Von Schenkendorff from Germany. With the nation’s major
cities represented and connections to both the White House—President Roosevelt wrote an
introduction to the group’s inaugural issue—and across the Atlantic, the Playground Association
enjoyed an auspicious beginning. From the start the Association argued that playgrounds forced
children to learn “self-government” and therefore sustained democracy from generation to
generation. To create citizens, reformers such as Joseph Lee believed in a high degree of
paternalism where on the playgrounds, at-risk youths could learn from and imitate adults of the
highest moral caliber. The organization’s early actions focused on the “study” of and advocacy
for urban recreation rather than actually politicking to create new recreational spaces in cities. A
consultancy capacity therefore let the association solicit donations with a modest budget of
$20,000 a year in mind. 15 That budget rose steadily over the coming years, totaling $380,358 in
1928. New initiatives such as the National Recreation School, opened in 1927, secured sizable
portions of the budget, but the primary functions of the organization remained fundamentally
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unchanged after two decades; research, publishing, advocacy, and consulting were where the
association spent its resources. 16
Research gave recreational reformers across the country a very clear view of what
municipal recreation systems should resemble. First and foremost, gone was the City Beautiful
Movement dichotomy of “passive recreation” versus “active recreation,” because parks were
places for any form of recreation so long as supervision existed. Second, every citywide
recreation system needed three essential ingredients: playgrounds for young children close to
schools; parks with athletic fields for communities throughout the city; larger landscaped
preserves linked together across the metropolis by parkways. Third, population density
determined the recreational needs of a community down to the square foot. For example, blocks
of bungalows needed 3 percent of land area devoted to playgrounds, while rows of duplexes
required 5 percent of land area for playgrounds. Every one-mile neighborhood also needed
athletic fields of between twenty and thirty acres. Zooming from the neighborhood to the city
level, such plans equated to one acre of park and playground space for every one hundred
residential acres. Except for Minneapolis, major population centers did not meet those standards.
The densest neighborhoods also tended to have the fewest park and playgrounds acres per
person; yet, as reformers pointed out, land in those neighborhoods also tended to cost too much
to secure enough for a playground, let alone a park. 17
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Reformers thus wanted to focus on partnering with real estate developers to bring parks
and playgrounds, either through the donation of land outright or for a no-cost rental arrangement
that allowed for play supervision by a third party on land owned by the developer, to the
explosion of new low-density subdivisions on the edges of cities. The National Playground and
Recreation Association and like-minded groups wrote off entire older urban core neighborhoods
whose density—by the reformers’ own standards—demanded more recreation space, in favor of
advocating for playgrounds and parks in new low-density places. They reached that decision
because they believed private developers would deliver on promises to build scores of parks and
playgrounds in places with few spaces dedicated to recreation. The results were modest: 134
recreational spaces donated by developers to municipal governments; 72 recreational spaces
owned by developers on which third-party recreation programs could take place; and eight
recreation spaces kept in trust for the public’s use. Recreational reformers had proven themselves
fully capable of identifying a lack of recreational spaces and advocating for new parks and
playgrounds, but during the first three decades of the twentieth century, studies went only so far
in moving city governments to action. 18
The stock market crash of 1929 further undermined the effectiveness of advocacy for
recreational reform—at least until the end of the Hoover administration. President Hoover
struggled to fully grasp the degree of the country’s economic downturn, not to mention the bold
strokes of policy needed to slow the collapse. His best attempt came with legislative action in
1932, which created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) that, among other purposes,
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tried to bolster the building of public works. In what would turn out to be the last months of his
office, President Hoover’s RFC built few of the public works promised. Under his successor,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the RFC became a giant piggybank for loans taken out by public worksminded New Deal agencies such as the Federal Public Works Administration. 19
Roosevelt won the presidency on November 8, 1932. Democrats controlled both Houses
of Congress. Together they wasted no time resuscitating the nation. While the president did not
put recreation near the top of his priorities during his famed “first hundred days,” six months into
his first term he had initiated and ushered through the legislature some of the law that laid the
foundation for the recreational revolution: Congress passed the act that created the Civilian
Conservation Corps on March 31; on May 12 the Federal Emergency Relief Act passed; and on
June 16 the Public Works Administration and the National Recovery Administration became
realities with the passage of the National Industry Recovery Act. Most of these agencies as
Roosevelt’s advisers and Congressional staffers conceived them afforded little in the way of
recreation because the concern centered on the employment generated by large infrastructure
projects such as dams and bridges. 20 That began to change first in 1933 and 1934 with the shortlived Civil Works Administration and more thoroughly beginning in 1935, when the Works
Progress Administration came into existence. Together these two agencies claimed credit for the
construction of 30,000 parks, playgrounds, sports fields, and swimming pools. 21
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A look through Roosevelt’s personal files shows that while in office Roosevelt preferred
to delegate recreational reform to trusted subordinates so that he could focus on more pressing
economic issues affecting the country. Nevertheless, the flood of letters and cables the President
received asking him to attend athletic events that ranged from National Indoor Junior Track and
Field Championships to Dixie League Softball, as well as inquiries for the President to name his
favorite sports and answer various recreation queries, all showed Roosevelt just how much a
nation gripped in depression still cared about sports. 22 For major international contests with
national pride at stake, such as the U.S. Davis Cup tie against Great Britain’s squad in July 1933,
the President might telegraph the team a message of encouragement, but on the whole Roosevelt
did not attend or personally respond to messages from sporting associations or private citizens
regarding athletics, despite his secretary’s assuring the interlocutors of both the President’s
longstanding passion for athletics and his belief that sportsmanship in international competitions
such as the Olympics was an essential ingredient of “American character.” 23 Nevertheless, the
National Recreation Association and other such national organizations interested in the
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furthering of the nation’s playgrounds and parks did have the ear of key Roosevelt subordinates
who passed on the recreational reforms wanted by those associations to the White House. 24
Republican politician-turned-New Dealer John Gilbert Winant provided a crucial link
between recreational reformers and President Roosevelt. Throughout his two terms (1927-1935)
as the Governor of New Hampshire, Winant remained an active officer in the National
Recreation Association at the same time that he supported the various social policy programs the
Roosevelt administration put forward. Winant kept abreast of the latest scholarly literature on
parks and recreation and how best to use leisure time during the 1930s. With titles such as
“Character Last?,” “Recreation and Civic Progress,” “Playground and Child Life,” and “Don’t
Quit Recreation,” the essays Winant read connected a healthy citizenry to robust recreation in the
nation’s cities. 25
The economic challenges confronting every level of municipal spending called the
robustness of that recreation into question. To a nationwide audience reached by the NBC radio
network on August 15, 1933, three recreational reformers spoke of a rise in mental illness and
crime when an underemployed population did not have wholesome recreational activities in
which to spend their increasing free time. Even before the Depression set in, the parks and
recreation department budgets of many cities were comparatively small when compared with the
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entirety of the city budget. New York City, for example, spent around 1 percent of its entire
budget on public recreation during the early 1930s. Percentages of city budgets spent on public
recreation dropped as the Depression worsened. A thousand of the nation’s largest cities spent a
total of $38.5 million on recreation in 1930, and that number fell 28 percent to $28 million by
1932. Cash-strapped cities saw parks and recreation departments as one of the first budgets for
the chopping block, but at the same time they moved incrementally to do so: salary reductions of
5 to 20 percent; the halt of capital projects; layoffs of specialized personnel; sporting goods
inventory reductions; a reliance on hard-to-come-by volunteers. More specifically, between 1930
and 1932 the number of playgrounds across the nation fell from 7,685 to 6,990; sports fields fell
from 1,834 to 1,629; and baseball diamonds fell from 4,396 to 4,151. Even the hours of indoor
recreation facilities dropped, especially in the evening. These reductions took place at the same
time that the public’s attendance at recreational facilities grew: 159 million attendances of
playgrounds in 1929 compared to 236 million attendances in 1932; a 41 percent increase in the
number of visits people made to indoor recreation facilities over the same three-year period.
Between 1931 and 1932, people swimming in city pools doubled. 26 What the numbers told
politicians such as Governor Winant was that cities simply could not put their recreational
houses in order without a major infusion of money from outside the city limits.
Winant also found that recreational planning for the improvement of citizenship was not
a top priority many other seated governors shared in the early 1930s. But the New Hampshire
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governor’s unique access to top Roosevelt subordinates, along with his seat on the board of
directors of the National Recreation and Playground Association allowed him to leverage the
federal government to pay for swimming and recreational facilities within the Granite State in
1933 and 1934—before the WPA came into existence the following year. 27 Outside of New
Hampshire itself, he should not get too much credit for recreational reform that New Deal
agencies headed by more familiar names such as Harry L. Hopkins actually ran; nonetheless,
Winant served as a conduit between private recreation association reformers and the directors of
federal agencies who had the money to make the reformers’ dreams for recreational reform a
reality.
Prior to 1935 the federal government’s partnerships with municipal governments in
improving the recreational infrastructure of cities consisted of stop-gap work and disorganized
efforts. All told, twenty-one temporary and permanent federal agencies had discretion to spend
part of their budgets under the broad rubric of recreation during the New Deal. At least eighty
nationally prominent non-governmental associations also exercised prerogatives over
recreational planning across the nation. 28 Throughout the Great Depression, competition and
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confusion between different governmental entities, let alone private associations, remained to a
not inconsiderable degree, yet the creation of and the powers the WPA would exercise made for
a revolution in recreation all the same. 29
Congress passed the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act on April 8, 1935. That
legislation paved the way for the revolution in recreation because even if only a small portion of
the $4.88 billion dollars Congress authorized found its way into recreation, that number would
still amount to more money for actually building parks and playgrounds than the country had
heretofore mustered for those purposes. 30 Envisioning the wide powers the WPA would yield
under the Emergency Relief Act, Roosevelt reassigned one of his most trusted subordinates,
Harry Hopkins, from the now defunct Civilian Works Administration—which had actually built
a significant number of schools and playgrounds during the late 1933 through early 1934 months
of the temporary agency’s existence—to lead the WPA. 31 Historians tend to look back fondly at
the Federal Writers’, Drama, Music, Arts, and Education Projects of the WPA, not least because
such comparative support today lags so far behind a time when the economy could not have been
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worse. 32 They tend to not even recognize that the impact of the supervised play and recreation
component of the WPA’s Service division actually mattered more to people living in the
Depression because of the sheer numbers that division employed for recreational purposes and
the number of people those employed served.
The WPA was first and foremost a program to put unemployed people to work. Thus,
Hopkins tapped Eduard C. Lindeman to direct the WPA’s early efforts in recreation in the form
of a grand “demonstration program” that employed many people and put them in contact with
many others to gin-up support for the agency. Called the Community Organization for Leisure
Program, WPA recreation department personnel approached local governments with the offer to
train the unemployed or underemployed in recreational supervision and building trades. More
than 75,800 men and women availed themselves of this training during the first years of its
offering—though those actually working for the WPA as recreation workers probably hovered
closer to a third of that total for any given time. Nine out of ten of those recreational workers had
at least a high-school education, while a little under half had attended college. Many had some
worked in recreation before the Depression forced cities to lay off employees. Thirty-eight
percent of WPA recreational workers were women—two percent of whom had played
professional sports. Together, these recreation workers and the young people and adults they
served spent 16,394,300 hours per week by August of 1937 in recreation; 70 percent of those
hours were spent on games and sports, with the rest of hours evenly divided between social and
cultural projects. From the WPA’s point of view, an initial recreation jobs program created good
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will between the agency and local community associations and elected officials. Cooperation
could lead to public works projects built for and paid by partnerships between the WPA and local
project sponsors like community Recreation Councils. Nonetheless, the agency’s initial foray
into municipal public recreation acted as a stopgap to strained city budgets rather than a
wholesale revolution in urban recreation. An emphasis on jobs rather than public works was the
reason for that. 33
At first glance the statistical portrait of the nation’s recreational infrastructure, reported
by the National Recreation Association at the same time the United States’ economy dipped with
the recession of 1937, might have suggested to WPA policymakers that the nation had plenty of
places for youth sports and activities. In 1937, 1,280 American cities owned supervised play
facilities of some kind. In the same year, 1,204 new places for play opened, which brought the
nation’s total recreational spaces to 17,745. A staff of 10,878 volunteers, 37,346 seasonal or parttime workers, and 3,067 fulltime employees worked at those recreational facilities with
$47,933,781.21 in annual nationwide public recreational expenditures. 34 The numbers alone,
however, belied the unequal distribution of those recreational facilities and those recreational
workers. Nowhere in the country did those inequalities appear in sharper relief than in
33
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Los Angeles, and WPA administrator Harry Hopkins thus chose to hold Southern California up
as an archetype for the rest of the country to see the impact the WPA could make on a city. 35
In the 1920s two million Americans left their home regions and moved to California.
Three out of four of those migrants made Southern California their new home; 1.2 million of
them lived in the Los Angeles County, and half of them settled in the city itself. 36 The Great
Depression further spurred migrations en masse to California as a whole and Southern California
in particular—though in the eyes of government officials and boosters, they were migrations of a
totally different character. From 1930 to 1934, more than 300,000 people, most of whom were
displaced central plains farm families, drove their Ford Model Ts to California. Roughly the
same number of “Okies” followed to California over the next five years. The families of the
famous Dust Bowl migration alarmed those already settled in California a great deal, but not to
the degree of those who came unattached. Between 1,000 and 4,000 jobless and single men per
month moved into Los Angeles during the mid-1930s, along with between 200 and 400 boys per
month who might, reformers feared, turn into delinquents. After a ten-week attempt in early
1936 to ban unemployed young men from entering Los Angeles County failed, government
officials soon resigned themselves to the reality that with the infeasibility of keeping people out,
resources would need to be devoted to improving life for those already there and those on their
way there. In total, about 1.2 million migrants entered California between 1930 and 1940, with
the majority settling in Los Angeles County. As the Republican-controlled statehouse battled
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New Deal-inspired reformers on fronts such as the Ham and Eggs Pension Plan, many everyday
Californians themselves held New Deal initiatives at arm’s length. But the demographic change
in the state simply could not go unaddressed by officials at every level of government. Public
works projects administered by the PWA and WPA but with local sponsorship thus made
California as a whole and Southern California in particular a focal point of New Deal
infrastructure improvement and employment initiatives. 37
Workers finished the WPA’s first building project in Los Angeles County on October 5,
1935. Two months later, the agency employed 37,000 people in construction work. The number
of Los Angeles County residents who worked for the WPA dipped and grew depending on the
number of plans for shovel-ready projects local sponsors had locked and loaded for federal
approval. That turned out to be so many that Los Angeles County-based officials took over
unified command and control over planning for most of Southern California—Santa Barbara
County, Ventura County, San Bernardino County, Riverside County, Imperial County, Orange
County, and San Diego County. 38 Whereas New York City received the largest single portion of
WPA money (one out of every seven agency dollars), by incorporating the entirety of the fastest
growing region of in the country into their planning purview, Los Angeles-based planners and
sponsoring committees assumed control of more projects (1,406 building initiatives between
October 5, 1935 and December 31, 1938), spent more WPA dollars ($75,496,456 federal, added
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together with an additional 18.2 percent of matching state and local funds between October 5,
1935 and December 31, 1938), and employed more people (1,001,692 man-months of work
between October 5, 1935 and December 31, 1938) than anywhere else in the country. 39 That
money mattered a great deal, because among the cities who reported their recreational spending
to the federal government during the late 1930s, none could claim their municipal expenditures
rivaled what the WPA was willing to spend on each city throughout the nine regions into which
the agency had divided the country. 40 All a municipality needed was a local sponsor, a state-level
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partner, and the approval of the WPA regional administrator for federal money to move into the
city limits for recreational services and broader public works projects. In Southern California,
that approval came time and again.
Los Angeles was through and through a Western city in that the management of water
trumped all other planning priorities. Whereas environmental activist scholarship might
characterize government-directed hydraulic policy in the West as “creative vandalism,” the
builders of public works in Southern California saw $92 million in money in under three years as
a means to hold back the river. 41 They spent about 30 percent of that money on flood control
measures and storm drains and another 20 percent on sewers and water supply. They also put
Los Angeles on the path to the auto-metropolis it became by spending more than $15 million on
parkways and arterial highways linking different neighborhoods and cities. After water and
highways, recreation comprised the third largest category of WPA project expenditures in
Southern California—just under $14 million and 15 percent of total costs. 42
Los Angeles became the test case for the nation in terms of measuring the impact federal
intervention could make on urban recreational reform for reasons that counted more than dollars
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spent. Unlike most cities that had a short history of and small commitment of municipal
resources to parks and recreation, Los Angeles actually had a rich tradition of and strong
commitment of municipal resources to parks and recreation. Especially robust recreational
heritage was the exception that proved the rule of the recreational revolution.
Los Angeles’ 1889 City Charter established the city’s first Park Commission, and over
the next decade that commission added parks such as Hollenbeck, Eastlake, Westlake, Echo, and
Exposition in what historian Kevin Starr has called “an excellent network of open spaces” very
much in the Progressive tradition of that time. 43 In 1904 the city took public recreation a step
further than any other municipality in the country when the City Council created a Playground
and Recreation Department separate from the Los Angeles Parks Department. The Parks
Department’s mandate allowed for the stewardship of park landscapes, while the Playground and
Recreation Department fulfilled its task of directing all athletic, educational, and cultural
activities on the schools parks and playgrounds. The 1925 Charter of the City of Los Angeles
reaffirmed the independence of those two departments, and between 1925 and 1932 the
Playground and Recreation department grew into the largest organizer of urban recreational
spaces in the world. By 1925 that department controlled nine playgrounds, four swimming pools,
four city mountain camps, and a budget of $5 million, whereas in 1932 those numbers rose to
forty-eight playgrounds, sixteen swimming pools, six mountain camps, and $23 million spent on
the 23,000 people who made use of the city’s parks every day. 44
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Beaches opened to the public proliferated to a degree and were enjoyed by more people
than anywhere else in the United States. Traveling South along the Coast, a traveler would
encounter beaches at Malibu, Santa Monica, Ocean Park, Venice, Playa del Rey, El Segundo
Manhattan, Hermosa, Redondo, Palos Verdes, San Pedro-Wilmington, Long Beach, and the
southernmost Seal Beach. The recreational wonderland of Catalina Island could be reached by a
twenty-three-mile steamer line by the Channel Islands. 45
Parks proliferated but varied a great deal in size, convenience, and recreational focus. Big
Pine Recreational Camp was the largest in the area at 5,557 acres nestled up against the
San Bernadino Mountains. The 3,751 acres of Griffith Park sat in Northwest Los Angeles—a
popular place for tennis, golf, and swimming for the Hollywood crowd. Rowers and anglers
enjoyed Los Angeles’ largest lake in Echo Park. Picnickers, hikers, and motorists found plenty of
fun along 548 acres of trails in Elysian Park. The home park for most Angelinos from the east
side of the city was Hollenback, which gave residents opportunities for tennis and boating.
Lincoln Park, Luna Park, Lookout Mountain, and the Japanese Gardens were all popular places
for reflection and communing with nature in botanic conservatories, mountain trails, and “one of
the largest privately owned animal collections in the world.” The Los Angeles Park Board called
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Westlake Park in the Wilshire district home, and newcomers to Los Angeles liked to congregate
on the twenty-acre lawn of Sycamore Grove Park. Further afield, Pasadena’s Brookside Park
featured a popular bathing pool open to the public. Long Beach’s Bixby Park routinely hosted
the meetings of various civic and social associations. A drive or an electric rail trip brought a
traveler to Eagle Rock Park, known for a stone formation of the nation’s symbol. The crown
jewel of the Los Angeles County park system, however, was Exposition Park. Comparatively
small at 130 acres, Exposition Park’s central location nonetheless made it an easy choice for
headquarters of the 1932 Olympics. Olympic officials repurposed structures such as the
Los Angeles County Museum and the National Guard armory, and enough undeveloped land
existed for the construction of the Coliseum, where the opening and closing ceremonies of the
games would be held. Most importantly, electric train lines, bus routes, and major auto avenues
all fed to the park. 46
The Los Angeles Coliseum was built by the post-World War I city boosters at the
Community Development Association (CDA). Those men defied the public’s unwillingness to
pay for the stadium—opposition voiced by the Municipal League—by getting the city to agree to
lease a sizable acreage of Exposition Park to the CDA, who would then build the Coliseum by
charging $500,000 worth of rents back to the city of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County to use
parts of Exposition Park. That scheme, along with no-interest loans, meant the CDA had the
Los Angeles Coliseum built in 1932, only three years after Southern California voters had said
no thanks to the stadium. That construction showed the ability of Los Angeles Chamber of
46
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Commerce members to make big projects happen in spite of opposition, a crucial demonstration
of power that helped Los Angeles secure the 1932 Olympics from the International Olympic
Committee (IOC). California state bonds totaling nearly $2 million dollars and issued in 1928
made sure the Coliseum measured up to international standards by 1932. 47
The ultimate sports spectacle was the way Los Angeles distinguished its economic
ascendance at a time when other municipalities were slashing their recreation budgets. In 1932
Los Angeles announced to the world that it had arrived as a global city when it hosted the Xth
Olympiad. Begun by the Greeks in 776 B.C.E., ancients conceived of the games as a means for
fostering mutual respect between competing polises and people. Having conquered the Greeks,
the Romans continued the Olympic tradition until the Western Empire’s rapid decline in the
fourth century stopped what had become a only a husk of the Greek games from before the
Common Era. Eastern and Western Europeans revived the Games in the mid-nineteenth century
with the first Games sanctioned by the IOC taking place in Athens in 1896. St. Louis became the
first city in the United States to host the games in 1904, and seven Olympiads later, Los Angeles
became the second. The significance of St. Louis as the “Gateway to the West” and Los Angeles’
status as the “Entertainment Capital of the World” were not lost on the city boosters who lobbied
the IOC for the chance to host the games. 48
The 1932 Olympics also marked a remarkable moment for gender in world sports history.
For the first time in the ancient or the modern games, a substantial number of women competed
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in the games. While outnumbered by their male equals ten to one, the presence of dozens of
women competitors posed a challenge for Olympic planners, given the paternalistic attitudes of
the men who planned the Games at each and every level. The International Olympic Committee
was made up of sixty-four men from forty-three separate countries. Fifty-two countries from
around the world had National Olympic Committees, and every single named member on these
committees was male. So too were the officers of the fourteen International Athletic Foundations
responsible for the rules and regulations of individual sports at the games. The thirty-nine
countries who sent attachés to the Olympics chose men for all of their attaché positions. In the
United States, the honorary members of the 1932 National Olympic Committee included such
dignified men as President of the United States Herbert Hoover, Vice-President Charles Curtis,
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court Charles Evans Hughes, Speaker of the United
States House of Representatives John Garner, Governor of California James Rolph, Chairman of
the Board of Supervisors for the County of Los Angeles Henry Wright, and the one nonAmerican as Life Honorary President, the Founder of the modern Olympic games Baron Pierre
de Coubertin. 49
The twenty-nine men most responsible for the details and execution of the 1932
Olympics, members of the Organizing Committee of the Xth Olympic Games, were mostly
leaders in industry, law, and real estate throughout the greater Southern California area. A quick
glance at the official portraits included in the self-congratulatory materials related to the Games
reveals just how traditional most of these men were. Dressed in their country’s stodgiest formal
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wear to the man, many carried noble titles and preferred to don armed service uniforms if their
military rank warranted such a sartorial choice. The only women to be found were the athletes
from one of the forty countries who sent competitors to the Games, along with the members of
Women’s Clubs who served as the games the “Hostesses of the Olympic Games. 50
Nowhere did the traditional city boosters exercise their authority more strictly than in the
building of athletic facilities for the 1932 Games. A list of those venues included: the Olympic
auditorium was a new construction that sat 12,000 people (about six blocks Northeast of the
Olympic Coliseum); along Grand Avenue was where boxers bouted, wrestlers grappled, and
weightlifters cleaned; polo and other equestrian sports took place at the Riviera Country Club by
Santa Monica, roughly a half an hour away from the Coliseum; fencers crossed swords at a
pavilion next to the Olympic Stadium in the Northeast corner of Exposition Park; a Fine Arts
Building exhibited old masters and the best contemporary art in the Palatial Los Angeles County
Museum of Arts and Sciences right next to the Olympic Coliseum; farther South, Los Angeles
County’s harbor entrance played host to the yachting course; aquatic events took place in the
10,000-seat Swimming Stadium next to the Olympic Coliseum; Long Beach, California, hosted
the rowing events with special electric rail lines and five new boulevards built to bring the trip
from the Olympic stadium to the rowing course down to under three-quarters of an hour; the
Rose Bowl Stadium, a little further afield in Pasadena, also hosted events and up to 80,000
spectators, and connected to the downtown Los Angeles by trolley and bus lines. 51
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Organizers prepared for 1.3 million spectators. Planners revamped the city’s Agricultural
Park into the centerpiece Exposition Park, where both major ceremonies and signature field
events were held. Noting the lack of public transportation compared to other cities the size of
Los Angeles, the one million cars driven within a one-hundred-mile radius of the city, and the
expected increased traffic burden the Olympiad would place on the city’s already stressed
boulevards, Olympic organizers planned to move large crowds swiftly to and from the Olympic
Park grounds. With easy access via streetcar lines built to funnel spectators to the competitions,
Los Angeles residents took advantage of newfound mobility to the improved recreational
facilities long after the Games left town. 52
An ideology of social control over Los Angeles’ booming population underlay the
physical reorientation of city space. Local boosters—charged by the Olympic Committee with
drumming up Los Angeles residents’ support for the games—emphasized the amateur ideal of
“international goodwill,” “sportsmanship,” and most emphatically, “clean living and proper
training of youth.” 53 The day of the Opening Ceremony, July 28, 1932, the President of the
International Olympic Committee addressed a gathering at City Hall and made the connection
between unwholesome play and productive youth quite clear: “It is also liable to give him a false
standard of values…In the great majority of instances the net result is that the young man, on the
very threshold of life, gets a wrong start and is led to adopt false standards which permanently
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interfere with his own fundamental interests in later life.” At the start of international
competition, the top Olympic official wanted to reassure a local government that what the Games
brought to Los Angeles was the exact opposite of the scenario he just described. Instead, a
zeitgeist of amateurism shot through the game, extending down to the youth of the city.
According to officials, the spirit of Olympic competition infused young men with the awareness
of “natural and wholesome” amateur recreation capable of lasting a “lifetime.” 54
The very system of recreational facilities built by Los Angeles city boosters was
supposed to provide that recreation for city residents when, after the competition of the Games
on August 14, 1932, the Commissioners of the Los Angeles Board of Playgrounds and
Recreation assumed authority over the Coliseum and most of the athletic venues built for the
games. 55 Ironically, that very action put the rich tradition of recreation in Los Angeles in
jeopardy. In September of that year, budget-hawk civic leaders pushed for a voter referendum
and City Charter amendment to dissolve the Los Angeles Department of Parks and Recreation as
a separate entity. The City Council defeated those efforts, and the City’s Park Department
absorbed the separate Playground and Recreation Department, but the message of austerity rang
loud and clear. The percentage of the city’s budget spent on public recreation now fell to only
.04 percent, essentially to zero, in late 1932—and at the very moment when double the number
of people had availed themselves of the city’s parks and playgrounds over the previous year. The
partnerships the Playground and Recreation Department maintained with recreationally minded
organizations such as the YMCA, the YWCA., the Boy Scouts, the Friendly Indians, the
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Campfire Girls, the Industrial Recreation Groups, and various Parent-Teacher Associations were
not enough to salvage the city’s recreation agenda. Likewise, hosting both the International
Recreation Congress and the Summer Olympics in 1932 obscured the reality of the city’s budget
shortfall for recreation with spectacles of world-class athletics. Study and spectacle aside,
without an infusion of money from outside the city, Los Angeles’ proud past of urban public
recreation would suffer during the first years of the Depression. 56
Despite the budget shortfall, Los Angeles County Recreation and Social Workers tried to
maintain spaces for organized play. Only a fourth of the County’s 268 playgrounds operated at
capacity just prior to July of 1933. A month later, all old facilities increased the number of youth
served while the recreation commission opened 85 new centers with roughly 50,000 people using
the facilities every week. A promotional campaign and four hundred new staff members reached
out to young people over the next months, raising the average weekly attendance to 240,000.
These staffers worked so diligently because of the widespread belief that supervised recreation
could curb the youth delinquency crisis affecting the nation as a whole and Southern California
in particular. The Juvenile Court of Los Angeles processed more than six thousand delinquents a
year in the early 1930s, with two out of three of those youths remaining supervised wards. The
number of those cases that actually came up for hearings before the Juvenile Court fell from
5,371 in 1929 to 3,546 in 1932—a total decrease of two-thirds of cases in only a four-year
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period. Nevertheless, Los Angeles County recreation workers remained steadfast in their belief
that supervised “Playgrounds Prevent Delinquency.” 57
Fortunately for the cash-strapped City and County of Los Angeles, the federal
government agreed that youth delinquency was a disease curable by the expansion of supervised
recreation. At the end of 1932, the Chief of the Washington D.C.-based Children’s Bureau,
Grace Abbott, sounded the alarm when she shared that across the eighteen U.S. cities that
reported back to her agency, the number of children who had to look outside their household for
food, clothing, and shelter had risen by 25 percent since May of that same year. In the same
article, the Child Welfare League reported that the number of youths they now provided for had
spiked by almost 50 percent in under half a year. A continuation of the trend of family
breakdown seemed unthinkable, in part because there was not much reformers could do to
change that. 58
Improving conditions community-wide made more sense. At the same time as these fire
bells in the night clanged, the Coordinating Council of Los Angeles—which was essentially a
fusion organization made up of leaders of law enforcement agencies such as city police
departments, County Sheriff’s Departments, and County Probation Departments; legal entities
such as the Juvenile Court of Los Angeles County; educational bodies such as the Board of
Education; and various other groups that ranged from the Safety Department of the Automobile
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Club of California, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and the Council of Social
Agencies—all in collaboration with the Rotary Club of Los Angeles—issued an optimistic
assessment of Los Angeles County’s early efforts and future initiatives to combat the threat the
Depression posed to young men in particular. The report opened with former president Hoover’s
“Children’s Charter” which, among other claims, argued that individual communities needed to
look after “every child regardless of race or color or wherever he may live” and that “provides
him with safe and wholesome places for play and recreation.” In his foreword to Why Have
Delinquents?, presiding Los Angeles Juvenile Court Judge Samuel R. Blake riffed off of
Hoover’s manifesto and argued the fault of a delinquent youth lay not with the individual but
with the neighborhoods and cities that failed to provide for the young man’s energies. The voices
of the youths themselves, though filtered through the reformers’ report, said, “there’s no other
place to go and nothing else to do in our neighborhood” other than the “pool hall” and “street
corner” for young men and the dance halls for young women. 59 By 1935 the Federal government
was prepared to make sure the youths in America’s cities had their choice of places to go play.
The WPA revived Los Angeles’ recreational heritage by building 183 separate parks and
recreation projects in and around the city. Prior to the WPA, the city’s poorest neighborhoods
had little in the way of publicly accessible athletic parks and fieldhouses because the private
money and civic association volunteerism needed to bring those facilities into existence put their
resources into places where their leisure class members lived. That began to change in late 1935
and continued to the end of 1938, during which time the WPA secured and improved 3,000 acres
of land in Southern California on which WPA workers poured 37,000 cubic yards of concrete for
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recreational structures. Some of that concrete went into Arcadia Regional Park, which before
1940 was the sole recreational space for the quarter of a million residents of the Arcadia
community just east of Pasadena. Having completed their work on a state-of-the-art tennis
complex, Olympic length swimming pool for international competitions, and a 135-acre, 18-hole
links, WPA administrators could not contain the pride they took in their project, calling Arcadia
“one of the most beautiful and modern [parks] in the country,” well worth the million-dollar
taxpayer price tag. 60
If a driver today left San Marino’s Huntington Library and Gardens and drove four miles
east along Huntington Drive, his route would bisect one legatee of the recreational revolution in
Southland. In between Huntington Drive East and Huntington Drive West sits Civic Center
Athletic Field and Recreation Area right next to the municipal building and City Hall of
Arcadia—an affluent commuter town fifteen miles northeast of downtown Los Angeles. Running
diagonally along the west side of Huntington Drive sits the Santa Anita Park racetrack, where
more than 60,000 spectators wagered on thoroughbred racing under the backdrop of the
San Gabriel Mountains. For those more interested in flora than fauna, the Los Angeles County
Arboretum and Botanic Garden abuts the track. Along the east side of Huntington Drive and just
north of Campus Drive, directly north of Arcadia High School sits the Arcadia Community
Center, the eighteen-hole championship Santa Anita Golf Course, the sixteen-court Arcadia
Tennis Center, the Arcadia aquatics center, and a lawn bowling club, all in the wooded Arcadia
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Park. 61 More than three-quarters of a century after it was built, the park’s recreational facilities
remain fundamentally unchanged in serving the residents of Arcadia.
Some parks kept much of the same character they had before WPA money modernized
them. The difference the New Deal made was great in degree but small in kind. At over 4,000
acres in size, Griffith Park had stood since City Beautiful proponent and local booster Griffith J.
Griffith gave around five square miles of land to the city just before the start of the twentieth
century. The mitigation of class and ethnic conflict through scenic reflection motivated Griffith’s
decision to donate the land, but Griffith also saw in the park the potential for educating the public
in the dramatic arts through the construction of an amphitheater, in the planetary sciences
through the construction of a celestial observatory, and in aviation through the construction of
the Griffith Park Aerodrome. With the exception of the planes, Griffith realized none of his
dreams for the park before his death in 1919; however, over the period of a decade and a half, the
city of Los Angeles funded construction of the Greek Theatre and Griffith Observatory
completed the same year the WPA came into existence. Five years earlier, in 1930, the venerable
landscape design firms of Olmsted Brothers and Harland Bartholomew completed a report for
the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce that argued when compared to other cities, Los
Angeles’ Progressive Era parks under-delivered on both the means for the city’s booming
population to get to the few number of parks that existed. Parks, Playgrounds, and Beaches for
the Los Angeles Region presented the firms as the ones to plan for the recreational future of the
metropolis, but the City’s Chamber of Commerce ultimately decided otherwise by not offering
their support, without which the plan arrived stillborn. In 1931, Los Angeles residents did vote
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for $172 million worth of bonds to acquire and improve city land, but that proved not nearly
enough for a city’s population that had doubled to 2.2 million people between 1920 and 1930
and was expected to double again over the next two decades. Two of the best historians who
have studied city planning in Los Angeles call what followed in the decade after the Parks,
Playgrounds, and Beaches report failed to become policy a “time of limited growth.” Actually,
what the WPA did suggested a path through the competing interests that had hamstrung attempts
at recreational redevelopment found in purportedly comprehensive plans like that of Olmsted and
Bartholomew. 62
Rather than counting on coordination among different civic associations, municipal
government departments, and private interests, the WPA took the more straightforward action of
looking for one local partner in improvement projects. In the case of Griffith Park, the city itself
sponsored a “comprehensive plan for the development of this park,” while the WPA provided
$3,556,190 of the $3,847,570 that went into overhauling the park. Administrators spent a good
deal of that money on manpower and material to turn the park’s scenic spaces into places for
leisure games—principally golf. By 1939, Griffith Park spotlighted three courses complete with
clubhouses and timed sprinkler systems for fairways and greens. Workers built ballfields and
tennis courts too, but the park’s biggest improvement was a free zoo erected on the former
grounds of the runways from which World War I aviators had practiced their takeoffs and
landings. The hilly topography and sheer size of Griffith Park led the City of Los Angeles and
WPA to agree to keep the park focused mainly on outdoor hiking rather than team sports. This
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made the most sense, given the logistical challenges faced by the many people who lived below
the park’s perch atop the east side of the Santa Monica Mountains in actually getting to the
park. 63 From the park’s western edge marked by the conspicuous Hollywood sign to the
Los Angeles Zoo at the Park’s northeast corner, Griffith Park remains California’s second largest
urban park and one of the biggest city parks in the country at more than five times the size of
New York City’s Central Park. 64
Griffith Park’s size, hillside location, and transportation challenges made it an exception
to the more common pattern of WPA parks and recreation projects in cities, emphasizing more
active recreation in individual and team sports over older preferences for leisure recreation in the
form of strolls and promenades. On occasion, those efforts manifested in major improvements to
existing sport venues, as was the case between 1936 and 1938, when hundreds of thousands of
federal dollars poured into the City of Pasadena’s Rose Bowl as part of a larger effort to improve
Brookside Park. Despite the silence on that topic in institutional histories and among
contemporary historians alike, such arrangements amounted to the first nationwide subsidizing of
stadium improvements in United States history. From the WPA’s beginning to end in 1941, it
improved 2,500 substantial sports venues across the country. 65
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Watching sports, even in grand venues, still qualified as passive recreation. Far more
federal money and man-hours for a far greater number of projects prioritized active recreation in
the form of the public’s participation in athletics. As people began moving into the San Fernando
Valley in greater numbers during the late 1920s and 1930s, they put heavy strains on the
undeveloped recreational infrastructures of towns such as Glendale, which in turn reached out to
the WPA to help build municipal recreation centers. In Glendale’s case, city residents received
$650,732 in Federal money for 560,000 cubic feet for an indoor entertainment complex and
Olympic-length natatorium. In the Gateway Cities such as Downy and Norwalk, encountered
traveling south by rail from Glendale along the banks of the Los Angeles river, the WPA built
basketball courts and horseshoe courts for suburbs with then comparatively dense populations.
Not already having the land in hand did not necessarily forestall the WPA’s willingness to work
on a project. In 1935, for example, all of West Hollywood—an area including such famous
thoroughfares as Sunset Blvd., Melrose Ave., and Santa Monica Blvd.—had no parks or
playgrounds despite the area’s wealthy and influential residents in the entertainment business.
Los Angeles County demolished twenty-three building to make room for Plummer Park’s seven
tennis courts, various athletic fields, and the 10,000-square-foot Great Hall built by the WPA for
indoor athletics and social gatherings. A line-by-line accounting by the WPA of their recreation
projects in Southern California revealed that the agency thought parks, playgrounds, and pools
the best use of federal dollars in fulfilling the desires of local project sponsors. 66
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From both the local sponsor’s point of view and the federal government’s point of view,
Progressive Era places for scenic reflection were undesirable during a time of mass
unemployment. People needed an environment adapted to the crisis of expanded leisure time the
Great Depression had created. Supervised sports were the key to that. 67 In making supervised
sports paramount to national recovery and reform, the recreational revolution catalyzed change
in the most traditional of sports. In no popular sport did those changes arrive with so much
intensity as in the sport of tennis. In no place were those changes focused in sharper relief than in
Southern California.
The conventional wisdom held that Southern California produced the highest proportion
of tennis players because of year-round warm temperatures and sunny weather. Favorable
climate was a necessary precondition for topflight tennis, but the more unique factor that
mattered in Southern California producing so much top tennis talent was the concentration of
premiere tennis facilities that allowed more people to take up the game. Most cities across
America counted a single grouping of public park courts along with one to two private tennis
clubs. By contrast, Los Angeles had twenty first-class tennis facilities with a dozen or so more
scattered throughout Southern California. Moreover, the focus of the New Deal’s recreational
revolution in Southland gave Los Angeles the highest concentration of municipal tennis courts in
the country. Talented junior players eventually found their way to private clubs thanks to

listed), pp. 201-205, 207, 219, Call# R6205.U59002, Department of Science, Technology & Patents, Los Angeles
Public Library Local History Collection, Los Angeles, California.
67

County of Los Angeles: Department of Recreation Annual Report, 1940-194, Folder A.4. County Agencies, Box
5, RG69, Records of the Work Projects Administration, NARA-II.

142
subsidies given by the Southern California Tennis Patrons Association, but the vast majority of
players first learned the game on public park courts. 68
Nationally ranked players such as Bob Rogers, Mike Franks, Noel Brown, Dick Skeen,
and Carl Earn all trained and taught on the storied La Cienega courts, whose bucolic setting and
locker room facilities rivaled that of any private club. Ellsworth Vines and Les Stoefen learned
their tennis at Griffith Park. Thanks to Pancho Gonzales’s fame, the former black sheep of
Los Angeles’ tennis parks, Exposition Park, became the citywide focal point for municipal
players with Willis Anderson, Jimmy McDaniels, Gilbert Shea, Herb Flam, Hugh Stewart, and
Jacque Virgil forming a regular training group on those courts. A reputation as a fine player was
enough to lead to invitations to play at private clubs throughout Southern California, whereas in
other parts of the country, particularly the East Coast, a focus on enforcing club regulations on
members and their guests acted as an impenetrable class barrier that never existed to the same
degree in Southern California. Players generally expected invitations to play at the North
Hollywood courts, the West Side Club, the Poinsettia’s courts, the Beverley Wilshire, 25th and
Santi Monica, the Hillcrest Club, the Altadena Club, and, the most important of them all, the
Los Angeles Tennis Club. Ted Schroeder, Jack Kramer, Don Budge, Beverley Baker Fleitz, and
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scores of other topflight talent all played at the clubs in addition to occasional park play. Playersturned-administrators such as Perry Jones ran leagues such as the Perry Jones All-Stars, which
pitted top junior talent against university players at the UCLA and USC tennis courts. During the
year, Southern California held tournaments that amounted to fifty-two weeks of the calendar,
including the famed Winter Tennis League that kept players competing when the rest of the
country took the season off. Climate did allow for that league, but, again, without the players and
the organization, Southern California would have had a lot of tennis players, not a lot of world
class tennis players. The recreational revolution was the key to all of that. 69
One further development completed the recreational revolution in the United States and
gave professional tennis a gentle push from the touch-and-go tours of the prewar years to the
more profitable tours of the postwar period. As the nation prepared for World War II, Southern
California became the epicenter of wartime production for the massive Pacific theatre. 70 The
scores of war industries workers and soldiers needed places to recreate when they were not in the
factory or drilling for combat. With the U.S. Congress’s formal declaration of war on Japan
issued December 8, 1941, army camps in Southern California literally sprang “into being
overnight,” in the words of an exasperated WPA recreation administrator. In the final year and a
half of its existence, the WPA public works building projects tapered as men joined the armed
forces and unemployment numbers fell. Yet in areas of the country where populations increased,
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the WPA ratcheted up recreational commitments. The most dramatic increase occurred in the
counties of Southern California. 71
The degree to which the recreational revolution took place in different cities did not cause
the population upswings in certain states any more than the population upswings in certain states
caused the building of recreational spaces in the cities within those states. But in the middle of
economic troubles and war, the coordination of local organizations along with municipal, county,
state, and federal officials fundamentally redeveloped the recreational landscapes of the nation in
a way that established the mass participation of any American who wanted to play individual or
team sports. The population centers that desperately needed and received new recreational spaces
became the epicenters for athletic excellence that increasingly took the form of professionalism
over amateurism. American entry into World War II hastened that trend as amateur tennis
players who grew up playing on recreational revolution public tennis courts turned professional
to travel throughout the country to entertain troops and a war-burdened population hungry for the
distraction offered by popular entertainment.
Modern tennis and modern sport began in Britain. By the 1930s, however, modern tennis
and modern sport were made in America thanks to the federal government. With the New Deal,
cities such as Chicago presented public parks and many small playgrounds with one if not
multiple tennis courts. In 1935, estimates were that 115,000 people swung a racquet on the city’s
public courts, a roughly equal number competing at private clubs, and a substantial but
undetermined number playing pickup matches on empty lots. Eager to spread the game, Park
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District officials and educators pitched tennis to the masses as “one of the most valuable sports in
improving body and mind.” 72
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CHAPTER FOUR
TENNIS MOBILIZES FOR WAR
Tennis mobilized for war in the late 1930s and the first half of the 1940s, first within
itself and then as part of the great military and political conflict of the mid-twentieth century.
Spurred by the recreational revolution of the New Deal but in different degrees in different
locales, the USLTA regional and sectional associations competed among one another for control
of the Association’s national policies and treasuries. Hard economic times incentivized top
amateur players who previously would likely have remained amateurs to look to tennis for a
source of livelihood. That meant an increased number of professionals compared to the previous
decade and heightened competition among these touring players for the limited dollars
Depression-weary consumers had to spend on entertainments. Just at the time when the
professionals had the numbers and prestige to further challenge the authority of the USLTA to
bar money in the game, the professionals splintered apart rather than forming a solid front to
advance their interests for open competition between themselves and amateurs at the
Association’s member clubs. World War II effectively ended international competition in Europe
and throughout the British Commonwealth. The game fared better in the United States, as the
most popular amateur and professional players found opportunities to play their sport as the
fulfillment of their military duty. Despite the elimination of the formal professional tour, tennis
amateur and professional champions spread the game widely from 1941 to 1945. In so doing, the
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war years created public interest necessary for the popular barnstorming professional tours that
followed in the late forties and fifties.
Before the recreational revolution, access to courts served as the primary barrier limiting
who could and who could not succeed in tennis competition. Money allowed but did not
guarantee access. Individual and largely idiosyncratic interest in tennis mattered a great deal too.
Francis “Frank” Townsend Hunter, the 1924 Olympic Champion and one of the most
accomplished players during the sporting heyday of the 1920s, spoke of how his father built and
maintained the only private court in affluent Westchester County, New York—and one of only a
handful of personal tennis courts in all of the country at the turn of the century. Most weekends
and holidays Frank’s father hosted work associates and friends from New York City at his New
Rochelle home, where the men played matches and discussed business decisions. Young Frank
watched the men play and sprang onto the court to practice with friends the moment the adults
vacated the premises. The fact young Frank often did not get on the court for days at a time when
the men played made little difference on his training, because even a court with limited
availability proved far better for developing a game than the commonplace situation of no court
at all. 1
Gardnar Mulloy, a future number-one U.S. men’s player during the 1940s, also learned to
play tennis on a homemade court constructed by his father. Robert Barnum Mulloy, remembered
as a “Miami pioneer,” built the court for him and his friends to play on; however, like in
Townshend Hunter’s case, the eleven-year-old Gardnar often found himself playing the second
half of a doubles team. Playing with the men put Gardnar on the fast track. Starting to play in
1
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1924, Mulloy beat the best junior players in Dade County and in the Florida State
Championships over the next few years. Such a quick rise to the top of junior tennis in the warm
weather state of Florida was not testament to Mulloy’s innate ability; rather, it was the reality
that with few tennis courts around, those who had access to a private court held a big and rare
advantage over their potential competition. Such advantages evaporated quickly for Mulloy,
however, as the collapse of the Florida housing boom in 1926 served as a harbinger for the later
and greater economic busts to come in the next several years. Robin Barnum Mulloy’s Miami
Lumber Company went belly-up when contractors’ orders for Dade County pine trees ceased.
Like other business owning families, the Mulloys lost much of their position and privileges,
limping through the Depression and relying more heavily than ever before on federal
government intervention in their everyday lives. 2
Doris Hart, the number one ranked player in the world in 1951, had that very experience
as a child. Born in St. Louis on June 20, 1925, Hart and her family moved to Miami in 1929. Six
years later Hart underwent surgery at a Miami hospital where her doctor prescribed tennis at the
newly built public courts next to the hospital as the key activity to recuperate her. Hart’s parents
bought her a $2.98 racquet, and she went with one of her older brothers to play every day on the
courts that were free and open to everyone which just a short time earlier had not existed. They
rode the bus to the courts after school, trained until suppertime, and sometimes went back after
dinner to play as a mixed doubles team in evening league competition on Miami’s municipal
courts. On weekends they played for six hours per day. Doris Hart developed further by traveling
2
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throughout the Southern states and competing on both private and public courts that held a few
tournaments for juniors and frequent tournaments for adults in what competitors called the
“Southern Circuit.” As a seventeen-year-old, she won the 1942 Junior National Championship in
Philadelphia at the Longview Cricket Club. She defended her title the next year in her last match
of junior competition. A career Grand Slam in singles, doubles, and mixed-doubles followed for
Hart in the late 1940s and early 1950s. She received accolades from civic societies from Coral
Gables to Los Angeles and honors from publications such as the Woman’s Home Companion and
the Los Angeles Times. She earned her tennis titles at the grandest private clubs that hosted the
biggest tournaments, but for Hart and other players of her generation, their tennis all started on
democratic courts built with taxpayer funds. 3
The United States Lawn Tennis Association echoed the Chicagoans’, the Floridians’, and
the New Yorkers’ excitement with the growth of the game in the city. “The overwhelming
majority of millions of players in this country first played the game on a public court,” opined
USLTA official Howard Burser in 1950. A survey of municipal courts, however, found that six
of the eight cities lagged far behind Chicago or Los Angeles’ 160 courts in playgrounds alone.
Crucial to the upkeep and growth of the sport was “a constant stream of new players,” and the
primary responsibility of introducing the country’s urban youth fell to local park districts and
recreation commissions. The survey identified seven challenges most cities failed to meet: first,
making courts accessible; second, charging reasonable court fees; third, providing instruction;
fourth, opening locker rooms and showers for players; five, maintaining playable courts; six,
3
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operating a junior development program; seven, running tournaments so juniors could experience
competition. Without providing specific assistance to any city, the USLTA nonetheless
recommended local organizations address each of the seven issues. 4
The fact the USLTA identified issues to address at all was a testament to how robust the
recreational revolution in America was when compared to other nations that did not experience a
similar building boom. In spite of obvious differences in population distribution, as well as
political, economic, and social history, Australia and the United States had enough in common in
the middle decades of the twentieth century to make comparisons in their production of worldclass tennis talent instructive rather than inchoate. Shared and decades-long traditions in British
sports, a public passionate about these sports, locations with year-round sunshine and warm
weather, topflight coaching from former champions, and numerous private clubs for moneyed
elites and their guests, all meant that both Australia and the United States produced a more or
less equal number of world class players before the Open Era in 1968. Minor distinctions aside,
the real difference between the two countries in terms of their tennis came not so much in the
why or how but in the when. Collapsing the categories of tennis professionals and the top
amateurs—an analytical move necessary for comparison but that gives short-shrift to very real
differences between these two levels of play in the minds of historical actors—shows that on the
whole America saw a bump in top tennis talent in the late 1930s, 1940s, and the first half of the
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1950s, compared to Australia before the Australians effectively closed the gap by the
mid-1950s. 5
That the United States peaked earlier owed to the pioneering junior development program
of the USLTA sectional associations such as the SCTA and to the recreational revolution that
built so many accessible courts when compared to Australia of the pre-war years. When tennis
came to the U.S. from Britain, it had been a game for the wealthy, but thanks to the recreational
revolution, by the late 1930s it had become a game for the middle class and the most promising
talent from the working class. The Australian amateur champion Fred Stolle noted that by
contrast, Australian tennis did not boom until later into the 1940s and 1950s when enough courts
became available. Unlike America, which by that time had a quarter-century of junior
development programs run by administrators trained in urban recreation, tennis in Australia
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during the country’s first push to real international prominence began because of the game’s
popularity as a “local and family-oriented pastime” enjoyed “with your dad on some distant
courts.” 6
The great Australian Champion Margaret Smith Court played tennis with family and
friends about 1952 as a ten-year-old. That timing meant that young Court could take advantage
of the postwar economic boom in Australia which saw the upswing in recreational building
similar to what America had begun to experience almost two decades earlier. From a poor family
in a small town named Aubrey that straddled Victoria and New South Wales, Court nonetheless
had access to twenty-four grass courts, which effectively guaranteed she could play anytime she
wanted to. Constant competition against teenage boys and men honed Court’s skills to a point
that she attracted the attention of tennis champion Frank Sedgman, who offered Court access to
his gym and training facilities in Melbourne. Then fifteen years old, Margaret accepted and
moved to Australia’s sporting capital, where she lived and worked at a boarding school when she
was not training. Two years later she won the Australian National Championships as a minor
where she beat the world’s number-one ranked player, Maria Bueno, in the finals in 1959. That
victory launched Margaret into international orbit, where she stayed, spanning the globe’s
tournaments for the next decade. 7
The career of a second and even more internationally visible Australian Champion also
exemplified the transnational impact the 1930s American recreational revolution had on world
sports after 1940. Frank Sedgman, a future finalist in or winner of all four Major Singles
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Championships in addition to a topflight professional whose career began in 1953 and extended
through the fifties, was born on October 27, 1937, in the Melbourne suburb of Mont Albert in
Victoria, Australia. Sedgman candidly recalled that the world-class Americans who played Davis
Cup in the 1940s personally “inspired” him and his entire generation of Australian players who
then took it upon themselves to improve their own games to challenge the United States. For
their part, the Australians competed well, winning the Davis Cup in 1950. Sedgman himself also
enjoyed tremendous success in America but not without initial difficulty. “I found the Americans
to be very tough on their home courts,” he said. By that Sedgman meant both the quality of
competition, particularly in the big East Coast grass-court tournaments held at Orange, New
Jersey, Newport, Rhode Island, West Chester, Forest Hills, New York, and Boston,
Massachusetts, as well as the actual kind of courts he played on in the California tournaments.
Unlike the older and mostly private grass courts of the East Coast, America’s West Coast
featured cement courts built with public money during the thirties. Before coming to play in
California in 1948, Sedgman had never played on hard courts. Along with several tournament
titles, Sedgman brought back with him to Australia the positive impact that government
spending, equality of opportunity, and concrete could have on a nation’s athletic achievements. 8
Coaching was also a key ingredient to the development of topflight tennis talent. Here, as
elsewhere, Australia followed the example of the United States, even improving upon it when the
famous coach and Davis Cup captain Harry Hopman won the 1950 Davis Cup and successfully
defended that title fifteen times over the next twenty years. But that consistent success came
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later, after coaches and teaching professionals in the United States had set the example. Dick
Skeen was one of these early coaches. He grew up in Winnsboro, a little hamlet in East Texas, in
the second decade of the twentieth century. His father was very prosperous by small town
standards—owning a large share in the county bank, a small five-and-dime store, and various
tenant farms. After Skeen’s mother’s death, his father remarried a woman who despised the
young Skeen and physically abused him. Skeen spent his summers away from his stepmother’s
beatings working on one of his father’s farms with little in the way of recreational sports
prospects. Tennis certainly was too “sissy” of a sport for a Texas boy to take up. In 1918,
however, Skeen’s father moved the family to Southern California, bought a large house and lot
for $14,500, and by 1919 had flipped the house for a $100,000 profit. Skeen began school at the
Selma Avenue Grammar School and failed miserably at physical education. Down the street
from his school along Hollywood Boulevard sat the Hollywood Hotel where, before Beverly
Hills grew into the home for the nation’s screen actors, the biggest names in silent film lived.
Skeen bummed around the court behind the hotel more to catch sight of the stars than for the
tennis. He would also collect tennis balls hit over the fence, and on one occasion was given a
racquet by Bert Lytell after the comedian cracked the wood frame during play. Skeen liked
swinging his broken racquet, and when he earned enough money from his Los Angeles Times
paper route, he bought a new racquet and tennis shoes. 9
Skeen had a difficult time finding a place to play, though. In the early 1920s, all of
Los Angeles had only four courts open to anyone, and the town of Hollywood had only three.
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Fortunately for Skeen, Hollywood High School, where he began attending made two of those
courts available. Before school and during his lunch hour, Skeen hit on the school’s court, hardly
noticing the decrepit condition of the concrete he treaded over. What Skeen had noticed,
however, was that next to no one in burgeoning Los Angeles County taught tennis for money. So
in 1931 Skeen convinced the parents of thirteen pre-teen and teenagers to let him try teaching
their children tennis lessons on the weekend. Skeen’s success with those kids led him to a $10per-month salary as a tennis professional, instructing the five members of the Pasadena Tennis
Club. While he helped grow the club’s membership to fifty in short order, Skeen still faced the
difficult reality that the metropolitan area had relatively few public or semi-public courts. He
therefore spent most of his time teaching juniors at Bart Wade’s private court and instructing
Beverly Hills and Santa Monica resident movie stars—including Bing Crosby, Gary Cooper,
Cary Grant, Fred Astaire, Joseph Cotton, Johnny Weismuller, Merle Oberon, Norma Shearer,
Dolores del Rio, Hugh O’Brian, and Cornel Wilde—on the movie stars’ private courts. 10
By the late 1930s, with the proliferation of public tennis courts across the country, the
popularity of the game had risen to the point that Skeen joined a tennis professional exhibition
tour in 1939 across the United States and Canada. During the war years he taught for a time in
Palm Beach, Florida, and with the conclusion of the fighting he went to France and Italy to teach,
instructing the Mexican Davis Cup team in 1946 through 1948. He returned to teaching in
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Southern California that same year, and over the next two decades taught at and managed a
variety of clubs up and down the Golden State. 11
Mercer Beasley was an even more influential American tennis coach because of his
ability to locate and develop juniors capable of promising professional careers. Beasley first
played tennis in 1893 on a grasscourt built by his father at the family’s New Jersey home. He
struggled because his poor distance vision made spotting the ball difficult, but he seemed to
grasp the technicalities of proper stroke production. Over the next few decades Beasley honed
communicating the best way to hit the ball to college players at Princeton, Tulane, and the
University of Miami. His real talent was spotting potential in young players that no one else saw,
as was the case of the eleven-year-old Frank “Frankie” Parker, whom Beasley first noticed at
Milwaukee Town Club in 1925 and, who, under Beasley’s instruction, went on to win top junior
tournaments, two major men’s single titles, and join the professional tour in 1949. In 1925
Beasley happened across an even more promising talent in Southern California. Having assumed
the coaching position at Pasadena High School, Beasley needed one more player to complete his
squad. Someone mentioned he should go by the local bakery, where he found a long and limber
teenager named Ellsworth Vines. 12
Born in Los Angeles in 1911 meant that when Vines began playing tennis in the mid1920s, courts were in far shorter supply than they would be a decade later. Fortunately for Vines,
Beasley had some pull at the Los Angeles Tennis Club, which offered talented junior players like
11
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Vines discounted junior or association memberships at $2 or $3 per month, sometimes without a
$25 joining fee. Such a subsidy put the Club’s sixteen courts within reach for youngsters like
Vines, who now had access to the best practice partners in the city along with the biggest
tournaments in Southern California that the LATC routinely held. After only a few years of
routine instruction from Beasley, weekly practice on the Club’s courts, and periodic competition
in smaller tournaments, Vines established himself as one of the top Southern California players.
The USLTA national office even took notice in 1930 when Vines became the number-one player
in Southern California and climbed into the top ten in the Association’s national rankings. Over
the next two years, Vines continued to dominate both Southern California tennis and tennis
throughout the United States, winning all the big tournaments in his home state as well as the
United States Nationals at Forest Hills in 1931 and 1932. After traveling to play tennis overseas
for the first time in 1933, where he reached the quarter-finals of the Australian Championship
and won the title at Wimbledon, Vines felt no one in the amateur ranks could rival him, so he
accepted an offer to compete against Bill Tilden on the professional tour. 13
Tilden remained a consummate entertainer who continued to draw fans to the tour’s
matches even though his game had declined since his 1931 World Professional Championship
and his 1932 tour victory over the German professional Hans Nusslein and the New Yorker
Vincent Richards. Nusslein defeated Tilden in the short 1933 tour, and Vines soundly beat
Tilden 47 matches to 26 matches in their more robust 1934 encounter. Vines was simply
younger, and thanks to the discipline he received from Beasley and Perry T. Jones in the junior
13
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development program in Southern California, he came to the professional tour with a great
degree of personal discipline that had never existed in Tilden and certainly had faded a quarter of
a century into Tilden’s playing career. Vines did not drink or smoke, he socialized but did not
chase the girls at the parties put on for the professional players, and he saved his money; while
Tilden always seemed short on cash despite the adequacy of their gate receipts when divided
among only four professionals. “I can remember traveling in the spring and the summer of 1934
when we played sixteen nights out of seventeen days, and must have covered two or three
thousand miles,” said Vines. 14
Entering his prime, Vines was prepared for such a grueling schedule but the over-fortyyear-old Tilden was not; nonetheless, Tilden both promoted the tour, along with his business
partner Bill O’Brien, and helped draw the fans into the stands based on his historic reputation as
an entertaining player. At the end of 1934 they modified the format into a national doubles
exhibition with Tilden and Vines beating the Frenchmen Henri Cochet and Martin Plaa along
with Lester Stoefen and Bruce Barnes. Without the return of the Frenchmen the following year,
Tilden modified the tour into a more decentralized format that resembled short exhibition tours
and round robin play. Separating Vines from Tilden made business sense for “Big Bill,” who
could pair himself with a capable but less strong player like George Lott. Vines toured separately
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against Lester Stoefen and a few other professionals, and then the tour exhibitions would meet
for a round robin event. Tilden won both of his individual tours in 1935 and 1936, as did Vines,
the latter of whom won the final round robins for both those years. Clearly the better player,
Vines relied on Tilden’s promotional abilities until a player came along who could challenge the
Californian on a competitive tour. At that point they would not need Tilden’s organizational
skills, reputation for theatrics, and pedigree as a past champion, but could draw a crowd on the
quality of the tennis alone. 15
The challenger that came along was Fred Perry, who remarked that “like most players” in
England before 1935, he had grown up playing tennis in the private clubs with the “white
company of tennis stars.” Perry attended Ealing County School, where the boys played cricket
and soccer but no tennis because the game did not arrive in British schools until around 1933.
But Perry found an old racquet at around fourteen years of age that he took to play at the
Brentham Garden Suburb Club, the Middlesex Championships contested at Herga Club at
Harrow, and the United Kingdom’s top junior tournament at Queen’s Club. His big break came
when the Herga Club began subsidizing their most promising youngsters. This assistance was far
less formal than the better organized amateur sectional associations and patrons organizations
like the Southern California Tennis and Association and Southern California Tennis Patrons
Association in the United States. Perry in particular benefited from the help of Mr. A.R. “Pops”
15

“Helen Jacobs Not Even Considering Pro Offer,” St. Petersburg Independent, January 4, 1935, p. 10. “When the
Pros Were Amateurs,” American Lawn Tennis 28, no. 11 (November 20, 1934): 35; “Pros at Loggerheads,”
American Lawn Tennis 28, no. 14 (February 20, 1935): 34; “Some Highlights on Tilden Troupers,” American Lawn
Tennis 28, no. 15 (March 20, 1935): 21; “Peace Among the Pros,” American Lawn Tennis 29, no. 2 (May 20, 1935):
45; “Famous Tours of Tennis History,” typescript, no date or author listed, Greg Gonzales private archive, Phoenix,
Arizona; Ellsworth Vines Interview, Oral History Collection, ITHF, Newport, Rhode Island.

160
Summers, who helped the junior work his way into the Chiswick Park Club starting in 1928.
There he played many of the best adults in England, and the quality of his game rose swiftly. The
following year he qualified for Wimbledon—the draw still dominated by English club players—
where he lost in the early rounds. He fared far better in his 1930 season, with late tournament
finishes in both Wimbledon and the British Hard Court Championships played at Bournemouth,
securing him the backing of the British Lawn Tennis Association, who sponsored him on a tour
of the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. 16
Perry excelled in this international competition and began a lifelong love affair with the
United States. He traveled with fellow players Leslie Godfree, John Olliff, Harold Lee,
Ermyntrude Harvey, and Phoebe Holcroft Watson on a coed team remarkable for its gender
progressiveness when compared to tours other sports took in the 1930s. The players traveled
aboard the finest ocean liners, stayed at some of the United States’ finest homes such as the
Beacon House owned by Commodore Arthur Curtiss James of Newport, Rhode Island, and
yachted with some of the wealthiest men and women in the Americas. In terms of tennis, the
English ladies outclassed their American competition, while the American men did better than
Englishmen with Perry, the best of the British bunch, making only the fourth round of the
national singles at Forest Hills. The British men had a round of excuses such as the “poor thin
quality” of the grass growing on the American courts when compared to English lawns, but Perry
put it more accurately that by the mid-thirties the “standards of American lawn tennis is the
highest in the world.” Britain and France could field a fine Davis Cup squad of four to six
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players, but only America could put dozens of topflight competitors in a draw. That competition
and the British Lawn Tennis Association’s money pushed Perry to return to play the American
amateur circuit year after year. 17
By the 1933 to 1934 season Perry realized that the best players in the world were not the
amateurs like himself playing for the Davis Cup but the “Tilden Troupe” of Bill Tilden,
Ellsworth Vines, Henri Cochet, Vincent Richards, Hans Nusslein, and Karel Kozeluh. Perry not
only respected the game of these men but also their grit in that they subsisted on their own ability
rather than on the “underground sources” of money and “shamateur” practices amateur players
and amateur associations routinely practiced. At that time he defended that practice not only
because he took that money himself on which to live, but also because he believed subsidizing
players from outside of “the moneyed and leisured” was the only way to reach “world preeminence in the game.” Of his contemporaries ranked in the top twenty in the world, only the
Frenchmen Jean Borotra had made a business career for himself outside of family inheritance
and amateur association allowances, whose own businesslike approach to collecting cash from
their member clubs meant more than enough money to distribute to a half-dozen of their
country’s top competitors. Perhaps because “Open Tennis” seemed a real possibility at that time,
widely discussed in the press, Perry decided to remain an amateur, thinking the International
Lawn Tennis Federation would resolve his dilemma for him. When that governing body’s
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members decided to continue the prohibition between amateur and professional competition,
Perry decided the time was not right to turn professional despite his observations. 18
Two years later was the right time for Perry. He decided to turn professional because he
felt he had nothing left to prove in the amateur ranks and had never received the respect he
deserved from the British Lawn Tennis Authorities. Where one came from mattered in England
like it did in America, and even though Perry’s family had some money, his roots were “the
North Country rather than the old-school-tie country” of Sir Samuel Hoare and the other leaders
of the British Lawn Tennis Association. He gave those men four Davis Cup titles and British
Singles Champion of Wimbledon three times by 1936, and they never batted an eye at the
personal and psychological toll managing such high national expectations for his country had
had on the North Country lad. Turning professional was a way for Perry to make tennis personal
again—and get paid for doing that. 19
On November 6, 1936, at Wall Street offices of the firm Donovan, Leisure, Newton &
Lombard, he accepted Bill Tilden’s $100,000 guarantee to play tennis against Ellsworth Vines in
a twenty-two week tour. That agreement took Vines by surprise because he had traveled to Japan
for a series of international tennis exhibitions. The professional champion Vines and the amateur
champion challenger Perry finally connected over the phone with Perry making the pitch to
Vines: “Listen, Ellie, would you like to make some money?” They both did, as did Tilden and
the other professional players, but so too did the group of investors Tilden put together to front
18
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the cash to guarantee Perry the $100,000 necessary to lure him from the amateur ranks. Given
the peripateticism of the professional tennis tour during the thirties, these backers did not expect
a return on their investment. “If we make any money out of this I’ll give you a horse’s ass in
diamonds,” said one. But Perry brought with him not only a top reputation as a player but also
international connections to well established lines of credit in London. In particular, he secured
coverage from the famous insurance syndicate Lloyd’s of London to mitigate the risk of match
cancellations from the exacting toll the grueling schedule placed on the players’ bodies. 20
Over the next two years Perry and Vines played each other approximately 350 times and
forged a friendship that lasted a lifetime: They reinvested sizable sums of their individual
incomes in their tour, where Vines managed the finances in America and Perry managed their
accounts overseas; they mutually owned and ran the Beverly Hills Tennis Club in Southern
California; they entered into various other joint ventures, all without a contract when it came to
each other. All the while they competed hard against one another on the court. Their 1937 tour
opened at Madison Square Garden on January 7 to the unfurling of the Union Jack for Perry and
Old Glory for Vines as dueling musicians struck up “God Save the King” and “The StarSpangled Banner” to the 18,000 fans in attendance. They made $52,000 that opening night and
the nationalism narrative played well with the spectators who came out in droves night after
night. 21
That public interest, along with the money that came with it, kept the professionals to
their vagabond schedule. Each evening’s play featured a warm-up match between two undercard
20
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professionals, a two-out-of-three or three-out-of-five (depending on the size of the city) main
event between Perry and Vines, and a two-out-of-three doubles rubber to conclude the evening.
The players then rushed to catch a midnight train, still wearing their sweats, and rode the four or
five hundred miles they usually traveled between matches. The morning schedule consisted of
breakfast, press conferences, and local promotional duties before the players finally took some
solid hours of sleep at their hotel before waking up in the late afternoon, eating again, pitching
the match one more time, usually over radio, and then heading for the arena or gymnasium to
warm up for the primetime match. Sometimes the matches went late and the players drove
themselves through the night to the next tour stop—often on the brink of exhaustion. On one
occasion, Vines and Perry got pulled over on the Illinois and Wisconsin border when the former
ran a stop sign traveling 85 miles an hour. A search of the car produced dozens of tennis racquets
and balls that secured the players’ release with a small cash gift to the local policemen’s
benevolence fund. Traveling through the Southwest, Tilden once flipped his car and decided to
leave it, hitching a ride with Perry and Vines so he would not miss the start of their match that
evening. Itinerancy bred solidarity among the players, all of whom also shared ownership stakes
and some logistical duties in the tour. The onus in 1937 fell hardest on Perry, because as the
challenger to the champion Vines, people came primarily to watch those two gentlemen play,
having been unable to see their rivalry since late 1933 when Vines transitioned into the
professional ranks. Vines’s periodic ailments and injuries meant that Perry sometimes found
himself playing ten nights without a rest. 22

22

Ibid., 113-6.

165
As a foreigner, Perry also shouldered additional challenges that Vines, Tilden, and the
other American players avoided. Chief among those problems was that of taxes. Players from the
United States who kept a permanent residence there simply reported their income and filed their
returns as any other worker would, but Perry needed constant monitoring for fear he would flee
the United States without paying taxes on his earnings. Given that the 1937 and 1938
professional tours flitted across the Canadian and Mexican borders several times, stopped off at a
number of Caribbean countries, and ended with an extended tour of Europe, little wonder that the
Bureau of Infernal Revenue assigned an agent to accompany Perry on his different tour stops,
where, after the distribution of that night’s gate receipts among the players, in the locker room
the auditor would report Perry’s income for each match. 23
The European leg of the tour also gave Perry a headache. The tension there came not
from taxes but from the logistical challenges he faced as the organizer of the group’s schedule
overseas. While the British Lawn Tennis Association had lionized their champion while he won
Wimbledon titles and Davis Cup crowns, his turn to professional tennis caused them to revoke
all his privileges that had included membership at whatever private sporting club he sought to
play at in the United Kingdom. That move essentially closed most venues to the professional
troupe in England—a country with far fewer armories and municipal arenas that the United
States. The players frequently played in town halls or on soccer pitches such as the Liverpool
Club’s Anfield ground, although they also received invitations to play at grand venues such as
the newly constructed Empire Pool Wembley Arena in Wembley Park. That stadium and the
27,000 fans who watched them play over a three-night stay rivaled if not bettered any experience
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the professionals had had in the United States. The canvas travel court the players put down for
most matches allowed them to play on almost any surface; because ice rinks, wooden basketball
courts, and dance hall floors were all commonplace, they did this often. When they competed
outdoors, they sometimes struggled to find anchor points to tie down their court, or they
competed on two different surfaces, as was the case when they marked out a tennis court in
Yankee Stadium between the outfield and along the infield diamond. 24
Perry, Vines, and all the professionals touring in the thirties remained out in the cold
because of the more adversarial relationship players and sports promoters had maintained with
the amateur stewards of the game. Those stewards organized in the United States Lawn Tennis
Association monopolized most of the tennis venues suitable for hosting a large enough crowd to
earn a hefty return on the matches. For example, the 1937 professional tour between Perry and
Vines consisted of close to sixty matches between the two professionals in the United States,
virtually none of which took place on courts run by clubs that belonged to the USLTA. 25 When
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combined with a European tour leg and additional matches against other top professionals in
substitute matches, both seemed to have done well financially, with Vines purported to have
earned $34,000 while Perry received $90,000. The large financial discrepancy owed to Perry’s
position as the recently turned professional challenger to Vines, who was defending the
professional title he had won against Bill Tilden in 1934 as well as in 1935 and 1936, when he
beat Lester Stoefen. The financial success of their barnstorming from the players’ perspective
also owed to how close the players’ ability levels stayed throughout the entirety of the tour, with
Vines narrowly edging Perry to retain the professional title. That success, however, came at the
high cost to the players in energy and time as they spent a full six months out of their year
competing night after night at different venues across the country because appropriate
tournament venues were closed to them due to their professionalism. 26
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Those difficulties aside, Perry and professional tennis seemed to fit. He endorsed sporting
goods such as Slazenger tennis racquets and went on to follow the lead of French champion Rene
Lacoste in founding the successful Fred Perry clothing line. Glamour also appealed to him.
While the reality of the professional tour was far from glamorous, the public at least thought of
the professionals in much the same way as other celebrities. Perry himself liked that association
to the point that he and Vines purchased the Beverly Hills Tennis Club in late 1937, required a
minimum income of $78,000 a year to join, and restricted membership to a total of 125
members—preferably from the movie industry. Such exclusivity worked, with their club
counting some of the biggest studio executives and film stars as members. Perry dated the
German actress Marlene Dietrich and was engaged to the English actress Mary Lawson in
Europe. While in America he met and married the actress Helen Vinson. Their marriage fell
apart after a few years, and Perry had no trouble finding actresses and models to date through the
forties. The Englishman even found himself playing a tennis player in a few American pictures
produced by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios—though his talent behind the camera lagged far
behind his talent on the court. 27
Distraction and age took a toll on Perry’s game. From the 1938 professional tour on he
was not the same player. Vines and Perry’s full ownership stake in that tour also meant that the
two top billing players managed the schedule of the players, accounts receivable, payroll, and
everything else that went into running an entertainment enterprise. Those added responsibilities
came at the same time that both Vines and Perry seemed more interested in golf than tennis. At
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most stops the players tried for a round before their evening matches. In the summer of 1938 the
players toured the Catskills, Adirondack, and Pocono Mountain hotels frequented by wealthy
New Yorkers and North Easterners. On what they came to call the “Borsch Circuit,” the players
raked in the money while still finding time to squeeze in some golf on the resorts’ courses. That
summer they drove their own vehicles, which signaled the independence Richards, Kozeluh,
Tilden, Perry, and Vines began to exercise from one another. For his part, Perry also had trouble
at home when Helen Vinson served him divorce papers. That separation prompted Perry to seek
United States citizenship in November 1938, not long before war seemed ready to break out
between Britain and Germany. Perry’s settlement left him financially vulnerable just at the
moment when a third year tour headlining Vines versus Perry seemed a hard sell to a public that
had grown weary of that rivalry. Fortunately for Perry and for professional tennis, a new amateur
champion had agreed to join the professional ranks, and he brought with him more buzz for the
sport than any player since Suzanne Lenglen. 28
The first Grand Slam popularized tennis in much the same way that the thoroughbred
War Admiral galvanized public interest in horse racing. In 1937, the horse won the Kentucky
Derby, Preakness Stakes, and Belmont Stakes—the Triple Crown. That same year the
Californian Don Budge so thoroughly dominated the tennis events he played that he finally
received the funding needed to travel to Australia to try for what later came to be called the
Grand Slam—the Australian Championship, the French Championship, Wimbledon, and the
United States Nationals. In that campaign he succeeded in complete fashion with convincing
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straight set wins in the final matches over John Bromwich in Australia, Roderich Menzel in
France, Bunny Austin at Wimbledon, as well as a four-set win over Gene Mako at the United
States Championships. Sportswriter Al Laney recalled that Budge’s success led the New York
Herald Tribune editor to give him “two-and-a half, three columns of space” for his tennis
coverage—space greater than that of even more popular team sports. 29
The public followed Budge’s transition into professional tennis with great interest, just as
they had followed his quick ascendance in the amateur ranks where Budge had always stood out
as a prodigy. His parents did not play tennis, but his older brother Lloyd, who played for the
University of California at Berkeley, encouraged the youngster Donald to steer clear of football,
basketball, and baseball, and instead put his energy into tennis. The pattern of an older sibling
taking up the game and playing with a younger brother or sister that goes on to a bigger career
did not begin or end with Don Budge, but he certainly fit that mold. A bigger and stronger older
brother to play with very much mattered to Budge, because his parents could not afford much
instruction in the late 1920s and early 1930s. John Budge managed the Chrystal Laundry in
Oakland while his mother worked as a type-operator for an East Bay newspaper. In 1931 the
fifteen-year-old Budge won the California State Championship—the first tournament he ever
entered. Such promising early results piqued the interest of his brother’s coach at the University
of California, Tom Stowe, who instructed the younger Budge in stroke technique and tactics. 30
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Budge first traveled east to play in the high ranking point lawn tournaments in 1934. He
performed so well there that when he returned the following year, he secured the number-one
ranking in the country, although he had to wait until 1937 for the USLTA to sponsor him to
travel to Wimbledon, where he won his first of six consecutive major tournament titles, only
halted by his decision to turn professional. In the offices of his Davis Cup captain Walter Pate on
November 10, 1938, Budge inked a contract with a $75,000 guarantee to play Ellsworth Vines in
a tour promoted by Jack Harris. Unfortunately for all of those involved in the 1939 and 1940
tours, war in Europe still-birthed those tours. 31
Budge came to be remembered as one of only two players in men’s tennis history to win
all four major tournaments in the calendar year. The Grand Slam became the stuff of sporting
legend even though contemporaries within the tennis establishment remembered Budge for
something far less grand at the time. USLTA officials despised Budge for turning professional
because that decision made the world’s best player unavailable to them at a time when
nationality reached a fever pitch. Budge’s professional move in the minds of these men made
him a traitor to his country and his class. The editor of American Lawn Tennis magazine likened
Budge’s decision to that of Judas Iscariot betraying Jesus for fifty pieces of silver. What these
enflamed contemporaries missed was the very real significance that Budge himself noted later in
life about his own tennis career and his place in the larger transition from amateur to professional
tennis. “In the Tilden era, it was mostly a wealthy man’s game, and you had to belong to the
good clubs and have the tennis lessons and so forth to be heard of in the tennis field, but since, I
would say, starting with Ellsworth Vines and Mako and myself and many of the other players
31
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like Jack Kramer and so on. Gonzales is a another one. We all came from the public parks.
Eventually, we got to the point where we could play at the clubs. They would like us to play, but
initially it stemmed from the public parks,” said Budge. 32 Those words came from the
perspective of a player who lived with tennis rather than that of the amateur association officials
who simply lived around tennis.
Budge’s doubles partner and Champion in his own right, Gene Mako, also grew up
playing tennis in public parks and then in the private clubs of Southern California. His path to
tennis stardom was far more circuitous, however. Mako’s father was a soldier fighting for the
Austria-Hungarian Empire at the outbreak of Word War I. Following the birth of his son Gene in
January 1916, the senior Mako approached his superior officer about a short shore leave. With
weekend pass in hand, Mako gathered his family and fled to Trieste, where they hid out for half a
year before crossing the Atlantic to Buenos Aires. After three years in the Argentinian capital,
Mako again moved his family, this time to Los Angeles in July of 1923. The wonderful weather
in Southern California afforded the seven-year-old Gene the opportunity to spend day after day
playing outside. And that he did, enjoying bat and ball games such as softball and baseball, team
sports such as soccer and football, running and field events—everything except tennis. He took
to athletics naturally as his father had excelled at soccer, sprinting, and distance running in
Europe, along with holding the middleweight wrestling title in Hungary before the outbreak of
the Great War. The senior Mako was a cosmopolitan continental in every respect. In addition to
playing soccer for club and national teams, Mako’s paintings passed jury reviews and hung in art
galleries in Budapest, Prague, and Vienna. In the United States, Mako put his artistic talents to
32
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work in the growing movie industry, helping to adorn movie theatres with sculptures and
ornaments as Fox Fest Coast expanded up along the Pacific from Hollywood to Seattle in 1926.
But for all his refinement, the senior Mako did not play tennis. Gene did not pick up the game
until he was twelve years old, getting ready to enter his freshmen year at Glendale High School
in 1928. 33
The summer before enrollment, one of Mako’s friends approached him about playing on
the poorly built court at Harvard Park near the boys’ homes. Mako agreed and fell hard for the
game. Later that evening he convinced his parents to buy him a tennis racquet. Gene then began
playing with his classmates, hoping to make the high school team the following spring. The boys
played often and took to training by running the mile and a half between their school and the
park where they practiced. Mako entered his first tournament in both the thirteen-and-under and
fifteen-and-under divisions after having only played the game for half a year. Financed and
owned by the railroad baron Henry Huntington, the luxurious Huntington Hotel in Pasadena
hosted the prestigious Southern California Tennis Association’s Boys Championship in
December of 1928—a setting far removed from the hardscrabble park court where Mako and his
freshmen friends played. The tournament experience primed Mako to make an immediate
impact; he played in the number one position on his squad as a freshman. 34
Mako also found quick success in the tournaments put on by the Southern California
Tennis Association. In the early 1920s the United States Lawn Tennis Association had facilitated
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the expansion of competitive junior tennis through the USLTA’s regionally based organizations.
The Southern California section with the Southern California Tennis Patrons Association was
particularly robust in the number and quality of the junior players produced by the late twenties.
The SCTA offered girls and boys divisions for thirteen-and-under, fifteen-and-under, and
eighteen-and-under play. Each division had a cutoff-date at the first of the year, meaning that a
December birthday meant one would play up an age division compared to a youngster born on
the first of January. Mako benefited from a birthday on the twenty-fourth of January, effectively
giving him a year-up on his competition. Fortune notwithstanding, he made the most of this.
When he began SCTA competition in 1929 playing in the fifteen-and-under division, Mako did
not lose a match or even a set over the next six years in which he played SCTA sanctioned
singles and doubles tournaments. 35
Mako’s undefeated junior career in regional tournaments certainly piqued the interest of
college coaches in Southern California. In the 1920s, colleges did not recruit players with much
vigor; certainly no national or international recruiting network existed. Mako liked his adopted
hometown of Pasadena and was thrilled to get the chance to play, ostensibly in his backyard, at
the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. As a college freshman, the eighteen-yearold Mako won the intercollegiate national singles and doubles titles in 1934, the first time a
Trojan had captured the crown. Mako’s tennis career continued to ascend when he hitched his
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star to the national bandwagon in Davis Cup play. Like Ellsworth Vines had done a few years
before, Mako left USC to accept his spot on the 1935 team. 36
Over the next four years, Mako proved himself one of two integral players in the United
States’ resurgence in international tennis. Don Budge rounded out the doubles team. The two
first played together in an exhibition match in 1934 in the Bay Area in an event coordinated by
Perry T. Jones—the executive secretary of the Southern California Tennis Association and the
de facto powerbroker of tennis up and down the West Coast. Roscoe Maples, a tennis contact in
the Bay Area, played matchmaker, and in the late winter of 1934, Mako came to San Francisco.
The exhibition took place in the Martina District at the Palace of Fine Arts, one of only a handful
of structures that remained from the Panama-Pacific Exposition of 1915. Mako and Budge first
locked horns in singles, each winning a set. After a short respite, the main event followed, which
pitted Jerry Stratford and Phil Near, two top doubles players from the Northern California Tennis
Association, against Budge and Mako, who partnered together for the first time. Budge and
Mako flogged their opponents 6-0, 6-1, one game away from the recherché double-bagel match
score. Budge, with his fiery red hair and stretched frame, Mako with his chiseled facial features
and strong movements on the court, whipped the crowd into enough of a frenzy that tennis
officials from Northern and Southern California had little choice but to recommend Budge and
Mako pair together on the United States Davis Cup team. 37
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Three years later in 1937, Mako and Budge found themselves playing at the All England
Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club (ALETC) against the Baron Gottfried Von Cramm and Henner
Henkel in the most politically significant Davis Cup match of the twentieth century. The
ascendance of the Nazi party in Germany during the thirties owed in no small part to the
arguments of Aryan racial superiority that Hitler and Reich officers shouted breath after breath.
The six-foot-tall blonde-haired and blue-eyed Von Cramm presented the ideal image for Nazi
propaganda. His world rankings, usually around numbers one or two during the mid-1930s,
mattered too. But for his part, Von Cramm never toed the party line. A likely apocryphal story
went that Von Cramm called himself as having struck an out ball before it bounced out of play in
order to deliberately lose a Davis Cup tie against the American Don Budge in a form of protest
against the Nazi party’s crackdown against perceived political threats. The questionable veracity
of this story notwithstanding, the fact that contemporaries believed it revealed a great deal about
the high regard his supporters held for Von Cramm’s sportsmanship and integrity, not to mention
the frustrations the Nazi party had in deploying their most visible worldwide sportsman to meet
political ends. Retaliation came first in a refusal to support Von Cramm in a 1937 return bid to
defend his French Championships title of the previous year. More severe measures came in1938
when the Nazis incarcerated Von Cramm on charges of homosexuality. Von Cramm served
about half a year in prison, returning to competitive tennis at the start of the summer season in
1939. 38
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Fresh from his March occupation of Czechoslovakia, Hitler eyed further expansion in the
summer of 1939. The German players, and everyone else for that matter, attended the 1939
Wimbledon with the pall of war ready to fall over all of Europe. When Von Cramm and Henner
Henkel met the Americans John Van Ryn and Wilmer Allison in the men’s semi-finals, national
politics intervened directly on the court. On match point for the Germans, Henkel approached the
net and called on his partner to translate.
“We default,”’ said Von Cramm.
“Just say that again. We didn’t hear you loudly. What did you say?,” replied Van Ryn
and Allison.
“All German nationals have been demanded to leave England tonight on the night boat,
and we can’t play the Finals tomorrow, so that if we should win the next point, we couldn’t play.
So we default to you.’
With that the Germans left the court and England in order to prepare for war. The
German military drafted Von Cramm not long after in early 1940, and the great champion lost
his peak playing years to the fighting. With the prelude to the war, international sport completely
broke down. 39
The Davis Cup match between Budge and Von Cramm three years before the war later
came to symbolize the battle between the Axis and the Allies. Following closely on a doubles
win for the United States in which Mako and Budge beat Von Cramm and Henkel, Budge and
Von Cramm faced off in a decisive reverse-singles match. Von Cramm blitzkrieged to a two-set
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to love lead, before Budge dug in, weathered, and then battled back the German onslaught in the
third and fourth sets. Von Cramm attacked again in the fourth set and seemed poised to punch
through, up four games to one in the fifth and deciding set. Budge surged, leveling the game
score and eventually besting Von Cramm 8-6 in the final set to claim the match and the overall
victory for the United States. Outside of the political and military significance of the United
States’ victory over Germany on British soil that observers would soon come to realize, the 1937
match proved significant in another important respect. Bill Tilden, the famous American
amateur-champion-turned-professional, had gone over to Germany to train with the German
squad in preparation for his own European professional matches—a move which subjected
Tilden to withering scorn from the United States Lawn Tennis Association and the American
press. 40
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Different in degree but not in kind, Tilden’s sexuality became a target for USLTA
officials. These efforts came to a head just over a decade later when Tilden sat before a
magistrate in a Los Angeles County Court on January 17, 1947, facing charges of sex with a
minor. Tilden was arrested two months earlier when Beverly Hills police pulled over his Packard
Clipper after tailing the vehicle on Sunset Boulevard. A teenaged boy—whom Tilden had met
the previous week at the Los Angeles Tennis Club—with his pants’ fly unbuttoned sat behind the
wheel, and Tilden had had his arm around him just prior to the pullover. The police took Tilden
to the station, where they booked him and forced him to sign a statement. Tilden later claimed
the police had coerced him into signing the statement and presented false information to him as,
being without his glasses, he could not read it. In any case, Tilden soon sought counsel in the
lawyer Richard Maddox in order to prepare for the coming hearing presided over by Los Angeles
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Superior Court Judge Alfonso Aloysisus Scott, made famous for his rulings protecting the rights
of adolescent film actors and for hearing the murder trial against Bugsy Siegel. 41
Professionally, the hearings could not have come at a worse time for Tilden. He was the
primary organizer in the middle of preparing for an upcoming professional tennis tour. To this
end, Tilden received letters of support from throughout the sports media and tennis community
with the glaring but unsurprising absence of any support from the USLTA—seemingly glad to
see a man who had so chapped their control and commitment to amateurism for so long.
Politically, Tilden’s legal troubles also came at a difficult time. While the second “red scare” was
still several years from finding a voice in Wisconsin U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy, many
already thought of Hollywood as a haven for radicals. Tilden’s close friendships with actors such
as Charlie Chaplin, themselves accused of communist sympathies, meant the imaginations of the
public, judge, and potential jurors would not need to stretch far in order to associate Tilden with
the degeneracy assumed of all communists. The psychiatrists ordered to examine Tilden reached
essentially these conclusions, going so far as to diagnose him with the degenerate insanity that,
coincidentally enough, afflicted all communists and homosexuals in the minds of the postwar
mental health profession. 42
Tilden likely took some of this to heart when he ignored the advice of his lawyer to seek
a jury trial and decided to plead guilty with the expectation the judge would grant him counseling
rather than jail time. That was a mistake. After making statements on the particular incident and
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expressing deep remorse to the incident in the Packard, Tilden then refused to give detailed
answers to Judge Scott’s questions about his previous homosexual encounters. Fed up, the judge
sentenced Tilden to a year of detention, mostly served at the Castaic Honor Farm, to psychiatric
counseling following his release, and to prohibition from coming into any contact with minors in
the future. Tilden served close to eight months of this sentence before his release. 43 A
competitor seldom defeated on the tennis court emerged a thoroughly beaten man. He was dead
five years later at the age of sixty.
Most contemporaries knew nothing about Tilden’s ignominious personal life. The public
preferred to view him as a champion of his class rather than a disreputable derelict. The same
cannot be said of Bobby Riggs. From his amateur days through his 1973 Battle of the Sexes
match against Billie Jean King, Riggs was the most notorious tennis professional to ever play.
Born in Los Angeles on February 25, 1918, to a preacher father and homemaker mother, Riggs
cultivated his later reputation as the “happy hustler” at an early age. Adolescence in the Great
Depression meant making the most of the outdoors for young Bobby, his siblings, and their
friends. Riggs recalled he learned about winning and losing by playing marbles for keeps with
his neighbor. After beating a friend soundly enough to collect all his marbles, Riggs then won the
boy’s sister’s tennis racquet staked as collateral in a double-or-nothing game. Racquet in hand,
Riggs did not immediately focus on tennis; instead, he tossed footballs, caught baseballs, kicked
43
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soccer balls, batted, tackled, boxed, sprinted, jumped, swam, dove, and played in all sorts of
games so long as winning and losing remained integral. Riggs, the runt of the family, competed
so fervently because he sought approval from his older, bigger, and stronger siblings. This need
led Bobby to take up tennis for the first time in 1930 at the age of twelve when he discovered
that the game masked some of the athletic disadvantages due to his diminutive size. 44
Without formal training Riggs did remarkably well in his first year of junior tennis
competition. Three months into the game, Riggs won his first tournament and attracted the
attention of junior tennis power-broker Perry T. Jones, who was based at the Los Angeles Tennis
Club. Jones recognized Bobby’s desire to win and helped to convince the small-framed Riggs
that tennis afforded a small athlete with certain opportunities unavailable in contact sports.
Impressed by Jones’s success in producing world-class players such as Ellsworth Vines and Don
Budge, Riggs agreed with the proven Jones’s formula: start young; supervise the youngsters to
make sure they learn proper technique; compete, always competition; secure proper fitting and
quality equipment for every player; keep the players out of trouble both on and off the court by
emphasizing activity over idleness; enter every tournament; play hard every tournament match;
pair younger players with players up an age group and ability level so that the mimicry and
imitation so crucial to adolescent learning can take place in a natural rather than a forced setting.
Combine Jones’s system with a cutthroat mentality with the game of tennis, as played in the
thirties, became, in Riggs’s estimation, “the one game where the large man doesn’t necessarily
have a big edge on the little fella.” In this Riggs spoke from experience. He won thirteen-and-
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under, fifteen-and-under, and eighteen-and-under Junior Championships, including the 1933
National Boy’s Doubles Championships and the 1935 National Junior Singles Championships.
The next year he entered Senior Competition and won both the Singles and Doubles titles in the
1936 National Clay Court Men’s Championships. 45
Riggs’s quick ascendance to adult competition rankled Perry Jones. The SCTA Secretary
treated his junior players as investments: while he could not make their value as players move up
or down in the competitive tournament environment, he fiercely defended his authority to keep
or divest players at the time he considered opportune. Jones wanted to keep Riggs because at age
eighteen Bobby maintained his eligibility to defend the National Junior Championships. As the
head of the Southern California Tennis Association and Director of their Junior Tennis Program,
wins from eighteen-and-under players reflected highly on Jones and promoted the National
standing of the SCTA Section to a degree that adult tournaments did not, because adult players
often played out on their own, not beholden to any particular regional tennis association.
Tradition mattered to the blue-blooded Jones. His junior players had always followed his orders
to defend their titles. Riggs, however, refused to follow the example of earlier junior players
because his ambition, spurred by his modest economic background compared with the tennis
champions from past decades, preponderated his physical stature. Faced with insubordination,
Jones tried to dissuade Riggs by arguing that the men in the adult competition hit too hard, ran
too fast, and competed too hard for an immature player. When words failed to persuade, money
talked as Jones pulled SCTA financial sponsorship, a move that forced Riggs to hustle for the
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first time in convincing patrons at the Los Angeles Tennis Club to fund a trip out east to compete
in the National tournaments outside of the channels of the SCTA. 46
His break with Jones made his 1936 season into a year of ups and downs. Riggs traveled
east, won big tournaments, and finished the year ranked fourth in the nation. In fact, he fared
well against the other top players, notching straight-sets wins over Frankie Parker and Bryan
“Bitsy” Grant. Don Budge dominated tennis that year, but the next best player behind him was a
toss-up. With several players near equally matched, the selection of the 1937 Davis Cup team
came down to amicability rather than ability. Jones had the real say in the selection, and he said
no to Riggs, replacing him with a lower-ranked player named Joe Hunt who, in an irony not lost
on Riggs, attracted Jones’s attention because of his strength, size, and “stature.” Once again on
the wrong side of the SCTA, Riggs found help from friends at the Los Angeles Tennis Club who
agreed to pass the hat for a trip to compete at Wimbledon. When Jones exited his office at the
Club and found Riggs soliciting donations, he said, “Bobby, if the Davis Cup Committee don’t
feel that it wants you on the team, I have a responsibility to Southern California Tennis, I don’t
feel like you should represent us [at Wimbledon] either.” Undeterred, Riggs managed to collect
several thousand dollars for the trip to the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club, only to
hear from Jones that the Davis Cup Team Captain Walter Pate needed Riggs as a practice partner
to prepare Don Budge, Gene Mako, Frankie Parker, and Bitsy Grant for their Inter-Zonal Match
against Germany. Riggs played the piñata, the funding for his trip to Europe never materialized,
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and he found himself playing summer matches in Salt Lake City rather than on Centre Court
Wimbledon. 47
By 1938 Jones and Riggs finally agreed that American tennis needed Bobby Riggs. Joe
Hunt and Frankie Parker had not contributed to the 1937 team victory to the degree Jones and
Pate expected. Don Budge and Bitsy Grant played tremendous tennis, but for how much longer?
Budge’s dominance worried the amateur tennis establishment that an opportunistic promoter
might convince the best in the world to start playing for pay, and Grant’s tournament wins
simply did not match up to those Riggs had accumulated early in 1938. As the defending
champion, the United States would host the Challenge Round after the U.S. Championships,
giving the Davis Cup selection committee and captain until late August to make final selections.
With Gene Mako’s spot secure as a doubles specialist and Don Budge’s partner, the second
singles spot was ripe for the taking, and Riggs’s consistent wins throughout the year earned him
the spot. Riggs beat the Australian Adrian Quist on September 3, at the Germantown Cricket
Club in Philadelphia in the first singles rubber of the Davis Cup final. Budge made the team
score 2-0 with his singles win over John Bromwich, Australia answered back by winning the
doubles rubber, before Budge secured the tie for the U.S. by besting Adrian Quist in straight sets
in the reverse singles. Riggs had contributed to the international prestige of tennis in a big way,
and the U.S. tennis establishment awarded him accordingly. 48
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In 1939 he finally got the financial backing to play in Wimbledon. Needless to say, he
made the most of it. Stepping off the Atlantic liner, he bee-lined for a London bookie who agreed
to take a $500 (roughly £100) bet to win the Wimbledon Singles title at three to one odds. The
odds maker, thinking the deal done, sat astonished when Riggs placed an extended wager, taking
the presumed winnings from the singles bet and putting them on a doubles championship with
partner Elwood Cook. Riggs proposed odds at twenty to one for such a feat, which, given the
magnitude of such an accomplishment, actually would have been a suitable stake for the bookie
to take. Betting on tennis was uncommon in general and foreign to this particular bookie, to say
the least, so he must have sensed Riggs’s eagerness rather than focusing on the numbers in
proposing counter odds at six to one. Riggs wanted none of that and chose to raise the stakes by
proposing, “What if I win the triple crown, the hat trick, it’s never been done by anybody up to
this time, the youngster to come over on the first visit, nobody’s ever won all three, but I’m
going to try to do it….I’m going to put it all on the mixed doubles,” he exclaimed. The
preposterousness of Riggs’s braggadocio must have convinced the bookie to take the bet at
twelve to one odds that put $108,000 on the line. Raising the championship trophy at Wimbledon
in 1939 meant winning six rounds in men’s singles; five rounds in doubles; and four matches in
mixed doubles. 49
Riggs obviously liked his odds to place such a wild bet, but more sober analysis suggests
recklessness and hubris. While he had competed well on the world stage in Davis Cup play and
raised the trophy at many quality tournaments, Riggs had never won one of the three largest
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International tournaments—the French Championships, Wimbledon, and the U.S.
Championships. He had made it to the final at the French Championship, but the American Don
McNeill soundly defeated him in straight sets. With Don Budge’s move into professional tennis
and therefore barred from the amateur championships like Wimbledon, Riggs felt the confidence
that now was his time. But Riggs could not count on the same buoyancy from his doubles partner
Elwood Cook and mixed doubles partner Alice Marble, who might bring the effort to a halt
either through poor performance or injury withdrawal. Remarkably, he won: first the singles
title; then the doubles the following day; and with fading light on the final Sunday, he and Alice
Marble raised the mixed doubles trophy. Riggs was rich and on top of the world—so it seemed. 50
Major world events directed the influence athletes, like everyone else, could make on
history. In 1939 that direction moved for the second time to world war. After Wimbledon, Riggs
won the 1939 U.S. Championships contested at Forest Hills, New York. He entered the apogee
of his career just as World War II plunged the importance of international athletes to a point
lower than that of World War I. Battling German bombers in the Blitz, England did not host
Wimbledon in 1940—a pattern that continued until the 1946 Championships. While not as
longstanding as it was first played in 1925, the French Championships also went uncontested
between 1940 and 1945. Essentially an all-Australian affair from its inception in 1905 until the
thirties, when the tournament received a few more international players, the Australian
Championship remained the least cosmopolitan and most regionally-focused of the big
international amateur tennis championships. Despite this isolation, the Australian Tennis
Federation also suspended the tournament between 1941 and 1946. That left the U.S.
50

Ibid.

188
Championships as the only international tournament played during World War II. Interestingly
enough, the U.S. Championships never missed a year between 1881—when the tournament
began—and 1968, when the game allowed professionals in for the first time, even playing
through World War I when the other tournaments halted for the conflict. This gave Riggs a
chance to defend his ranking as the best in tennis, which he more or less did, making the finals of
the 1940 U.S. Championships, where he lost to Don McNeill but bouncing back the next year by
defeating Frank Kovacs to claim the September 1941 title at Forest Hills. 51
Fresh from their final, Riggs and Kovacs joined Don Budge and the Englishman Fred
Perry on the professional tour. Lex Thompson, the owner of the Philadelphia Eagles gridiron
squad, swayed Riggs to forgo amateurism with a $25,000 one-year contract that Bobby was only
too happy to accept. For his part, Kovacs had a reputation as a comedian on and off the court,
and he too did not need much sweet-talking to start playing tennis for money—officially. Riggs
recalled in his memoirs that in one of their previous meetings Kovacs appeared on court dressed
in the classic long-sleeved shirt and flannel trousers worn by players at the turn of the century.
Throughout the match he mocked the skimpy legs Riggs’s shorts revealed, only to grab scissors
toward the end of the match and slash his own pants into thigh-high shorts right on the court.
Fellow players may have hated playing Kovacs, but a promoter like Thompson recognized the
crowd appeal the bad-boy inculcated. Every Kovacs’s antic, from stalling in between points and
games, to lying down on the court and refusing to play on because of a questionable ruling by a
tournament official, the “Clown Prince of Tennis,” as contemporaries called Kovacs, would
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balance out a tour of the finest tennis players and four of the most recognizable international
athletes in the world at the start of World War II. 52
Their tour began on December 26, 1941, at Madison Square Garden in New York City.
Three weeks earlier the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, and in the weeks leading up to the
opening night next to no one wanted a ticket. Thompson simply gave away seats to anyone off
the streets in a desperate attempt to create some atmosphere for the players and the media
shooting newsreels for distribution. The tennis also disappointed spectators. In particular, the
match between Fred Perry and Bobby Riggs proved disastrous when Perry moved for a ball,
went down hard, and injured his elbow. The English champion defaulted the match, sought
medical attention at a hospital, and withdrew from the tour to return to England. Thompson
scrambled to replace Perry with players like Gene Mako and Lester Stoefen, but neither
American drew the crowds that a major international celebrity like Perry inveigled. Logistically
the tour also suffered. Government rationing of tires and gasoline made a barnstorming sports
tour that depended on daily travel unfeasible during wartime. Thompson cut his losses, called the
tour off, and paid the players the little that he could. 53 Athletes like Riggs were out of work.
Two decades of military drawdown and comparative isolation in world affairs compared
to that of Western European nations resulted in an American military of smaller size than
seventeen other countries along with a military budget of only 2 percent of the United States’
entire Gross National Product in 1940, which rose only slightly above that in 1941. The
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following year, American workers made more military equipment than all of the Axis powers put
together, a gap that widened as the war progressed. By the time of the treaty signing on the
Battleship Missouri in 1945, American manufacturing accounted for two out of three planes,
ships, planes, tanks, trucks, guns, uniforms, and supplies produced for the Allies’ cause.
Traditional manufacturers such as General Motors ran at capacity throughout the war;
entrepreneurs like Henry Kaiser rolled out new plans for more efficient production; and 500,000
new businesses opened their doors between 1941 and 1945. The war increased employment in
America from forty-five million people in 1940 to fifty-five million people in 1945 and
decreased unemployment from eight million people in 1940 to under one million people by
1945. Those sixty-five million American workers produced one out of every two manufactured
goods in the world at war’s end. By 1945, twelve and a half million Americans also served in the
military. 54
Such high levels of productivity and military service seemed all the more remarkable
given the physical fitness of most Americans before the start of World War II. Before the last
major war, enlistment tests had shown widespread failure of American men to pass even the
most basic fitness tests. In the 1920s, politicians from both sides of the aisles stressed policies
that purportedly prioritized physical fitness, but World War II was what boosted American
fitness. As commandant of West Point, Douglas MacArthur revamped the educational
requirements of cadets, making physical training through individual and team sports a critical
54
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part of the professionalization of army officers. Fellow generals such as Omar Bradley and
Dwight Eisenhower all agreed that sports could help win the War, and they commissioned
athletic officers to build company morale over what many believed would be a protracted
conflict requiring long tours of duty. From naval stations, to airfields, to forward operating bases,
baseball diamonds were part of the daily routines of men in uniform. Soldiers read sporting
magazines, played ball against other companies, and attended exhibition games headlined by the
biggest Major League phenoms. Both inside and outside the military’s ranks, the triumph of
American athletics came to symbolize both the supremacy of the American war machine and the
eventual push to Allied victory. 55
Tennis stars were no different than Major Leaguers in that World War II halted their
normal routines and forced them to either serve the war effort directly or find a new avenue in
which to ply their trade. For the fifty-year-old Bill Tilden, this meant combining theatrics with a
new tennis tour featuring some of the finest female talent from the amateur ranks. Just prior to
the War, Tilden had embarked on a brief theatrical career, acting in the stage-plays The Nice
Harmons, The Fighting Littles, and The Children’s Hour—for the last of which Tilden received
some positive reviews from the Los Angeles Times. At around the same time Tilden also
appeared in War Bond drives and benefits across the country. Buoyed by his popularity in these
ventures and aware of the massive influx of GIs and war workers to Southern California where
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he made his home, Tilden put together a tennis production for young men in uniform. Tilden
partnered with Walter Wesbrook, a Pasadena tennis professional, but the real draw for the
soldiers were the widely popular and young amateur champions Gertrude “Gorgeous Gussie”
Moran and Gloria Butler. Tilden and Westbrook would hit a few shots before quickly showing
themselves off the court so the soldiers could watch Moran and Butler play. Tilden would add
some provocative commentary over a public address system before returning to the court with
Wesbrook, both of whom were now both dressed in drag. After a few games of Tilden and
Westbrook versus Moran and Butler, the men would throw off their costumes and pair up with
women for a mixed-doubles match—basically the only real tennis of the whole show. Needless
to say, such a spectacle ran afoul of the USLTA. Tennis officials certainly continued to bristle at
the thought of Tilden involved in the game in any way, and the cross-dressing certainly did not
bring them onboard. What ground their gears, though, was not the intermixing of the sexes. The
presence of amateur players and professional players on the same court was what proved
insufferable. 56
Moran and Butler built on the legacy of women such as Lizzie Stroud and Alta Weiss,
who had for decades blazed trails for women to earn money from their athletics. World War II
meant increased opportunities for women athletes, most visibly the All-American Girls
Professional Baseball League that ran between 1943 and 1945. 57 Beginning in 1943, the military
extended the draft further—Congress had first authorized the draft in 1940 and expanded it after
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Pearl Harbor—to conscript groups such as fathers previously deferred from service. 58 That move
bolstered the ranks of the military with new recruits. The young father Bobby Riggs was one of
those recruits when he entered the basic training program at the Great Lakes Naval Training
Station. 59
Riggs and most other athletes soon found themselves sent to Bainbridge, Maryland,
where they joined the Physical Instruction Brigade commanded by Gene Tunney. 60 During
World War I, Tunney served in the U.S. Expeditionary Force, where he made a name for himself
as a boxer. In the 1920s, Tunney won bout after bout and established himself as world
heavyweight titleholder with an attendance-setting victory over then champion and celebrity Jack
Dempsey. Tunney went on to defeat Dempsey in the infamous 1927 “Long Count” rematch,
retaining his title until his retirement in 1928. He remained a prominent public figure in
retirement through the serialization of his autobiography in Collier’s Magazine that became a
bestselling 1932 book titled A Man Must Fight. 61 That book’s title brilliantly captured Tunney’s
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own experiences as an athlete willing to answer his county’s call, and military leaders found
Tunney a good fit to lead a new generation of soldier-athletes—people such as Major League
slugger Johnny Mize, Dodgers’ shortstop Harold Peter Henry “Pee Wee” Reese, and Chicago
White Sox ace Johnny Rigney—in World War II. 62
In some respects athletes simply continued doing what they normally did. They played
games to entertain others. What differed during wartime was who they were entertaining, where
they were entertaining, and who was paying for the entertainment. Before the draft began,
professional athletes primarily played benefit exhibitions for suitable causes like war bond drives
or aid rallies for the Allies. For example, as the World’s Professional Champion in 1941, Bobby
Riggs joined Warner Brothers movie stars George Brent and Errol Flynn for tennis exhibitions in
Los Angeles and San Francisco to raise money for British War Relief. When the draft began in
earnest and the country’s best athletes found themselves in uniform, the entertainment changed
to focus on the fellow men in uniform rather than the public at large with competitions between
different branches of the service being one of the more common formulations. Riggs and Wayne
Sabin played for the Navy against Army officers Don Budge and Franky Parker. Major Leaguers
like Buddy Blattner, Skeets Dickey, and Johnny Lucadello likewise formed intra-service baseball
squads to entertain troops. The soldiers gambled incessantly. 63
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Entertainment for troops reciprocated the grand strategy priorities of Allied politicians
and war planners. Prioritized operations in the North African and European theatres of battle
meant that American troops marshalling in the Pacific—but not yet engaged in heavy combat—
recreated with greater regularity than their European counterparts. In the Pacific, troop
entertainment centered on Hawaii because Navy bases like Pearl Harbor massed the most troops.
As the intensity of the U.S. military’s island-hopping strategy intensified in 1943, Physical
Instruction brigadiers accompanied combat troops battling Japanese troops on Pacific
archipelagos. Riggs and Sabin played Budge and Parker in both singles and doubles on Saipan,
Tinian, Iowa Jima, and Gaum after American troops captured these islands from the Japanese.
On Gaum, under the direction of the avid tennis player, Vice Admiral John Hoover, the everbusy servicemen of the Naval Construction Forces, popularly called the “SeaBees,” built a tennis
court for the naval brass and Physical Instruction soldiers to compete on in-between war
making. 64
Troops stationed in the United States were also entertained by athletes in and out of
uniform. After a tour of duty as the captain of a tank-landing ship for the Allied Invasion of
Europe, the American Davis Cupper Gardnar Mulloy was sent back stateside by the Navy to
train for action in the Pacific. In the interim, Mulloy convinced his superiors at the Little Creek
Naval Base in Camp Bradford to allow him to organize exhibition and fundraising matches.
Mulloy recognized the draw lady players had for American GIs, so he first recruited Alice
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Marble and Dodo Bundy before filling out the roster with big names such as Bill Tilden, Vinny
Richards, and the Irish champion George Littleton Rodgers. As the troop toured different bases,
they made the most of fellow players in uniform and incorporated them into the exhibitions. In
Norfolk, Virginia, for example, the naval aviator and tennis champion Ted Schroeder squared off
against Bill Tilden before Mulloy and his group moved on to another base in another state.
Opinion surveys completed by men in uniform overwhelmingly approved of these
entertainments; most soldiers did not seem to mind that these men and women held a tennis
racquet or microphone in their hand rather a rifle. 65
During the war, private tennis clubs also did their part for the American war effort. Those
with money and influence held special events such as fundraising exhibitions featuring the best
players—many on loan from their military units. On the East and West Coast, clubs like the
La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club of La Jolla, California, adhered to the coastal evening blackouts
by prohibiting night tennis in order not to give the German or Japanese air forces suitable targets.
And clubs fortunate enough to have talented teaching professionals often bid goodbye to those
men without complaint when the draft notice of these healthy young men came up. 66
The war certainly changed the playing careers of many competitive tennis players. Unlike
professionals like Tilden who entertained troops for pay without joining the army or players like
Riggs who were themselves in the military and playing for Uncle Sam, amateur players like
65
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Doris Hart still could not receive any form of compensation for winning their matches.
Furthermore, with players throughout the world serving their respective countries, any
semblance of international competition was deferred until the conclusion of the war. Because
large numbers of top male players wore uniforms, women players like Hart carried the torch of
amateur tennis throughout the conflict. In some ways, these women resembled their fellow
female athletes who filled the bleachers and swung the bat on the baseball diamond while the
boys were away from the field. The resemblance did not go much beyond that, however, mainly
because the organizers behind the All American Girl’s Baseball League (AAGBL) had a very
different background when it came to the place of money in sports. Phillip K. Wrigley and his
management staff at the Chicago Cubs spearheaded the AAGBL and held few reservations about
making money off the backs of their lady players during wartime. 67
On the tennis side, the United States Lawn Tennis Association still held their defensive
position of no money to any amateur player. That stance presented a problem, though, because
the USLTA had previously collected money from their high attendance tournaments and
distributed this money to various sectional tennis divisions after keeping a substantial sum for
their administrative duties at the national office in New York City. The tournaments could not
run by themselves either, so the USLTA decided to donate all of the proceeds—after subtracting
the costs incurred in running the tournament—to charity organizations of stature such as the
International Red Cross. All in all, many top players did not pick up a racquet during the war,
while those who did played in fewer tournaments and faced diminished competition between
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1941 and 1945. But with most other sports, leisure activities, and entertainments, tennis survived
the War and continued on in the immediate postwar period—albeit in a new direction. 68
That westward movement of the game literally coincided with the direction toward
professionalism tennis had moved during the thirties and early forties. One of the most lasting
consequences of the Great Depression and World War II is that Americans became more mobile
than ever before. Between 1940 and 1945, sixteen million Americans served in uniform in some
capacity while one out of every five citizens of the United States moved to a new city, state, or
region of the country. The deeply cherished physical and emotional degree of mobility most
Americans enjoyed when compared to their European peers exploded altogether anew in the
heady economic times in which people no longer disparaged the government spending money on
what would become the country’s great postwar infrastructure projects. 69
At war’s end, tennis clubs in the United States numbered in excess of eight hundred and
covered the entire country. The game that began at a Welsh Garden party in 1873, came to
America via Bermuda in 1874, and had its rules standardized in a New York City hotel in 1881
had, during the first three decades of the twentieth century, grown to the point that the national
office of the USLTA struggled to exercise authority over its member clubs, let alone player
members. The dozen sectional associations that reported to the national association may have
held the organization together and helped the game of tennis grow, but at the same time those
68
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regionally based sub-associations had their own agendas that often clashed with both one another
and the national office. The agendas of the amateur associations also contrasted with those of the
amateur champions turned touring professionals. One-time insiders Suzanne Lenglen, William
“Big Bill” Tilden, Don Budge, and Bobby Riggs became outsiders the moment they publicly
played tennis for money. Without the organizational support the amateur associations provided,
the touring professionals formed their own subculture on the road that kept them apart from and
primed to upend what amounted to the tennis establishment still based largely in East Coast
private clubs. 70 Conflicts between different associations and between the highly visible touring
professionals and the heavily cloistered amateur clubs chipped away at the authority exercised by
the national office and in so doing, hastened the rise of the postwar professional tennis tour led
by the Southern Californian Jack Kramer.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE “KRAMER KARAVAN”
The first international sports tour took place in 1859 when a dozen professional English
cricketers traveled to Montreal, Quebec, and Rochester, New York, to compete against
Canadians and American batsmen. With only a few stops, minimal promotion, poor turnout, the
1859 tour nevertheless prompted imitation from other national sporting associations and private
clubs. 1 In 1861 an English cricket team toured Australia, and seven years later the Australians
reciprocated and toured England. The first Tour de France did not involve bicycles but baseball
teams, who barnstormed France in 1903. International test matches and world championships
were in place for nearly all sports by the first third of the twentieth century, but in the United
States, at least according to a British sports historian, what would become the triad of American
spectacle sports—baseball, football, and basketball—preferred domestic tours if the teams and
clubs toured at all. In fact, most professionals in the three major team sports in Americas had
found comfortable city homes by the mid-1930s. 2
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The sport of tennis had likewise embraced the idea of touring in the first half of the
twentieth century. The Davis Cup international competition and the tournament-to-tournament
travel of players for United States Lawn Tennis Association sanctioned events, British Lawn
Tennis Association sanctioned matches, French Tennis Federation tournaments, Australian Lawn
Tennis Association matches, and any other country that belonged to the International Lawn
Tennis Federation all constituted what a few contemporaries called the “amateur tennis circuits.”
But what people meant and thought of when they spoke or read about tennis tours were the
professional barnstorming matches of Suzanne Lenglen, Bill Tilden, Ellsworth Vines, Fred
Perry, Don Budge, and Bobby Riggs, among other players and promoters. 3
A fresh faced-challenger taking on a seasoned professional champion constituted the core
attraction of nearly all the tours in the prewar years, and that drama remained at the center of the
professional tours led by Jack Kramer beginning in 1947. Whereas fresh faces in terms of players
helped the tours, both prewar and postwar, a high turnover in terms of tour managers and tour
promoters hurt professional tennis. Kramer’s constant presence as the head of the postwar
professional tennis tour during the next decade professionalized professional tennis which, in
terms of a business enterprise, had come across as scattered and at times sloppy. The consistent
entertainment product Kramer put before the United States public and people around the world
on his international tennis tours popularized the sport in the postwar years at the same time that
Kramer’s constant presence in seemingly all aspects of the game unnerved the directors of the
United States Lawn Tennis Association and amateur tennis abroad. Kramer thus became an
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impediment to the arrival of Open Tennis competition between amateurs and professionals
because he did so much to grow the game. The “Kramer Karavan” was professional tennis in the
fifties, for better and for worse. 4
Kramer thought he understood what earlier professional tennis promoters from C.C. Pyle
to Bobby Riggs did not: the USLTA would countenance professional tennis if they received part
of the action. Better to make the amateur association the ally of professional tennis rather than its
antagonist. So at the same time the Southern California Tennis Association, acting on authority
from the USLTA national office, labored to make sure even a truck driver associated with Jack
Kramer’s World Tennis Incorporated (association member Hugh Stewart, who wanted to
maintain his amateur status to play tournaments), could not pick up a racquet and hit around for
fun with the professionals and could only receive compensation “no greater than those ordinary
payable to a truck driver,” the directors of the Southern California Tennis Association agreed to
split profits from the Los Angeles professional tennis tournaments Kramer and his players
sponsored. Such an arrangement between amateur tennis and the professional tour happened
because of Kramer’s special relationship with Perry Jones—the leader of Southern California
tennis. Jones believed in amateur tennis, but more than anything he desired Southern California
to lead the world in grooming tennis champions. Forty-five percent of the gate receipts for the
professional exhibitions introduced innumerable young players to tennis if that money found its
way into the Southern California Tennis Association and the Southern California Tennis Patrons
Association. The alliance could also happen because Jones always considered Kramer his
favorite player to come out of the junior development system at the Los Angeles Tennis Club. In
4
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Jones’s mind, professional tennis did not look so bad if it looked like the blond and muscular
Jack Kramer. 5
In particular, the potential for television contracts Kramer dangled excited the SCTA,
SCPTA, and USLTA board members. They liked Kramer so much they even went so far as to
bless him to scoop up a dozen of the best junior players after the national juniors in Kalamazoo
to go train with him and his professional players. That flew in the face of the USLTA
leadership’s normal paternalism, amateur code, and the ethics statements they drafted at around
the same time that sought to prohibit contact between amateur players and association members
with professional tennis players and promoters at all costs. The Southern California Tennis
Patrons wanted the money they expected to make from the televised professional tournament, so
the USLTA sanctioned Kramer to hold his event. Perry Jones and his peers at the Association’s
national office always fancied professional tennis as a windfall profit generater for the players
and promoters, both Kramer and his predecessors, but the limited receipts that came in from the
first major association of the professional tennis troupe with a major amateur-owned and
-operated venue in the Los Angeles Tennis Club revealed to anyone who cared to count the
money that the life of a touring tennis professional and their promoter was risk-filled for little
financial reward. 6 As the player professional to beat in the early 1950s, the ambitious sports
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promoter, and the spokesperson for professional tennis, Kramer saw the opportunities and
challenges better than anyone.
Professional tennis suited Kramer from the beginning. As with so many other parts of
life, World War II upended positions of power in the tennis world with the antebellum
dominance on the court of Donald Budge giving way to Bobby Riggs, who beat Budge for the
first time twenty-three matches to twenty-one matches in the first professional tennis tour after
the war. As in the tours in the late 1930s, Jack Harris promoted and managed the 1946 to 1947
tour that Riggs won. For his part, Riggs only secured his position as the touring professional to
beat in the coming year with a win over Budge at the Forest Hills National Professional
Tournament in September. There Harris made it perfectly clear to both players that the loser of
their final match would not receive a tour contract. The winner could expect to take on the
current amateur champion Jack Kramer in a tour beginning on December 26, 1947 and going
into the spring of 1948. 7
Riggs’s victory earned him a contract of 17.5 percent of the tour gross receipts as
compared to 35 percent of the total gross receipts allotted to the amateur champion turned
professional challenger. In fact, Harris negotiated Riggs down from 25 percent to 17.5 percent
simply by threats of finding other professionals to tour against the amateur champion turned
professional challenger, whom Harris maintained was the real draw for spectators anyway. The
wily promoter further leveraged the power he held over the few professional players, unable to
return to the amateur ranks, by offering the Ecuadorian Francisco “Pancho” Segura and the
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Australian Dinny Pails not a percentage fee but a flat weekly rate of $300 to play the tour’s
undercard match. Both signed quickly because they did not have a choice. Regardless of who
won the most matches in the tour, Kramer would earn $86,470, Riggs $43,225, Segura around
$5,000, and Pails around $5,000. Kramer’s first tour had earned him the largest payday per
match of any player in professional tennis history, yet he also realized that by not promoting the
tour, he had missed out on the roughly $107,705 Jack Harris had netted as tour promoter and
manager. 8
Like Riggs, Kramer’s earliest tennis took place on the public park courts in Los Angeles
County built by the New Deal’s recreational revolution. La Cienega Park, Boyle Heights Park,
and municipal courts in the working-class suburb of Southgate were his regular haunts until, like
Riggs, he attracted the attention of Southern California Tennis’s boss, Perry T. Jones, who
opened the Los Angeles Tennis Club to the promising junior. Unlike Riggs, however, Jones
adored the clean-cut and well-behaved Kramer. Jones made sure to arrange matches for his
protégé with the best junior players and many of the best one-time professional players who
played their retirement tennis at the Los Angeles Tennis Club. Great competition in Southern
California meant that, in Kramer’s own words, he “was almost automatically the best in the
country.” 9
That claim got put to the test in 1947 when, after having won the Davis Cup Challenge
Round, the 1947 Wimbledon title, and the 1948 United States Championship, Kramer turned
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professional to challenge Bobby Riggs. The challenger thoroughly routed Riggs sixty-nine
matches to twenty matches in their 1947-1948 tour. That summer Kramer again bested Riggs in
the twenty-first year of the National Professional Tournament hosted by the West Side Tennis
Club in Forest Hills, New York, and thus assured himself a place on the tour for the following
year to take on the top amateur player who could be coaxed to join the professional ranks.
Getting to tour mattered so much to the finances of the professional player because of the limited
tournament schedule of events for professional players and the small payout each event offered.
The highest profile, largest grossing, and best paying professional tournament in 1948, for
example, collected gross receipts of $25,856.00. After liabilities, the tournament netted
$17,095.17, of which 60 percent (i.e., $8,057.10) was distributed to the roughly thirty players
who competed. A first-round loser thus received $50, a round 16 loser $100, a quarter-finalist
$322, and a semi-finalist about $500. For his second place finish, Riggs earned $966.85 while
Kramer’s win secured 18 percent of the tournament purse—$1,450.20 in winnings for singles
with an additional $825.14 of winnings in doubles. That modest amount when combined with the
infrequency of professional tournaments meant that a professional player could not make it
financially without a tour unless they were willing to spend most days of the year teaching the
game to people willing to pay for the instruction. 10
The vast majority of people who called themselves tennis professionals and were called
tennis professionals by the USLTA never made a living playing tennis. The moment a tennis
amateur earned their first dollar from the game in any capacity, outside of the sanctioned
10
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expenses the USLTA approved, they became a professional regardless of the origin of that
money. The majority of tennis professionals were simply tennis amateurs who the USLTA
caught teaching tennis, stringing racquets, or selling apparel to earn their living. Outside the
USLTA’s structure, these teaching professionals thus formed their own association in the
Professional Lawn Tennis Association, which primarily served the teaching professionals rather
than the handful of playing professionals. As a tennis professional in 1931, Bill Tilden organized
the Professional Player’s Association for the handful of top players touring for a living. While
never strong, that organization existed apart from the PLTA in functioning essentially as a way
for the few top tennis players to discourage competition from other professionals who might
think of starting a rival tour. 11
Division among those labeled as professional tennis players reached a boiling point on
June 12, 1948, when the PLTA announced that only full members of their organization were
allowed to play in the National Professional Championship sponsored by the PLTA and hosted
by the West Side Tennis Club at Forest Hills. That excluded Kramer, Riggs, Pails, Segura, and
Budge; however, without those players that fans across the country most associated with
professional tennis, the tournament’s draw underwhelmed. Both teaching professionals and
playing professionals recognized this, and in final negotiations tour players agreed to forsake
their own professional organization in favor of the tennis teacher-focused PLTA if the latter
organization would not interfere with the best players’ efforts to tour when the PLTA sponsored
championship was not going on. The PLTA would continue to devote the majority of its time
11
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and resources to helping their few hundred members receive better contracts for their instruction
at different clubs and sporting goods stores while the half-dozen touring professionals continued
to play tennis for money. 12 Kramer’s first major impact on developing professional tennis thus
involved new associations—not always successful and not always mutually beneficial, but new
associations nonetheless—with fellow professionals and amateur associations alike.
Kramer also further professionalized tennis in that he pioneered a completely new style
of play. Contemporary sportswriters and spectators came to call his style the “Big Game.” For
the first two-thirds of a century of tennis, nearly all top players—Tilden, Richards, Vines,
Bromwich, Quist, Pails, Budge, Parker, Talbert, Riggs, and Mulloy—preferred to play
groundstrokes from the baseline with an emphasis on consistency and defense. After Kramer,
nearly all top players played a hard serve, well-placed return, or penetrating ground-stroke after
which they explosively approached the net looking to end the point quickly with a volley or,
should their opponent lob to them, an overhead smash. Kramer did not pioneer the big game in a
vacuum. Rather the innovation owed to the championship 1946 Davis Cup team. Walter Pate, the
squad’s captain, picked Kramer, Ted Schroeder, and Gardnar Mulloy precisely because he
believed an aggressive style of play to be the only means to victory over the seasoned Australian
team of Dinny Pails, John Bromwich, Adrian Quist, and Victory Murphy. In front of a boisterous
Melbourne crowd at the Kooyong mega-stadium, the Americans’ aggressive serve-and-volley
game so thoroughly overwhelmed the Australians that only one match out of five went more than
straight-sets in the sweep for the United States. Tennis’s huge popularity in Australia practically
required that the Australian Lawn Tennis Association and their internationally famed Davis Cup
12
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captain Harry Hopman adopt the strategy of attack, attack, attack of the Americans. From the
first year of competitive tennis after the war, the two tennis nations that all other countries
looked to as an example espoused the big game. 13
Kramer continued to popularize and refine the big game in his years as an amateur player
and then as a professional. In his stellar 1947 season, Kramer increasingly played opponents in
the final rounds of the big tournaments who had also begun to serve and volley, chip and charge
on the service return, and look for a short ball to hit an approach shot to follow into the net. The
1947 Davis Cup pitted the United States against Australia with both teams playing more of the
big game—though the Americans playing it slightly better to defend their title. With few titles
left to win, Kramer turned professional, where his big game overwhelmed the world’s
professional champion Bobby Riggs in their 1948 tour. Riggs, a highly adaptable, thoughtful,
and strategic player, enjoyed early success against Kramer—including in their opener at Madison
Square Garden in front of a record-setting crowd despite a blizzard outside. Rather than getting
drawn into Riggs’s gamesmanship, however, Kramer slowly tweaked his aggressive game in
order to maximize what he called “percentage attack.” This meant the likelihood of winning a
point based on Kramer having hit a certain shot in a certain situation. Kramer was bigger and
stronger than Riggs, but the real key to his tour victory came from the realization that he could
only control his percentages with any regularity if he consistently took the initiative to set up
scenarios of shots when the percentages would fall in his favor. If he allowed his opponent to
dictate what sort of rallies they entered, then his likelihood of having to play statistically un13
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advantageous exchanges increased, and too large an increase in these un-advantageous
exchanges would result in a lost match and eventually a lost tour. 14
The percentage attack theory got a thorough test on the 1949 to 1950 professional tour
when Kramer went up against a bigger and stronger opponent in Pancho Gonzales. A fellow
Los Angeles public-parks player, Gonzales was far less welcome at the Los Angeles Tennis Club
than either Jack Kramer or Bobby Riggs, but the big-serving and hard-hitting Gonzales proved
his mettle two years in a row with pressure wins over Ted Schroeder in the finals of the U.S.
Championship at Forest Hills. The ability to handle big-match pressure did not beat the
percentages, however. Kramer thoroughly defeated the strong-striking Gonzales on the indoor
canvas courts of their tour, 97 matches to 26 matches. For his part, Gonzales learned from his
defeat and developed his own percentage attack game that, when combined with Gonzales’s
physical gifts and mental toughness, thoroughly dominated tennis for a decade beginning in
1953. 15
In the meantime, Kramer beat Eduardo “Little Pancho” Segura—whose two-handed
forehand and counter-punch hustling style were as far away from the big game as a player could
get—in the 1950 to 1951 professional tour before defeating Frank Sedgman 54 matches to 41
matches in a stretched/false-started 1952 to 1953 professional tour. The big game, however, had
taken a toll on Kramer’s body, and after only half of a decade of professional touring, he retired
from full-time play to focus on minding the percentages of his promoting. 16
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Kramer could have made close to the same amount of money not playing as he did
playing because he retained his key source of income long after he stopped competing on the
court. Since the 1920s, sporting goods companies had tried to establish endorsement deals with
the best amateur players of a more robust sort than the few gratis racquets. Every time the
USLTA had nixed these attempts through the enforcement of their “Sporting Goods Rule” that
not only prevented an association player from having his likeness attached to a racquet but also
prohibited any amateur player from working for a sporting goods company in any capacity. Once
again the primacy of the Davis Cup in the thinking of the USLTA Executive Committee raised
the tolerance of the association’s voters for amateurism when, after having held the Davis Cup
for four years in a row, the Americans lost to the Australians in the 1950 through 1953 ties.
USLTA Executive Committee members correctly attributed at least part of the Australians’
newfound dominance to the Australian Lawn Tennis Association’s (ALTA) acceptance of its top
amateur talent working for Australian sporting goods firms. In fact, the ALTA’s position on
amateur tennis players working for sporting goods firms went beyond forbearance to the active
encouragement of the practice, whereby senior ALTA members secured lucrative
consultantships for the most talented young Australian players who no longer had to worry about
actually clocking-in and could spend all of their days improving their game and traveling for
tournaments. For four years the USLTA bristled at that action by the Australians until 1954,
when the hundreds of delegates and their proxies met at the Association’s annual meeting and
overwhelmingly ended the sporting goods rule with only one dissenting vote. Tony Trabert, the
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United States’ top amateur player in 1954, went to work for the Wilson Sporting Goods
Company; that December he led the American Davis Cup team to victory over the Australians. 17
The USLTA 1954 vote was supposed to go only so far. Delegates did not countenance
both the so-called “givesmen” of sporting goods companies who outfitted amateur players with
free racquets, strings, and apparel as well as the association of a player’s likeness to a racquet,
sneaker, or tennis ball in exchange for a small percentage of each good sold. In a satire published
in World Tennis magazine that same year, player Art Larsen and editor Gladys Heldman gave a
comical but highly accurate portrait of the absurdity of the USLTA’s Amateur Rules
Committee’s obsession with policing gratis sporting goods and amateur player product
endorsements. Sporting goods firms in the early 1950s simply did not have that much free stuff
to give away because they did not operate on big margins themselves. Firms such as Spalding,
Dunlop, Wilson, and Cortland preferred to use their extra equipment not for giveaways to
amateur tournament players but in free junior tennis clinics sponsored across public park courts.
The players they partnered with for endorsements had to play professionally because the players’
likeness or signature that came to literally appear on the neck of the endorsed racquets in those
days made plain to the USLTA who got paid to play with that racquet. Hiding such an affiliation
so that a player could keep his amateur status made no sense from the point of view of the
sporting goods firms, who wanted the association of their product with the best players in the
most visible of ways. The dual strategy of big play-day-in-the-public-parks and professional
product endorsement paid off for the big four sporting goods firms, who in 1958 reported that
17
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over the past decade they had increased sales of tennis equipment and apparel by 60 percent.
That increase came about because of an innovative marketing partnership between the Wilson
Sports Equipment Company and Jack Kramer. 18
Sporting goods firms liked tennis because the game required a lot of equipment. Whereas
late nineteenth-century outdoor sports sellers such as Peck & Snyder of New York City as well
as early twentieth-century racquet makers such as A.J. Reach Company of Philadelphia, string
manufacturers such as Armour Company of Chicago, and sporting apparel clothiers such as
Brooks Brothers all marketed and advertised without a prominent player associated with their
firm, by the mid-thirties professional tennis players had toured enough that profitable sporting
goods manufacturers such as Dunlop thought the time right to pay professionals such as Vincent
Richards to associate himself with their products. At first those associations took the form of a
company like Dunlop claiming that professionals like Bill Tilden and Richards “designed,”
“tested,” and “played” with a racquet with a generic name such as “Maxplay.” During the war
years, marketing in the sporting goods industry tapped into patriotism to sell more products and
used their professional player spokespersons such as Richards and others for campaigns like
“Yes Tennis Will Help Keep the Nation fit in 1943.” If a professional player served in the
military or directly aided the war effort, his or her image might appear alongside a product such
as Don Budge’s, Bobby Riggs’, Alice Marble’s, and Ellsworth Vines’, all having a head-shot in
Wilson’s “New Wartime ‘Championship’ Tennis Ball” campaign. During wartime and in the
first few years afterwards, sporting goods manufacturers stopped short of a complete association
18

Kramer and Deford, The Game, 134; Art Larsen and Gladys Heldman, “The Sporting Goods Representative,”
World Tennis 2, no. 6 (November 1954): 19; “Tennis Clinics,” World Tennis 2, no. 4 (September 1954): 60-61;
Edward Potter, “Vic Denny is New USLTA Prexy,” World Tennis, 5, no. 10 (March 1958): 12-13.

214
between one of their racquets, balls, strings, or apparel, and a professional player. Wilson’s early
advertising in the prewar and war years did not feature a player endorsing the product; to pay a
professional player a flat fee or percentage would have made little financial sense since little
tennis touring was taking place in the early forties. As the war continued into the mid-forties,
professional and amateur players alike entered military service and put on exhibitions for troops
and war bond fundraisers; however, patriotic advertising placed limits on the individual
professional making money during a time of national sacrifice. In a major campaign immediately
after the war, Wilson emphasized the technology of their “Strata-Bow” racquet frame by
equating it to the jet airplanes of the present and future. 19
Wilson soon recognized, however, that features could only take a product so far—even at
a peak time of technological vogue. The firm needed people to help sell their products, and no
tennis person appeared more visible than the popular professional champion Jack Kramer. His
full partnership with Wilson began in early 1948 right after Kramer signed a contract with Jack
Harris to play Bobby Riggs on a professional tour. Wilson wanted everyone to know that no
matter who won the “World’s Tennis Championship” in 1948, either Riggs or Kramer, both men
“have used Wilson rackets since their early amateur days…and still play Wilson exclusively.”
The key innovation came after Kramer secured the World’s Professional Title and Wilson
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recognized that Kramer would dominate the game both on the court and in the court of public
opinion for the foreseeable future. 20
In December 1948 Wilson announced their new partnership with Kramer to present the
“Jack Kramer Autograph.” Advertisements to the contrary, the racquet had the same
specifications as Wilson’s standard strata-bow racquet except it came in two different weights
and displayed Kramer’s cursive handwriting on the stick’s neck. “I’m as proud of this racket as I
was of my first championship trophy. It’s the finest racket I’ve ever played with,” said Kramer
about his new equipment. While the Kramer autograph was not the first signature racquet—
Ellsworth Vines and Don Budge, as examples, each had racquets designated as their very own by
Wilson in the late 1930s and early 1940s—the Jack Kramer Autograph was the first tennis
racquet to come out during a heady time for the sale of sporting goods. In a meeting at Wilson’s
Chicago offices, Kramer wisely accepted the company’s offer by President L.B. Iceley and the
company’s sales executive Bill King’s of 2.5 percent earnings on units sold compared to the 3
percent Riggs, Vines, and Budge collected. Wilson pushed the Kramer racquet on wholesalers
and retailers harder than they did all their other racquets, and Kramer’s royalties rose from
$13,000 in the early years for the Kramer Autograph, to $50,000 in the late sixties, and $160,000
a year in 1975. The tennis boom of the mid-seventies ensured that the Jack Kramer Autograph
became the best-selling tennis racquet of all time and paved the way for a host of athlete
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signature sporting goods endorsements in other individual sports such as golf and team sports
such as baseball. 21
Playing style and product endorsements alone did not make much change to a tennis
professional’s bank account if the athlete behind the endorsement did not back up his or her
action on the court. In that Kramer made good. He overwhelmed Bobby Riggs in their 19471948 tour; he soundly beat Pancho Gonzales in the 1949 tour 94 to 29 matches; he remained the
all-American champion widely popular across the country after besting Pancho Segura 64 to 28
matches in their 1950-1951 tour; he defeated Frank Sedgman 54 to 41 matches in their 19521953 tour. Four tours in a row, Big Jack had retained the title “World’s Professional Champion.”
On the thirty-fourth match of the last tour, Kramer met the $100,000 guarantee he had offered
Sedgman and Ken McGregor to lure the Australian champions out of the amateur ranks and to
his professional troupe, which was rounded out by Pancho Segura. In the United States alone, the
four players reported $800,000 in gate receipts, eclipsing the next closest professional tennis tour
by $300,000. Kramer thus understood that people wanted to pay to watch him defend his title. 22
Kramer, however, refused to risk losing to Gonzales. While not playing night after night
on the tour, Gonzales still had established himself as the man to beat in professional tennis both
by fellow professionals like the Irishman George Lyttleton Rogers, who ranked both Gonzales
and Pancho Segura in front of Kramer, and through his on-court play by having won titles as the
21
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World’s Professional Champion through the yearly tournament contested in Cleveland, Ohio. He
was playing against the strongest professionals across the globe. Kramer compensated for his
own absence on the court by instituting a new mini-tournament format that replaced the standard
“exhibition” event that had always paired an undercard match before a main event match. Now,
players scrambled against one another during the first night of a tour stop, with the two winners
playing each other on the second night for a prize-money incentive. This two-night format led
Kramer to institute a new tennis scoring system called the pro-set that replaced the standard
tennis scoring system of first player to win two out of three sets or three out of five sets with a
single set played to eight games. These reforms did not address the real issue, though, of having
the director, manager, accountant, and promoter of the tour also being a part-time player, which
brought a great degree of emotional baggage to the enterprise of professional tennis in the fifties.
That baggage weighed down the financial prospects of the players as they readied to travel
across the country for another season. 23
Along with Kramer, the person who most made the tennis tour successful and exciting to
the audience was the last person to come onboard. In the Lenglen and Tilden tours, people paid
to see the grace and dominance of the champion. But after the Depression tours of Vines, Perry,
and Budge, promoters believed people paid to see conflict between the upstart amateur
challenger and the established touring professional. They therefore prioritized luring the most
attractive amateur champion, no matter the cost. The David versus Goliath narrative continued to
resonate with Americans into the fifties for several reasons. First, differences notwithstanding,
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the conclusion of World War II had brought American Jews and American Christians, both
Catholics and Protestants, into common cause to a greater degree than at any other time in the
nation’s history. With the onset of the Cold War and the godlessness of the new enemy, it was
little wonder people of different faiths found the emerging popularity of the “Judeo Christian
Tradition” settling and righteous warriors from the Old Testament beating insurmountable odds
inspiring. Second, the Gilded Age and Progressive Era middle-class built a foundation for the
American Dream in the twentieth century supported by a plank of professionalism. At the same
moment when doctors, lawyers, and accountants, to name a few of the upstart career trajectories,
all grew in the rigor of their training and standardized in their methods and results, so too
spectator sports grew and modernized, with the athletes dedicated to fulltime training and
specialization for the first time in any real numbers. Third, ever since the explosion of modern
consumer culture and leisure in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Americans
obsessed over what historian William Leach has called “the cult of the new”—that is, finding
happiness in the next good to buy, the next spectacle to see, the next experience to experience. 24
Kramer intuited all of this. With his tennis tours in the fifties he reaped respectable gate receipts
with minimal advertising expenses. But it was not just Kramer who was bearing the cost of the
tour. That burden fell on the players. 25
The start of the 1954 tour revealed just how touch-and-go professional tennis in the fifties
was. The Australian professional arrived in the United States from the Melbourne-hosted Davis
24
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Cup tie on January 2, 1954—the day before the professional tour began. Jack Kramer had spent
the last couple weeks of 1953 not preparing to play but in promoting the tour across newspapers,
radio, and television. Big Jake made more than a hundred phone calls a day on subjects that
ranged from renting a truck large enough to move their canvas court, securing a driver for the
truck, insurance policies should one of his four touring players injure themselves, and printed
programs for each tournament venue. The tour opened at Madison Square Garden on January 3,
1954 and featured a pre-card match of Don Budge versus Pancho Segura, a main attraction of
Frank Sedgman versus Pancho Gonzales, and a doubles pro-set of Segura and Gonzales versus
Sedgman and Kramer. At their second night at the Garden, Gonzales and Segura faced off, as
each had won the night before, with Gonzales serving ace after ace to win the match and secure
the $1,500 bonus for the event’s winner. On January 5, the troupe left New York City for their
city-to-city tour with plans to play the same format at most stops—that is, two-night
engagements with winners from the first night’s matches squaring off against one another for the
second night with an additional prize money bonus on the line. 26
As they set off, a sports reporter asked the competitors who they expected to win the tour.
Segura thought Gonzales, Gonzales named himself, both Budge and Sedgman did not offer a
definitive pick, and Kramer picked Sedgman, thinking Gonzales out of shape, ill-focused, and
weak in spirit. The players had 100 engagements to bear these predictions out. In the next month,
for example, the tour played the Onondaga Memorial in Syracuse, New York, before moving on
to Rochester, Albany, and then Boston Gardens and then departing the next day for Montreal for
26
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the Forum. The Canadian leg concluded with matches in Quebec City and the Auditorium in
Ottawa. Cornell University, Duquesne Gardens in Pittsburgh, and the Fort Wayne, Indiana,
Arena followed. The players then planned to go on to play Kansas City, Los Angeles, Pebble
Beach, Sacramento, Oakland, and Palm Springs before the end of February, despite Kramer not
having secured final venues for any of the California matches. Such fly-by-night scheduling
exemplified just how underdeveloped barnstorming professional tennis was in the 1950s. 27
The play of the professionals was far from underdeveloped, however. During the tour’s
first month, Pancho Gonzales proved his own prediction of his success true with a singles record
of fifteen wins and six losses as compared to Pancho Segura’s win-loss record of 13-9, Frank
Sedgman’s of 10-10, and Don Budge’s winless record of 0-15. Jack Kramer’s prediction that no
player could win more than 45 percent of their matches was certainly a marketing strategy on
behalf of the tour promoter to gin up media interest. Claiming that no player had an edge over
another player made for more intrigue over the day after day, months-long tour, that, as past
experience had shown, dwindled if one player became too dominate. Kramer’s unwillingness to
recognize how thoroughly Gonzales dominated the matches also stemmed from an unwillingness
to move past his own playing prime as Big Jake. He practiced with the players on a regular basis
and played some doubles matches in select cities, but on the court Kramer was only a shadow of
his former self. His domination of tennis in the late 1940s and the first two years of 1950s was
near complete. 28
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But the candle that burns brightest burns half as long. Aggressive play meant Kramer
developed nagging pains that turned into career-ending injuries after what amounted to less than
a decade of combined topflight amateur and professional play. Compared to other players of his
generation, along with prior and subsequent generations of players, for that matter, Kramer’s
dominance was short-lived—so much so that he at times disparaged the very professional players
he needed to promote and market. The ego of Kramer the athlete was not the reason professional
tennis only scraped by in the fifties, but it certainly did not help World Professional Tennis, Inc.
What did help was the fine entertainment value the players themselves provided. Crowds loved
Pancho Segura’s unorthodox two-handed strokes and never-quit hustle across the court. They
respected Don Budge’s place in tennis history as a two-time Grand Slam amateur champion
despite the nightly shellacking he took on the court. With Frank Sedgman and especially with
Pancho Gonzales, the crowds sat in awe at the talent and the power of the play. Even filming
Gonzales practice serves and overheads, a television crew remarked that he hit with such power
that “TV viewers would have a mass heart attack if this were in 3-D.” 29
After a season of nightly matches, Pancho Gonzales emerged above Sedgman, Segura,
and Budge in match wins. Having watched seventy-five nights of play, and even umpiring a few
matches, the sportswriter Hugh Stewart remarked that Gonzales beat out the other players simply
because of “his big serve” and his “complete all-court game” without mentioning his
determination and willingness to work hard to capitalize on the second chance at professional
tennis he had received. In fact, in writing short summaries of Sedgman, Segura, Budge, and

29

“Around the World,” World Tennis 1, no. 8 (January 1954): 42.

222
Kramer, all of whom Gonzales soundly defeated on the doubles court and the singles court,
Stewart considered all of them superior in “fighting spirit” and “concentration” to Gonzales, but
big Pancho simply had more physical strength to draw from then any other tennis player in the
world. Such observations seemed difficult to justify when Stewart himself umpired matches
where Gonzales “caught fire” and ground his way back from major score deficits to win a match,
or, in the case of a Fort Wayne, Indiana, match where Gonzales held the nerves at bay to win 28
games to 26 games when the match could have ended at 8 games to 6 games. 30
Stewart’s opinions of Gonzales revealed a deep dislike on the part of sportswriters for
Gonzales the man, not the player. His game stood above reproach, but his personality came
under frequent attack. The harsh commentaries came, at least in part, because of Gonzales’s
outspokenness over his financial compensation for his performance on the tennis court. Having
won the tour handily with victories in 85 of 126 singles matches played over sixteen weeks,
Gonzales secured $39,425, for the 1953-1954 tour—$35,000 less than he earned for losing badly
to Kramer on the 1949-1950 tour. 31
Modest attendance for the 1953-1954 tour partly explained why Gonzales earned half as
much for playing twice as well. Gate receipts from the most recent tour gave Kramer less money
to move around compared to the first professional tour Gonzales participated in and the 19511952 and 1952-1953 tours Kramer forced Gonzales to sit out. But differences in compensation
had more to do with how Kramer structured the tour now that his skill was diminished. The
30
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round-robin mini-tournament format was supposed to reward the player with the most match
victories, but Kramer distributed prize money bonuses based on his own whims rather than on
the actual wins of the players. For example, in April 1954, the tour swung down into Texas with
Gonzales maintaining a healthy match lead, Sedgman second, Segura third, and Budge fourth,
despite Segura sitting atop the prize money standings at $25,525, Gonzales second at $25,240,
Sedgman third at $20,025, and Budge, having won only one match on the entire tour, with
$10,900. While Big Pancho did end up with $4,000 more than Little Pancho and a few thousand
dollars more than Sedgman by the tour’s final accounting, the percentages Kramer paid to the
players did not accurately reflect their win-loss record on the tour. 32
Big Jake also took a more whimsical approach to his promotional duties than previous
tours. In the years where he both played and promoted, conventional wisdom would have
suggested an under-promoted tour when compared to the 1953-1954 tour, where he essentially
just promoted. The opposite actually happened. When the tour played New Haven, Connecticut,
on February 4, 1954, Jerome Scheur recalled how much fuller the arena was in Boston the year
before when he saw Kramer play Sedgman. Scheur’s sister-in-law lived in New Haven and had
not even heard that the tour planned to visit. At the matches she had no other explanation for the
“third full” gymnasium than the “lack of advance publicity.” Whereas in previous years the
troupe had always come close to selling out Madison Square Garden for the tour opener, the
January 1954 Garden matches set an underwhelming tone, soon followed by 500 people at the
Teaneck, New Jersey, Armory matches when, only the year before, 4,000 people had filled that
venue. Kramer missed basic details he had never before missed, such as securing ball boys in
32
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advance for the matches. He spent a lot of time playing golf at the different cities the troupe
stopped at rather than looking ahead to make sure the marketing was set for future stops on the
tour. Kramer put on tennis clinics for promising junior players with the blessing of USLTA and
the underwriting done by corporate friends such as the publisher of Holiday magazine. He
partnered with Perry T. Jones and the Southern California Tennis Association to hold a
professional tennis tournament in Los Angeles. In short, the promoter Jack Kramer realized that
he could still make the money he wanted—even with skimping on marketing and contracting out
what publicity took place to Frank O’Gara—because the players had no recourse to challenge the
compensation Kramer decided for them. 33
World Tennis Incorporated was the only game in town for the world’s best professional
players shut-out from returning to play amateur tournaments. It owned the professional players,
body and soul. The meritocracy of professional tennis where the best player got paid the best was
as much fiction as fact on the professional tour. Whereas professional tennis tournaments like the
1953 Wembley Professional Tournament attracted record crowds of up to 15,000 paying
spectators a night and paid the players based on how they finished in the tournament, enough of
those events simply did not exist for a professional player to earn a living in the 1950s. If people
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like Gonzales wanted to make it through the year just by playing tennis, they needed Jack
Kramer as much if not more than Kramer needed them. 34
Kramer’s influence over the professional players even extended to when the players were
not officially under contract with him. In February 1954, Kramer sat down with Jack March, who
ran the World Professional Championship in Cleveland at the Sutton Restaurant in New York
City—the preferred venue among sports promoters for tennis deals. The two signed an
agreement that required all professionals in Kramer’s troupe to play the Cleveland event after
Kramer’s tour ended. The details of the enforcement mechanism for such a deal after the players’
contract with World Tennis, Incorporated, do not survive in the written record, but Kramer likely
threatened his players with refusal to renew their tour contract if they did not play March’s
tournament from which Kramer drew what amounted to a finder’s fee. While they did not care
for getting told what to do, the professional players certainly wanted to play in the World
Professional Championship tournament because March ran a good event. The Pilsener Brewing
Company supplied $10,000 in prize money for the sixteen-person tournament with the winner
after four days of play receiving $2,000. A tournament-approved betting pool assured gambling
action on the tournament and stoked excitement with bookies barred from the grounds of
amateur tennis tournaments. 35
After four months on tour, Gonzales and Sedgman entered the main tournament in peak
form and played each other in the Sunday afternoon final on May 2, 1954, after having
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demolished the rest of the field. While March certainly had every incentive to hype the talent of
the players in his event, he also spoke truthfully when he remarked that what fans saw in final
was “the finest tennis” the world had ever seen. Night after night on tour had perfected
Gonzales’s serve to a point where Pancho literally threw down two aces a service game against
one of the strongest service returners around. He lost his own serve in only one game to take the
match 6-3, 9-7, 3-6, 6-2 for a repeat as the World’s Professional Champion. For his part,
Sedgman played his best tennis, committing next to no unforced errors, and missing only one
overhead the entire tournament. “Not since the days of Tilden has a top player so completely
overshadowed the field,” remarked March. Such dominance actually posed a real problem for the
champion’s future in professional tennis, because he had already established his dominance over
the best professional players and what amateur wanted to turn professional only to get
embarrassed on the court and forfeit the financial assistance they received from their amateur
tennis association? March was glad that Gonzales planned to return to Cleveland in 1955 to try to
defend his title, but the tournament director could not help but wonder if Pancho had “dug his
own financial grave.” 36
Gonzales proved himself the most consistent winner of all tennis professionals for the
next decade. His dominance, however, was incomplete. Segura bested Big Pancho and six others
in the Pacific Coast Professional Championships on August 22, 1954. These professional
tournaments were often slapdash combinations of tennis, movie stars, comic entertainment, and
last-minute funding from a business executive with a fondness for tennis. On the Copa Club
Courts on the grounds of the Beverley Wilshire Hotel in Los Angeles, for example, actors Walter
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Pidgeon, Mark Stevens, and Howard Duff umpired the matches, while actress Ida Lupino handed
out the prizes, and Rosemary Clooney, Spike Jones, Jose Ferrer, and the Ritz Brothers sat in the
stands and attended the after-match cocktail hour. Outside of a few household names such as the
two Panchos, less well-known teaching professionals such as the Irishman Freddie “The Fox”
Houghton would fill out the draw and willingly subject themselves to embarrassingly one-sided
losses for the few hundred dollars of a $2,500 total purse awarded to first-round losers as a
thanks for playing incentive. That Gonzales, Segura, and a handful of other top professionals
demolished their competition so systematically certainly did not help tournament promoters such
as Frank Feltrop put fans in the stands, but a champion winning convincingly against weaker
opponents, as people expected champions to do, did not hurt attendance nearly as much as
naysayers stated. If anything, people paid a little to see their expectations met, and then were
willing to pay more to see a contest with a less certain outcome in a tournament semi-final or
final where the best players would meet. 37
One of the more unusual experiences people paid to watch was the 1950-1951 mixed
doubles tour that proved a profitable venture for World Tennis, Inc. Many fans had tired of
Kramer’s predictable bruising of challenger after challenger. The fast-paced serve and volley
power game of the dominant male players in the fifties had turned people off because of the
predictable one-off serve, return, volley, point over. Fans wanted less predictability and more
variety. They wanted longer rallies more in line with the women’s game. Promoters like Kramer
saw this and needed a new draw to boost the gate. He settled on two players whose prime assets
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to the tour were the way they moved on the court. The two players he picked were women, and
they appealed to the crowds because of their sex and not in spite of it. 38
Gertrude “Gorgeous Gussie” Moran turned heads whether she had a tennis racquet in
hand or not. Her good looks and gregarious personality led to short movie roles, regular photo
shoots, and numerous product endorsements that she leveraged off of her most sensational
moment at the 1949 Wimbledon Championship. A finalist in the women’s title match at the end
of the tournament, Moran’s fortnight at the All England Club broke tradition and protocol with
her bold fashion choice. For the club that both hosted the first lawn tennis tournament and most
prized tradition, Moran’s sartorial selection of short skirt and white lace panties flew in the face
of over sixty years of tennis history. The typical stretches and lunges of a competitive match with
legs on full display revealed a tennis garment that had never before been treated as appropriate
for stylizing. Pilloried in the press for her titillating fashion, the crowds could literally not get
enough of Moran, further stoking the controversy. 39
Moran defended her attire with a practical assessment of the connection between
competitive tennis and women’s fashion: “After all, jumping and dancing about the court, people
see your underwear anyway, so they might as well see something with lace on it.” A tournament
spectator, A. Steward of London England, agreed, remarking on the fine play and good looks of
the American players, while also singling out Moran’s underwear for keeping the “female flag
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flying high.” 40 Moran’s intimates even attracted the attention of Members of Parliament who
denounced the “panties worn by ‘Gorgeous Gussie”’ along with the media outlets zealously
covering her lack of coverage. 41 The player Moran, the spectator Steward, and the government
officials understood that the tournament crowds looked at female players with more on the mind
than the spin of the forehand or the power of their serve. Gazers expected style, grace, and
celebrity as defined by a balance between the old and the new. For his part, Ted Tinling, the
designer of the athletic ensemble, thought any woman in the ladies events could and should wear
his panties and short skirt. He went so far as to take his prototype into the locker room, where he
propositioned players who met his prodding with mixed reactions. Pauline Betz seemed to show
some interest, while Louise Brough Clapp stridently resisted, labeling the clothes a
“distraction”—prophetic words, as the heavily favored Moran lost on Centre Court to a relatively
unknown Chinese player. What the competitor Clapp did not realize was the entertainment
power the panties possessed. Spectators cared more for the sizzle of the players than their strokes
and strategies. As a sport, tennis was entertainment after all, and by dressing just a little
differently, Moran made a name for herself that would help to pay the bills in the decade to come
while the great champion Clapp scraped by teaching tennis lessons to beginners. 42
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Kramer’s plan to celebrate the panties fizzled out not long into the 1951 World
Professional Tennis tour. The foursome played a typical stop on February 1 at Oakland’s
Auditorium Arena. Attendees paid $1.80 for a Gallery spot, $2.40 for a Balcony view, $3.60 for
a position in the Dress Circle, and $3.60 for Main Floor seats. The tour promoted “the California
boys who have made good” to the East Bay audience, even though Kramer came from Southern
California, Pancho Segura hailed from Ecuador, and Moran and Betz made up half of the tennis
tour without even acknowledgment on the tour’s promotional materials. Those problems aside,
the real issue centered on the difference in the players’ skills. Segura entertained but he could not
consistently beat Kramer. Moran turned heads but she could hardly rally with Betz. The
difference between the playing ability of the ladies became the bigger issue because their matchup was the novel addition to that year’s tour to deflect from Kramer’s failure to lure a new
challenger out of the amateur ranks. Kramer never disclosed how much he paid Betz, but given
that she had toured previously as a professional in the late forties, the number he and Riggs
agreed to pay her likely fell more in line with the $1,000 a week they offered Segura compared
to the $35,000 guarantee plus 25 percent over $35,000 that both Moran and Kramer accepted. 43
Betz grew up playing tennis in Southern California, first on the Queens Playground
public park courts near Los Angeles High School, and later on the courts of the Los Angeles
Tennis Club after she became California state high school champion. Throughout her junior
career, she learned the game from Dick Skeen, one of the country’s most successful
professionals at developing youngsters. At the LATC she had matches against other top players
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such as Louise Brough, arranged for her by Perry T. Jones. Jones took an even greater interest in
Gussy Moran and Jinx Falkenburg, who also began playing there in 1938. Like he did with so
many players, he paid for their lessons, secured practice partners for them, and even bought their
tennis balls. That support figured prominently in cresting the wave of Southern California lady
players that thoroughly dominated women’s tennis in the middle third of the twentieth century.
Those women won thirteen national singles championships between 1935 and 1950; they held
seven national eighteen-and-under championships between 1940 and 1950; they raised the
Wimbledon singles trophy five times in a row between 1945 and 1950; and the Southern
California lady players likely would have won more tournaments had World War II not limited
the amateur tournaments available to them in the prime of their careers. 44
The USLTA male directors grew so accustomed to the dominance of the Association’s
women players that these men balked at any hint that one of their amateur champions might
consider playing tennis for money on a professional tour. Since Suzanne Lenglen and Mary K.
Browne’s 1926 tour, the only other women to play professionally were the Californian Alice
Marble and the English champion Mary Hardwick, who joined Don Budge and Bill Tilden in the
1941 professional tour promoted by Jack Harris. Women players continued to play with their
male professional peers in fundraising until after World War II, when those matches stopped.
The excitement of matches on the road outside of the control of the USLTA inspired Betz and a
handful of other women champions to consider playing some exhibition matches of their own
outside the auspices of the Association. The USLTA leadership treated that curiosity as a
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complete betrayal of the financial support they had given Betz and Sarah Palfrey Cooke during
their prewar amateur careers. Those same male directors thus helped to make Betz’s and Cooke’s
decision to turn professional for the women when they suspended the champions’ amateur status.
Shortly thereafter Betz and Cooke announced they would play a professional tour in the summer
of 1947 with the former player and Cooke’s husband Elwood Cooke managing their tour. For the
first time, women had a professional tour of their own. 45
Betz and Sarah Palfrey Cooke played the first professional match of their tour in front of
1,500 fans in Los Angeles on July 8, 1947, following a signing ceremony at the Beverley
Wilshire Hotel. Their opener certainly showcased the fine playing ability of both players, but
spectators noted the contest more of a splendid spectacle than a serious contest because in
addition to the singles match, Cooke paired with the actor Mickey Rooney and Betz partnered
with the fine tennis player and coach Carl Earn for a mixed doubles match. Over the coming
months the two women played match after match from the West Coast, to the Midwest, and on to
the Atlantic Coast with crowds that averaged 1,000 spectators. Betz beat Cooke most of the time,
but the matches remained competitive and the competitors remained on good terms throughout.
Finishing their tour in New York City, Betz and Cooke then traveled with Bobby Riggs and Don
Budge to Europe for matches in England, France, Belgium, and Switzerland. 46
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Cooke was forty and too old to tour again when Kramer approached the women
professionals about joining his 1951 tour. Betz and Moran were not only in shape; they were
physically attractive as well. Neither woman was a stranger to the sexualized gaze of onlookers.
Moran had embraced that attention with her sartorial selections while Life magazine’s coverage
of the 1946 United States Women’s Singles Championship featured that year’s winner Betz flat
on the ground with a gaze looking up the back of her legs to her rear-end. The interest of arousal
proved fleeting for many fans, however, as Betz bested Moran night after night on the court. The
one-sidedness of the tour grew so bad that Kramer and Riggs each approached Betz about
withdrawing from the remainder of their matches because people decided to forgo attending if
they could guess the outcome ahead of time. In trying to force Betz out and then offering to buy
her a car as a quid pro quo for her withdrawal from the tour, both Riggs and Kramer earned
themselves reputations for sexism that continued to cling with them throughout their later
careers. At the same time, though, the financial failure of the 1951 Professional Tour showed that
sex and sport worked together only if the sex did not substitute for the sport. The
competitiveness of the players mattered a great deal too given the format of the 1950s
professional tennis tour where the same two people played one another night after night. 47
The basic logistics of the professional tour posed another big problem to the sports
promoter. Small and medium towns had few venues suitable to hold a tennis match where
enough spectators could attend to make a decent gate and also provided enough lines of sight so
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that those spectators would not howl in protest over paying so much for so little viewable action.
The ambitious schedule World Tennis Inc. maintained made rain an ever-present fear in the
promoter’s mind, which in turn led Kramer to favor indoor over outdoor venues. The players
might have despised playing on armory and gymnasium floors in front of a howling crowd that
raised temperatures indoors to stifling temperatures, but they wanted to get paid. 48 Kramer tour
veteran Barry McKay remarked, “I have played tennis in 42 countries throughout the world—
traveled around the world five times and played in matches on every surface from burned clay
courts in Moscow to dried-out cow dung in Hybrabad, India.” In the adversity the barnstorming
players faced daily lay one of the sport’s greatest profit generaters, because difficulty meant
drama. Furthermore, the fact that difficulty played out in locations exotic to and far flung from
the American viewing public meant that if television could be brought to lay the struggles of
those players bare, then tennis stood a good chance of growing in the future as the world became
more globally connected. 49 That same drama also cut the opposite direction from the players’
point of view, and that different perspective helped to explain why so few chose to join the
professional tour during the fifties.
Professional prospects gave a number of other reasons why they often chose to remain
amateurs. They cited the physical and emotional toll of a barnstorming tour. For example, player
turned promoter Bobby Riggs courted Richard Savitt in 1951 in the midst of Savitt’s remarkable
season. Winning the Australian and Wimbledon titles, Savitt seemed the heavy favorite to win
the U.S Championship at Forest Hills and the heir apparent to replace Pancho Gonzales as the
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challenger to world professional champion Jack Kramer. Savitt’s semi-final exit at Forest Hills
made the picture of who was the best amateur player a little less clear, but also gave Riggs more
flexibility in negotiating a better contract for the tour and a worse contract for the player because
Savitt’s domination in 1951 proved less sure. Without a truly sweet contract, Savitt had an easy
time putting the thought of playing professional out of mind. Matches in armories and night after
night on the road simply made for “a difficult life” from Savitt’s perspective. But foregoing the
professional circuit in no way meant that Savitt removed tennis from his life. Instead, he
continued to play in the U.S. Championship for the next decade and even won the U.S. Indoor
Singles Championship, all the while making a name for himself in financial services on Wall
Street. Savitt simply thought professional tennis in the fifties a bad investment. 50
Amateurs did, however, admire and seek to emulate the independence from the USLTA
professionals exercised even though most tennis players in the 1950s were unwilling to forgo the
limited financial support and network of tournaments the Association provided. For example, in
1954, during the peak tennis tournament months of June through September, the USLTA’s
various sections sanctioned 300 tournaments across a few dozen categories that ranged from
under-ten year-old players, to super-senior age divisions, and father-daughter events. The
problem from the amateur player’s point of view was not with the number or variety of
tournaments but with how the tournaments were run. In an anonymous short story titled “The
Rich Man’s Game,” the player-author, presumably Gardnar Mulloy, lambasted a fictionalized
sportswriter named Bob Considine who had written an article claiming that “big-time tennis was
now monopolized by poor sandlotters and public parks players.” Mulloy goes on to rebuff the
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sportswriter by conjuring an Associated Press story that listed number one ranked player Gardnar
Mullard (Gardnar Mulloy) as the seventh wealthiest person on the planet, tennis champion
Smudge Patty (John “Budge” Patty) kept full households of servants at his American and
European mansions, and top lady player Patricia Podd (Patricia Canning Todd) did not attend a
tournament without a dozen luggage bags and her personal assistant. Given their ostentatious
display of wealth, Mulloy observed, did organizers of events such as the Overhampton
grasscourt tournament really expect a player who drove up to the match with his 1926 Rolls
Royce and who played with six 24-carat gold racquets to sleep six players to a room in the club’s
servant’s annex? Did the tournament organizer Harrison Pringle need to give the players their
twenty-five dollars in expenses with such secrecy and beam with such pride when the
tournament champion received a piece of used luggage as first prize? Did such a wealthy Long
Island Club need to plan a special player menu of sardines and bread rather than the club’s
normal turtle soup, fois gras, and soufflé? The satire was not subtle. 51
Mulloy’s opinions rallied fellow players because his views were based on their actual
experiences. At South Hampton, New York, for example, members of the Meadow Club literally
put their player guests on army military personnel cots stacked side by side in a squash court.
They served the players “special tennis meals” which was code for innutritious and cheap food
rather than the normal delicacies enjoyed in the dining room. These slights aside, the biggest
problem from the players’ point of view was that members treated the competitors “as if they
were the performers solely for the enjoyment of the Meadow Club’s exclusive membership”
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rather than invited guests who happened to play tennis very well. Worse still, players would
sometimes show up for a tournament, often after having traveled across the country, only to find
an event like the Narragansett tournament cancelled for inadequate organization on the part of
the host club. At other times, the USLTA tried to over-manage the schedules of players without
input from the participants. In the fall of 1953 the USLTA and the Australian Tennis Federation
agreed to a quid pro qua whereby Australian players would attend the United States
Championship at Forest Hills while American players would remain in Australia after the Davis
Cup for the Australian Championships. When USLTA committee members told Davis Cup
competitor Tony Trabert about the deal, he flatly refused to stay because he wanted to return
stateside to his wife. Such treatment at event after event spurred amateur players to organize the
game’s first amateur player association in the summer of 1953. 52
The “Tennis Players’ League” made a public announcement in September 1953, that
named the organization’s nine specific goals. First, give the players a substantive voice on the
important USLTA decision-making committees. Second, help create better press for the USLTA
and the game of tennis. Third, aid tournament officials in securing players and bringing more
money into tennis by running better tournaments through promotions and marketing. Fourth,
coordinate the schedule of sanctioned tennis events to avoid tournament overlap. Fifth, convince
tournament officials and association leaders to recognize what players brought to the game.
Sixth, grow junior tennis, especially through player-run clinics. Seventh, promote public interest
in tennis by bringing the rules of the game out of the late nineteenth century and into the postwar
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world. Eighth, assist in the building of new public courts and the opening of new tennis clubs.
Finally, grow the financial resources of the game. 53
The players chose Sidney Wood, Jr. to lead the League as president. They elected the
outspoken Gardnar Mulloy vice-president, with Grant Golden serving as secretary-treasurer. Vic
Seixas, Art Larsen, Chauncey Steele, Billy Talbert, Don McNeill, and Tony Trabert also served
on the league’s first executive committee, which meant that the lion’s share of the top ranking
amateur men’s players in the country participated in the League. Such solidarity gave the
USLTA President Colonel Bishop little choice but to work with the players toward the mutual
purpose of growing amateur tennis. 54
Wood and his fellow amateur players certainly had statistics and anecdotal evidence on
their side to show that the growth of the amateur game had not been well served by the USLTA
Executive Committee since the thirties. In 1935, United States sports goods companies sold
6,250,464 tennis balls and 537,002 tennis racquets. By 1952 those numbers fell to 5,070,288 and
382,600—respective declines of 18.8 percent and 28.6 percent, even as the United States
population as a whole rose 11 percent from 138,439,069 to 154,233,234. In the early thirties
major grass court tournaments took place at Wilmington, Delaware; Seabright, New Jersey;
Orange, New Jersey; Newport, Rhode Island; Staten Island, New York; Rye, New York; Boston,
Massachusetts; Narragansett, Rhode Island; Providence, Rhode Island; Germantown,
Pennsylvania; Merion, Pennsylvania; Southampton, New York; Glen Cove, New York; Piping
Rock, New York; and Forest Hills, New York. Two decades later, the only substantive lawn
53
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tennis tournaments that remained were the Eastern Championships played at Orange Lawn
Tennis Club, the Merion Cricket Club tournament, the Newport Invitational at the Newport
Casino, the United States Doubles Championship contested at Longwood Cricket Club, the
National Championships at Forest Hills, and two new but smaller tournaments at the Nassau
Country Club and across greater Baltimore. European tournaments attracted much greater
crowds than American tournaments, and “in Australia,” one American player noted, “more
people watch members of our Davis Cup team practice than attend any tournament final or Davis
Cup match in the United States!” 55
Yet in certain respects the game had actually grown in the United States because of the
recreational revolution of the late thirties and early forties. By 1950 thousands more people
played the game competitively than ever before, which was due largely to the proliferation of
public courts built during the Great Depression. While elite East Coast lawn tennis tournaments
suffered and came to occupy only four weeks on the USLTA’s national tennis calendar,
tournaments in the South, Midwest, and Pacific Northwest boomed along with the long popular
Southern California amateur circuit. Initiative to grow the amateur game seemed to come from
everywhere except from the USLTA’s national office. In July of 1953 American sportswriters
contacted the USLTA in Manhattan to ask for an interview and some photographs with recent
Wimbledon Champion Vic Seixas upon his arrival back in the United States. The USLTA had no
idea when Seixas would arrive despite their insistence to the players that they manage all aspects
of United States tennis abroad. That paternalism in thought but not in practice contrasted sharply
55

Wood, Jr., “The Case for the Tennis Players’ League,” 8; Gardnar Mulloy, “Is Tennis Dying?,” World Tennis 1,
no. 3 (August 1953): 12.

240
with golf—the game to which sportswriters most often equated tennis. The Professional Golfers’
Association and the United States Golf Association were only too happy to help the mayor of
New York City coordinate a ticker-tape parade along Broadway for golfer Ben Hogan upon his
return stateside after having won the British Open. So the blame for the parts of the tennis that
had declined lay not with larger social forces but with the passive mismanagement of the
USLTA national officers, or so the players argued. 56
In selecting Wood to lead them, amateur tennis players picked a capable spokesperson for
their interests. Wood established himself as an amateur player consistently ranked in the top ten
in the nation during the 1930s and 1940; however, he never ranked in the top three, and therefore
a career change to professional tennis made no financial sense. Wood also realized that simply
accepting the expense payments provided by the USLTA would never give him a stable or
satisfactory income. He solved this problem by partnering with professional tennis player Don
Budge to establish one of the first celebrity athlete-owned and -operated businesses in America
in 1940. The Budge-Wood service pressed the laundry, waxed the floors, washed the windows,
and shampooed the carpets of New Yorkers on Manhattan’s East Side. Headquartered at 306
East 61st Street, by 1953 Budge-Wood Services employed 350 people who serviced clients in
Manhattan, Long Island, Westchester, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Wood then plowed some
of this money into a non-profit tennis club called Town Tennis Club built on the site of a former
brewery at Sutton Place, sandwiched between 55th and 56th Streets. The tennis champion and
dry-cleaner kept clean from the stains of professionalism by refusing to accept any money
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directly from this sporting venture, and by using all monies collected from member fees to
subsidize player development for competitive juniors. He also ran a public relations business
with connections throughout the New York City sports media. That combination led one
sportswriter to remark that along with Jack Kramer, “Sidney is tennis’s foremost business
man.” 57
To a degree not seen before from a player turned promoter, Wood succeeded in softening
the hardest edges of the tennis establishment by appealing to USLTA officials’ vanity about their
own importance. He cajoled players, both amateurs and professionals, to play against each other
in exhibitions specifically for USLTA national and sectional officers. At a 1953 event hosted by
his Town Tennis Club, Wood convinced mayor-elect Robert Wagner along with many of New
York City’s first families—the Chryslers, Vanderbilts, Coreys, and Fairchilds—to watch a match
between Don Budge, Bobby Riggs, Don McNeill, and Gardnar Mulloy with the far less
prominent USLTA officials who all enjoyed an over-the-top champagne brunch. Special
treatment dampened association officers’ opposition to Wood’s proposal for a nationally
televised thirty-five-week round robin tournament played at Wood’s Town Tennis Club and
complete with corporate sponsorship, Monday evening television coverage by WPIX for thirtyfive weeks, and publicity by Wood himself. Play week after week meant amateur players drew
their maximum association expenses of $15 a day on a much more regular basis than the current
tournament schedule allowed for—a fact seemingly lost on the notoriously tight-fisted USLTA,
who at the same meeting voted down a player expense increase per play day from $15 to $20.
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The players’ spokesmen had figured out a basic rule of influence: make people feel important
and they will go so far as to act against their own financial self-interest and embrace impractical
schemes such as a nine-month revolving tennis tournament. 58
Actually running a successful tennis event was another matter entirely, and Wood did not
prove up to the task. On Monday, April 26, 1954, WPIX crews ripped out a fence behind the
show-court at the Town Tennis Club in order to secure line-of-sight positions for their television
cameras. They brought in special 24,000-watt lights strung atop twenty-four-foot poles that
required power cable connections that ran to the top of a nineteen-story building next door.
Logistics aside, WPIX producers had a fundamentally different view of what they were
televising from Wood and his players. The Tennis Players’ League, USLTA officials, and Wood
all wanted the broadcast of “a sports event,” while the network wanted to air “a TV show.” That
difference of opinion contributed to the poor reception television viewers gave the match
between the biggest stars of amateur tennis—Tony Trabert, Vic Seixas, Gardnar Mulloy, and
Ham Richardson. Wood wooed the USLTA board members to provide the match with linesmen,
umpires, and ball-boys by once again providing gratis food and beverages along with a spate of
celebrities that included Gene Tunney, Lana Turner, and Igor Cassini. About twice as many
guests as were invited turned up for dinner and the open bar—an overflow that pushed back the
start time of the match. So much reliance on celebrity service bulletins and publicity from
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Charlie Einfeld and Martin Michel at 20th Century Studios led Wood and his team to overlook
the basics of running a tennis event. 59
Disorganization reigned with play set to begin. The players did not even have tennis balls
with them on the court for the start of the match. Lights make the tennis ball hard to see from the
players’ perspective, and photographers’ flashbulbs further handicapped the players, who put on
less than a stellar performance. Eighty letters from viewers found their way to Wood—a full
quarter of which complained of the poor event and the larger problem of having turned topflight
tennis into a “circus.” Those epistles, not openly hostile to the round robin event, offered
suggestion after suggestion to improve the experience. To his credit, Wood tried to put some of
these suggestions into practice, such as adjusting the position of the cameras so the entire tennis
court fell into the field of view rather than showing only one player at a time. But changes like
limiting celebrities’ time on camera in favor of keeping the action on tennis did little to solve the
fundamental problem with the venture. The round robin simply demanded too much from
America’s top amateur players in terms of time away from crucial tournaments in Europe during
the late spring and early summer. Without financial remuneration, how could Wood expect the
players he supposedly represented to block out substantial parts of their schedules so that he
could earn a commission from television networks for promoting a tennis event hosted at his
club? Sportswriter Jim Burchard of the World Telegram panned the event; his opinion was
shared by the sliver of viewers who watched the match and the few players themselves who
participated. USLTA officials, their fascination with television and their susceptibility to
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selective flattery aside, likewise felt underserved by the event and by Wood. 60 Jack Kramer’s
position outside of the amateur association as the head of the professional tour put him in a much
better place to take advantage of the changed economic outlook for sports in the fifties that
television had made possible.
Society-wide changes in the postwar period that moved entertainments squarely from the
public sphere to squarely inside the home had by the early 1950s brought on what one historian
has called “The Great Sports Slump of the 1950s.” Between 1947 and 1949, Americans spent
about $282 million per year on attendance at sporting events. Over the next decade, that yearly
number fell thirty million to $252 million dollars. Every spectator sport suffered at the same time
that the economy hummed along and consumer spending boomed. Along with where they spent
their money and what they spent their money on, who spent the money mattered in the fifties.
Women exercised increased control over their household incomes, and tasked with raising the
largest generation, up to that point, of children in American history, it comes as no surprise their
spending focused on the home. The role of women as primary household consumers became so
total by the early 1950s that even when men did spend money on entertainments outside the
home, be it movies, concerts, and especially spectator sports that they previously had attended
exclusively with male friends, these men now bought a ticket for themselves and a ticket for their
wives. Given the long popularity of tennis with women compared to baseball, football, and
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boxing, tennis fared proportionally better than the major team sports and prizefighting, whose
spectatorship slumped during the fifties. 61
The rise of television in the home also impacted attendance at sporting events. Homeviewership did not, however, toll the death bell for many spectator sports as quickly or as loudly
as commonly assumed. Television ownership rose from four million Americans in 1950 to 75
percent of all families by 1956. Families in the United States by the middle of the fifties watched
television about five hours per day. At the same time, the popularity of sports programming fell
from the high water mark in the late 1940s and early 1950s when teams and sports ranging from
the Chicago Cubs and championship prizefighting had sold their broadcast rights to television
networks on the cheap, or for nothing at all, because the sports executives believed television
boosted their gate sales. Once the novelty wore off, television viewers quickly realized that some
of the fun of attending a wrestling match or the incredibly popular roller derbies of the late
forties and early fifties did not translate well into the family room. The technical limitations of
the standard camera at the time, popularly known as “Doctor Cyclops,” also limited the angles of
the action to a degree that the quick and oftentimes decentralized movement of team sports
proved too complicated to capture for home viewership. Networks compensated for these
shortcomings by doubling-down on producing quality programs in other areas, such as comedy,
drama, and gameshows that most families spent more time watching in the fifties than sports
shows. 62
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Whereas football had proven troublesome to televise, tennis had long been made into a
camera-friendly sport. The reality of airing a tennis match nonetheless posed a real challenge for
broadcasters. Editors could add sound-effects and commentary later, but cameramen had
difficulty keeping the ball and players in frame, especially as the speed at which the top
professionals increased. The predictability of the serve-and-volley game helped cameramen pan
their cameras immediately up following the serve and frequent charge to the frontcourt, but the
different environments in which the matches took place—stadium one afternoon, armory that
evening, gymnasium the next—meant that without the purchase and set-up of dark matting along
the back and sides of the court, players’ white outfits, not to mention the white tennis balls,
would appear vaguely on screen if they showed up at all. But they did show up with great
regularity during the intermission of double features, where tennis newsreels brought far-away
and posh tournaments into the movie palaces popular with the less well-to-do. The focused
drama of two competitors, one rectangular court, and one ball meant that one camera rather than
a troupe of operators could cover a match. The major newsreel series, The March of Time, Pathé
News, Paramount News, Fox Movietone News, Hearst Metrotone News, and Universal Newsreel
all recapped tennis tournaments and ties with dramatic commentary and cheesy tennis shot
sounds. The rapid rise in television ownership and viewership in the late 1950s and early 1960s
ended those sports newsreels. Television sports programming grew worldwide, as was the case
in Australia in 1962 when producers shot thirteen 30-minute television shows of professional
tennis in Sydney and planned another thirteen episodes in Melbourne. The next year the Riviera
Tennis Club in Los Angeles taped matches of Kramer’s players and aired those matches on
KTTV and other California networks in 1963 and 1964. In 1965 CBS Sports further abbreviated
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a tennis tournament by interspersing one-hour matches with bowling shows as the popularity of
that sport rose steadily in the mid-1960s. 63
Jack Kramer’s tour took partnership between competitive tennis and television to a new
level by separating production from the amateur tennis associations and their tightly controlled
tournament venues. Without set tournament homes such as Forest Hills, Wimbledon, or Roland
Garros, the more peripatetic professional tour could attach itself to venues whose owners and
operators seemed amenable to sharing revenues generated by televised coverage of the tennis.
Kramer’s abbreviated round-robin match format between just four players made for a night of
interesting television without locking the network into paying a steep price to secure two weeks
of tennis tournament coverage where they were likely to use only a small fraction of what they
had paid for. 64
The players embraced television. Kramer secured short-term broadcast contracts that
stipulated cameras would not adversely affect play by being poorly placed around the court.
With television, Kramer and troupe expected a positive impact on their pocketbooks. They did
not do as well as they hoped. At the cusp of the Open Era in 1968, tennis remained, in the words
of former tennis champion turned longtime broadcaster Barry MacKay, “wide open as far as
television goes.” It took the next generation of sports managers to create multi-year contracts
worth multi-million dollars, but by getting media outlets such as the BBC to agree to televise
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dramatic tennis matches at London’s Wembley Stadium, for example, Kramer’s barnstorming
tennis tour demonstrated to sports promoters and marketers the realizable future, especially after
1968, when the problems between professionals and amateurs became less apparent. 65
A great number of problems remained, though, with the sport of tennis and the place of
the professional player in that sport prior to 1968. The Australian champion Frank Sedgman,
who toured with the Kramer troupe beginning in 1953, captured the essence of the professional
tennis tour in the fifties and sixties when he said: “With professional tennis in those days, you’d
just have to get out there and play, and not complain about it, because you were there to make a
buck. And you had to put on a good show.” 66 But a good show in the fifties was a heavy burden
to carry. On no one’s shoulders did that burden fall more heavily than on the longtime World’s
Professional Champion Richard “Pancho” Gonzales.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE METEORIC RISE OF THE KID FROM THE “WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS”
Tennis-professional-turned-sports-instructor Dick Skeen liked to say, “tennis players are
not born—they are made!” In the mid-twentieth century, Skeen taught more top-level tennis
players in America than any other coach. He knew how to make winners. At the end of his
teaching career, he published his accumulated wisdom on technique, tactics, and strategy that
drew on his forty-five years in tennis, his time on court with the game’s top amateurs and
professionals, and his training of more than forty United States national champions. 1
Skeen’s major insight was that proper training along with mental toughness could
overcome athletic deficiencies and make any junior into a player capable of playing at a level
high enough to earn a university athletic scholarship. With the right serve, groundstrokes,
footwork, net play, and service returns, along with a set of goals, Skeen contended, any player,
after a decade of practice and competition, could excel as a tournament player. In emphasizing
the proper technique of stroke production and competitive fortitude, Skeen spoke well from the
experience of a proven coach; however, in his assertion that the where and the with what one was
“born” did not matter in their future prospects in competitive sports, he missed the large impact
that class conflict and ethnic antagonism had on the everyday lives and future prospects of
professional athletes in America during the mid-twentieth century. 2 In tennis—a sport highly
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steeped in class conservatism, racial exclusion, and traditional amateurism—those tensions
proved particularly acute until the most unlikely of figures pivoted between amateur tennis with
limited professionalism and professional tennis without real amateurism. Professionals were on
the outside of tennis before open competition began in 1968. Outsiders thus found something
attractive in joining the professional tour.
Richard “Pancho” Gonzales was born in Los Angeles and grew up on a tennis court that
could not have differed more from the posh private clubs popping up along the West Coast,
where most of Skeen’s students originated. The hustling world of the public parks and the streets
were a far cry from the clubhouses and manicured lawn courts of Philadelphia, Boston, and New
York City. The personal refinement and self-control with which the game instilled amateurs—
according to International Lawn Tennis Federation and United States Lawn Tennis Officials—
did not stop the adolescent Gonzales from running afoul of the law. His life of struggle on the
streets almost ended his tennis career before it began. The game he learned to play in the public
parks resembled the sport played by East Coast elites and the Country Club caste in name only.
The circuitous path he followed to become the U.S. amateur champion was part of a broader
renegotiation and disintegration of a half-century of sports tradition devoted to amateurism. In
tennis it took Gonzales, someone from what tennis officials called “the wrong side of the tracks,”
to make that accommodation happen. But even among a band of outsiders, Pancho lived his life
on the outside. 3
The first tracks Gonzales’s story crossed was the southwest border of the United States
and the century-long struggle in Mexico. Beginning in December of 1808 with the Valladolid
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conspiracy and the Hidalgo Rebellion of the following year and a half, a succession of rebellions
had culminated in a self-government with a constitution in 1824, only to see years of struggle
devolve into near constant internal strife and frequent invasions from outside nations until the
1880s finally ushered in modest political solidity. Over the following thirty years, cracks grew
wide enough to plunge the country into a deep chasm of revolutionary violence that came to be
called the Mexican Revolution. For roughly twenty years following the start of the Mexican
Revolution in 1910, Mexicans emigrated from their country’s northern states by the hundreds of
thousands. They settled throughout the American Southwest and remade the social fabric of this
region. Traveling as individuals and as families, the climate, kinship networks, and opportunities
for agricultural work pulled many migrants to the fertile valleys of Southern California. As more
and more immigrants arrived, in the analysis of the leading historian of the topic, a burgeoning
Latino “subculture” developed in and around the growing metropolis of Los Angeles. 4
Gonzales’s parents, Manuel and Carmen, made just such a journey to Los Angeles in the early
twenties.
Unlike Manuel, who lived near subsistence before walking to Arizona, Carmen
Esperanza came from the wealthy Alire family, whose numerous land holdings surrounded their
home in the city of Chihuahua. Property ownership made the Alires targets for attacks similar to
those reported by American coffee plantation owner Charles F. Simon. Armed resistance fighters
raided different estates, seizing cash, documents, and deeds with the intent to muddle legal
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possession of lands. 5 Under this climate of concern, Carmen’s father entrusted his property
records to a nephew and moved to El Paso with his wife and daughters. A short time later,
unwilling to return home but unsatisfied with her life in rural Arizona, Carmen moved
independently to Los Angeles. There she met Manuel Gonzales, whose own journey from
Mexico was equally harrowing. Escaping the influenza outbreak of 1918, the nine-year-old
Manuel walked barefooted with an uncle from Durango to the mining town of Globe, Arizona.
After staying a short while with family in Globe, Manuel moved during the late 1920s to Los
Angeles—a city whose Latino population had increased from roughly 4,000 persons in 1900 to
nearly 150,000 at the start of the Great Depression. 6
Manuel and Carmen spent their first year in Southland together living in an ethnicallymixed neighborhood at 1268 East 58th Street. There they welcomed their first-born son, Richard,
into the world on May 9, 1928. A “Depression Kid,” as he would write years later, both his
parents’ difficulty in finding work and the family’s peripatetic search for housing outside of the
Mexican barrios of East and South-Central Los Angeles marked Richard’s first years. Carmen
worked as a seamstress, for a company and from home, because outwork was often the only
option for Mexican women recently arrived in Southern California. Skilled as a carpenter,
Manuel tried to find stable employment with mixed success. Much of his work consisted of
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painting and assisting in the construction of movie sets. With upwards of 90 percent of Latinos in
Los Angeles doing some form of blue-collar work, the Southern California film industry had a
rich pool of skilled but easily marginalized workers to draw upon. Movie studios began
relocating from New York City to Southland in the 1910s because executives believed Southern
California offered better climates in terms of both sunshine and weaker labor unions. Those
moves meant jobs but only manual work for Latinos living in Los Angeles. Between 1,000 and
3,000 workers plied 275 unique skills in order to create a movie. Manuel supported his family in
this way. Even when he held a job on set, Manuel still had much to fear. As with any other
industry, Hollywood suffered the effects of the Great Depression. In the spring of 1933, cinema
producers slashed workers’ wages by 50 percent and cut back on the production of big budget
films. At the same time, Hollywood studios turned over six out of every ten members of the
Actors Guild annually. Manual laborers like Manuel Gonzales fared even worse. Manuel and
men like him, mostly below 35 years of age, found themselves scrounging for work in 1933 and
1934. 7
New migrants to Southern California from Oklahoma and the Midwest further pressured
employers for jobs previously held by Mexican workers. Under these conditions Washington
partnered with both local governments and the Mexican government to return Mexican
immigrants to their country of origin. The contrived repatriation of Mexicans during the thirties
7
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forced tens of thousands of families to leave America, while thousands more voluntarily returned
to Mexico. In all, around one-fifth of the total Mexican-American population went back to
Mexico during the first half of the Depression. Making just such a journey, Manuel led his
family back to Chihuahua in the early thirties. Expecting some Alire wealth to still be intact, the
Gonzales family instead found the state’s economy drained both by the earlier depopulation of
northern Mexico and the infighting among those who remained. Leaving his daughter Margaret
to live with an aunt in the city, Manuel, Carmen, and their five other children returned to
Los Angeles in late 1934. 8
By 1935 the Gonzales family had settled a mile north and a mile west of their previous
home in South-Central Los Angeles. Living on the corner of East 43rd Street and San Pedro
Avenue placed young Richard in the shadow of Wrigley Field—a proximity that mattered to the
young boy. A racially mixed community with no one group dominating, around 75,000 people
lived in the neighborhood, with a slightly higher than average elderly population for Southern
California. Monthly rents hovered around $25, and the Gonzales family lived with neighbors
who, like themselves, earned a below average income and enjoyed below average social services
compared to the city of Los Angeles as a whole. Manuel disciplined his children with a heavy
hand, and as the oldest boy, Richard tested his father’s limits more often than did his siblings.
After turning seven, Richard spent more and more time on the street roughhousing with the
neighborhood kids. On more than one occasion he returned home having bloodied another boy or
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having been scraped up himself. Manuel regularly struck Richard for misbehaving and, on
several occasions, hung the boy by his thumbs in their garage. 9
Carmen pursued a gentler tack with the strong-willed Richard. She encouraged him to
pursue wholesome play rather than meting out punishments for bad behavior. A longtime
admirer of the sport of tennis as played by the wealthy in Mexico, Carmen bought Richard a
hardware store racquet as a Christmas gift. Richard hit the ball against the garage doors for the
first half a year until a trip to the movies opened the youth’s eyes to the world-class play of
Britain’s Fred Perry—an amateur champion turned touring professional who at that time made
his home in Southern California. Walking out of the theatre, Richard told his mother, “I’m going
to be just like him.” An avid marbles player, Richard regularly journeyed a mile north and half a
mile west of his home to Exposition Park for games and the National Marbles Championship.
Starting in 1935, the grounds surrounding the Memorial Coliseum and which had been the site of
the 1932 Olympics would be where Gonzales learned the game of tennis. While tennis was not
an Olympic Sport in the 1932 Games, the facility master plan had called for courts on the
southeast side of the park 10
Reformers and social workers in Los Angeles County combined the “amateur ideal” of
the Olympic Games with their own aims of producing “sound character” in otherwise delinquent
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children to the “supervised recreational activities” the city’s Parks and Recreation Department
sponsored. Officials classed recreational sites in different ways, but they long maintained
schoolyards as the best place to promote “citizenship” in America’s youth through the
constitutive development of both body and mind. Building on the Civic Center Act passed by the
California government in 1913, the representatives passed legislation supporting the efforts of
schools to extend recreational opportunities past school hours. The City did their part by floating
bonds to pay for new parks, most notably a $12 million bond in 1947. 11 Despite comparatively
well-funded efforts, a real challenge existed in providing the Los Angeles metropolitan area with
adequate recreation space. A burgeoning population, the largest and most decentralized
metropolitan area by square mileage in the country, and the great diversity of social class and
race in Southland gave urban planners—charged by the Los Angeles Community Welfare
Federation—plenty of work in recommending recreational changes that took into account the
metropolis’s boom during the World War II. 12
The reason city planners and municipal reformers approached play with such seriousness
had a lot to do with the youth delinquency crises that swept the nation at the same time. Since the
Depression, federal officials had warned against the vulnerability of young people to fall into
misbehavior at an early age, only to descend further down the criminal ranks each passing year.
Social workers linked juvenile crime to parental irresponsibility. They also considered
“misdirected leisure” a root cause, with the personal and group responsibility taught by
11
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organized play as the cure to this youthful anomie. The tone of these reformers changed from
concern to panic with the absence of fathers and male role models forced by the draft. 13 Right to
identify a problem and try a non-punitive solution, the jeremiads missed the possibility that the
presence of fathers and young men in uniform might cause trouble too.
In 1943 the infamous Zoot Suit riots made the racialized dimensions of youth
delinquency impossible to ignore. The name of the riots came from the bold sartorial choice
favored by young Mexican-American men in cities like Los Angeles. The generous cut of the
suit and extra fabric needed to achieve the look created both a sense of danger by hiding the
wearer from view while also making the wearer highly visible in a crowd. During the war, the
zoot flaunted authority by consuming cloth otherwise usable in military uniforms. 14 The race of
the wearers mattered all the more beginning in late 1942, when the United States and Mexican
governments agreed to allow migrant laborers from Mexico to come north for work—primarily
in the agricultural fields of Southern California. The Bracero Program reversed the decade-long
policy of voluntary and forced repatriation, now welcoming Mexican workers on temporary
13

“A Renewed Emphasis on Our Major Task,” Program for 1943-1944, Folder 3, Box 1 LA County Coordinating
Councils Records, 1930-48, California Social Welfare Archives, USC Special Collections; J. Edgar Hoover,
“Juvenile—or Public—Delinquency?,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 19, 1937, p. J10; “Delinquency Blame Put on
Adults,” Los Angeles Times, March 27, 1937, p. A5; Crete Cage, “City Recreation Declares Supervised Play Must
be Public Concern,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1935; R.W. (Pat) Shepard, “Boys Kept From Crime,” Los
Angeles Times, August 30, 1937, p. A5; “Four Main Causes Given for Youth Delinquency,” Los Angeles Times,
May 2, 1945, p. A14; Myron E. Gurnea, “War Delinquency of Youth Serious Problem,” Los Angeles Times, April
18, 1947.

14

“Findings and Recommendations of the Grand Jury of Los Angeles County for 1943,” Folder 3, Box 1 LA County
Coordinating Councils Records, 1930-48, California Social Welfare Archives, USC Special Collections; “Portent of
Storm,” The Christian Century, June 23, 1943, 735-6; “Pachuco Troubles,” The Inter-American, August 1943, p. 56; “Los Angeles’ Pachuco Gangs,” The New Republic, January 18, 1943; Carey McWilliams, “The Zoot-Suit Riots,”
The New Republic, June 12, 1943, p. 818-820; John Reese, “Scoundrels Among the Angles,” Westways, June, 1956,
p. 37-39; Thomas McCarthy, “Report from Los Angeles,” Commonweal, June 25, 1943, p. 234, 244. The fullest
analysis of the zoot’s place in wartime political economy is Luis Alvarez, The Power of the Zoot: Youth Culture and
Resistance during World War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

258
contracts to meet both the need for laborers to fill the vacancies caused by the draft and the
entirely new demands of increased wartime production. Within Los Angeles, an already vibrant
Latino subculture received an influx of young men who worked hard during the day and looked
to play hard when time allowed. 15
The first flashpoint occurred on August 2, 1942 with the death of José Gallardo Diaz.
Police arrested seventeen Mexican Americas, charging these young men with the murder of Diaz
near a swimming hole popular with young minorities. The trial of the suspects in what came to
be called the “Sleepy Lagoon” murder revealed the racial fears fomenting beneath the bucolic
surface of Los Angeles’ unified war effort. The perceived criminal underworld connections
between the youths charged with murder and Pachuco gangs particularly distressed the media
and the public. A group that was difficult to characterize, generally Los Angeles’ Pachucos had
origins in borderlands groups called Tirilis. These laborers stood outside of mainstream Mexican
society by embracing vice and violence, as well as conspicuously marking their marginalization
with tattoos and slang speech. Moving with other Mexicans to Southern California, these men
morphed into Pachucos—the name for El Paso in the slang dialect they spoke. 16 While a very
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small number of the city’s roughly 300,000 Mexicans, some young men did form gangs who
competed—mainly with each other—for spaces in barrios where racketeering and other criminal
activity could flourish. To help control territory, the Pachucos’ weapon of choice was the knife.
Through the publicity of the trial, many came to believe that most Latino youths wore a zoot,
wielded a switchblade, carried a scar, and threatened civic order. 17
Los Angeles police reinforced the stigma by charging hundreds of innocent Mexican
Americans—on occasion in a single night—with misdemeanors simply for appearing in public in
a group of three or more. The arbitrariness of these actions in some cases emboldened young
men to don the zoot and stride into public spaces. In June of 1943, white servicemen stationed
and furloughed in Los Angeles decided any Mexican debouching their assigned place was
targetable for attack. Beginning on the evening of June 4 and continuing the next three nights,
nearly a thousand sailors and civilians stormed along Main Street and into the barrios near
streetcar lines, accosting all zoot suiters and nearly any Mexican unfortunate enough to cross
their path. The police responded by punishing the victims; as before, Mexican youths spent time
in jail under charges of “vagrancy.” 18 In the midst of what Carey McWilliams called “the ‘WolfPack’ Crusade,” many reformers thought providing minority youth with supervised spaces for
recreation would be a way to protect these young people from outside aggression by placing
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them on a path that led to fuller citizenship rather than delinquency on the street. 19 For groups
like the Los Angeles County Coordinating Council, the Zoot Suit riots made curbing juvenile
delinquency the top national security priority. 20
A survey of ten thousand youths conducted by the Coordinating Council of Los Angeles
County formed the basis of renewed efforts in the wake of the Pachuco crisis to create spaces for
safe recreation in 1944. More specifically, two thousand Los Angeles youths were asked to rank
the types of games and activities they liked best. Out of a list of twenty potential activities, male
respondents ranked tennis as the sixth most popular sport while female respondents ranked it
second on the list of preferred recreational activities. Taking the survey results seriously, the
Coordinating Council also talked back to their respondents using mass media. In the mid-forties,
they hired a writer and partnered with the Columbia Broadcasting Company to produce thirteen
radio dramas aimed at educating young people about the perils of youth delinquency. 21
Other episodes were aimed more at adults. The plot of “The Community Goes into
Action” explains how even formal recreational spaces such as school playgrounds can attract
youth gangs without proper adult supervision. These “young sneak thieves” may appear to be
“innocently playing marbles” when “they are actually utilizing the time to carefully plan the
raids they intend to make that night.” Fortunately for all involved, the community rallied behind
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the Coordinating Council fathers to quash the “delinquent atmosphere” with “closer
supervision.” In this way, the airwaves worked with the very real problem of holding parents
accountable for supervising and encouraging the healthy recreation of their children. 22
The shortage of recreational spaces in Gonzales’s neighborhood compared to the
citywide average was offset by the quality of supervised leisure Exposition Park afforded the
community. However, it was unlikely that members of the Coordinating Council actually
understood the type of tennis played there. Frank Poulain, a washed-up and ostracized
professional, managed the tennis shop, and a ragtag assortment of players helped maintain the
courts. African Americans, Mexicans, and even some cripples hung around the shop where
betting on marbles and poker occurred near every day. The confidence games of the street played
out on the hard concrete of the municipal tennis courts. Gonzales himself recalled trash talking
and hustling. He also looked to the courts as a “sanctuary” from the truant officer. Without
proper adult supervision, Exposition Park tennis fell far short of the transformative vision
reformers had in mind when renewing the city’s recreational space. 23
On the other hand, the park courts were truer to real life than the cloistered world of the
private club. Bill Tilden’s generation of elite players originated in and thus remained somewhat
ensconced in what was popularly called at the time the “country club set.” The clubs provided
players with club professionals who were the only people who knew and could teach the proper
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stroke mechanics and tactical patterns. The clubs were the likeliest places to secure the funds
necessary to travel and compete in the growing number of tournaments. Most importantly, before
the recreational revolution, the clubs were the only places to find tennis courts. This changed
with the New Deal, which ushered in a new cohort of players centered in California. Ellsworth
Vines, Gene Mako, Bobby Riggs, Gene Mako, and Pancho Gonzales, as their contemporary Don
Budge recalled, “all came from the public parks.” 24
After exhibiting promising results in the public parks, Gonzales and his generation of
recreational revolution players might find some acceptance by USLTA authorities. That attention
could mean financial support to improve one’s game. It certainly meant subjecting oneself to a
great deal of paternalism not dissimilar to the control exercised by recreational reformers more
broadly at the same time. As Executive Secretary and President of the Southern California
Tennis Association, Perry T. Jones directed the warm-weather USLTA Western section’s
evolution from a fine place to play to the epicenter of championship tennis. Born forty-five miles
east of Los Angeles in Eltiwanda, California, on June 22, 1890, Jones was scarcely older than
tennis in America and one of the first Californians to take up the game. His father, a bookkeeper,
moved the family to San Bernardino by 1900, where Jones started playing tennis around the age
of ten. During his teens and twenties, few tournaments existed west of the Mississippi River. A
player but only a one-time champion—holding the Los Angeles Metropolitan singles title in
1918—Jones worked as a salesman and began officiating and promoting small tournaments
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before directing the major Pacific Southwest Tournament during its inaugural year in 1924. That
same year Jones secured the position of the Junior Development Chairmen for the SCTA. 25
The responsibility of supervising training, setting up tournaments, and chaperoning
juniors on away tournaments fell to Jones. He was tasked by the Los Angeles Tennis Club
members making up the newly formed Tennis Patrons Association to develop both world-class
tennis and the well-behaved juniors. Beyond his basic responsibility of helping boys hit better
backhands, Jones emphasized proper social behavior in his interactions with Southern
California’s young tennis players. Jones himself was a bit of a dandy, usually sporting a bow tie,
tinted glasses, and a double-breasted suit. He often took afternoon tea at the Club. The stress
Jones placed on etiquette in his own life informed his efforts to refine his junior players both on
and off the court. After returning from a tournament and a homestay, Jones always required his
players to write thank-you notes to their host family. Likewise, if he could not travel with the
players, he arranged a chaperon to make sure the youngsters used their silverware properly. For
Jones, tennis was still an elite sport where manners and gentility mattered a great deal. He
emphasized proper dress and “all white attire” on page one of his guide to junior tennis, linking
confidence on the court to the right clothes, ethics, and sportsmanship. 26
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In considering the moral uplift of tennis, Jones was far from alone. The game’s history
bespoke a strong tradition of refinement and gentility designed to uplift the elite player above the
suspect leisure pursuits of the middle and working class. Will Levington Comfort understood as
much, opining in the Los Angeles Times that tennis served as the best antidote to temptations
confronting youths between the “dangerous age” of twelve and seventeen. Moreover, Comfort
pointed out the popularity of the game among the working class and the importance of growing
the game on the public courts where the “less favored” boys could compete. Likewise, the
Presbyterian Minister, College President, and USLTA Tennis Clinic Committee Chairman
William Plumber Jacobs believed tennis to be the best sport for increasing the “moral stamina”
of America’s youth. Plumber thought tennis was not just for the well to do. He called on every
city across America to provide public courts and instruction in a game that bred self-reliance,
persistence, and wholesome competition. Plumber also saw the potential for “spiritual
development” in the sportsmanship required to play the game. Echoing Teddy Roosevelt’s call
for a “Strenuous Life,” Plumber argued that primarily as a game for the young and
impressionable, tennis played a more important role in “citizenship building” than any other
sport. 27 High minded to be sure, Plumber and Comfort failed to address the specific hurdles
facing a working-class youth trying to become a competitive player.
Tennis’s unique blend of mental and physical match-play fused the cerebral challenges of
golf with the corporeal demands of one-on-one boxing sans violence. As a sport that demanded
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complex biomechanical moves in order to progress beyond the most rudimentary level of play,
tennis required the watchful eyes of a seasoned instructor who corrected and guided the
newcomer on the proper stroke mechanics, playing tactics, and match strategy. On one level
then, becoming a competitive tennis player resembled an apprenticeship where the master shared
direct experience and gave direct feedback to the journeyman. This mode of training meant a
challenge for any outsider trying to break into the cloistered world of competitive tennis because
the traditionally elite champions felt most comfortable training new players that resembled
themselves. By both excluding working-class players from private club courts while
simultaneously holding tennis up as a wholesome activity for all people, elites limited the ability
of the “wrong” players to break into the top echelons of the game. 28 In the sport of tennis, where
one played often dictated not only how one played but how good they could become.
California clubs did care about who played on their courts, but classicism and racism was
less overt than on the East Coast. When asked about three African Americans competing in the
Southern California Tennis Championships held at the Los Angeles Tennis Club, Perry Jones
told his East Coast superiors the SCTA had always encouraged talented players from outside the
club to participate in the tournament. Feeling the pressure to take a harder line toward
unwelcome players, Jones became more selective in inviting juniors to the courts of the Los
Angeles Tennis Club. Regardless of efforts to police play, the strength of competition and
subsequent number of champions produced on the courts set the Los Angeles Tennis Club apart
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from competitive tennis found anywhere else in the country. By 1940, Californians held nine of
ten national championship titles, and the SCTA had burgeoned into the largest USLTA section
with more than fifty public and semiprivate clubs paying dues. The junior development program
Perry Jones invented was so rigorous it earned the nickname the “Factory System” from the
national media because of the consistent champions Southern California tennis produced.
Consistency, however, extended down to include the background, appearance, and attitude of
players. All the players knew “Mister Jones” kept a list of favorites who looked, dressed, and
acted the part. 29
The most significant tension to ever surface between Jones and a player involved not
Bobby Riggs but Pancho Gonzales. While not explicitly about Gonzales’s class and racial
background, Jones’s decision to ban Gonzales from sanctioned tournaments was bolstered by his
refusal to attend school about the time he entered seventh grade. Although the association had a
policy in place requiring schooling if a junior planned to play tournament tennis, they enforced
the rule inconsistently. The talented Jack Kramer was a few years further along in development
than Gonzales. Jones granted him court time at the Los Angeles Tennis club that fell during the
normal school day. With this comparison, it is hard not to read Gonzales’s ban as directed at
Gonzales’s working-class, Mexican, and, potentially, delinquent background. While not from the
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worst part of town, Gonzales did live in a neighborhood that had a slightly higher than average
number of cases of juvenile delinquency. Moreover, the long hours Gonzales’s parents worked
and the aggressive discipline his father imposed made Richard particularly prone to delinquency
in the eyes of reformers. But most damning was the association Jones could make between
Gonzales and the Pachucos. Big for his age, Gonzales seemed a potential leader of the Mexican
youth gangs roaming the city in the forties. He also had a prominent scar on his face that
resembled the type of cut one received in a knife fight. While the fears were not completely
unfounded as Gonzales did choose to drop out of school and hang out with hustlers before his
ban from competitive tennis, the SCTA’s decision to sanction him removed his most important
recreational outlet. 30
Jones’s strict instructional methods and unrivaled successes in producing so many topclass players set him apart from any other tennis coach and official in the United States. He was
not alone, however, in espousing regimented training. The second most successful nation at
producing world class tennis players in the late 1940s and 1950s was Australia. The Australians
had their own Jones in Melbourne-based coach Harry Hopman. When Australian Davis Cupper
Frank Sedgman referred to Hopman as a “very strict disciplinarian,” he greatly understated
Hopman’s approach to the game. While Jones sought to help youngsters gain self-discipline over
their minds through the manipulation of their bodies in terms of proper tennis technique, proper
dress, and proper sportsmanship, Hopman more straightforwardly strove to have his players
30
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master their bodies through unprecedented physical conditioning. “Physical fitness,” remarked
Hopman, was his “philosophy” and his “whole theory.” He introduced weight training to tennis
players at a young age, placing prospects in gymnasiums when they turned thirteen. He made his
players run mile after mile, both distance and speed work. His signature conditioning move, the
Kangaroo jump, where an athlete squatted down and then exploded upward and brought their
knees up to their chest and their elbows down to their knees, became the bane of every youngster
baking underneath the Australian sun. 31
Those who survived Hopman’s training and developed the right stroke mechanics went
on to successful careers. The regime secured Australia’s international reputation for the fittest
players in world tennis competition. But so long as they remained amateurs, even playing at the
highest level as demonstrated by winning the Davis Cup, Australians remained under the control
of coach Hopman and the Australian Tennis Federation just as the American amateurs remained
under Perry Jones’s and the United States Lawn Tennis Association’s control. In fact, the better a
player became, the more tennis officials tightened their handling of a player. Players competing
abroad in major tournaments and Davis Cup play, in particular, garnered unwanted scrutiny from
their respective federations who feverously promoted and policed the international reputations of
their countries’ games. Harry Hopman flatly told his players, “I don’t want you talking to the
press, I want to do all the talking to the press.” 32 In words and actions, Hopman was far from the
only tennis official who protected the purity of the amateur ideal and safeguarded the sanctity of
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the national tennis federations over the basic freedoms of speech and property earned but not
enjoyed by the players who put those national organizations on the world map.
Pancho Gonzales had none of those thoughts and actions on his mind when he once again
ran afoul of both Perry Jones and Los Angeles legal officers. Gonzales encountered the truant
officer one too many times, stole toys from local stores, and even burglarized homes in 1942. A
1943 juvenile court ruling removed Pancho from his neighborhood and put him in the custody of
the California Youth Authority (CYA), who operated a series of reform schools throughout the
State. The Authority first placed Gonzales in the Preston School of Industry in Ione, California,
forty miles east of Sacramento and thirty miles south of Folsom State Prison along the Sierra
Foothills. The foreboding “Preston Castle” was a place of woe for Gonzales and his fellow
wards. Opened in the summer of 1894 to a handful of youths transferred there from adult
penitentiaries, by the 1920s the school had earned a reputation for cruelty towards wards and
recidivism among those released. Superintendents routinely flogged boys and used solitary
confinement to coerce certain behavior. Nine out of ten boys sent to Preston found themselves
back in the CYA or in adult corrections not long after their discharge from the reform school,
compared to estimates of only 2 percent reformed to the satisfaction of CYA officials. 33
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Numbers alone do not do justice to the harshness of life in the Castle. For example, on
February 23, 1950, the school’s housekeeper, Anna Corbin, was strangled and beaten to death,
her body wrapped in carpet and hidden in a locked room. Severe interrogations of the wards
extended throughout the night and coming days until Amador County officials finally charged an
African American youth named Eugene Monroe with the murder. Corbin’s death was far from
the only “major incident” in Preston’s history. In 1946, for example, fracases between MexicanAmerican and African-American gangs broke out on two separate occasions with wards
fashioning shanks for stabbing, sheriff’s deputies arriving to quell the violence, and several boys
receiving convictions for attempted murder. To try to keep order in the face of such madness,
Preston’s wardens placed boys in “silent rooms,” placed boys on “restricted diets,” and deployed
tear gas canisters as a last resort. Even the superintendent of the school had a hard time reporting
that life in Preston Castle was anything but cruel. 34
Fortunately for Gonzales, the United States’ wartime production goals lifted him out of
what otherwise might have been a long stay in Preston Castle. In the spring of 1943, the CYA
increased their coordination with the National Youth Administration (NYA) and the War
Manpower Commission to put youths in the custody of the CYA to work in war industries. Over
the prior nine months, the NYA trained 8,000 youths across 705 workstations that ranged from
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Los Angeles to Sacramento, California. They now needed even more youth workers. The plan to
put CYA wards to work required the shuffling around of equipment and youth, and Gonzales
found himself transferred along with one hundred and fifty fellow CYA inmates to the Benicia
Arsenal positioned at the Western tip of Suisun Bay and the northeast shoreline of the Carquinez
Straits in Solano County, California. That location made the arsenal an ideal point for munitions
production because it connected to the Sacramento River via the Suisun Bay to the Pacific Ocean
via the San Pablo Bay and San Francisco Bay. CYA youths joined roughly 4,500 NYA and other
civilian employees who moved more munitions to the Pacific Ocean than any other military
facility in World War II. 35
Gonzales participated in the behemoth logistical operation, albeit against his will. The
challenges of fighting a war across the largest body of water in the world forged Pacific coastal
cities into massive arsenals of ships, planes, vehicles, and munitions. California cities, in
particular, drew huge numbers of warriors and war workers to their factories and bases.
Los Angeles County grew more swiftly and more dramatically than anywhere else, with the
population skyrocketing 49 percent from 2.78 million people in 1940 to 4.14 million people in
1950. 36
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War workers transformed the social character of Los Angeles suburbs such as South Gate
seemingly overnight. Defense and home contractors alike strove to meet the demands of the War
Production Board that favored worker output as well as hastily constructed and deconcentrated
housing over more farsighted metropolitan planning. In this way wartime Southern California set
a pattern for postwar urban planning that spread to both coasts and the emerging Sunbelt region
after the United States’ dramatic break with a tradition of immediate and sustained military
demobilization after war. Major American demobilization took place after World War II, but
Congress’s passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and President Harry Truman’s decision
to fight a land war in Korea recommitted America to massive defense spending to a degree that
varied only nominally for the subsequent three decades. 37
Truman’s willingness to continue to project United States military power after the defeat
of Germany and Japan gave Gonzales an opportunity to get out of the custody of the CYA by
joining the military in 1946. His service on a naval ship guarding the California coast not only
freed him from youth prison but instilled in him a new fascination with all things mechanical that
continued into his postwar tennis career. Like many veterans who returned to Southern
California after the War, he became enamored with drag racing. The appeal stemmed from three
factors: young men had spent months if not years working around and fixing vehicles and other
machines; former airfields and roads along landing strips proliferated in Southern California that
allowed for flat and safe driving; combat culture became speed culture for returning veterans.
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Gonzalez built vehicles and drove them with his brother Manuel and other veterans on
abandoned airfields and salt flats across Southern California, racing on top courses like Sauggish
against the fastest dragsters in the world at that time. Gonzales’s affinity for time in and around
cars attracted him to the peripatetic lifestyle of the professional tennis tour, which existed as a
roadshow of sorts. But in the meantime, his military service encompassed none of the fun of
playing tennis exhibition matches that more established players such as Don Budge and Bobby
Riggs had enjoyed on exotic courts built by the U.S. military as it hopped from Pacific Island to
Pacific Island. 38
Gonzales’s return to competitive tennis in late 1947 marked the most significant
comeback in the history of the sport. He spent almost four years without touching a tennis
racquet. Fresh off a troop transport ship moored off the California Coast, the nineteen-year-old
Gonzales arrived back in Los Angeles and told his parents he planned to dedicate his life to
tennis. The news shocked Gonzales’s parents, whose strained relationship with their son had
further deteriorated during his long absence from home after the juvenile division of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles removed the delinquent Gonzales from their care. He had not picked up a
racquet in so long, his parents thought, how could he ever regain lost ground? With
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determination to show everyone he was now his own man, Gonzales started on the path to
become a professional tennis player. 39
Gonzales went back to the Exposition Park courts on which he grew up. He began to
practice six to seven hours a day against anyone willing to play. Gonzales worked on his
forehand, his backhand, his volleys, and his overhead. The weight he carried around as a child
was gone. He had grown into a six foot, three inch slender frame. Long legs and a wide reach
made his court coverage tremendous. To combat years off the court, Gonzales emphasized
conditioning, going on long runs and training relentlessly to increase his foot speed. 40
The quickness took a while to return, but his longtime flawless serve only improved.
Fully extended, Gonzales’s arm stretched just beyond the 114-inch height of tennis’s longtime
dominant server William “Big Bill” Tilden. Along with its height, the brilliance of the Gonzales
serve came from the un-teachable timing of his motion that transferred the energy coiled from
his body into the ball at the perfect moment. A kinetic chain of physics began when his legs
pushed off from the ground, up through the rotation of his hips that pivoted the trunk, chest, and
shoulders up toward the ball. The once opened chest and shoulders facing the sky now closed
and moved parallel to the ground in a movement that whipped his serving arm up into the ball
with tremendous force just as the ball floated in the air at the top of the toss. The racquet was
simply an extension of his body that moved where and how his body did, naturally decelerating
at a pronated angle after the ball left the sweet-spot of the racquet’s string-bed. Following his
arm’s follow-through, Gonzales’s body now followed the stroke naturally into the court, giving
39

PGOH, ITHF.

40

Ibid.

275
him an aggressive position to exploit a weak return of serve with either a forehand drive or a
well-placed volley. More than most players, Gonzales understood that winning in tennis meant
playing to one’s strengths. In so doing, Gonzales, along with Jack Kramer, initiated and
popularized the new seize-the-initiative style of play. 41
Gonzales’s fast return to winning in topflight tennis happened because he badly wanted
it. The early losses never discouraged him. The confidence of losing a match but knowing he
would win the next one had a great deal to do with his success after such a long layoff. Contested
in October 1947, on the Los Angeles Tennis Club courts, his dominant wins over
Czechoslovakian champion Jaroslav Drobny, intercollegiate title-holder Bob Falkenberg, and
two-time U.S. amateur champion Frankie Parker in Pacific Southwest Championship propelled
him to national attention. After only a year of practice and minimal tournament play, Gonzales
established enough winning potential to force the SCTA officials—men like Perry Jones who
previously harbored significant reservations about Gonzales—to reexamine their opinions of
him. 42
The ban Jones imposed on Gonzales for not attending school expired upon his return from the
military service. Jones, however, could have continued to keep Gonzales out of tournaments by
refusing to fund the young amateur. Long obsessed with “What is an amateur in tennis?,” Jones
and his fellow USLTA officials diligently protected the purity of their players from the
corrupting influence of money in sports. The enforcement of what they called the “amateur
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ideal” had a great deal to do with the USLTA’s charge to field the best Davis Cup Team
possible—an international competition that allowed only amateur players. At the same time, the
zealousness of the USTLA’s Amateur Rule Committee in imposing sanctions on players for the
slightest infractions smacked of bureaucrats looking to maintain whatever measure of control
they could over the game’s future. Sometimes fickle in enforcement, in Gonzales’s case the
SCTA and the USLTA were more frank. A poor kid from urban Los Angeles with Mexican
parents and a delinquency record was hardly the representative Jones wanted to send east to play
in the summer grass court circuit and National Championship. That same young man
representing the United States against other nations seemed equally unthinkable just a year
earlier. 43
By the spring of 1948, however, the USLTA could no longer afford to keep the gifted
Gonzales on the sidelines. Not contested during the war, the Davis Cup returned to the United
States in both 1946 and 1947 with the Angeleno and world number one Jack Kramer leading the
squad to victory both times. Winning more than forty matches in a row including the 1947 U.S.
Championships, Kramer turned professional in the fall of 1947, leaving the David Cup Selection
Committee scrambling to find fresh faces to continue American dominance on the world stage.
As Gonzales shared, “The Emperor Jones” himself decided to stake the still unproven talent on
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his first extended trip east to play in all the matches leading up to the U.S. Championships at
Forest Hills. 44
Jones’s reversal also had a lot to do with Gonzales’s newfound maturity. While far from a
decorated soldier, Gonzales did serve in the military, and on March 23, 1948, he married his first
wife, Henrietta. For the conservative Jones and the entire USLTA establishment, Gonzales the
serviceman and Gonzales the husband and soon to be father were necessary steps for the young
man to take in order to potentially represent the United States abroad. And beyond the
symbolism of a patriotic family man, Gonzales also made the actual choice to remain eligible to
play for the United States. In February, the Bank of Mexico—on behalf of the Mexican
Government—offered the nineteen-year-old Gonzales financial security for life, a nice
beachfront home, and a lifetime appointment at the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles if he
agreed to accept Mexican citizenship and compete for Mexico in all international tennis
competitions. Gonzales briefly considered the offer before turning it down saying, “I prize my
[American] citizenship above all the benefits.” Gonzales passed the temptation. USLTA officials
like Jones gave him the necessary funds to compete in the tournaments leading up to the United
States Nationals at Forest Hills. 45
Gonzales’s record in those tournaments was mixed. He won some important
tournaments—most notably the National Clay Court Title contested in River Forest, Illinois. But
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losses in some smaller events to low ranked players allowed for many to write him off as too
inconsistent to mount a serious challenge for the U.S. Championship in September. The year
before, Gonzales had made the trip east for the Nationals but lost in only the second round.
People believed him soft, a reputation that developed into his nickname of “Gorgo”—that is, the
cheese-champion. But on Saturday, September 18, 1948, Gonzales dominated South African Eric
Sturgess in straight sets for the U.S. Championship singles title. More than ten thousand fans
attended the match and shook their heads in disbelief at the “meteoric rise” of the “the scar-faced
Pancho”—the second youngest champion in the history of United States tennis. 46
The press interpreted Gonzales’s repeat win in several ways. Some outlets dismissed it as
a fluke. Others stereotyped Pancho as a Pachuco. More rightly recognized the incredible social
upheaval the champion “from the wrong side of the tracks” had just caused in the ranks of elite
sports. During the coming year, Gonzales’s reputation ebbed and flowed depending a great deal
on how he fared in bouts with California rival Ted Schroeder, who exemplified the simon-pure
amateur. A crew-cut Anglo from California with a wonderful family and a prosperous
refrigerator business, Schroeder played a very limited schedule, often skipping major events in
order to spend more time at home. He long refused contracts from professional promoters,
preferring instead to see tennis as a serious hobby rather than a means to make a living.
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When Gonzales repeated his 1948 win over Schroeder at the 1949 United States Championship,
many who followed the tournament disbelieved it. 47
Gonzales’s decision to turn professional days after lifting the amateur trophy again
surprised no one. As the youngest player to join the professional ranks, an inner-city kid who
grew up gambling and hustling around public park courts could hardly be expected to turn down
$60,000, people interested in tennis thought. The press pointed out that a Mexican youth knew
no other way to get ahead. Some capitalized on controversy. Bobby Riggs, who would promote
the 1949 Jack Kramer versus Pancho Gonzales professional tour, encouraged such talk among
the nation’s sports reporters. Riggs’s preferred word to describe Pancho to others was
“colorful.” 48
Gonzales’s Forest Hills Championship was the biggest story in amateur tennis in 1949.
He followed that up with the biggest story in both amateur and professional tennis when he
decided to turn professional. Gonzales ended his amateur tennis career a few weeks after his
second National Championship with one final win on the courts of the Los Angeles Tennis Club.
On September 18, 1949, in front of Perry Jones, Southern California Tennis doyens, and USLTA
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officials, all of whom despised the Mexican-American player until his talent left them little
choice but to begrudgingly accept him, Gonzales demolished Ted Schroeder one final time—a
symbolic victory over amateur tennis and the men who guarded that ideal. 49
Upon turning professional Gonzales, quickly found himself facing a different attack—
that of his seasoned opponent Jack Kramer. The 1949-1950 tour opened on October 25, 1949, in
front of 13,357 fans squeezed into New York City’s Madison Square Garden, who paid at least
eight dollars apiece to see the professionals. Francisco “Little Pancho” Segura and the recently
turned professional Frankie Parker warmed up the crowd with Segura’s unorthodox two-handed
forehand electrifying onlookers. Most everyone, however, came to see how well Gonzales would
hold up against the champion. As the main event got underway, many people thought he would
fare quite well. The two matched each other power for power, hitting harder than any tennis
player, professional or amateur, ever had up to that point. The canvas court rolled over the
arena’s floor only increased the pace of their blistering serves, and shocked spectators who had
only seen the speed of amateur tennis played outdoor on slower courts. In the end, Kramer’s
experience on the fast court and the big stage propelled him past Gonzales in four sets—the last
set the most one-sided of the four. “He’s not as tough as I thought he’d be,” said Gonzales after
the match. “I figure it will take eight or nine matches before I hit my stride against Jake. But
don’t worry, I’ll hit it.” 50
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Riggs certainly was not worried. A veteran barnstormer, first as a player and then as the
promoter, Riggs knew how much the opener set the tone for the rest of the professional tour. A
gate of over $100,000 from night one meant that Riggs would far exceed the minimum
guarantees he had made to the players, and that neither of the singles matches were blowouts
boded well for the continued interest of his players with fans as play continued over the next one
hundred matches. Alice Marble, herself a former amateur champion turned touring professional
and therefore no stranger to what made tennis profitable, advanced another reason why the
Kramer versus Gonzales tour would pay dividends to the promoter and the players: Pancho
intrinsically knew how to whip fans into frenzies either with his big shots, long stretches, or his
on-court behavior. “The spectators automatically enthuse when they see his handsome dark face,
his splendid physique and his many delightful mannerisms,” opined Marble after watching the
Madison Square Garden match. Marble linked Gonzales’s crowd appeal to his troubled
background that had not only produced some of the young professional’s more appealing
physical features such as his muscular legs, shoulder, and core, but also packaged Pancho in a
ready-made narrative of Mexican-American machismo that contrasted sharply with Kramer’s
All-American backstory and those of most topflight tennis players in the past. From his fast serve
to his fondness for fast cars, his spurning of the amateur authorities to his wide smile, what
Pancho did both on and off the court titillated the public. He was both the good player and the
bad boy of tennis at the same time. Riggs promoted Gonzales as the “people’s choice” on the
lookout for “new worlds to conquer.” 51
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But the tour quickly went from good to bad for Gonzales as the grind continued into the
winter of 1950. Whereas the USLTA’s prohibitions against accepting money had sheltered
players during their amateur careers, upon turning professional, companies came calling.
Gonzales and Parker found themselves constantly at the beck and call of companies who wanted
them for everything from cigarette advertisements to tennis racquet designs. Part of succeeding
as a professional meant balancing off-court money-making opportunities with on-court
commitments. More so than his fellow professionals, Gonzales faced the greatest degree of
media scrutiny for two reasons: first, because so many sportswriters clung desperately to the
mistaken belief that the best amateur tennis players could beat the professionals; second, because
of his Mexican-American heritage. Gonzales had ended the year 1949 ranked number one while
Frankie Parker ended it ranked fourth, but the hollowness of world rankings that included only
amateurs but not the professionals rang true night after night as the more experienced
professionals Kramer and Segura consistently beat their young colleagues. To help explain those
losses, sports reporters once again used the Mexican-American narrative, this time stereotyping
the challenger Gonzales as lazy and tired, unfit for the day-in and day-out work of professional
touring. The reason Gonzales trailed Kramer by thirty matches through January 1950, had less to
do with the former’s effort and more to do with the latter’s experience—although such a
straightforward explanation hardly made for good copy. In fact, when the barnstormers made it
to the West Coast in February, Gonzales began winning matches more consistently than Kramer,
even notching an 80 percent winning percentage over a California stretch of matches. Gonzales
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was far from lazy. Most of their matches consisted of hard-fought tennis, point after point. For
example, on February 2, the first set alone of their Seattle, Washington, match went 54 games—
hardly an uninspired effort halfway into a tour of night after night play. Yet at the midway point
in the tour, the ball rested firmly in Kramer’s court with Gonzales behind 18 matches to 59. 52
By that point Gonzales simply did not have enough dates on the schedule left to claim the
professional tour. He nonetheless continued to fight on because he knew he was improving and
he believed that if he finished the tour strong he would secure himself a place on the next
professional tour. Entering the spring of 1950, the current tour had no fixed end date. Riggs
played his players as long as people continued to pay to see them. The promoter also made his
troupe play the Philadelphia Inquirer’s professional tournament the week of March 20. Gonzales
beat his fellow touring professionals along with a few dozen non-touring professionals to earn
$2,376 in prize money and claim the title of the best player in the City of Brotherly Love. There
was no love lost between Kramer and Gonzales, however, as the two continued to battle through
New England during the month of April. When the tour finally ended in June, Kramer had
notched 96 wins to Gonzales’s 27. As anyone who had attended understood, the final match
count did not do justice to the quality of the tennis they saw. But professional tennis was about
getting paid, not about justice. Kramer, Riggs, and Gonzales all got their fair share of the money,
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pay far exceeding the guarantees the players retained. Kramer and Riggs then tried to end
Gonzales’s professional career as their tour concluded. 53
In May 1950, Kramer and Riggs began feeding the Associated Press rumors that
Gonzales himself wanted a year respite from the tour in order to rest and recuperate. The veracity
of such a claim seemed questionable given that Gonzales had started to play stronger tennis as of
late when compared to his earlier play on the tour. The casual follower of the sport, however,
accepted the rumor because that fit with the lazy Mexican-American stereotype. Gonzales did
himself no favors in that regard when he posed for beer advertisements that made their way into
popular glossy magazines like Life. There he was lounging on a chair and swigging beers, “a
natural alliance if we ever saw one,” remarked one sports commentator. 54
Such images served the purposes of Kramer and Riggs. They waited until their tour
ended on May 21, 1950, in Dayton, Ohio, after over one hundred events on the road, and then
quickly dismissed a bewildered Gonzales. Pancho believed that the $400,000 in gate receipts he
had helped earn would have secured him at least a place as the undercard match for the
forthcoming fall 1950 to spring 1951 tour, especially given that Ted Schroeder and other eligible
amateur champions had turned down Riggs’s offers to tour against the professional champion
Kramer. Sports commentators shared that view, editorializing how much “the crowds loved
him,” how they “lustily” rooted him on, and “how heartening for a kid from the other side of the
53
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tracks” to make a living in such an elite sport. Unbeknownst to Gonzales, though, Riggs had
already started working to entice Gussy Moran to turn professional with a first offer of $100,000
for her services on the tour. The two agreed to $75,000 for “a 100 match barnstorming tour” four
months later. 55
Gonzales returned to Southern California embittered. He began to drink heavily, and a
few weeks later San Diego police arrested him on charges of disorderly conduct. Law
enforcement put Gonzales in jail before releasing him on a $25 fine and an apology to the
women to whom he and his friends had made inappropriate remarks. Feeling deflated, Gonzales
decided to sit out some of the summer tournaments that filled out the professional players’
schedule in between the touring months, even though those tournaments were some of the only
events he could play now. That absence gave other players such as Segura an opportunity to
shine, and “Little Pancho” took full advantage, winning Jack March’s first big professional
tournament in Cleveland, leveraging that win along with his entertaining personality to make a
case for his spot on the forthcoming professional tour, and sealing the deal with his willingness
to play on the tour for less money than any other challenger. Even the champion Kramer realized
his precarious position in that the promoter could replace him at will, so he resigned with Riggs
for the same percentage that had earned him $100,000 from the previous year. For his part, Riggs
especially wanted to pinch every penny because he was in the middle of a messy divorce
proceeding with his wife Kay, who had also acted as an unpaid accountant and manager for the
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tour. The Riggs’s separation left Bobby flailing to get his tour organized—and only days before
he planned to open. Riggs even considered letting Gonzales play the undercard, only to revoke
that offer at the last minute. 56
Gonzales did get to spend more time with his family when Riggs and Kramer sidelined
him—impractical when a player barnstormed. Shortly after turning professional in the fall of
1949, Henrietta and Richard used $12,000 of his guarantee to buy a two-bedroom ranch house at
5838 South Arlington Avenue in the low income neighborhood of Park Mesa Heights in SouthCentral Los Angeles. There most of the child-rearing fell to Henrietta, who looked after the sixyear-old Richard, Jr., the five-year-old Mike, and the four-year-old Danny. A few nights a week
“Henry” and Richard drove their Mercury sedan to the neighborhood bowling alley for league
night, where Gonzales averaged a 183. Pancho spent a significant amount of his time away from
home building and racing hot-rods on a strip forty miles away at Saugus, California. The
mechanical side of building cars drew Gonzales to racing, but the danger also thrilled him. That
personality trait also led Gonzales to dog breeding, and he kept a kennel of boxers in his
backyard. Mostly though, the player widely regarded as the best in the world at that time hit
tennis balls much as he had as a kid before anyone who mattered had ever heard of him. At his
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house that meant hitting against his garage door at all hours of the day, much to the frustration of
his neighbors. 57
The Exposition Park courts he had learned to play on as a junior, however, provided a
more favorable place for Pancho to practice. On any given day, kids and local hustlers might find
themselves across the net from the two-time United States National Champion and holder of
every professional championship except the tour title. A fifteen-minute car ride from his house to
those courts spurred Gonzales to purchase the pro shop next to the Exposition Park courts. He
would string racquets and teach the occasional lesson; his heart never went into retail or
instruction. Fiduciaries upon his professional debut had encouraged Gonzales to buy annuities
and other structured investments that would look after him and his families when his playing
career inevitably came to an end, but that financial counsel presupposed that Pancho would play
as a professional full time for at least half a decade rather than finding himself all but shut out
after only one full year of touring. Not a pauper, he nonetheless needed cash more than the least
talented of professional athletes in other sports. “Richard Alonzo Gonzales is a troubled man,”
said his friends of Pancho in the early 1950s. 58
The question on the minds of everyone who followed tennis after the 1952 professional
tour never materialized was “Where’s Pancho?” Through all the trials, Gonzales kept his game
remarkably sharp while not barnstorming on tour. He practiced against University of Southern
California players and the best amateurs and teaching professionals in the area. He belonged to
the Los Angeles Tennis Club, which always worked hard to get one of their own a match. More
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frequently, Gonzales’s professional matches took place overseas, where other countries paid
better than what the limited professional tournament circuit paid in the United States. Four
months of exhibitions across Southeast Asia from Japan to the Philippines netted Gonzales
$30,000, where in cities like Seoul, Korea, 15,000 fans might queue hours at a time to watch him
play. Tennis-mad Australia offered even handsomer remuneration. Four-man tournaments in
Melbourne, Perth, Adelaide, and Newcastle averaged 10,000 fans who paid about $66,000 per
event. Gonzales swept through the competition, winning $2,800 per event for his first places. 59
Gonzales’s success abroad explained sportswriter Arthur Marx’s answer to Pancho’s
whereabouts on America’s professional tour—that is, “They’re all afraid of Gonzales.” Kramer
had said so, at least, admitting that Gonzales’s consistent wins in the tournaments that featured
all the best players made Pancho the player to beat even though he was not touring with Big
Jake, Frank Sedgman, Pancho Segura, and Ken McGregor in the winter and spring of 1953. That
fear, along with grudges each one held for the other, hurt the bottom line of the tour when
Sedgman versus Kramer failed to compel fans to pay as had past matchups. Kramer intensified
their mistrust by spreading rumors that he had made an offer that the greedy Gonzales turned
down—scuttlebutt Gonzales and most sportswriters denied but some Kramer fans believed. In
driving that wedge between himself and the future of professional tennis, Kramer set back the
cause of professional tennis a few years and may have inadvertently pushed back Open Tennis
by at least a few years. 60
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Unable to reconcile with Kramer, Gonzales began a comeback in the United States that
would rival his earlier return to championship tennis in 1947 and 1948. On June 21, 1953,
Pancho won the World’s Professional Tennis Championship contested on the Lakewood Park
Courts of suburban Cleveland. The preeminent professional tournament in the world was a study
in contrasts with the most prestigious amateur tournament in the world. Pancho competed against
fifteen other professionals over four evenings while the 1953 Wimbledon draw included 128
Men’s singles entries reduced down to one champion over two weeks of play. Every player in
the World’s Professional Championship came from the United States, while Wimbledon focused
attention on players from more than two dozen countries in the Men’s Singles draw. The
women’s professional contest contrasted even more with the women amateurs. Pauline Betz
defeated the only other entry, Mary Hardwick for the professional title—the first contested in
four years—while the Wimbledon’s Ladies draw presented 128 entries. For his first place finish
in singles, doubles, and mixed doubles, Pancho earned $1,600 in prize money out of a total prize
pool of a mere $8,000. Those earnings should have dwarfed the $0 dollars Wimbledon players
were supposed to have received, but the top players from most countries attending Wimbledon
secured stipends and honorariums in excess of Pancho’s winnings. The All England Lawn
Tennis and Croquet Club made more selling strawberries and cream in one day than the total
purse of the World’s Professional Tennis Championship offered in 1953. 61
Gonzales nonetheless accepted the engraved P.O.C. trophy from Sam Benjamin and Mrs.
George Carter with a big smile. He had established himself as the best player in the world in
61
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spite of the amateur and professional divides. Moreover, as a whole the professionals could view
1953 as a major success in popularizing their sport because for the first time, their championship
aired on prime time television. The Empire Oil Company had their WXEL broadcast four nights
of professional tennis coverage on channel 9. Viewers who turned in would have watched both
the highest level tennis in the world and a poorly run event when compared to the major amateur
tournaments like Wimbledon. For example, the professional players planned to give their own
commentary rather than have a separate announcer narrate the matches. Budge had been both
playing and broadcasting, but when he won in an upset, he couldn’t broadcast anymore. Earn
was just playing, but after Budge won and Earn lost, Earn took over broadcasting duties. In the
tournament’s final order of business, the players elected Cleveland’s Robert Trenkamp as the
professional tennis commissioner. That move did little to gain respectability for professional
tennis, which continued into 1954 without open competition between amateurs and
professionals. 62
Kramer fretted that year about whether or not to step back from professional play because
he knew the high likelihood of losing to a man he loathed in Gonzales. He knew his pocketbook
would take a hit, but he also hated the idea of losing his first professional tour. Kramer reached a
compromise with himself by announcing he would play doubles on the tour but not singles
because of health complications, although he offered no explanation about how bending down
for low volleys and rotating one’s trunk for the American twist serve—the biomechanics that put
the most stress on the players’ spine—did not aggravate his back in doubles play while the same
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actions did on the singles court. The simple reality was that Kramer wanted to maintain his
legacy as a player at all costs. His ego, a personality characteristic of many great competitors,
actually worked against the financial success of the tour even after Kramer mostly retired from
singles, played doubles sparingly, and focused almost exclusively on promotion just before the
start of the 1954 tour. 63
Gonzales took full advantage of that opening. He soundly beat all his challengers in a
1954 tour that more resembled a round robin than the undercard and primetime format Kramer
had used for himself when he played. Gonzales won thirty matches to twenty-one losses against
Frank Sedgman, thirty matches to twenty-one matches against Pancho Segura, and thoroughly
dominated Don Budge and Carl Earn, who also played him in a smaller series of matches. The
tournament format made for a mixed picture in that one player might lose in the stop’s semi-final
match one night and at the next stop win two matches in a row over two different opponents. The
games of some players might match up well against all the competitors save one who would
consistently beat that player. Kramer ran what sports commentators called his “circus” with a
seasoned hand to try to prevent one player from consistently dominating the others to a degree
that the gate receipts might suffer. 64
The tour format also kept the players’ finances in check because players were only paid if
they won the two matches at each stop as opposed to a contract guarantee or option of a
percentage of the gate receipt that the promoter had to meet. Whereas the professional champion
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previously secured upwards of $70,000 for winning the tour, the round robin tournament meant
that after seventy two-night tournaments, in effect more matches than had ever taken place on a
professional tour before, the champion Gonzales, who won twenty-nine of those seventy events,
took home $39,425—or a little more than half what he had when he went down in defeat four
years prior in the 1949-1950 tour. Moreover, more players on the tour meant more professionals
in the spotlight and more confusion among sponsors about who to endorse. From Kramer’s
standpoint, that was all to the better because he could hide behind having won the last tour he
fully competed on and keep his contracts with Wilson Sporting Goods and other companies well
intact. The new round robin format did not give the same conclusiveness of results that the
previous challenger versus champion format had. The lesser professionals did not seem to mind
the round robin format because the previous challenger champion had allowed only for two
prime-time players paid on guarantees or gate percentages and two undercard players paid on
weekly salaries. All players could now compete for the dollars, and the prize money results
showed a more equitable distribution than any previous tour: $1,550 for Earn; $2,125 for Riggs;
$3,170 for Kramer; $12,050 for Budge; $31,025 for Sedgman; $31,025 for Segura; and $39,425
for Gonzales. Given that even the tour’s last place finisher Earn earned $1,550 more than he
could have as an amateur tennis player, the round robin format was attractive—attractive, that is,
to everyone except the winner Gonzales, who in rising to the top now wanted a chance to show
his dominance and be paid accordingly. 65
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The professional tour of 1955-1956 more closely resembled Gonzales’s first professional
tour in 1949-1950 in that the world’s number one amateur turned professional to challenge the
world’s professional champion. This time Gonzales was the champion and Tony Trabert was the
challenger. Along with Trabert, Kramer had convinced the Australian amateur doubles champion
Rex Hartwig to turn professional to compete against the most entertaining of all the
professionals, Francisco “Little Pancho” Segura, in the preliminary match. Kramer tried to adapt
the format of each tour to suit the particular players competing that year. For example, in the
1955-1956 match he knew that Segura would soundly defeat Hartwig, so he kept their match
short at only one set. He expected a close series between Gonzales and Trabert, so the main
event match would be best three out of five sets. Hartwig’s doubles skills would “feature” in the
doubles contest that he increased from previous years to the best two out of three sets. 66
Kramer also justified why he had again decided to skip playing in the tour. It came down
to the stamina that Kramer lacked to play the “100 match series.” When the players practiced,
Big Jake laced up the boots, strung the racquets, and hit with them should an injury ever force
him to “step in and fill the breech,” but laying out a second season made clear to everyone who
followed competitive tennis that Kramer’s playing career had come to an end. He had won four
tours, the same number as Don Budge, and two fewer than Ellsworth Vines, but over those four
years Kramer had played four hundred tour matches in addition to the selected tournaments and
random exhibitions the professionals played. His body was breaking down, and the baton passed
to Pancho Gonzales. Yet Gonzales still had something to prove to everyone despite his past
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results: he had won fourteen out of the past eighteen “major pro titles” that included the
Nationals at Cleveland, the Internationals at Cleveland, the Miami Peach Professional
Championship, the Los Angeles Professional Championship, the International Professional
Championships at Wembley Stadium, the National Indoor Championship at Philadelphia, and the
National Hardcourt Championship in Beverley Hills. He won the 1954 world’s professional tour
against the world’s six best professionals with a singles record of 85 wins to 41 losses and a
doubles record of 40 wins to 31 losses. Gonzales owned the most lethal shot in the sport, a 112mile-per-hour serve—the fastest in recorded history. 67
Kramer and Gonzales agreed to coexist, so the promoter went looking for the best players
to compete against his new professional champion. Early headhunting did not go well when on
October 17, 1955, the Australians amateur champions Ken Rosewall and Lew Hoad publicly
walked-back their decision to turn professional. While competing in the United States for the
defense of the Davis Cup, Rosewall and Hoad agreed to a behind-closed-doors offer from
Kramer for £20,000 apiece guarantee for a professional tour against Big Jake and Tony Trabert.
Once back in Australia, however, the Lawn Tennis Association of Australia officers applied
pressure to the Slazengers and Dunlop sporting goods companies that employed Rosewall and
Hoad to increase the players’ compensation to a level Kramer could not match. Slazengers went
on to promise Rosewall the job security that professional tennis did not give with a five-year
contract, an employee option to cancel the contract without penalty, and an executive position
with the firm following his full-time playing days. To persuade Hoad against professionalism,
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the LTAA dangled what amounted to a blank check for tennis-related travel to Hoad, his wife
Jenny, and his family. 68
Kramer considered legal action. He produced contracts Hoad and Rosewall had signed
for the professional tour. The LTAA produced contracts the players had signed prohibiting them
from professional tennis. But Kramer realized the difficulty of litigation against popular athletes
from another country—especially when the sporting goods companies also held employment
contracts for each player that predated Kramer’s contract. In addition, both players were minors
who had signed his contract without the binding signatures of their legal guardians. Kramer
instead decided to try a carrot of his own with a red-eye flight to Sydney and a sweetening-ofthe-pot to by $17,000. When Dunlop stepped in again to offer more compensation to their player
consultants, Kramer packed his bags and returned empty-handed. Rosewall and Hoad decided to
stay away from the grueling reality of the professional tour until they were more prepared than
Gonzales was in 1949. 69
Kramer succeeded where other promoters failed because as a player-turned-promoter
Kramer knew his sport and he knew how to manage his professionals. Two decades in the game
had helped him refine the player contract that served as the principal mechanism he used to
manage the strong-minded Gonzales and his fellow players. Whereas he had previously offered
guarantees for a minimum income to entice players to join his tour, by the fall of 1953 Kramer
felt self-assured enough to court globally known professional players such as the
Czechoslovakian-turned-Egyptian and one-time world’s best amateur Jaroslav Drobny, to whom
68
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he offered a contract without a minimum compensation figure. 70 Contractual terms with the tour
promoter mattered just as much if not more than match attendance, because without good terms
for the player, any additional gate receipts could go right into the hands of the promoter. Donald
Dell, a former amateur tennis champion, friend of Kramer, and a sports agent who managed
professional athletes, nicknamed him “the czar of tennis” because of the influence Kramer
wielded over the future of the game as tennis opened in 1968 because of preexisting contracts he
held with many of the top players. 71
Kramer certainly used those contracts first and foremost to benefit himself, but he did do
some good by the players in helping to found the International Professional Tennis Players
Association in Los Angeles during June 1960. Kramer realized that following his retirement
from play at the end of 1953 and his sole focus on managing and promoting the top four
professional players for his World Tennis Incorporated Tours, he had created some antagonism
with the players who believed they drew the fans and therefore were entitled to a greater split of
the gates than manager Kramer offered. His solution was to make the players greater
stakeholders in their tennis enterprise. Kramer invited Earl Bucholz, Jr., Andres Gimeno, Rod
Laver, Kenneth Rosewall, and Tony Trabert to join. 72 The Association’s by-laws and
constitution stated a greater goal of mutual cooperation with the International Lawn Tennis
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Federation in bringing about Open Tennis competition between amateurs and professionals
throughout the world. Two years after its founding, the organization claimed twenty-three
members across countries, in effect the best tennis players on the planet. 73
Those players could now run the professional tennis tour themselves. This suited Kramer
just fine, because by the spring of 1962 he was tired of promoting the sport. In March he
shuttered his Los Angeles offices—a quick process given that the only payroll he had to meet
consisted of himself and his immediate family members who had kept his accounts. The option
clause in the players’ contracts allowed Kramer to step away in quick order without having to
meet any further financial obligations to the Australian professionals Lew Hoad, Frank Sedgman,
Ashley Cooper, and Mal Anderson. All effectively entered free agency, while Pancho Segura
relocated to Los Angeles to run the tennis program at the Beverly Hills Country Club. Pancho
Gonzales likewise retired from touring to direct the tennis program at Paradise Island, Bahamas.
The former amateur champion and professional touring player Tony Trabert tried to organize a
professional tour. Without any top-card American players to recruit from amateur ranks or within
the professionals themselves, Trabert decided to work with the four Australian free agents, sign
the Australian professional Ken Rosewall, who had spent a good deal of 1961 retired from
touring, and attempt to draw more top Australian players, who had dominated amateur tennis in
the early 1960s, into the professional ranks. Both Neale Fraser and Roy Emerson declined
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professional contract offers, but Trabert landed the biggest name in world tennis in December
1962 when fresh off of a fourth consecutive Davis Cup win, the Grand Slam Champion Rod
“Rocket” Laver joined the professionals. 74
The recruitment of Laver brought the first player since Don Budge to have won the
Grand Slam to the tour at a time when professional tennis desperately needed a fresh face.
Everyone expected a positive impact on professional tennis because of Laver’s talent. Less
apparent, however, to anyone except those on the inside was the discord among the players at
that time. Trabert’s deep dislike of Gonzales made his choice to work with the Australian players
as much a personal decision as a business one. Trabert considered the Australians agreeable and
the future; he thought Pancho was surly and the past. While Gonzales had made his own decision
to enter retirement with Kramer’s retirement, he did so expecting that the professional tour
would go away with Kramer. Trabert’s resumption of the tour without giving Gonzales, the
reigning professional champion, a chance to join on favorable terms prompted Pancho to channel
his anger into a lawsuit that found its way to a federal court in Southern California. 75
That 1963 case laid bare the fragility of professional tennis in the pre-1968 era as the
players squabbled among themselves for the little bit of money in the game. Unfortunately for
the petitioner Pancho, his counsel did not adequately explain to the judge just how little money
there was in the professional game. The lawyer failed to reveal that a small clique of players
(about half a dozen) in a larger group of three hundred tennis professionals, actually earned
income from playing matches. More importantly, they monopolized that revenue source. He
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further failed to demonstrate that Gonzales’s fellow professionals were guilty of discrimination.
They deeply resented the position Pancho had held as the tour champion from 1954 to his first
retirement in 1961. Along with his 1954 and 1955 wins, Gonzales defeated Ken Rosewall fifty
matches to twenty-six matches in 1957, Lew Hoad fifty-one matches to thirty-six matches in
1958, Mal Anderson, Ashley Cooper, and Lew Hoad in a 1959 round robin, Ken Rosewall in
1960, as well as Andres Gimeno, Lew Hoad, Barry Mackay, Alex Olmedo, and Butch Bucholz
for the “Kramer Cup” in 1961. Yet here he was, seemingly at the end of his career, suing them
for scraps. 76
Had that case been publicized, the public might have gained a better understanding of the
economic weaknesses of professional tennis in the postwar period. The four or six best
professional players formed the professional tour and barnstormed across the country playing
exhibition matches night after night. The remainder of the tennis professionals, usually around
two hundred people, mostly taught tennis and hoped for a “professional tournament circuit.”
That circuit never materialized, which meant that outside of the World Professional
Championship tournament held in Cleveland, usually in June, more than 95 percent of
professional players had no events in which to play. Noel Brown, one of those professionals
without a place to play, found that situation so discouraging that he appealed the USLTA for
reinstatement of his amateur status which he received after foreswearing professional tennis and
serving a two-year probationary period before being granted remittance to the amateur ranks.
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“The future of professional tennis is dismal, from the point of view of a pro circuit,” remarked
Brown. “There is always room for the National Champion in an organized four-man pro tour, but
the pros offer nothing to the lesser player who is still interested in playing tournaments.” 77
Brown knew. He had tried to make a living as a professional for four years. Beginning in
autumn 1946, as one of the top ten players in the country and a collegiate standout for UCLA,
Brown decided to make a living as a professional, with ruinous financial consequences. Passed
over by Kramer and Riggs for their tour, Brown taught lessons for $6 an hour on the private
Beverley Hills courts of clients such as William Wyler, Robert Parrish, Elia Kazan, Laurence
Olivier, Coleen Gray, Jose Ferrer, and Montgomery Clift. He liked the work but missed playing.
He knew that he had no job security and no means for promotion in what equated to life as an
independent contractor. Three to four lessons a day were the most any “free-lance” professional
ever secured in Los Angeles—the tennis capital of the country in the mid-twentieth century.
Even in major tennis areas such as Southern California and Southeast Florida, only a handful of
tennis clubs existed with a membership and grounds to support a professional looking to teach
and raise a family: the Los Angeles Tennis Club in Los Angeles, the La Jolla Beach and Tennis
Club in La Jolla, California; the Boca Raton hotel, and the Hollywood Beach Hotel in Florida, as
examples. More club professional positions existed along the private tennis, cricket, and athletic
clubs and resorts along the mid-Atlantic and Northeast, but here class privilege often meant that
the club professional’s treatment and compensation did not rise above that of “hired help.”
Unless a player had the game of Jack Kramer, Pancho Gonzales, Ken Rosewall, or Rod Laver
with a personality to match, it made more financial sense to remain in the amateur ranks where
77

Noel Brown, “I Was A Pro,” World Tennis 1, no. 1 (June 1953): 19.

301
small subsidies and allowances appeared with surprising regularity. 78 Even for the best players
and their promoter, professional tennis was not that great to them before 1968.
Near the conclusion of Pancho’s suit against his fellow professionals, the judge spoke.
“My judgement of Mr. Gonzales is he is a pretty good business man. I don’t know how good a
tennis player he is but he is an excellent business man,” explained judge Charles Carr. 79 In that
decision, at least, the judge was completely wrong. Gonzales played a great game of tennis but in
the business of professional sport he failed miserably. He beat all the best players in the world
throughout most of the 1950s and into the early 1960s, a decade at the top of the game, yet he
faired financially worse than players he crushed on the court. Racism was an important factor.
Pancho’s income in 1963 was a pittance by the standards of the top handful of athletes in a
global sport, but that income accurately reflected the outsider status of professional tennis. He
earned $25,000 for four months of seasonal employment at the Paradise Island Bahamas resort,
where he taught tennis to rich tourists—his principal source of income. He earned $15,000 a year
from the Spaulding Company for his Pancho Gonzales Signature racquet and endorsements of
other sporting goods products. His status as the top draw tennis player in the world also netted an
additional income of $4,000 in media appearances and $5,000 in tournament guarantees, which
together put his total income in the last year of his real tennis form at $49,000. He was thirty-five
years old. 80
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The reality of Gonzales’s money troubles appeared in sharp relief when compared to the
generation of players who peaked right after he did. Pancho dominated professional tennis from
1954 to 1964, but he did not own the sport. There was not much to own. Few television
contracts, limited corporate sponsorships, and inadequate tournament venues kept the best
players in the world playing points for pennies. The tour promoter Jack Kramer retained the
lion’s share of what professional tennis made during that decade. Barred from returning to
subsidized amateur competition, Gonzales and his fellow touring professionals had little recourse
but to begrudgingly accept Kramer’s terms. That changed in 1968.

CHAPTER SEVEN
OPEN TENNIS TOURNAMENTS, PROMOTERS, AND TOURS
Pancho Gonzales’s off-again-on-again retirement from professional tennis helped propel
the sport into the doldrums. People attended matches to see the familiar champion. Kramer’s
withdrawal from managing the tour also mattered. He was the only person truly experienced in
managing the more than one hundred separate appearances the group made across six continents.
The players tried to compensate for both these absences by creating a tournament circuit with far
fewer dates and venues to replace the more peripatetic touring days of World Tennis
Incorporated. That changed format seemed especially necessary because the professional players
now managed themselves in the International Tennis Professionals Association, which purported
to organize prize-money events for any player who belonged to the Association and wished to
compete. While real equality never materialized in practice, the Association did have a number
of more active professional players competing for prize money than Kramer ever had without
any of the carrot-and-stick contracts he deployed to control his players during the fifties. 1
Riven with rivalries, the professionals failed to tour in 1963. The following year they
organized a series of professional tournaments that carried an average purse of $10,000 divided
across a sixteen-player draw. The $1,000 the first place finisher earned for a half-week of work
barely covered his expenses in many parts of the world. In 1965 the finances behind the
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tournaments improved somewhat, but most everything else behind the events remained
touch-and-go. The promotions of the events, or rather lack thereof, caused spectators to confuse
the 7th Regiment Armory with the 71st Regiment Armory when the troupe played New York
City. One professional, Barry MacKay, woke to nightmares of crowds crushing him in the
cramped quarters where the players performed, only to find the real nightmare of actually
playing in front of only 200 fans. Older professionals such as Lew Hoad continued to draw fans,
but they often withdrew from an event at the last moment because their body or their mind
simply could no longer take the day-to-day grind of life on the road in front of what seemed like
dwindling crowds. Such last-minute withdrawals left fellow professionals playing in front of
hostile or smaller crowds upset that the player they most wanted to see had bailed at the final
moments. On balance, the professionals could not pay nor police themselves. 2
Their frailty and factionalism attracted the attention of outsiders who saw opportunities to
better organize and promote the players. At the same time the national amateur Associations
became so divided themselves over the long-simmering debate of Open Tennis that the
International Lawn Tennis Federation could no longer punt on that important topic. Disunity
among and between both the amateur and professional leaders of the sport had prevailed from
Suzanne Lenglen’s playing days through those of Bill Tilden, Jack Kramer, and Pancho
Gonzales. Those discrepancies would only increase, however, now that money could flow into
the sport like never before. Professional tennis began to turn professional as a new generation of
promoters—who had less connection to the game than player-promoters such as Tilden, Vines,
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Perry, Riggs, Kramer, and Trabert— bought into the sport. 3 Sports promoters from outside
organized tennis saw opportunity to make money in the game because disunity within and
between national amateur associations had reached a degree that Open Tennis seemed a real
possibility by the mid-1960s. Over the next decade the conflict and compromise between insiders
and those outsiders made that possibility into modern professional tennis. The Open Era of tennis
had arrived.
The most tradition-bound of all the national associations actually did the most to bring
about Open Tennis in the years leading up to 1968. Modern sport began in Britain in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, then spread throughout the world thanks to Britain’s
colonialization efforts and empire building. That geopolitical development assigned to
Wimbledon a great deal of symbolic weight for the British and foreigners alike. Prior to World
War II the English crowds at SW19 had a reputation for restrained applause and general
appreciativeness to competitors from anywhere in the world. After 1945, however, Wimbledon
fans earned a reputation for the reproach of foreign players. Ironically, given that they were allies
during the War, British spectators treated American players more harshly than athletes from any
other country, as several players made clear: “They would like to see the Americans lose,”
remarked the Indian player Narranda Nah; “Yes, they are anti-American,” said Violette Rigollet
Alvensleben of Belgium; “I don’t think they like the Americans,” stated the Frenchmen Jean
Claude Molinari. In the 1948 doubles final featuring Gardnar Mulloy and Tom Brown of the
United States versus John Bromwich and Frank Sedgman of Australia, the British fans broke all
tennis protocol by applauding wildly after service faults by the American team. In that match,
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along with each match that involved Americans, the Wimbledon fans reenacted the decline of the
British Empire and the ascent of the United States as a world power. “It is because of Empire,”
said the English player Gem Hoahing when asked why the British had changed the way they
cheered. For a quarter of a century since the Englishman Fred Perry last won the Wimbledon
Championships in 1936, Britain endured not only the drought of a national champion but also
watched while Australia and the United States competed in nearly every Davis Cup Challenge
Round in the postwar period. The serious consideration the British Lawn Tennis Association
gave in 1961 to hosting an Open Tournament without the ILTF’s blessing exemplified a
willingness on the part of British elites, some of whom also served in positions within the
government, to reassert sovereignty and to take a measure of pride in the face of waning
influence. 4
Pride and insecurity had in the recent past prompted the British LTA to thwart attempts
by other national associations to bring about Open Tennis. As far back as 1930 the USLTA had
brought the idea of Open Tennis to the International Tennis Federation in the midst of the
swirling controversy of the great American Bill Tilden’s Davis Cup suspension and decision to
turn professional. The resolution stalled until 1934 when USLTA President Louis Carruthers
again broached the idea of amateur and professional competition. Once again Open Tennis went
down to defeat. The Depression and World War II kept Open Tennis off the radar until after
1945, when the aggressive professional touring and promoting of Bobby Riggs and Jack Kramer
soured a number of tennis officials on the character of professional tennis. By 1961, however,
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Kramer had mostly left the picture, and USLTA officials revived Carruthers’s 1934 Open Tennis
resolution and presented it to the ITLF. The French Tennis Federation and the British LTA
effectively killed the USLTA’s push for Open Tennis, divided the USLTA sections over Open
Tennis, and embittered tennis officials in the United States against their British counterparts.
Four years later the British would need the cooperation of the Americans they had not long ago
spurned. 5
At first many members of the ILTF did not believe that the highly conservative All
England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club would come out in favor of Open Tennis. The
Wimbledon host retained only between three hundred and four hundred total members and
admitted a new member to full status only after a fifteen-year probationary period. The titled
nobility that comprised a significant proportion of the Club’s membership roll certainly favored
tradition in most other walks of their lives while the new-money members likewise valued the
tradition of Wimbledon for the prestige that heritage imparted on their own social statuses. 6
Tradition cut both ways, however. Many tennis enthusiasts within Britain could not help
but wring their hands over how lawn tennis had languished in the land that invented it when
compared to the successes of other nations such as America and Australia on the international
scene. As Great Britain failed year after year to advance to the Davis Cup Challenge Round, the
British Lawn Tennis Association began to rely almost entirely on the Wimbledon
Championships to subsidize all tennis activity in England. Even after some efforts to expand the
tournament grounds, by the 1960s capacity crowds of 30,000 people attended most days of the
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tournament’s fortnight, prompting the All England Club and their partners in running the
tournament and sharing revenue, the British Lawn Tennis Association, to return more than
$250,000 in presale tickets to fans who had requested tickets but could not be accommodated
during that year’s tournament. Total monies collected by the British LTA from the tournament
approximated $140,000 annually by the1960s. That number alone outvoted the hundred
councilors from across the country who decided the policies of the British LTA. With the wishes
of the Championships Committee of Management, stacked with All England Club members,
firmly in favor of Open Tennis, the many members of the British LTA opposed to Open Tennis
consoled themselves with the history that when cricket began open competition the sport had still
retained much of its heritage while also improving its revenue stream. They hoped for the same
with tennis. 7
The leadership of the British LTA understood that Wimbledon was a jewel in their crown
that put them in a unique position to press for Open Tennis when compared to the situations
other national amateur associations making up the ILTF. Most ILTF member nations hosted their
own national championships that invited popular foreign players to attend in order to increase the
revenue the associations collected at the tournament gates. At the same time, few of these
tournaments offered the players much in terms of expenses while many of the associations ran
the tournaments in a sloppy fashion that frustrated the international players to the point of not
attending, had the players had a choice in the matter. In fact, they did not have much of a choice
because the real value in the ILTF came in the unity of the amateur associations at the expense of
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the players within different national associations. For example, players despised the poorly run
Italian Championships to the point that the tournament would have folded long before 1965 had
the Italian Tennis Association not requested the ILTF to direct other member countries to require
their own players to attend the tournament. The attendance of the international players, despite
their own frustration with the situation, prompted more spectators to attend the Italian
Championships than otherwise would have. That in turn put the Italian Tennis Association in a
better financial situation, having run a more profitable tournament without having had to invest
money in actually improving the experience for the players. That situation was not uncommon
among national associations within the ILTF. 8
Not surprisingly, most of the smaller countries that ran smaller National Championships
offered little in the way of player expenses. They wanted to see nothing change in how the ILTF
conducted business. In the fall of 1965, then, the British LTA planned to move slowly in
bringing other countries around to Open Tennis. The first tournament allowing amateurs and
professionals to play could take place in the summer of 1966 or perhaps not even until 1967, and
then a few more Open tournaments would appear on the schedule each year. The British plan of
gradualism and compromise proved difficult to execute, primarily because the memberships of
other national amateur associations were themselves divided over Open Tennis. 9
Such was the case in the United States for years. The USLTA’s national office failed to
control Kramer’s professional tennis players and struggled to keep the Association’s various
sections under the control. Those shortcomings finally cracked the longstanding opposition to
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Open Tennis within the USLTA—the ILTF’s largest member nation. In 1956 the USLTA
celebrated their “Diamond Jubilee” not at the traditional site of the annual meeting in New York
City but in San Francisco, in what one meeting attendee called a testament to the “growing
power” of the West Coast Sections of the Association. There, representatives from the 193
California tennis clubs realized that if they joined with clubs from the Pacific Northwest,
Southwest, Mountain States, Midwest, and South, they could easily defeat the votes held by the
213 Eastern Section Clubs. They did so the following winter, sweeping the New Yorker Renville
McCann out of the top position in the Association in favor of the Seattle financier Victor Dinny.
Dinny replaced the officers from the East Coast and Mid-Atlantic with his own retainers, who
ranged from Chicago to Florida. The most high profile removal Dinny made concerned the holyof-holies of amateurism in American tennis—the Davis Cup. Bill Talbert, a former player turned
coach, had led the Davis Cup team since 1953. Although the 1954 team defeated Australia, the
squad put together by the famous Australian coach Harry Hopman had won seven of the
previous eight Challenge Rounds. By 1958 Dinny decided to make a change. With one phone
call he replaced the flabbergasted Talbert with Perry Jones, a surprise move, given Talbert’s
pedigree as both a champion player and a proven match-situation coach compared to Jones’s
strength as an organizer rather than an on-court tactician. Jones got the job done, though, and the
Davis Cup returned to the United States from Australia in 1958. That victory brought Pails a
great deal of goodwill from conservatives within the USLTA in terms of pushing other reforms
centered on player expenses and amateurism. 10
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At the annual meeting of the International Lawn Tennis Federation during the first week
of July in 1960, voting members seemed ready to allow open competition between amateur
players and professionals for the first time. Perry Jones’s popularity on the national tennis scene
allowed him to convince many reticent USLTA voters that Kramer had no designs to monopolize
the sport should the United States back the prospect of Open competition. Australia, France, and
Great Britain, along with the United States, collectively represented the big four tennis nations.
Those countries produced most of the world’s top players and had won every Davis Cup
competition since the Cup began in 1900. All agreed and voted in favor of the Open Tennis
resolution—though Britain and France chose not to exercise their sizable influence over other
European countries that would have resulted in a land-slide victory for the American
championed Open Tennis resolution. Other countries saw the matter differently, however.
Spain’s fear of losing their top player, Andres Gimeno, to a Kramer contract single-handedly
caused that country’s members to vote against the proposed rule changes. Open tennis in 1960
fell only five votes short of the necessary two-thirds super-majority. That autumn a sportswriter
opined that the sport of tennis had reached its “low point” and over the next half decade many
USLTA members wrote to the Association’s leadership with much the same views. 11
Jack Kramer, for one, certainly agreed with that assessment. He fervently believed that
ILTF members voted more against Jack Kramer than they did against Open Tennis. Some
members of the ILTF admitted as much. Reluctant supporters within the USLTA of the 1960
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Open Tennis legislation returned to their normal tennis activities. Perry Jones, for example,
began devoting his energy to attracting the United States National Championship from Forest
Hills to the Los Angeles Tennis Club. USLTA conservatives opposed to Open Tennis had their
biases confirmed with the 1960 no vote, and they redoubled their efforts to keep money out of
the game, or at least money they did not control out of the game. Between 1963 and 1966 the
USLTA in effect voted for a gag rule on the issue of Open Tennis when the topic arose at the
ILTF annual meeting. 12
Yet change was on the horizon, with the British LTA proposing to the ILTF a semantic
change from amateur versus professional to a single category of “players” out of which
applications could be made for tournament travel and training expenses in a more transparent and
less under-the-table way. Jean Borotra, the former French amateur champion turned French
Tennis Federation director and ILTF official, urged refining the player designation category. In
his formulation, a “Special Committee” would meet to designate a player acceptable—in the
view of the various national associations and the international Federation—to receive traveling
stipends and living expenses throughout the year. Such semantics did not actually solve the
“hypocrisy of sham-amateurism” constitutive of topflight international tennis for more than half
a century, but Borotra’s words and the policies that followed gently nudged tennis toward Open
competition at the same time the vote tallies of ILTF member nations told a different story. 13
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As before, the All England Club considered letting professionals onto their courts only if
the tournament committee worked directly with the players and had nothing to do with Kramer.
His aggressive recruitment of the Australian amateur champions Roy Emerson and Rod Laver
further soured the mood for Open Tennis because the Australian Lawn Tennis Association felt
compelled to pay their players unmatchable expenses to remain amateurs at the same time the
ILTF had sought unanimity from national associations in piloting their new player expense
structure. By 1960, top Australian players were accustomed to Australian sporting goods
companies putting up £100,000 per year for player expenses. When decreased Davis Cup
revenue from the Australians’ near perpetual hosting of the Challenge Round dwindled in the
mid-1960s, Australian businessman and tennis fan Bob Mitchell bankrolled Australian tennis
players at £4,000 per player, which, combined with money from the Australian LTA and other
sources, proved enough to keep players such as Roy Emerson, Ashley Cooper, and Margaret
Smith Court amateurs playing for Australia rather than professionals playing for Jack Kramer.
That practice put the differing agendas among different national associations within the ILTF
into sharp relief in 1966 and that ultimately delayed what many sports commentators thought
inevitable only a year before. Yet at the same time, contemporary officials in the USLTA, other
national associations, and the ILTF missed the irony that the apotheosis of amateur tennis in the
Davis Cup was the Trojan Horse about to let the professional raiders in to sack their amateur
stronghold. 14
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George MacCall and National Tennis League
George MacCall’s Davis Cup captaincy and Robert Kelleher’s USLTA Presidency during
the mid-1960s pushed the USLTA away from the anti-Open Tennis stance they had maintained
between 1963 and 1966 to greater amenability to the idea by 1967. For the first time in his life,
Perry Jones began delegating some of his tennis responsibilities to others as the old Southern
California Tennis Association leader started to slow in the early sixties. Based in Los Angeles
and with personal wealth and a flexible schedule from his insurance business, MacCall became
one of Jones’s protégés, performing some administrative duties for the Pacific Southwest
Tournament and the Southern California Tennis Association. The USLTA named former Utah
tennis champion David Freed Davis Cup captain to replace the aging Jones in 1960, thanks to the
voting alliance of the Mountain States Section and the Pacific State Sections. Freed, however,
proved an ineffective choice. The captaincy then passed to Robert Kelleher until the Association
believed Kelleher better served United States tennis in several vice-president positions and as a
delegate to the ILTF before his election to the USLTA Presidency in 1967. George MacCall
assumed the duties of Davis Cup captain in 1965. 15
MacCall immediately set to bringing more money into amateur tennis by convincing the
USLTA to triple the budget for his handful of players from $26,000 to $64,000. The investment
did not pay off in terms of wresting the Cup away from the Australians. In fact, under MacCall,
the U.S. Davis Cup team suffered repeated pre-Challenge Round losses: first to Spain in 1965;
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then to Brazil in 1966; and most disastrously to the reputation-conscious USLTA, to Ecuador in
the Americas Inter-Zonal Final in 1967. In defending himself from attacks both outside and
within the USLTA, MacCall went on offense, stating that “nothing succeeds with the USLTA
like failure,” when asked by reporters about his records as Davis Cup captain in April of 1967.
With failure on the courts and finger-pointing in the press, MacCall started the summer with the
job still his in all likelihood because he maintained strong relationships with most of his players.
Both coach and players defended one another from outside threats, and that common defense
created the camaraderie that MacCall soon put to his advantage in deciding to break away from
the amateur ranks of the USLTA and forge his own tennis tour. 16
In the fall of 1967 MacCall was ready to make his move. He signed many of the best
players because his position as the United States Davis Cup captain from 1965 to 1967 gave him
access to America’s and the world’s best players at just the right moment. Arthur Ashe, for
example, sought the counsel of his coach on whether or not to compete in the 1968 Wimbledon
Championships at the point when the International Lawn Tennis Federation had yet to affirm
Open Tennis and therefore threatened disciplinary actions against any player who bucked that
organization’s authority. MacCall quickly named Pancho Gonzales coach of the 1965 squad
because of Gonzales’s successful coaching of the last United States Davis Cup squad to win the
Cup in 1963. MacCall’s appointment of Gonzales built a working relationship between the semiretired professional champion and the upstart tennis promoter. Gonzales’s regular practice
sessions with the Davis Cup squad players at the Los Angeles Tennis Club got the former
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champion back in playing shape. That led to MacCall signing Gonzales as one of his first tennis
professionals for his newly formed National Tennis League and newly formed Tennis
Championships, Incorporated. A minimum guarantee of $40,000 for a twenty-six week season
was much more money for much less work than Gonzales had earned while the number one
player in the world under Kramer’s control. MacCall used Kramer’s technique of offering
substantial guarantees to sign most of the top international players to his troupe at just the right
time. 17
Kramer’s heavy-handed and at times under-handed management of his players resulted in
myriad conflicts between the professionals and their promoter. In the main, though, Kramer’s
stern approach kept the big personalities of his players more or less in check, and that meant he
could schedule a robust series of international tour dates, actually deliver his players to the
events in order to keep sponsors happy, and in turn make sure his players were compensated well
enough to keep them touring in the face of many obstacles. The same could not be said for the
professionals in 1964, 1965, and 1966 when the players themselves—mainly led by
Australians—more or less ran their own international tour that increasingly focused on
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tournament tennis in the land Down Under. Kramer continued to promote a handful of
tournaments in the United States and Great Britain that generally did quite well, but the players
took the day-to-day management of the tour into their own hands in forming the International
Professional Tennis Association. In July that organization passed a code of conduct that
stipulated fines for behavior infractions. Self-policing, however, meant individual professionals
continued to do as they please. 18
The year 1967 began in much the same inauspicious way with the failure of the
professionals to recruit top amateurs such as Roy Emerson and Tony Roche into the pay ranks.
Emerson, Roche, and other amateurs maintained they could make more under the table than the
guarantees they were offered to turn professional. These top amateurs likewise did not believe
the professionals could actually deliver on the guarantees they made. Rod Laver, for example,
went on record reporting that as a top amateur he earned “between $600 and $700” per week
from the Australian LTA and various other sources. During the year he made around $40,000 of
tax-free money in a sport whose amateur bodies purported that no money outside of single-figure
per day (and then only during select tournament weeks) expenses made it into players’ pockets. 19
That hypocrisy mattered more than ever to the professionals, because without new
challengers to fill their ranks, people failed to turn up to watch the same match-ups they saw
before. Whereas during the Kramer tours of the fifties, the professionals only toured in a group
18
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of four, by 1967 a dozen professionals wanted to play on at least a semi-regular basis. Those
numbers combined with a lack of suitable venues to accommodate multiple matches
simultaneously forced the professionals to divide into two groups for the 1967 tours. A reduced
schedule for each individual player made few of them happy, and the unwillingness of venues
such as Madison Square Garden—which professional tennis had been closely associated with
since the tours of Suzanne Lenglen, Vinnie Richards, and Bill Tilden—to host the players for
their opener further distressed the athletes. To a man they vocalized that distress in screeds
against the ILTF, the Australian LTA, and the USLTA—the latter of which took steps at the start
of 1967 toward paying top American amateurs’ expenses equivalent to a full-time white-collar
job. At the very moment when their tennis touring reached a nadir, the professionals catalyzed
the cause of Open Tennis not through their actions but through their words. The willingness of
Laver and other professionals to speak candidly to the sports press, particularly newspapers and
magazines in Great Britain, about the secret payments they had received while playing as
amateurs galled British LTA officials and galvanized them to take action against amateurshamateurism. 20
Over the next year, that action culminated in tennis becoming the last major world sport
to allow Open competition between amateurs and professionals. In the summer of 1967 the ILTF
held their annual meeting at Mondorft-les Bains, Luxembourg, where Open Tennis appeared up
for a vote for the first time since 1961. The early tally looked like Open Tennis would carry with
the three of the four largest tennis nations—the United States, England, and Australia. The latter
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defied the Australian LTA President William “Big Bill” Edwards’s conspicuous hatred of tennis
professionals. All voted in favor of the resolution. The situation changed, however, when France
mysteriously abstained from voting, and then smaller nations cast their votes. Every country in
South America, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe voted no to Open Tennis. The
resolution failed 139 votes to 83 in favor. While the British LTA had expected solid opposition
from the Soviet countries whose state sponsorship of players amounted to professionalism in all
but name, the lack of support from countries such as Italy, France, India, and Brazil had
ultimately doomed the measure to defeat. 21
The British LTA moved ahead undeterred in staging a speculative professional
tournament at the grandest venue in tennis. Since his first year as a professional, Jack Kramer
had spoken his desire to get onto the lawn courts of the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet
Club and play a professionals-only version of Wimbledon. Twenty years later, in August 1967,
the British LTA decided to make that happen in part because Kramer had exited the promotional
business. The All England Club extended direct invitations to Rod Laver, Ken Rosewall, Andres
Gimeno, Dennis Ralston, Fred Stolle, and Pancho Gonzales, with an additional two spots
determined by qualification matches. Some of these players had not entered the walled grounds
of the Club as a spectator, let alone a player, since they had turned professional; all would now
play for the largest purse in professional tennis history at £21,500. The tournament initially
underperformed expectations; the short horizon of the preparations, the novelty of the event, and
the lack of publicity led to only half of the seats on Centre Court filled on day one. The thirty21
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nine-year-old Pancho Gonzales and the thirty-two-year-old Lew Hoad salvaged the tournament,
though, with a spirted 3-6, 11-9, 8-6 match that repeatedly brought the crowd to their feet and
left everyone who saw the tennis wondering what they had been missing by not getting to see
these two professionals on Centre Court, where the caliber of their play so evidenced that that
was where they belonged. Centre Court remained “Standing Room Only” for the remainder of
the tournament, while the BBC broadcast the matches in color television around the world. Laver
won the singles while Gonzales and Gimeno partnered to win the doubles. All the professionals
walked away from the Wimbledon Professional Championships feeling good about the
experience. In fact, the real winner of the Professional Wimbledon was the British LTA and the
All England Club, who now had the confirmation that an Open Tournament would prove a
commercial success. 22
That momentum carried into the turning point that made Open Tennis a reality. On
October 4, 1967, the British LTA decided to hold an open tournament despite the prohibition
against such events by the ILTF. “We have hopes of not going it alone,” said British LTA
President Judge Carl Aarvold, “but we have had no assurances from anyone.” The boldness of
the British LTA action took other ILTF member nations by such surprise that assurances of any
kind did not come for what felt like forever. To heighten the anxiety those opponents faced, the
International Professional Tennis Association (IPTA) had recently been restructured into a
corporation with an elected Board of Directors that for the first time included managers from
outside tennis. Those directors brought a more aggressive approach to dealing with infighting
22
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among the professionals and, more substantially in terms of shaping the Open Tennis debate, a
more aggressive approach to pressuring top amateur players to turn professional. In addition to
the dozen professionals currently touring the world, the IPTA Board pursued the top twenty
ranked amateurs so aggressively that amateur officials in countries like Australia expected that
they would lose at least half of their world-rated players to professionalism. That was enough to
prompt leaders such as USLTA President Bob Kelleher to put the idea of Open Tennis to a
USLTA sectional vote after his own Executive Committee defeated the measure twenty-two
opposed to twenty-one in favor. The seventeen USLTA Sections unanimously supported Open
Tennis, and the USLTA delegates felt free to offer quiet support for the British LTA’s Open
Tennis agenda. Two years earlier the USLA Executive Committee had paid private investigators
to ferret out expenses paid to players “under the table”; now the USLTA Sections voted
unanimously that no Open Tennis position held by members of that Committee was irrelevant. 23
Most people who spoke up about the Open Tennis issue supported the British LTA in
their decision to make the 1968 Wimbledon Championships a tournament that allowed
professionals. ILTF President Giorgio de Stefani’s position that “a certain hypocrisy” on the part
of the ILTF was preferable to the “antidemocratic and illegal action” of the British LTA was well
outside the mainstream. De Stefani expressed his intention to remove any country from the ILTF
if those national associations did not enforce ILTF rules against Open Tennis on their players. He
seemed more or less alone in his opinion that the Open Wimbledon would prove such a financial
flop that other countries would not even consider allowing professionals to play their own
23
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national championships. USLTA Section Association presidents from Richard Botsch in
Delaware to Robert Kelleher in the National Office opined in favor of the Open Wimbledon.
Amateur players from Tony Roche in Australia, Pierre Darmon in France, and Allen Fox in the
United States all voiced their intention to play the Open Wimbledon. Even recently retired
professionals such as Lew Hoad announced their intention to get back into playing shape so they
could participate. Professional promoters both past and present—Jack Kramer, George MacCall,
and recent arrival to the scene Dave Dixon—all pledged the participation of the professional
players. The only minority opinion that would matter was retired French Davis Cup player
Bernard Destremau, who remarked that France “should organize a Roland Garros Open.” 24
That, it turned out, was exactly what happened. French tennis had languished at the world
level since the days of Suzanne Lenglen and the glory years of the Four Musketeers. Lenglen had
died thirty years earlier in 1938, but Jean Borotra, Jacques Brugnon, Henri Cochet, and René
Lacoste were all still living in 1968. Of the four, Jean Borotra remained the most involved in the
administration of tennis in France and in the government of the ILTF. As President of the ILTF
in 1961, Borotra put himself out in front of the Open Tennis debate when he gave an important
press conference on January 19 of that year, remarking that while the ILTF planned to continue
to keep professionals away from amateurs, personally he favored Open competition. George
MacCall remembered those comments made to Chicago sportswriters when he visited Paris in
1965 with the United States Davis Cup team. Over the next two years, Borotra redoubled his
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efforts to push the French LTA to lead on Open Tennis. Those efforts stalled until the British
LTA announced they would hold an Open Wimbledon in 1968. 25
As with the Tennis Court Oath of 1789, the French relished a good revolution, and in
March of 1968 they whipped enough votes from the ILTF Committee of Management sanction
Open Tennis. The so-called “Declaration of Principle” stressed the “retention” of “amateurism”
as the principle that guided the ILTF, the “right” of “self-determination” among member nations
to categorize players as amateurs or professionals as they saw fit, and the tight cap on the number
of “open tournaments” allowed by the ILTF. The digestif the French proposed that helped other
nations swallow such sweeping reforms was the category of the “authorized player”—that is, a
player allowed by his or her National Association, and thus the ILTF, to accept an unlimited
amount of expenses and other remuneration without forfeiting his or her amateur status, thus
remaining eligible to play in both Open tournaments and those closed to professionals, especially
the Davis Cup. What an authorized or registered player compared to a professional would
actually mean in practice would take several more years to clarify, but in the meantime French
tennis officials felt they could move ahead with holding Roland Garros as the first important
Open Tournament just weeks before Wimbledon. 26
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The French had less than two months before their big tournament. Borotra’s primary
contact became MacCall, whom he knew and with whom he knew most of the top professionals
remained under contract. The French LTA authorized a first offer of $20,000 in guaranteed prize
money. The low figure surprised MacCall and his players, who held longstanding beliefs about
how financially lucrative each of the four major championships were for the sponsoring amateur
bodies. The professionals failed to take into account that compared to Wimbledon and the U.S.
National Championship, the French Championship seldom recorded a big profit for the French
LTA. More importantly, the involvement of the professionals reintroduced the key concern of
tax liability that shaped the policies of the private clubs that made up the amateur associations.
Having no precedent in tennis for the division of taxable prize money to professionals, nontaxable expenses to the authorized players and amateurs, and partially-taxable revenue to the
French LTA, Borotra and his fellow officials preferred conservative accountancies. 27
Offers and counter-offers between the French LTA and MacCall kept an Open French
Championship an open question days before the May 27, 1968, tournament start. In the interim, a
comparatively small tournament took place in Bournemouth, England, from April 22 to April 27
where professionals and amateurs played against one another in an event sanctioned by a
national amateur tennis association. The British Hard Court Championships thus technically
became the first Open Tournament, but the significance of that event was that it catalyzed the
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professionals and the French Tennis Federation to work out a deal. MacCall finally gave way on
demanding close to the same purse for his professionals that the far more consistently profitable
Wimbledon offered the NTL stars. Likewise, the French LTA agreed to pay the professionals
lavish expenses in addition to prize money—a compensation structure the professionals preferred
because it minimized their income taxes. 28
Upheavals spread around the world in 1968. Major social and political revolutions in the
United States, Poland, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain, Israel and Palestine, and Czechoslovakia, among
other countries, as well as military interventions, particularly in Vietnam, bucked the stability of
nation states the world over. Roland Garros was played in the middle of massive riots throughout
France and centered in Paris. MacCall’s professionals players had to fly into Brussels, Belgium,
and then travel via bus to Paris. Laver, Emerson, and Stolle received special permission to land
at a United States Air Force airfield near Paris. Many of the world’s top amateurs skipped the
French Open to play the far smaller Berlin Championships both as a protest of the presence of
the professionals at Roland Garros and because of the significant logistical challenges of getting
to the Parisian red clay courts. The competitors shared towels because the launderers in the city
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remained on strike, while the tournament did not serve the customary afternoon tea because
electric rationing made cooking and hot water unavailable during those hours. Police and
demonstrators clashed in the streets. One-fifth of the 128 men in the draw defaulted their first
round matches because gas rationing meant walking to the tournament. The smell of food rotting
along the avenues wafted through the Stadium. Open tennis seemed poised to fail at its
beginning. 29
Yet the fans came in droves to watch the competitors, both amateur and professional,
play brilliantly against one another. Perhaps because Parisians had nothing else to do but to
protest, perhaps because they wanted to watch the professionals play the amateurs, more fans
attended Roland Garros in 1968 than even in the halcyon days of French tennis when Lenglen
danced on the courts and the Four Musketeers won the Davis Cup for all of France. That the
crowds came to watch the professionals play in a place of such tennis tradition became clear by
the quarter-finals, in which five of the remaining eight players were professionals. Out of
retirement, the forty-year-old Pancho Gonzales, the literal grandfather of the game, won a fiveset grind against the reigning number-one amateur in the world, Roy Emerson, a victory that left
an over-exuberant sportswriter claiming the French viewed Gonzales’s effort equal to that of
“General [Charles] de Gaulle.” 30
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Just as President de Gaulle weathered the strikes of that May to find his political career
end in resignation a year later, so too did Gonzales’s victory come to a quick end at the hands of
Rod Laver after such a stirring victory. Laver then lost a mediocre Final to fellow Australian Ken
Rosewall, who raised the trophy of the first major Open Championship. All the professionals
won, however, because they had finally come back to play the courts where they belonged. The
best facilities should have the best players, the professionals had argued for years, and the
pocketbooks of the fans who came to watch the 1968 Open Championships validated that claim.
During the first five days in 1967, the French Championships reported 13,000 francs in gate
receipts. That number increased more than 1,000 percent in 1968 to 142,000 francs. Even a
competitor as fierce as Gonzales considered the 50 percent stake in the gate that he and the halfdozen other professionals under contract received to be a victory. 31
Strangely the professionals’ promoter had a different view about winning and losing.
Losses on the court rather than in the accounting ledgers were the chief concern MacCall carried
with him in the early days of the National Tennis League. He full well knew that any new
enterprise might incur debt while the concept found its footing with a public willing to pay. But
every time one of his contract players lost to an amateur player, he wondered aloud whether or
not a spectator would continue to find paying extra to see a professional worth it. Too many
defeats of his professionals at the hands of amateurs would embolden the International Lawn
Tennis Federation to reverse their course change to Open Tennis and financially ruin MacCall.
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The conservatives who had long balked at money in tennis might be proven right after all. Such
fears weighed heavily on MacCall’s players every time they took to the court. The history
associated with the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club setting added pressure to the
professionals who competed in the 1968 Wimbledon Championships. 32
Begin at the King’s Cross train station and buy a ticket for the SW19 stop. Board the train
and ride past Patmore Estate, Battersea, and Earlsfield. Get off one stop before Wimbledon
village and proceed up the platform onto the street level. A short stroll along cobbled streets and
food stands where vendors wrap cod and chips in newspapers brings you past many of the flats
players rent for the fortnight. At the Northeast corner of the village, you pass by a golf course
packed with cars parked across the green and the fairways. Walk along the edge of the course,
and you have arrived at the gates to the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club. You are at
what is simply called The Championships.
A line forms along the west side of the grounds for tickets. Cut the queue and proceed
through the green tunnel and through to the practice courts. The perennial ryegrass and creeping
red fescue is one-eighth an inch off the hard packed dirt. Stapled into the ground are white lines
that mark off the seventy-foot courts. Maple net posts driven into the ground hold up a woven
black and white net loosened and tightened on one end by winding a brass hand-crank. The grass
on these practice courts has already started to die in many places, worn bare by thousands of
steps taken in just a few days. Bare dirt now sits behind the baseline, near the center hash-mark,
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and near the service T. On these practice courts, white Slazenger felt balls zing past. Fans
congregate along the walkway and glance down to see who they recognize.
Walk past these spectators and into Club’s main complex of courts. Off to the left is the
massive oval of Court One. Next to it sits the boxier and bigger Centre Court. Proceed along the
back side of Centre Court and you’ll reach a small hill. Off to the back of the hill sits tables
where fans often greet players. Scattered along the perimeter of the hill, you’ll find fresh
strawberries and cream, champagne in flutes, and cups brimming with Pimm’s No. 1. Grab a
libation and walk down along the side of the hill to see the courts. Court 18 sits up high above
the rest. It backs up against the media area where journalists and technicians broadcast the
tournament to the rest of the world. Courts 12 through 17 are small and lay below Court 18 in a
straight line. Walk past them, and you come to the Court 2, infamously known as the Graveyard
of Champions. Courts 4 through 22 proceed out past Court 2. Many of these courts are small and
intimate. The players hit right next to fans, who can lean on the short fence-line. The final group
of courts, numbers 8 through 12, lie farthest from the Club’s entrance and jut up next to the
croquet pitches on one side and the indoor courts on the other side. The scenes you just saw
stayed alive because of what happened June 24 through July 6, 1968. 33
At forty years old, Pancho Gonzales stood no chance to win Wimbledon that year.
Memories of him as the best professional player for so many years and the number-one player in
the world at the time of his effective retirement in the early 1960s, however, led many to hold
unrealistic expectations for Gonzales. Fans carried those same expectations for all the
professionals. Unlike the predictable grind of consistent tennis on the slow red clay of Roland
33

These observations are based on the author’s visits to the All England Club for the Championships.

330
Garros, the slick grass courts of the All England Club always produced more uncertainty
throughout the tournament fortnight. Players very seldom lost serve. If they did, their opponent
more often than not ran out the set. A dark horse with a hot hand could down a champion
because hour-long matches often came down to only a handful of big points. Physicality
mattered in a far different way than on red clay, where the fittest player more often than not won.
Early summer in England meant frequent rain delays and sometimes cool conditions that
combined to cause not infrequent injuries in even the fittest of athletes. As the oldest seed in the
draw, Gonzales competed more against time than against his younger opponents, and his thirdround four-set loss to Russia’s Alex Metreveli seemed to have surprised him less than the fans
excited to see the old Champion play his first Wimbledon since 1949. The bigger surprise was
the early exit of both amateur and professional seeds so that amateurs made up half of the field of
the round of sixteen, professionals the other. In the Final, veteran professional Rod Laver beat
young professional Tony Roche in straight sets to lift the title, but as with the French
Championships, the real winner of the first Open Wimbledon was tennis in general. Whereas
Roland Garros proved that Open Tennis could make money, Wimbledon demonstrated that Open
Tennis could grow without forsaking tradition. Top amateurs might not beat the best
professionals in the end, but they could win matches and not get blown off the court. Moreover,
the game was bigger than the biggest names, either amateur or professional, and as with all
sports, the big names of today would eventually fall to the new names of tomorrow. 34
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Professional promoter George MacCall found that last development more unsettling than
most because of the average age of the professionals he kept under contract. His players—Laver,
Rosewall, Emerson, Gonzales, Stolle, and Gimeno—won the majority of big professional events.
But it came at a high cost and for how long? All in all, the National Tennis League lost
$208,403.89 in 1968. The League’s tournament earnings were good, but MacCall had promised
unrealistically high guarantees in order to secure the signatures of nearly all the top
professionals. He never stood a realistic chance of meeting those guarantees in his first full
season of operation. While he personally did fairly well thanks to his side business of selling
premium life insurance policies to all his top players, his fellow investors who had put up
$150,000 understandably felt burned by the enterprise. Men such as Charlton Heston may very
well have wanted to see topflight tennis grow because they thought the game great
entertainment, but more than that, they were investors interested in achieving a return on the
capital they had provided to MacCall. They put pressure on MacCall to repay their investments.
MacCall responded by merging his enterprise with that of Lamar Hunt’s World Championship
Tennis. 35
Lamar Hunt and World Championship Tennis
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No promoter and tour owner proved more consequential in bringing about truly profitable
professional tennis than Lamar Hunt and the World Championship Tennis Tour (WCT) that he
founded. Hunt made a major name for himself in sports by leveraging family business assets into
owning and operating professional sports teams such as the Kansas City Chiefs in football. He
took major risks in professional sports as well; he helped found the American Football League
(AFL) and started Major League Soccer in the United States. So when a fellow sports
entrepreneur, David F. Dixon, who brought the National Football League’s (NFL) Saints
Franchise to New Orleans to play in the Superdome that he helped finance, approached Hunt
about the potential to make money off a properly promoted professional tennis tour, Hunt
expressed the interest that later resulted in WCT. 36
Tennis was not Hunt’s primary focus when it came to professional sports. His first
encounter with professional tennis came only a decade before he founded WCT at the Southern
Methodist University tennis courts, where he watched Pancho Gonzales, Ken Rosewall, and Rod
Laver battle each other in the Texas heat for the modest crowds that Jack Kramer’s World Tennis
Incorporated matches tended to draw. When Hunt and Dixon met in August 1967 to discuss
forming a tennis tour of their own. Dixon sold Hunt on the waste of that talent. “The finest
players in the world were playing their biggest tournaments before 150-200 people at little
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private clubs,” Hunt’s friend Moore recalled Dixon saying at the meeting. 37 They thought
Kramer and George MacCall, both former players turned barnstorm tour promoters, could never
look too far beyond the tennis itself to the sport’s broader position in the entertainment industry.
But Hunt and Dixon thought they knew how to make tennis pay.
The first step meant mustering capital. Hunt arranged the financing from some of his
other sporting investments, notably the American Football League franchise Kansas City Chiefs,
as the AFL and National Football League looked to cease competing by merging into a superleague, and he added a business partner named Al Hill, Jr. 38 Then they needed players. The
difficulty of convincing amateur players to turn professional and forever forgo playing the major
amateur tournaments of Wimbledon, the United States Championships, the French
Championships, and the Australian Championships was one of the major factors that kept the
professional tennis tours of the 1920s through 1950s usually at four players. Hunt and Hill’s
money convinced double that number of players to join. The top names in the game, Pancho
Gonzales, Rod Laver, and Ken Rosewall, already had existing contracts with George MacCall’s
National Tennis League, so Hunt went after the players of the future. The Yugoslavian Nikki
Pilic, the South African Cliff Drysdale, the Frenchman Pierre Barthes, the Englishman Roger
Taylor, two players from Australia, John Newcombe and Tony Roche, as well as two Americans,
37
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Dennis Ralston and Butch Bucholz, formed what Hunt called “The Handsome Eight.” The
finances made a hard decision for players more palatable. John Newcombe, the best
nonprofessional player in the world, fed his family on $15,000 per year. The chance to almost
triple that with a three-year guarantee persuaded Newcombe and his fellow amateurs to turn
professional. 39
For the present those players had a chance to play in places not available to players from
the past. Those venues began to sprout in what historian Robert C. Trumpbour summarized as
the “third era” of sport stadium construction in the United States, marked by “the geographical
expansion of sports teams, acceptance of taxpayer-funded sports facilities, and the construction
of large all-purpose stadiums and arenas.” 40 The popularity and profitability of football largely
propelled sports stadium constructions in the fifties and sixties. Hunt’s position as the owner of a
professional football franchise meant he knew firsthand just how much the venue mattered to the
bottom line. Hunt made meticulous notes on the suitability of different tournament venues,
which he kept in journals for reflection. For example, he noted that the West Side Tennis Club,
then the host of the United States Championship, had too many courts spread over too far a
distance for the small group of WCT professionals to suitably fill the Forest Hills grounds.
Financial success in sports entertainment meant taking the specific rules and particularities of
each sport into account. 41
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Hunt’s tour officially began in late 1967 when Al Davis, Jr., part of his retinue, signed the
first eight players who agreed to forsake the amateur tennis ranks and take a chance on a limited
number of matches. The so-called “Handsome Eight” competed directly against George
MacCall’s National Tennis League players. After MacCall accepted Hunt’s buyout, WCT made
it on the world scene in 1971 when thirty-two players agreed to play twenty tournaments across
the continents of North America, Australia, Europe, and Asia. In cities as different from one
another as Sydney, Miami, Rome, Tehran, Louisville, Vancouver, Cologne, Boston, Stockholm,
and Dallas, among others, what Hunt called his “Million Dollar Tour” put the “World” in his
organization’s title. 42 But WCT also needed a home base—a fact Hunt might have realized from
his professional football experience when he moved his American Football League Dallas
Texans and to Kansas City in order to avoid direct competition with the upstart NFL franchise
Dallas Cowboys. 43 Hunt and his partners strove to anchor the tour’s year with a season-ending
championship held in, of all places, Dallas’s Memorial Auditorium in November. To this end
they also drew on their experience in football, where a week’s worth of hype meant more to a
game’s bottom line than four quarters’ worth of action. Players spoke at press conferences,
promoters wore tuxedos at galas with sponsors, and Hunt hosted his own version of Breakfast at
Wimbledon on Finals morning at his Dallas home. In that final, two veterans from the Kramer
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and Gonzales tours of the early sixties—the Australians Ken Rosewall and Rod Laver—played a
competitive match after officials paraded the players courtside in colorful outfits, much like
boxers and their trunks moving ringside. Rosewall won. He collected $50,000 in prize money,
which was 100 percent more than one of his earlier professional titles, where a sponsor’s
bankruptcy meant winning the name of the best tennis player in the world without a dollar to
show for it. 44
Stadiums and stable sponsorship agreements mattered a great deal in making WCT a
sustainable professional sports venture. Television contracts mattered even more. WCT had
recorded and privately distributed the 1971 Rosewall-Laver final, and the popularity of that
match with both the national and international media convinced National Broadcasting
Company, after Davies and Hunt had approached the network, to accept a broadcast contract
with WCT to begin in 1972. 45 Here as elsewhere, Hunt drew on his prior experience founding
and growing the AFL, during which he had successfully negotiated a television contract with
American Broadcasting Company that had single-handedly kept his upstart football league in
business against the more powerful NFL during the early 1960s. 46
For their part, the players did what they could in 1972 to attract and solidify attention.
They competed hard in WCT tournaments held in twenty-three different cities and six different
countries. Compared to the farther-flung 1971 season, players played more matches in the United
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States, Canada, and Western Europe—a decision indicative of the importance Hunt assigned to
cultivating his tennis league’s fledgling relationship with television. 47
The beginning of WCT’s end came in 1983 when Hunt initiated a lawsuit against
International Tennis Federation (ITF), the International Professional Tennis Council, and the
Association of Tennis Professionals. A decade earlier WCT was on good terms with the ITF,
then called the International Lawn Tennis Federation. Hunt and the Federation officials had
agreed to a schedule that allowed the sixty-four best players in the world to compete in two tours
of thirty-two players on the WCT circuit during the first five months of the year. After the WCT
Championship contested in May at the Moody Coliseum on Southern Methodist University’s
campus, the players’ contracts stipulated their freedom to travel to Europe and the United States
to compete. The players preferred the freedom to make their own schedule and play the events
that paid them the most. Before the 1980s that meant playing WCT events. A better organized
ITF schedule of Grand Prix tournaments gradually drew players away from WCT tournaments.
At the time of Hunt’s lawsuit, WCT could only count a few matches that attracted top players
because most big names played Grand Prix tournaments instead. 48
The USLTA, Slew Hester, and Flushing Meadows
That a businessman of Hunt’s caliber in running highly profitable sports franchises such
as the Kansas City Chiefs and the Chicago Bulls should have World Championship Tennis
succeed at first, only to go bankrupt, owed a great deal to the peculiarities of tennis as a global
sport and to the unique history of tennis as a game whose authorities fought professionalism for
47
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so long. Some of that fighting took the form of self-flagellation, as evidenced by the USLTA’s
long sensitivity to criticism. No barbs dug deeper than top players taking the Association to task
for money-grubbing tournament ticketing and fees with simultaneous miserliness when it came
to the on-court competitors. Players such as Bill Tilden and Ellsworth Vines deserved
punishment for the opinions they penned in the popular press, maintained the USLTA leadership.
In the case of Vines, the USLTA Executive Committee tried to bar him from entering the
broadcast booth at Forest Hills so he could fulfill his contract with NBC to provide commentary
for their radio broadcast of the United States National Championships. USLTA leadership thus
seemed willing to hurt the bottom line of their showcase tournament and one of their biggest
sources of revenue by side-lining the popular commentator and well-known sports personality
Vines simply because he had thwarted the control they exercised over him by turning
professional. In the mid-1930s the USLTA had “refused to accept money from a sponsor for the
broadcasting of the national events because we did not want the events used for the promotion of
business.” Whenever journalists in the United States reported on the USLTA barring players for
actions deemed professional while simultaneously paying other players’ expenses above and
beyond the amateur threshold without penalty, Association leadership lashed out. As President of
the USLTA in the late 1940s, for example, Lawrence Baker wrote to Life magazine editor Henry
Luce complaining about the latter’s June 14, 1948, story highlighting hypocrisy in the USLTA’s
amateur player expenses. A decade later, in one prominent case, the USLTA Amateur Rule
Committee prohibited the request of Gardnar Mulloy, one of the top amateur players in the
United States, to appear in a television commercial teaching tennis strokes in exchange for a
small honorarium. The USLTA denied Mulloy’s request, but had he played in a country such as
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Australia, such a request likely would have been granted by the Australian Lawn Tennis
Association. 49
At other times, the USLTA came across as not hypocritical but simply confused and in
need of counsel over their own rules. Such was the case most often for the USLTA Amateur
Rule Committee, who, in just one of many available examples, sought legal advice over whether
Wheaties Sports Federation’s pursuit of Dennis Ralston’s services in an educational tennis series
for broadcast turned Ralston into a professional player. Robert Kelleher and Perry Jones each
thought Ralston could participate. They wanted the best for Southern California Tennis after all,
but they also sought assurance from the USLTA President James Dickey that such participation
could proceed without fear of Ralston losing his amateur status. USLTA leadership decided to
approve Ralston’s participation if Wheaties agreed to remove all mention of professional tennis
as played by Jack Kramer and his troupe. 50
The quality of the tennis the Kramer professionals played throughout the fifties had
created a climate of permanent crisis at the USLTA by 1960 at the same time that constant
barnstorming had brought tennis to most parts of the country. The latter contributed to a steady
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rise in USLTA membership from 12,555 dues-paying players in 1958 to 27,521 in 1962. Most of
that growth came from junior players, because during the leaner finance years of the mid-sixties
the USLTA wisely invested heavily in junior tennis as opposed to adult tennis. Between 1962
and 1963, for example, USLTA adult membership actually fell from 9,129 to 9,108—the first
time that had happened in the postwar period. Open Tennis caused “Peak Memberships” in 1969
and 1970 with 52,474 dues paying members belonging to the USLTA by 1971. The crisis came
in part because increased membership rolls had not put the USLTA on a firmer financial footing.
Association leaders read with disgust newspapers that printed ten times more lines about golf
than tennis despite the United States boasting 1.5 million more tennis players than golfers. They
also misread the reasons why golf had become more interesting to report on than tennis. Far from
harming golf, professionalism encouraged a cult of personality around certain players. Sports
marketers such as Mark McCormack used that to secure sponsorship dollars from company
executives willing to spend their firm’s advertising and branding budgets on sports marketing.
Managers decided on sports rather than on other promotional opportunities in large part because
such a decision came with a tee-time with Arnold Palmer at Pinehurst, Pebble Beach, or Augusta
National. That money made for better golf tournaments. More importantly, the flow of dollars
into the professional golf tour helped forge partnerships with television networks. Greater media
attention helped make the sport of golf seem more popular to a television-hungry public than it
was at the grassroots level. More people played tennis than golf, but a viewer would not see that
on their television screen. Instead of picking up on that disconnect, USLTA leaders scratched
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their heads at how golf seemed more popular with the press than tennis when the former
maintained an even stricter policy of no talking or photographing during play than the latter. 51
In the run-up to Open Tennis, Robert Kelleher’s Beverley Hills legal background made
him the first USLTA President to feel comfortable monetizing the majority of the Association’s
activities through licensing agreements with the Licensing Corporation of America (LCA). In the
same year, 1967, the USLTA also looked to partner with Madison Square Garden Attractions,
Inc., that managed the entertainment spectacles at the newly built Madison Square Garden. What
Fred Podesta, the President of Madison Square Garden Attractions, offered the USLTA was
actually a pittance compared with professional tournaments run a decade earlier. The USLTA
received a guarantee of only $30,000 from Madison Square Garden Attractions with two-thirds
of that sum going to player prize money, while the USLTA had to shoulder the burden of
securing “top flight foreign and American players,” and Madison Square Garden Attractions kept
all television revenue and receipts above the $30,000 guarantee. 52
LCA handled other negotiations that went even worse for the USLTA. Wilson Sporting
Goods flatly told the Association that they would not play ball with them when it came to paying
a licensing fee in order to have Wilson balls used in USLTA events. The USLTA under Kelleher
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took an important step toward professional tennis, but before Open Tennis, companies simply
did not see enough potential in a sport whose international governing body still officially
outlawed money from entering the game in a commercial capacity. 53
That all changed in 1968 with Open Wimbledon. For the first time sponsors saw real
financial potential in sponsoring tennis events, and the USLTA had a bigger incentive than ever
before to pursue those sponsors even though such pursuit put American tennis at loggerheads
with the ILTF. In his capacity as president of the USLTA in the two years immediately following
Open Tennis, Alastair Martin pointed out a number of problems with Open Tennis and the freewheeling authority the ILTF exercised. Martin reiterated to his fellow USLTA Executive
Committee members that their organization take their own path on these issues or suffer
whatever fate the ILTF Committee of Management decided for them. The most significant area
of disagreement toward the beginning of Open Tennis addressed the “authorized player” idea
proposed by the ILTF Committee of Management. Taxes presented the most glaring problem to
the USLTA leadership. No stranger to litigation over tax law, the Association’s counsel advised
the Executive Committee that the IRS would almost certainly require authorized players, despite
their technical amateur status under ILTF rules, to pay income tax on their expenses prior to
leaving the United States for a tournament abroad. USLTA officers feared such an arrangement
might leave them partly responsible for not providing a fellow ILTF member nation with players
on time for the start of a tournament or an accomplice in players’ shirking their tax
responsibilities. Whether or not the IRS would ever have held up the travel of a player who
53
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claimed they were an amateur who did not receive income from their tennis proved a moot point
because the very possibility galvanized the USLTA to look for another way to try to help their
sport grow. 54
The mechanism for growth they tried first was to “sanction” events. Before 1968, the
USLTA sanctioned amateur tournaments, but if a professional player competed in an event not
sanctioned by the USLTA, then he or she would forfeit eligibility to play in USLTA-sanctioned
events. That rule reflected the consensus of the 96 ILTF member nations infuriated by the “fee”
professional player promoters demanded of tournament committees and national associations in
order “to deliver them to tournaments.” The ILTF took the action of “closing all events to
players under contract to such promoters.” National associations had the blessing of the ILTF to
charge appropriate sanction fees to tournaments within their jurisdiction, and the USLTA
required a 6 percent cut of the tournament total prize money along with USLTA travel expenses
in order for a tennis event to get a sanction. Little wonder then that promoters such as George
MacCall, Dave Dixon, and Lamar Hunt came to blows with the USLTA and the ILTF, although
the sides seemingly reached “an agreement” by the summer of 1972. 55
The USLTA justification for the sanction fees they assessed in the years immediately
after Open Tennis made sense from the point of view of the men who ran the Association. A
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great deal of sponsorship dollars had entered into tennis, and the sanction fees provided, in their
words, “an ever increasing source of revenue to the USLTA.” The Association could use that
money in turn to keep “the future of tennis in this country...better off in the hands of the USLTA
than of any other organization.” That they certainly meant, as Association lawyers prepared suits
and counter-suits to wrestle as much control of professional tennis as possible from other
stakeholders such as World Championship Tennis and the Virginia Slims Women’s Tour run by
World Tennis publisher Gladys Heldman and Phillip Morris Chairman Joe Cullman. “In
complete candor, I suggest that we stop pussyfooting with Gladys Heldman, Joe Cullman, Lamar
Hunt, and others whose interests are selfish, short term, and in opposition to ours. Let us go our
own way and build our own tournaments and our own players,” said USLTA leadership. Their
idea of building would mean the abandonment of the West Side Tennis Club as the host of the
United States Open Championships and the construction of the most commercial of all tennis
venues. Sanction fees gave them the capital to get that project started, and what they needed then
was a little luck. 56
Flushing Meadows Park first come to the serious attention of New York City urban
planner Robert Moses as far back as the 1930s when a torrent of New Deal money for urban
recreation made even the grandest of park plans seem possible. Thirty years later, toward the end
of his building career, Flushing Meadows remained undeveloped. He saw the opportunity to
finally get his park built with the World’s Fair of 1964-65. His lack of enthusiasm for the Fair
itself, however, undermined his vision for a grand Flushing Meadows. Buildings were built on
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the cheap without the usual Moses mustard, and Moses’s simultaneous loss of ten of his dozen
planning commissionerships during the Fair’s preparation meant that he directed that
organization with an even greater degree of heavy-handedness than usual. Employees routinely
lost their jobs without cause, and over a year went by before Moses finally listened to the
accountants who reported that the Fair lost around $17,000,000 in 1964. The Fair closed the
following year having only made $8,600,000 rather than the $29,000,000 Moses expected to
have in order to make Flushing Meadows Park grand after the Fair left town. Moses took
$6,576,000 more from his other remaining post—the Chairmanship of the Triborough Bridge
Authority—to add additional improvements to Flushing Meadows. The Park, however, remained
full of cleared land with little in the way of development due to the disappointing finances of the
Fair. 57
The USLTA saw a great opportunity for American tennis in Moses’s failure to remake
Flushing Meadows. After declaring irreconcilable differences with the West Side Tennis Club in
Forest Hills, the USTA (formerly the USLTA) withdrew from talks in February of 1977 and
began to search for a new home for the tournament that, upon the decline of the Davis Cup in the
1960s, single-handedly made or broke the Association’s balance sheet. That summer USTA
President Slew Hester and Association lawyers reached an agreement with the New York City
Parks Department to lease some of the Flushing Meadows-Corona Park land that had been the
site of New York World’s Fair barely more than a year prior. Property in Queens, the largest in
land area of New York City’s five boroughs, did not command the potential real estate values of
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property in midtown Manhattan or much else of the city, for that matter. The USTA also had the
makings of a prime time show court in the Singer Bowl, left over from the 1964 World’s Fair.
Boxing bouts between Floyd Patterson, Vito Antuofermo, Saoul Mamby, and Edwin Viruet,
among others, in the 1970s revealed that the odd rectangular-shaped venue could deliver the
thrill of one-on-one sports to an audience large enough to justify the pricey location compared to
more suburban venues near major freeways and with large parking lots. A functional-enough
public transportation network already existed connecting the Singer Bowl to neighborhoods in
Queens and New York City, by and large. 58
Hester was the right person at the right time to help the USTA. His personality disarmed
those in the Association heavily steeped in traditional amateurism and still reeling from the 1968
opening of tennis to professionals managed by the likes of McCormack and Bill Riordan and the
tours of Kramer, McCall, and Hunt. He was perfect to navigate the new frontier of big money for
big-time tennis. A World War II officer from the South, Hester wisely noted the commercial
opportunities in the broad economic, political, social, and cultural strip that people came to call
the “Sunbelt.” 59 He first tapped the region’s business potential by providing the most essential
postwar technology that facilitated the mass demographic shift to this region—cool air on the
cheap. He owned and operated a Carrier air-conditioning distributorship after returning from
overseas to 1955. The following year, Hester prospected for oil in his home state of Mississippi
during the rough-and-tumble wildcat postbellum decades of the Gulf Coast oil boom. The
58
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business worked like this: Hester hired geologists who proved the oil reserves of plots; he then
purchased leases on lands that held oil and whose owners did not know what they had, at least
not enough to demand a better offer; investors gave Hester money to negotiate individual drilling
deals worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, agreements he often made on the telephone. He
served as the executive vice-president and chief operating officer of the Southern States Oil
Company until 1962 after which he opened a new office that he ran until his retirement from the
energy industry. 60
A tournament tennis player since 1925, Hester served the USLTA and then later the
USTA at the regional, state, sectional, and national level until the 1980s, all the while playing
national level tournaments from the junior level up through the Men’s 65s and over. USTA
officials looked favorably on Hester’s experience developing new oil lands and negotiating
complex and profitable deals on the quick, just as they noted that he had founded and built a
successful tennis complex in the River Hills Club of Jackson, Mississippi. The National Office
admitted a mistake and unanimously reinstated Hester after having ousted him from the board in
a five to four vote following his refusal to approve a contract negotiation between the USTA,
Lamar Hunt and World Championship Tennis, the Tournament Council, and the International
Tennis Federation that would have effectively monopolized control of high-level American
tennis. Hester’s fellow board members rightly recognized that they needed Hester to ward off the
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eclipse of the Association’s relevancy in the tennis boom of the 1970s. A new tennis complex for
the new moneyed game was the cornerstone of that effort. 61
Just fourteen months before the 1978 U.S. Open, Hester, the only person within the
USTA who believed construction of the tennis park could hold to a ten-month timeline, and New
York City politicians and commissioners signed contracts. The USTA moved quickly to secure
bids from contractors to complete a major renovation of Singer Stadium and the construction of
other courts and tournament facilities on the surrounding grounds. Engineers first divided Singer
Stadium into two tennis courts; then workers installed seats to bring the seating capacity of the
newly named Louis Armstrong Stadium (after the famous trumpeter) to 20,600. The smaller
court, called simply the Grandstand, sat 6,2000 and abutted the prime-time stadium. What set the
Flushing Meadows tennis complex apart from not just any other tennis tournament site in the
world but from every other major sporting venue in the world in the late 1970s and 1980s was
the catering. The USTA built nine indoor courts and air-conditioned them—first for serving
meals and only a distant second for tennis. Those nine courts accommodated 5,000 at any one
time, with spectators in the late August and early September heat availing themselves of the
shade, refreshments, and cool air throughout the tournament. 62
When it came to food, however, the USTA preferred hot over cold. Prior to Flushing
Meadows, no major sporting venue served sit-down hot meals to spectators. Concessions
reflected class conventions and country traditions: duck gillette and smoked salmon at the U.S.
Open golf tournament; ploughman’s lunches or pates with Champagne at Wimbledon; beef on
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the barbie at the Australian Championship; beer and brats at the American baseball park. Hester
planned to prevent the complaints from athletes and fans alike, who disliked the smell of large
quantities of cooking meat wafting through the grounds on a late summer day. The USTA spent
$30,000 on one smoke washer alone that allowed for the firing of charcoal steaks without forcing
the smell of accelerant and burnt flesh across the noses of thousands of people. Another larger
smokewasher located in a restaurant situated between the highly trafficked area of the
Grandstand Court and Louis Armstrong Stadium ascended 110 feet up an elevator tower,
essentially to the railway line that linked the grounds to the Metropolitan Transit Authority. 63
Food and drink sales immediately made the U.S. Open more profitable than the far older,
more prestigious, and more exclusive Championships at Wimbledon. Good as the All England
Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club’s strawberries and cream tasted, Flushing Meadows outsold
SW19 three to one. Furthermore, California and Florida growers sold strawberries to the USTA
at a price far below that of producers in the United Kingdom, which allowed the association to
turn around and sell the classic tennis tournament fare to attendees at a price 60 percent lower
than British Lawn Tennis Association, while operating at a more favorable margin. The
Americans’ clotted cream might not rival that of the British, but the U.S. Open tournament
operated on a quantity of scale far beyond that of any other tennis tournament or annually
contested international sporting event. 64
Unlike Wimbledon and former high-profile tennis tournaments in the United States for
that matter, Flushing Meadows stressed inclusiveness over exclusiveness. Compared to the
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private tents McCormack erected for tournament sponsors and the Royal Box at Wimbledon, the
two most visible V.I.P areas at Wimbledon, Flushing Meadows brought to the fore an Open Club
open to anyone willing to pay $25 above their ticket price. Outside the player locker room and
broadcast booth, only one other room existed on the entire grounds that required pre-approval to
attend. Called “Slew’s Place” after USTA president Slew, the VIP room was actually open to
anybody on a first-come first-served basis who asked the current USTA president for a card to
enter. Such openness compared to other major sporting grounds, which by the 1970s had already
reached a point of high stratification, set Flushing Meadows apart as a sporting experience. The
genesis of that openness lay in Slew’s own experience as a player during the Great Depression
and the New Deal. Compared to the East Coast during those years, the South held few private
tennis clubs. In fact, despite the fine weather for outdoor competition and the rich sporting
tradition of the region, few tennis courts existed there before government initiatives built courts
throughout the South and the rest of the country in the thirties and forties. The speed at which
these courts were built inspired Hester. So, too, did the intransigence of the Eastern private clubs
in the face of an onslaught of new players to the game and new competition at the highest level.
Clubs throughout New England and the mid-Atlantic doubled down on their exclusivity, some
even barring spectators from using the club’s restrooms, eating at the club’s restaurants, and
drinking at the club’s bars. 65
A gamble for openness in a traditionally closed game paid off handsomely for the USTA.
In 1976, the USTA’s entire budget stood at $800,000. Two years later when the tournament
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concluded at Flushing Meadows, owned and operated exclusively by the USTA, the association
boasted a budget of more than $8 million. The new U.S. Open at Flushing Meadows singlehandedly increased the USTA’s budget more than 100 percent, with the tournament immediately
becoming the most profitable year-to-year athletic contest in the world after 1978. 66 The venue
also allowed Donald Dell and the ProServ agency, who represented the interests of the USTA, to
secure a record-setting cable television contract with ESPN for $110 million paid over six years
for broadcast rights to the U.S. Open. The private boxes the USTA had built into Louis
Armstrong Stadium was just the sugar Dell needed to sweeten the deal with ESPN executive
John Skipper. 67
People usually apply the old adage “winners write history” to military matters and
politics. But in business and in the business of sports, the companies, managers, and lawyers who
beat rivals also tend to shape the historical record to their end. Such is the case with the WCT,
now largely forgotten because Hunt’s tennis venture fought against and lost to other competing
interests in the game. 68 International Management Group and the smaller agencies of ProServ
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and Advantage International became a veritable Saturn that devoured the WCT son. But the
impact Lamar Hunt and his WCT had on professional reached further in time and space than the
tour itself. Nowhere was that more visible than on the reshaping of the physical landscape of the
sport’s most historic tournaments contested on the game’s most revered venues.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
AGENTS AND AGENCIES TAKE TENNIS TRANSNATIONAL IN THE OPEN ERA
The most profound change to modern entertainment in the second half of the twentieth
century was the rise of management and marketing agencies. These organizations managed and
marketed every hair on their clients’ heads in order to maximize the clients’ public exposure and
money-making potential. The most successful generated solid earnings for the athlete, artist, and
actor, while ensuring healthy profits for the agency and hefty commissions for the agents.
Whereas entertainers like singers and actors had for decades kept counselors and promoters,
sports management became a new arena in the 1960s and 1970s thanks in large part to Mark
McCormack and his International Management Group—the earliest, the most successful, and the
most historically significant player. McCormack and the agents who worked for him did not
create a new sport; they created a new species of entertainer in the managed athlete.
Those athletes who contracted with management agencies and the agencies that followed the trail
they blazed struck it rich. Those athletes who did not seek their representation or did not obtain
their representation struggled financially in the age of the managed athlete. Pancho Gonzales was
in the latter category. His application for IMG representation was denied by IMG some time
prior to the fall of 1965, but McCormack still “admired [him] as one of the truly great
professional athletes of all time.” 1 McCormack, on the other hand, was named twice by Sports
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Illustrated “the most powerful man in sports,” for twenty years was consistently ranked number
one in Sporting News’s power ranking for the influencers in global sports, and is remembered by
his top competitor as a juggernaut whose firm made every other sports marketing firm up until
the new millennium resemble little more than a “mom-and-pop operation.” 2
Saying and doing were two different things though, as Mark McCormack knew well. A
fine collegiate golfer for the College of William & Mary, McCormack served briefly in the U.S.
Army at Fort Gordon, Georgia, conveniently located close to Augusta National Golf Club.
Leaving the army in 1956, he attended Yale Law School, and, after a short time as a practicing
attorney, earned an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. 3 With law and business degrees in
hand, he had the credentials to succeed at a moment when the economic production of the United
States and the world underwent profound changes. Industrial production moved outside of
America, and the economy of the United States transitioned to service, information, and
technology. Information was paramount in this post-Fordist economy, and the control of
information gave a firm in any industry a competitive advantage over their rivals. 4 McCormack
possessed the tools, and the “golden Age” of sports after 1960 was the economic moment to
make his mark. 5 Now he needed the clients.
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McCormack wooed his first client through a mutually shared passion for golf. He was
working at the prominent Arter, Hadden, Wykoff & Van Duzer law firm in Cleveland when he
thought that golf exhibition matches could turn a profit if the person who ran them knew what to
do. In 1958 he found a partner in Richard Taylor, who ran the Carling Golf Tournament.
Together they started National Sports Management, Inc., a firm that convinced twenty topflight
golfers to represent their business interests. The firm specialized in product endorsements and
exhibition bookings that garnered players between $350 and $500—a paltry sum compared to
what IMG commanded a decade later. Before long the golfers told McCormack: “Look, Mark,
you’re a lawyer and you know golf, why don’t you look at some of the contracts that people are
giving us to sign and give us some help?” McCormack thought negotiating contracts with other
businessmen a great idea for both himself and the golfers, who could benefit from a skilled hand
at the negotiating table. That sort of work, however, did not interest his partner Taylor. The two
went their separate ways in 1959, a short time after Arnold Palmer—whose golfing star ascended
after clinching the 1958 Masters Golf Champion—approached McCormack about handling all of
his financial needs and interests ranging from event and tournament scheduling, player
promotion, deal-making, financial planning, income taxes, and liabilities. 6
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The golfer and the lawyer literally agreed to a partnership by shaking hands. Palmer
would play in the public eye and McCormack would shape his image and manage his affairs out
of the limelight. Confidence in one another’s integrity rather than a contract made the deal.
McCormack believed it was better to manage a smaller number of higher-profile players than a
large stable of middling talent. Reflecting on his first client agreement and his new business
venture twenty-seven years later, McCormack correctly noted that “more than any other single
event,” his handshake with Palmer “ushered in the era of mutual profit between professional
athletes and professional managers.” In Palmer’s case, that profitability meant an increase from
around $2 a year in 1960 on his sole investment, a savings account, to more than six figures
annually on a diversified investment portfolio, out of which McCormack took a commission. 7
McCormack soon signed agreements with other golfers. He signed Gary Player in 1960,
Jack Nicklaus in 1961, and Doug Sanders, Bruce Devlin, and Bob Charles in 1962. The
representation of Jack Nicklaus proved especially important for McCormack because “the
Golden Bear” was still an amateur. McCormack was instrumental in transitioning the golfer into
life as a touring professional. From that stable of clients McCormack extracted fees that ranged
between 10 percent and 20 percent of the golfer’s gross total income. As IMG grew, so too did
the percentage of income that clients paid to the firm for management fees. By 1967,
McCormack was receiving one third of his clients’ income. 8
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McCormack drew from other companies with longer histories in the entertainment
industry in managing his athletes. The most important progenitor was Lew Waserman’s Music
Corporation of America (MCA). MCA started when Wasserman booked the Guy Lombardo
band and then signed entertainer after entertainer whose earnings grew so large that the 10
percent fee MCA charged clients earned the company an average of $8 million a year. The
United States government moved against the firm’s monopolization of the music industry, and
MCA sold off their stakes in performer management. From that corporate cautionary tale and
conversations with Wasserman, McCormack realized the value in running his agency with a
small-shop ethos where—despite the growth his company sought and the subsequent delegation
that inevitably accompanied a firm’s bureaucracy—“if Arnold Palmer wants a pair of shoes sent
some place or wants to complain about the fact that his Shell Oil bill hasn’t been paid on time,”
said McCormack, then “I am the only one that he is going to call and, for that matter, I am the
only one that I would ever want him to call.” 9 But cultivating that sort of relationship with
sportstar clients meant that McCormack needed to recruit the right kind of athletes.
IMG preferred representing athletes in individual sports over athletes who played team
sports. From the perspective of the company’s history, that preference made sense because the
agency’s first and most important early clients played golf—not to mention McCormack liked
golf the most. But there were also more hard-headed business motives free of nostalgia.
Questionnaires the firm required potential clients to complete prior to a meeting about the
athlete’s suitability for representation revealed differences between how athletes in team sports
versus individual sports earned income for themselves and the agency. For example, the agency
9
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made clear to professional footballers such as Pat Summerall, Leo Sugar, Buddy Humphrey, and
Joe Krupa that endorsements were where athletes from team sports made their money, while
exhibitions made up a mainstay of the revenue that individual sport athletes generated. Herding a
whole football team together, or two for that matter, proved expensive, whereas a single golfer or
tennis player could play an exhibition for pay at a club and promote the clothing and equipment
he or she endorsed at the same time. That difference explained why IMG favored signing clients
from elite sports such as golf and tennis. 10
How exactly did IMG make money off of and for their clients? They profited by
commodifying their athlete into a malleable image for sale to any interested buyer at the highest
possible price. Cultural theorists and historians have long hypothesized about the imaging of
celebrities with little in the way of empirical evidence to show how that process actually worked
in practice. 11
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The IMG operations manual drafted by McCormack on December 26, 1967, provides
such a blueprint. He stressed keeping the sixty-one-page memorandum secret, but the rapid
growth of his Cleveland-based company into a global presence with different units and
subsidiaries across several continents spurred him to succinctly state his business philosophy and
expectations for the various branches of the firm. The core of that philosophy was McCormack’s
own “reputation” as someone his athletes could trust to manage them and create income for
them. For a company selling the intangible images of the agency’s clients, it made sense for the
firm itself to sell the intangible reputation of the company’s founder to the athletes IMG sought
to represent. 12 Fourth-generation management theorists might call that philosophy a “personal
mission statement” of the most personal kind. 13
McCormack and IMG pioneered another hallmark of management theory in the
information age economy. They delegated. 14 Specialization within capitalist economies was as
old as the nail-maker made famous by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations. In a modern
corporation, selling entertainment meant not actually making something small but making
someone larger than life. To convince a client that the transformation of their self was worth it,
in the custody of quasi-independent organizations under the IMG umbrella, both box numbers and the name of the
client file folder, when applicable, is the surest way to locate the materials. A second point addressing this collection
involves the closure of some files within the collection until 2023. While I was made aware of the titles of a few
folders presumably containing material of import to this study—for example, IMG’s involvement in a lawsuit
brought by the Tennis Player’s Council—I have not included that material here because I did not read those records.
The material used in this study is open to research and publication under the DuBois Library’s policies and Deed of
Gift for the Mark McCormack Collection.
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McCormack hired experts in investments, book publishing and printing, bookings and publicity
tours, accounting, hospitality, and other services to transform that client into a managed athlete
ready for the market. But McCormack’s “invisible hand” guided all the major decisions IMG
made on behalf of their clients. The athletes represented took comfort in that control. 15
The world’s top athletes were also attracted to IMG for the agency’s secrecy and
selectivity. “I am not the least bit interested in having anybody outside of our organization know
anything about what we are doing or planning until the event has actually been consummated—
and sometimes, not even then,” wrote McCormack in 1967. He meant it. He went so far as to
advise against his agents holding public meetings with clients or business contacts in public
places like Toots Shor’s restaurant in New York City for fear that someone might overhear them
at the bar and scuttle the firm’s deal. 16
McCormack’s plank of exclusivity had roots in the progressive economist Thorsten
Veblen’s concept of “conspicuous consumption.” He theorized that people bought expensive
commodities because they thought the act of an expensive purchase made them popular and
powerful. When it came to people rather than to things, Veblen’s model seemed to flow in
reverse, where the less someone saw of something the more that someone wanted to be a part of
it—much like the private blueblood lawn tennis clubs of the early twentieth century. In
straightforward terms, McCormack turned down, either permanently or for a time, most athletes
who applied for representation, even famous ones such as boxer Cassius Clay, running-back
15
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Gale Sayers, chess grandmaster Bobby Fischer, switch-hitter Mickey Mantle, Formula One race
car driver Joakim Bonnier, and a host of other athletes and entertainers. 17
McCormack recognized the income lost every time he turned down a high-profile or an
up-and-coming athlete. He justified to himself and his team that agreeing to represent the wrong
sportsman or sportswoman would cost the company more money in the long term, because the
company’s reputation suffered every time a client left IMG’s management. Agents thus received
instruction to accept only clients that met two criteria: first, IMG could obtain an appropriate
return on that client’s hefty commission paid to the firm by increasing the market share of the
entertainment industry that athlete commanded; and second, that the athlete’s best years were in
front of them rather than staring them in the face or behind them. Only with both of those criteria
met could the partnership between the player and agency prove productive for both parties. For
the first half of the company’s history, IMG largely succeeded in meeting that objective as they
lost only three clients: “We lost Jeremey Flint, the bridge player, because he couldn’t find
anybody to finance his continuing bridge efforts; we lost James Whittaker, the mountain climber,
because he wouldn’t climb any more mountains; and we lost Anderl Molterer, the ski racer,
because there were no more races for him to ski in.” In each case McCormack put the onus of the
breakup on the failure of the athlete to excel in their chosen sport. Yet he also instilled in his
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agents that the responsibility of a losing a client in the future fell on their shoulders. It was best
to avoid signing a bad contract. 18
Exclusivity and secrecy prompts the question: What did athletes expect when they signed
and agreed to pay IMG between one-tenth and one-third of their income? “Coordinated
services,” was McCormack’s answer. When a superstar client approached the agency, everything
was found “under one roof.” No squabbles among the public relations expert, the accountant, the
insurer, the talent manager, the fiduciaries, and the lawyer negotiating contracts. Because IMG
was the first agency to streamline the management of every part of the professional athlete’s life,
the firm absorbed much of the capital that was otherwise available to agencies run by people
such as Frank Scott and Fred Corcoran, who might have wanted to integrate in the same way.
Likewise, McCormack celebrated IMG’s ability to assuage the fears harbored by the firm’s
clients that the interests of one client may come into “conflict” with the interests of another client
also represented by the agency. Athletes competed on the field, but competition for
endorsements mattered more to the athletes represented by entertainment management agencies
such as IMG. Those firms made the arbitration of those conflicts a top priority because theirs
was a business model where reputation made or broke the bank. 19
The growth of the entertainment industry meant that firms like IMG had to grow or get
out of the way. The business McCormack founded thus expanded into a conglomeration of at
least twenty-three separate units that functioned together to maximize the exposure of the
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athlete-entertainer they represented. Half of these units focused on developing the assets of stars
from individual sports—mainly the golfers McCormack signed in the agency’s infancy. 20
Merchandising was a particularly important component of a corporation that “made
nothing in particular,” in the words of Sinclair Lewis’s protagonist George Babbitt. 21 Here the
International Merchandising Corporation, one part of IMG, took the lead. IMG also looked to the
potential for big profits in television, motion pictures, and sport instructional films in both wide
and small-release formats, and radio broadcasting. Trans World Sports division, a conglomerate
nested within IMG, led those efforts by partnering in joint productions with such worldwide
media behemoths as Tokyo Broadcasting System and the British Broadcasting Corporation. That
IMG division also ran wholly owned telecast rights of some of the largest sporting events in the
world like the Daytona 500. 22
Other branches of the group maximized the impact of clients in the print media. That took
the form of both athletes for whom the International Literary Management company negotiated
book contracts with publishers as well as for authors who sought representation from them to
maximize their own dealings with publishing houses. If an IMG-represented athlete wanted a
memoir ghost or co-written by a particular author, agents would only support that effort if the
agency represented that author. Client files within IMG made clear that some sports journalists
who enjoyed an outsized reputation for sports reporting actually had their careers made not by
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the quality of the prose on their pages but by IMG’s manipulation of client athletes who selected
the book’s author and pocketed $7,000 of the publisher’s $10,000 advance. 23
Bud Collins, the most flamboyant tennis journalist of the twentieth century, was one such
author. Born in Lima, Ohio, in 1929, Collins moved to Boston without a job or an interest in
sports. Hard up for work, Collins went to graduate school at Boston College and wrote part-time
for the Boston Herald. Serendipitously, Brandeis University approached him about helping out
their tennis team, and without a tennis background, Collins said yes. He learned about tennis
from his players and wrote about tennis for the Boston Globe beginning in 1963. 24
Collins heard about McCormack’s representation of athletes and approached IMG about
what the firm could do for a writer. As it turned out, they steered Rod Laver away from his firstchoice coauthor Frank Deford to Collins for his first book (the 1971 memoir of the Australian
Grand Slam Champion titled The Education of a Tennis Player), a second co-written player
memoir with IMG client Evonne Goolagong published in 1974, negotiations with Chris Evert’s
father for Collins to write Evert’s book, and the resources for regular publication of Rod Laver’s
Tennis Digest first published in 1965 and reprinted over the next decade. Collins also did his part
by tirelessly seeking out compliments from anyone who was anybody in the cities he visited,
assembling what one IMG employed called “laudatory comments” in a “portfolio” Collins could
present on demand. Most lucratively, IMG secured a commentator position for Collins to
broadcast tennis, first with CBS Sports in 1968 and then in 1972 with NBC’s Breakfast at
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Wimbledon coverage that IMG originally proposed, securing a prominent and visible
commentating position for Collins during the next thirty-five years. 25
Along with those contracts, IMG even helped Collins with his clothes. The company
knew that color attracted free publicity, and Collins donned outrageous custom pants at his
agent’s suggestion: Saltie Crocodile Australia striped pants; Gap Khakis signed by players with
quotations such as “30 years? Now that’s stamina”; Uluru/Ayer’s Rock pants; and his signature
Koalas Bud Collins tennis log. His writing style, like his sartorial sense, was more about
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sensation than about substance. The same can be said of his broadcasting, where any spectator
familiar with tennis might wonder what the heck he meant as his florid commentary flowed forth
over the airwaves. None of that mattered to IMG, though. The agency was just happy to collect
its 33 1/3 percent commission from Collins. 26
Clients with a much bigger footprint than Collins received even more attention, which in
turn enabled IMG to make more money. The first athletes the agency signed were golfers, and
the agency looked after them with care because McCormack realized that lending the image of
someone handy with the club meant the realization of profits from exhibition fees, equipment
endorsements, and, most significantly, course design commissions. IMG thus incorporated more
than a dozen subsidiaries to manage the franchising of golfers that ranged from Arnold Palmer
Dry Cleaning Centers to Ohio Promotions that managed Jack Nicklaus’s “sportswear licensing,
exhibitions and appearances, television programs and commercials, motion pictures and radio
tips, premium sales, publishing, newspaper features, all franchised operations such as the putting
courses, golf schools and driving ranges.” As with George MacCall’s National Tennis League,
IMG controlled insurance options for the firm’s athlete assets through divisions such as Nicklaus
and Hoag Insurance Incorporated and the Palmac Company located in Chicago. IMG
corporatized individual athletes and then hedged against the losses to come as time wore on the
athlete’s body and the subsequent desirability of that image. 27
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The agents within IMG made it their business to make business from the athletes and
other sorts of clients that they managed. Who were these agents and what specifically did they
do? McCormack was the first among equals. Founder, President, Chief Executive Officer,
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Chairman of the
New Client Committee, and Chairman of the Finance Committee, he also supervised IMG’s
oldest and many of the firm’s most important accounts: Arnold Palmer; Gary Player, Jack
Nicklaus; the U.S. Ski Association; Bob Beattie; Playboy; Newark Ford Dealers; Carreras Ltd;
Gary Player Enterprises; Gary Player Company of South Africa; Gary Player Promotions; Golf
Enterprises; and World of Sport & Bob Ferrier Ltd. He also liaisoned, negotiated, and struck
deals with some of the largest corporations in the world—companies from which IMG sought
license fees and endorsement deals: networks such as NBC, ABC, CBS, and the BBC; media
companies such Newsweek magazine, Time, Inc., Sport Illustrated, and Playboy; airlines such as
United and Pan American World Airways; manufacturers such as Ford and Lincoln-Mercury
Division, General Motors and Pontiac Division, RCA, Firestone, Coca-Cola, Canada Dry, U.S.
Gypsum, and Standard Oil; sports organizations such as the Professional Golf Company, Royal
and Ancient, the Professional Golf Company, the United States Golf Association, Worldwide
Dunlop and Slazenger Group, and the International Olympic Committee; and the credit card
company American Express. He kept a “Money List” of powerful executives that he could call
upon for a pitch—a list he kept up to date. 28
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McCormack also created for himself a separate corporate entity of McCormack’s own
commercial activities in publishing, paid speaking engagements, and self-promotion that IMG
managed for him. Contacting all those managers and serving all those accounts across the world
gave McCormack plenty of material to write a string of a dozen bestselling books with titles such
as McCormack on Negotiating and What They Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School
about Executive Travel: Hit the Ground Running. Despite McCormack’s claim to candor, his
books obscured as much as they clarified when compared to the actual day-to-day business
practices IMG performed on behalf of clients and directed to bolster the firm’s balance sheet.
Moreover, his McCormack-centered books—in the latter title he goes so far as to give an hourby-hour, restaurant-by-restaurant, and hotel-by-hotel accounting of his travels during February
1995—created the impression he did much of the firm’s work himself. In actual practice in an
organization as large as IMG, the company’s founder and chief executive delegated a great deal
to able subordinates. 29
McCormack called Arthur J. Lafave, Jr., his “second in command.” Lafave was
responsible for a smaller list of less priority clients. He was charged with licensing to smaller
companies, and operating areas of IMG’s media influence with fewer dollars in them than

29

Mark McCormack, What They Still Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School: Selling More, Managing
Better, and Getting the Job Done in the ’90s (New York: Bantam, 1989); Mark McCormack, The Terrible Truth
About Lawyers: How Lawyers Really Work and How to Deal with Them Successfully (New York: Beach Tree
Books, 1987); McCormack, Arnie; Mark McCormack, What They Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School:
Notes from a Street-Smart Executive (New York: Bantam, 1984); Mark McCormack, The 110% Solution (New
York: Villard Books, 1990); Mark McCormack, McCormack on Negotiating (New York: Random House, 1995);
Mark McCormack, McCormack on Managing (New York: Random House, 1995); Mark McCormack, McCormack
on Communicating New York: Random House, 1995); Mark McCormack, McCormack on Selling (New York:
Random House, 1995); Mark McCormack, Staying Street Smart in the Internet Age (New York: Penguin, 2000); );
Mark McCormack, What They Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School About Executive Travel: Hit the
Ground Running (New York: Dove, 1996), 67-80.

369
television rights—books and syndicated newspapers, for example. Richard R. Alford oversaw
the New Client Committee, probably the most crucial part of the firm’s growth, as did Charles L.
Foley and Edward J. Keating. William H. Carpenter counseled IMG on most legal and insurance
issues, while John W. McGrath worked on the Finance Committee to shelter clients’ tax money.
In a market with total fluidity and no solid numbers behind what the licensing of a certain athlete
might bring to a company that agreed to buy the rights of that athlete to endorse their product,
good legal counsel from Carpenter was paramount. In representing clients from around the world
who played in sporting events across the world, the opportunity existed for “creative tax
planning” from McGrath and IMG’s accounts. 30 Expertise in those two areas more than anything
else drew the world’s best athletes and biggest sports organizations to seek IMG’s services.
IMG’s chronological files of two important tennis clients reveals just how the firm
operated. Rod Laver peaked as a tennis player during the late 1960s at just the moment that
traditionally amateur tennis tournaments opened to professionals and IMG expanded its
influence—they had major offices in Cleveland, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, New
York, and Tokyo—over global entertainment. The red-headed Aussie may have earned his
“Rocket” nickname back in his home country, but IMG’s agents were the ones who transformed
Laver into a worldwide personality. He first approached McCormack about representation in
1966, but as with Pancho Gonzales, McCormack turned Laver down. With professional tennis
coming off two of the game’s most unsuccessful years monetarily in America since professional
tours in America began in 1926, McCormack simply did not see much potential in making
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money from a professional athlete positioned in a still largely amateur sport even if that player
was the best in the world. 31
Two years later Laver wrote McCormack again, and that time IMG responded differently
because tennis had opened to professionals. The firm’s Jay Lafave met Laver, signed him in
short order in September 1968, and then put IMG’s resources into gear for their first tennis
client. 32 Most of that work began with letters Laver’s IMG agents sent to companies who might
consider paying the tennis player for the privilege of attaching his likeness to their company’s
product. Janet A. Horvath’s letter to Howard Friedman, who managed Kodacorp’s Menswear
Division, typified the usual pitch: “Mr. Laver is one of the hottest properties in the sports world
today and we are looking to develop a manufacturing program for him that would be ready for
Spring ’72.” 33
Letters never made any promises about how much money Laver’s image would make for
the company. Platitudes and generalities abounded. Companies who themselves operated in
industries that did not make a physical product but rather traded in information—financial
services, for example—tended to view unsubstantiated pitches with reluctance and passed on
paying for endorsements. 34
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Apparel companies proved far more amenable to paying for a player’s likeness attached
to their product. Those firms continued to seek athlete endorsements without a clear sense of
how that endorsement actually affected their sales. The upstart Adidas Apparel Company agreed
to pay Laver a 3 percent royalty and a $10,000 guarantee to name a shoe after the tennis player
with no market research into the impact his likeness might have on sales. A short photo shoot for
a cover of a product catalog placed Laver between two models, one posed to reveal her
underwear and the second to highlight her breasts; as far as Adidas was concerned, this small bit
of Laver’s labor made a difference to their bottom line. Adidas’s operations and export
department records show a far more complete picture that the company’s real profits came from
cheaply producing shoes in different countries throughout the world and then selling those same
shoes to buyers in countries who could pay more. Numbers aside, IMG convinced Adidas and
many other companies that a global product in a global economy needed to associate with a
global sports figure. Athletes such as Laver had few qualms in accepting 3 percent of
$302,507.31 generated by the sale of 18,480 pairs of shoes, because they did little direct work for
their endorsement check and they earned so many other endorsements through the ceaseless
work of IMG’s agents. The Puritan Sports Company claimed they sold “the shirt off Rod Laver’s
back,” but that did not mean Laver sweated a bit for it. 35
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Those same agents diversified Laver and IMG’s other client entertainers into as many
different areas as possible. Consulting work at the Palmas del Mar resort in Palm Desert, LaverEmerson tennis magazines distributed throughout Hyatt’s 28,000 United States hotel rooms,
management positions relating to the tennis programs at places such as Hilton Head Island
Resort and the Newport Beach Tennis Club where pro shops paid to screen the instructional
copies of the uninspired “Laver Emerson Method,” joint ventures with other tennis players, the
Insurance Companies such as Mass Mutual, who thought their products would sell better by
putting a young and vigorous athlete in advertisements, the creation of player management
companies named after the player and managed by IMG with the intention to manage and move
some of the player’s assets as needed, and various tennis products that ranged from ball
machines that claimed to feed balls in the way that shots came off of the professional’s racquet
and “Hy-O-Sheep” racquet string—IMG’s agents tried to put Laver into all of it. 36 In those
efforts—along with the cattle breeding, ranching, and numerous other investments they found for
their clients—the agency largely succeeded. 37 In less than a year McCormack doubled Laver’s
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off-court income, moved him from a no-name clothing endorsement to the up-and-coming
Adidas sportswear brand, segmented the world market for Laver’s racquet endorsement into
Europe, Australia, and the United States for $50,000 a year, and negotiated twenty contracts for
Laver across a range of fields. 38
Defending a player license against unwanted infringement from outsiders mattered
almost as much as brokering the original sponsorship deal. Mark McCormack practiced law; so
too did many of the agents who worked for him. Patrolling the unlicensed usage of an athlete
client often meant IMG counselors went after small individuals or companies for petty
infringements. One case occurred in 1975 when Rod Laver wrote to IMC’s legal department
about “a few nuts in the world” who produced cassette tapes that purported to teach the “Laver
forehand” and the “Rosewall backhand.” At $15 apiece, Dick Bradlee of Dick Bradlee Tennis
College planned to get rich off those images of Laver. IMG threatened Bradlee with a lawsuit
and dissuaded him from trying to profit from “the highly valued property” that was “Rod’s name
and likeness.” 39
Once athletes like Laver accumulated a great deal of income in licensing, then IMG’s
performed its second major function in helping athletes move into an even wilder world of tax
accountancy. The globalization of the world economy in the seventies incentivized some
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countries to offer tax shelters to corporations. 40 IMG operated in six of the world’s seven
continents without the usual problems of managing inventory that plague companies that actually
manufacture products. The nation-to-nation traveling of IMG’s client athletes meant the agency’s
tax lawyers did not have to work too hard in explaining away any financial irregularities. But
secrecy rather than explanation prevailed. IMG coordinated Swedish tennis champion Bjorn
Borg’s various interests from the agency’s headquarters in Cleveland and assessed a 25 percent
fee through divisions or subsidiaries like International Merchandising Corporation, Inimark, Inc.,
International Merchandising Establishment, or I.M.E. Clearing House. Merrill Lynch brokered
Borg’s investment portfolio in New York City, but IMG’s Cleveland office made decisions on
when to buy and sell precious metals, stock, funds, bonds, property, and other securities for a
client whose L’Estoril Avenue Princess Grace, Monte Carlo address in Monaco limited his tax
liability in the United States and Europe, where most big money tennis tournaments took place.
Seldom did clients’ assets reconcile with their actual income. 41
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How did that representation vary for women clients or clients from racial minorities? In
the case of female athletes, IMG essentially worked as hard to promote the images of these
women as they did the men. McCormack’s writings revealed staunch sexism when it came to
hiring women and promoting them into senior management positions within his firm. On the
occasions that women working for IMG rose above the secretary ranks to positions where
negotiations of real weight took place, McCormack gave those employees due credit for rising
high in a the “traditionally…male bastion” of sports while simultaneously hinting that a woman
executive or lead attorney was the result of something unusual, such as the impression made by
the imposing six-foot height of IMG lawyer Betsey Groff on negotiators looking to make a
deal. 42
As IMG grew, though, McCormack’s reluctance to acknowledge the executive
capabilities of many women softened, and he promoted women to lead core parts of the firm. For
example, Stephanie Tolleson headed the IMG’s Women’s Tennis Division in the 1990s and grew
that area by signing crucial contracts with players such as Venus and Serena Williams. Whereas
women employees of IMG had an uphill climb to succeed in sports management, the company’s
account executives bent over backwards to please the company’s female athlete clients. When it
came to representing players such as Evonne Goolagong, Billie Jean King, and Martina
Navratilova, McCormack put the business instincts of these women on par with if not exceeding
many of IMG’s male clients. The chief complaint the agency’s account executives leveled
against sportswomen pointed not at the athletes but at their entourages, spouses, and partners,
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who proved much more meddlesome in the financial well being of the IMG client than the wives
or girlfriends of male players. That perhaps explains why the two women athletes McCormack
most admired and most enjoyed managing were Billie Jean King and Martina Navratilova. Both
players kept their sexual preferences secret during much of their playing careers and came to
IMG unencumbered by male partners who thought they knew sports and sports management. 43
The most influential female player IMG represented during the first two decades of the
firm’s tennis representation was Billie Jean King. Her lawyers agreed to IMG’s “exclusive and
worldwide” representation of “Ms. King’s career” in September of 1978, though IMG may have
done some work for King as early as 1974. In either case, by June 1980, IMG had generated and
was managing nineteen contracts for King with companies ranging from American Express to
Yonex Trading, each paying out retainers and annual minimum guarantees of between $2,500
and $100,000, with each guarantee set to rise between 10 percent and more than 100 percent
annually over the two to four years of most agreements. In exchange for her retainer, King may
or may not have had to make an appearance at a company event such as a photo shoot,
conference, or exhibition. The inconsistency of the amount of money the contract awarded for
the amount of real work in terms of appearances revealed not only the persuasive powers of IMG
agents to make deals for their clients but also how difficult companies found assigning a dollar
value to an athlete’s likeness. For example, Nestle Tea paid King $50,000 a year beginning in
1980 to drink Light Iced Tea but did not require her to make a single appearance or anything else
except, on occasion, sip the bottled beverage. Charleston Hosiery, on the other hand, paid King
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$10,000 in 1980 to wear their athletic socks in all her matches and attend one of their corporate
events for the day. Simply put, the impact an athlete had on an advertising campaign was close to
impossible to measure. 44
King’s personal measurements, on the other hand, were essential from IMG’s
standpoints. On March 15, 1980, IMG prepared detailed measurements of every part of King’s
body down to the quarter-inch. Armed with that information and King’s impressive biography,
IMG agents approached potential clothing sponsors with much of the information those
companies needed to make a decision about whether or not to offer King an endorsement deal.
IMG worked on biographies for many of their athlete clients. But in terms of the detailed
analysis of athlete’s bodies, IMG actually worked harder in generating that information for their
female client athletes than their male client athletes—though the fact that a company sought such
information points to the importance of sexualization of female athletes when compared to their
male counterparts. By June of 1980, half of IMG’s tennis clients were women. That percentage
rose in the 1990s as IMG’s tennis division grew compared to that of other agencies with strong
positions in tennis recruiting. 45
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When it came to athletes from traditionally marginalized groups, IMG’s efforts varied.
The company represented only sixty-seven African American athletes out of a total of 2,335
unique clients—though the firm did count as clients the two most famous African American
athletes in the world, Muhammed Ali and later Tiger Woods, and the most famous athlete of
color outside of the United States, Brazillian striker Pelé. Despite doing a tremendous amount of
business in Japan, in particular with Japanese companies obsessed with golf, IMG represented
only six Japanese entertainer-athletes—LPGA champion Ayako Okamato, PGA champion
Tsuneyuki Nakajima, PGA champion Asao Aoki, poet Karou Maruyama, tennis player Soichi
Nakamura, and Japanese-American tennis player Ann Kiyomura. The company preferred
participating in Japanese sporting events rather than managing Japanese athletes. Religion and
ethnicity mattered much less than race: Pope John Paul II and Itzhak Perlman both had IMG
representation. IMG also did not mind getting political in representing presidential hopeful Bob
Dole and other candidates in their campaigns. Nor did the company refuse to manage easy-going
entertainers with audiences far afield from sports—Fred Rogers of Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood,
for example. 46
Examples of openness notwithstanding, when they had the opportunity to recruit a major
African American athlete, IMG agents were less aggressive and successful. After a third
recruitment meeting, Arthur Ashe described McCormack as “aloof.” 47 At the same time, the
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agency worked with the League’s lawyers to discourage the formation of a “Negro Union” made
up of African American representatives from the League’s sixteen franchises authorized to
bargain on behalf of African American footballers. Athletes Lionel Alridge, Elijah Pitts, and
Henry V. Kane reported that they and “almost all of the other negro athletes in the NFL” had
received “nil” in terms of dollars from advertisers, endorsements, and personal appearance fees.
Writing on behalf of IMG, Richard R. Alford pointed out that while the tide of a “white only”
preference among national advertisers was beginning to change, the proposed union’s efforts “of
Negroes banning [sic] together partly because they are Negroes is a step in the wrong direction.”
Alford simply did not see McCormack wanting to lend his influence and offer marketing help to
“the Negro nobodies of the NFL.” 48 Having said that, nowhere in McCormack’s voluminous
correspondence, to the author’s knowledge, do specific slurs or specific policies of African
American exclusion appear. Sometimes silence and inaction, however, speak louder than words
and actions.
IMG’s traditional stance against athletes who had already peaked likewise seemed more
general guidance than a hard and fast rule when race entered the picture. The agency turned
down Pancho Gonzales for representation when he was still the number-one tennis player in the
world, while at the same time IMG looked to sign Jack Kramer, who promoted tennis but had not
played the game competitively in more than fifteen years. McCormack himself even considered
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supervising Kramer’s account. 49 Here and elsewhere, IMG’s agents made choices on who and
what to represent with race an underlying but not explicitly stated factor in those decisions.
Stepping back from the work they did for individual clients to look at the Management
Group as a whole, how did IMG spend the bulk of its resources? An imprecise but instructive
inference is revealed by examining the entirety of the company’s files and counting the
frequency with which employees worked to promote clients’ interests as those interests related to
certain sports. Golf dominated with 8,621 (36.287 percent), followed by tennis with 2,368
actions (17.38 percent), and compared to sports often considered far larger such as baseball with
158 (1.159 percent), basketball 144 (1.057 percent), and football 487 (3.575 percent). 50 Out of
13,622 specific actions IMG’s agents took relating to twenty-eight different sports or categories
of sports (i.e., water sports), IMG prioritized individual sports eight-and-a-half to one for team
sports, with golf first and tennis second for a combined eight for every ten sports activities IMG
undertook. That prioritization goes far to explain the tennis boom of the 1960s and 1970s despite
the fact no contemporary journalist then or historian since has carefully studied IMG records and
archives. 51
Less than a decade after the company signed Arnold Palmer, IMG counted a significant
number of the most recognizable “personalities” in sports among the agency’s clients. That rapid
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ascendance was attributable to how well McCormack ran his agency, to how much demand
professional athletes had for professional representation, and, more broadly, to how popular
sports—in particular individual sports—were with the broad public. McCormack also put into
practice the old adage that it takes money to make money by pioneering—much to the chagrin of
ProServ, his closest competitor in the sports management business, who was less than a third the
size of IMG—the awarding of guarantees to potential sports client. An IMG executive would ask
an athlete how much money he or she had received for an appearance or product endorsement
and guarantee to double that number regardless of whether IMG actually convinced a company
to match the stated offer for licensing or the “personal appearance fee.” The athlete usually
agreed to IMG representation, which forced the firm to make good on their promise of increased
compensation. They often honored that pledge by simply paying the additional money to their
client out of IMG’s bank accounts without revealing to the athlete the true source of the money.
Making good on their guarantees thus allowed IMG to accumulate far more athletes than they
might have otherwise and created for the firm an economy of scale and a stable of clients
unmatched by most of their competitors combined. 52
In a 1974 letter bragging about the “caliber of athlete” they represented, an IMG
executive put together something close to an agency master client list. For team sports, the
agency represented only a handful of baseballers, players of great talent such as Frank Robinson.
IMG’s basketball clients included names like Hank Finkel. The firm highlighted more football
players of high caliber such as Archie Manning. Hockey and soccer clients of the status of Kyle
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Rote, Jr., were also few when compared to the individual sport athletes IMG boasted most about.
The agency counted many more athletes as clients, but they liked to brag about their best. The
same was true even more so, for their individual sport athletes: Arnold Palmer and Chi Chi
Rodriguez, among dozens of other golfers; tracksters such as Brian Oldfield and Jim Ryan;
motor racers such as Jackie Stewart, Sam Posey, and Brock Yates; tennis’s most elite players
such as Bjorn Borg and Martina Navratilova; along with dozens of other athletes at the top of
their comparatively minor sports. IMG even counted non-athlete entertainers among the
entertainers the firm represented, including fashion designer Jean Shrimpton, broadcaster Chris
Schenkel, and several classical musicians. 53
By the year 2000, IMG employed approximately 2,500 people in 81 offices across 31
countries. The firm represented the most profitable events in sports along with major music
competitions—including the Winter and Summer Olympics during the 1980s and 1990s—and
put Tiger Woods on course to become the first athlete in history to earn more than one billion
dollars in pre-tax income. 54 At the time of McCormack’s death in 2013, the agency had
represented 2,335 client athletes, entertainers, organizations, and sporting events in a total of
42,937 negotiations. 55 All in all, the agency’s influence over professional sports and
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entertainment more broadly was beyond quantification, but with influence came conflict with the
other powerbrokers in the entertainment market.
The closest competition came from fellow sports agents courting celebrity athletes for
representation. On December 30, 1968, McCormack wrote to the United States Davis Cup
captain Donald Dell, via the United States embassy in Canberra, and wished Dell luck in the
Davis Cup Challenge Round. The real purpose of the letter was to persuade Dell to join
McCormack’s agency because, in McCormack’s words, “there is an awful lot that we can do
together in this area.” McCormack meant tennis, and he feared the competition Dell could give
IMG if Dell decided to mimic McCormack’s success with the greater connections he held with
tennis players. 56
That concern proved warranted because Dell brought a tremendous pedigree to the sports
agency business. Dell garnered All-American honors three of the four years he lettered at Yale,
and he reached the NCAA Men’s Tennis Final his junior year. He competed in United States
Lawn Tennis Association and International Tennis Federation amateur tournaments during the
1960s as well as playing on the American Davis Cup squad in 1961 and 1963. A year later he
earned his law degree from the University of Virginia and entered practice in the Washington
Beltway. Dell worked for powerful politicians such as Bobby Kennedy and Sargent Shriver,
whom Dell served as his Special Assistant when Shriver directed President Lyndon Johnson’s
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). 57
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After Shriver left the OEO and accepted an appointment as the United States Ambassador
to France, Dell continued to serve his country both domestically and abroad. That service also
served Dell’s ambitions to develop his own service-based business marketing professional
athletes around the world. In the late sixties he lived in Georgetown along the Potomac River,
giving him ready access to the Beltway power brokers. He talked to and dined with President
Johnson. He drank with the Australian Prime Minister and Australian Ambassador to the United
States when he captained the United States Davis Cup team, just at the moment when tennis
moved to open competition between amateurs and professionals. He worked for Senator Robert
Kennedy, ate lunch and played tennis at the Kennedy compound on Cape Cod, and sat next to
the senator in Kennedy’s campaign plane when President Johnson announced on May 31, 1968
that he would not accept the Democratic Party’s nomination for President. 58 With the White
House in Republican hands, Dell still maintained political connections with subsequent
administrations as his ProServ agency expanded dynamically in the 1970s, speaking, eating, and
praying with President Gerald Ford—himself a former University of Michigan football player
and fan of athletics. Throughout his career Dell consistently maintained that his personal record
of accomplishment on the tennis court gave him access to people powerful in both politics and
business. 59
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Like McCormack, Dell recognized the seismic shifts in the American and the global
economy in the late sixties and early seventies. When the U.S. Labor Department reported that
most American workers earned their living in service rather than in agriculture and industry by
the 1980s, Dell saw not an overturned but an underperforming economic sector. Nonetheless
Dell hesitated to enter the sports agency business because he believed his career lay in legal
practice focused on Washington politics. At the same time Dell kept one foot in the tennis world
by captaining the U.S. Davis Cup team, and one of his players gave him the push necessary to
leave his Washington law firm behind to create a rival agency to McCormack’s IMG. In 1968
Arthur Ashe won the first U.S. Open as an amateur; suddenly the U.S. Army officer and
champion received offer after offer from sports promoters to turn professional. The best offer
came from George McCall, who guaranteed Ashe $400,000 in playing fees over five years—
serious cash when compared to the paltry earnings professionals like Pancho Gonzales had made
on tour just a year previously. Ashe asked his mentor Dell for advice: “Arthur, I’d wait. Your
name value is going nowhere but up. You’re playing well. You are allowed to win prize money
now. You’re in the army. You’re single. You don’t need the contract now. I think the money will
be bigger if you wait,” replied Dell. 60
At the same time, Dell arranged a series of meetings between McCormack and Ashe with
the belief that IMG could make Ashe into the “Arnold Palmer of tennis,” but those talks
ultimately foundered. “Why don’t’ you represent me,” a frustrated Ashe asked Dell after leaving
another failed meeting with McCormack. Dell spluttered unconvincing responses and waffled

60

Dell, Minding Other People’s Business, 3-5, 38.

386
when Ashe pressed him late in 1968, until the lawyer abandoned his public service and his firm
to open his own practice focused on “representing tennis players.” The first player was Ashe, the
second Stan Smith, who—in a story right out of McCormack’s playbook—agreed to Dell’s
representation with a shake of the hand. Overnight, Dell had the top two American tennis players
on board. And as studies in contrasts, they gave Dell a great deal of flexibility in approaching
companies for endorsements: Ashe was African American, a Southerner, a military officer, softspoken, with an elegant serve-volley and touch-game. Smith, by contrast, was blond, from
California, brash, with a big game to boot. 61
Nearly all the agents Dell hired were attorneys. Licensing an athlete’s image essentially
fell in the realm of intellectual property work, where the strengths of lawyers in argumentation,
contractual nuance, and combativeness mattered more than in other business pursuits where
producers and consumers of a good could more easily reach agreement on the essence, utility,
and value of a product or service—as well as the transaction from one party to the other of that
product or service. 62 Agents with legal backgrounds meant ProServ could move against
established stakeholders to set new precedents in professional sports. For example, in 1974
ProServ handled eighteen-year-old basketballer Moses Malone and his direct transition from
high school basketball to professional play without the requisite stop in college. In so doing the
agency defied upholders of tradition and threats from the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA). 63 Malone immediately excelled in the American Basketball Association
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(ABA) and then the National Basketball Association (NBA), following the 1976 merger, for
twenty years. At the time of his retirement in 1995, another talented high school senior named
Kobe Bryant prepared to forgo college and head directly to the NBA draft despite the warnings
against skipping college that continued and intensified two decades after ProServ’s agentlawyers made that vertical move a reality for players.
During ProServ’s first twenty years Dell and his agents secured “playing contracts” for
five hundred athletes and negotiated countless endorsement deals with companies for those
athletes and additional clients. 64 The most important of those contracts came in the spring of
1984, when Dell and coworker David Falk met with Michael Jordan and University of North
Carolina coach Dean Smith to discuss the upcoming NBA draft in June and Jordan’s future in the
league. ProServ’s agents approached that meeting with a great deal of confidence because the
dozens of tennis players they managed and effectively, turned into sports franchises in and of
themselves had established a reputation in the minds of team sport athletes that the firm could do
the same for them despite the presence of four teammates on the court at the same time. “Why
don’t we use this time for you to ask questions,” Dell told Jordan. Before he even entered the
draft, ProServ had made sure that Jordan understood himself as a player apart from his
teammates, his franchise, the league, and his sport. They launched Jordan not as a player but as a
“high-flying sports hero.” Dell convinced Nike to agree to make the Air Jordan sneaker before
Jordan even played his first professional game. That deal happened because Dell had long
cultivated a relationship with Nike founder Phil Knight over bottles of wine with their wives at
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Dell’s private box at the Italian Open tennis tournament in Rome. The actual “Air Jordan” slogan
synonymous with the most profitable endorsement deal in sports history was simply an
afterthought—without any market research or focus grouping—that arose as a throw-away
comment at a final meeting between Nike and ProServ. With that contract for the yet unproven
Jordan, Falk and Dell created the concept of athlete individuality in leagues and sports crowded
with talented players. It became the agency’s most powerful recruiting tool. From the mideighties and after, ProServ agents wooing a new client had only to present a contract after citing
some specifics on the firm’s success with “licensing and merchandising” Michael Jordan. 65
Two major clients who signed contracts with Dell were the Communist nations of Russia
and China. In 1986 General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev publicly
announced policies of glasnost and perestroika within the Soviet Union. 66 Three years later
ProServ secured a contract with the Russian Tennis Federation for representation, unaware that
the Berlin Wall would soon fall. The seeds of that arrangement dated all the way back to 1961
when Dell, along with his Davis Cup teammates, became the first American tennis players to
compete behind the Iron Curtain. That international amateur competition gave the Russian
Tennis Federation representatives and Dell a place to work from in crafting marketing policies
for the international professional tennis that had proliferated in the 1980s. 67 President Richard
Nixon’s visit to Peking in the spring of 1972 started a dialogue between Chinese and American
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political leaders. 68 Toward the end of that decade Dell began reaching out to the Chinese athletic
associations as well. ProServ agents did their first deal with Chinese athletes and their political
handlers in 1979, and the agency and China continued to do business throughout the eighties and
into the nineties with events such as the “Asian Games” that China hosted in 1990. 69
Like IMG, ProServ’s pull even extended over athletic events themselves because the
managers of star athletes could direct a player away from one event and toward another. For
example, in tennis tournaments, seeding committees and directors often had discretion in
admitting a small number of “wild cards” into the event’s draw without regard to the computergenerated ranking of the player under consideration. With prize money awarded to a player who
even lost in the first round, simply making the draw of a tournament meant a payday for the
player and the agency that represented him. The possibility of losing several ProServ client
athletes or one ProServ client superstar often proved too great a threat for a tournament director
to not extend the up-and-coming ProServ client athletes an entry into a tournament, whether or
not rankings warranted such an invitation. But the events also did much for Dell’s business.
Toward the end of his career, he reflected that the single greatest asset he had in closing a deal
was his courtside private boxes at the French Open and the U.S. Open that he received as a thank
you, along with millions of dollars in fees, for representing the French Tennis Federation and the
United States Tennis Association’s television rights to interested networks. 70 McCormack
adopted the same approach at the two exclusive tournaments to which he was closest—the
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Masters at Augusta National and Wimbledon. The founders of the two major entertainment
agencies that dominated sports management up until the 1990s understood that the CEOs and
upper managers who controlled the budgets of corporations large enough to invest in sports
marketing and advertising preferred the perceived exclusivity of golf and tennis events with a
glass of champagne, a fine cigar, and strawberries with cream just a finger snap away. Show
them a good time, and they would show the money. 71
McCormack and Dell built their firms focused on individual sport athletes at the same
time athletes in team sports wielded new power. Sports historian Charles Korr, for example, has
written about the “enormous leverage” the Major Leagues Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) exercised between 1961 and 1980. 72 Baseball players had free agency, but tennis
players were free of franchises. That freedom, when combined with the finances new to tennis
after 1968, meant that IMG and ProServ made tidy profits from tennis players despite the game’s
low profile compared to larger team sports. Furthermore, whereas team sports owners assumed
little financial liability over publicly floated bonds for stadium building, sports management
agents such as McCormack and Dell did not even have to answer to voters, elected
representatives, or municipal officials. 73 They built someone else’s reputation for winning into
sports celebrity, not bonds into buildings. The intellectual and legal sports world in which they
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moved proved more malleable than concrete. They cared less about local public opinion because
they did not deal in specific places and spaces. The images of athletes they created moved across
borders and away from local populations so fickle with their own tax dollars. In the
entertainments that constitute popular culture, levels of abstraction have increased over time. The
transnational sporting celebrity became the apotheosis of that transformation in the late twentieth
century.
In 1967 McCormack published a promotional tract of his first client that masqueraded as
a biography of Arnold Palmer. McCormack did not actually write the book, nor did he singlehandedly write his bestselling classic What They Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School.
What mattered was that IMG’s founder stood behind every word. Arnie’s second to last chapter
printed a selection of letters golf fans submitted to Palmer. Not one of the letter writers realized
how much Palmer’s managers, acting on behalf of the golfer, invented and enforced questionable
legal practices, practiced creative accounting, and manipulated companies who then passed their
extravagant marketing budgets onto consumers in the prices for their products; instead, all the
letter writers opined that Arnold was their friend, he inspired them, he played phenomenal golf. 74
That focus on emotional connection and athletic skill rather than on inequality and waste was
and remains the power of sport in the contemporary capitalist marketplace.
The media-first tour and the managed athlete were just two expressions of that power. In
tennis, that power reached fullest expression in the evolution of the game’s greatest tournament.
In the winter of 1985, Mark McCormack sent a company memorandum stating that “Wimbledon
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is our most important client and, therefore, it is your most important assignment as far as I am
concerned – I don’t have to tell you this either.” 75 For a firm whose primary mission was to
convince companies that attaching a person’s likeness to their products would help sell more
goods, such blunt talk about the prioritization of a single sporting event over the dozens of
celebrity athlete clients hints at just how profitable selling the sport of tennis became after 1968.
The importance McCormack assigned to Wimbledon was right on the money.
The first Wimbledon dated back to 1877. By the start of the twentieth century, the
tournament’s popularity had grown to the point that the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet
Club made a massive investment in bleachers around the Club’s Centre Court to accommodate
the burgeoning crowds. Detractors believed the Club had overreached, but year after year the
number of spectators grew and filled the Centre Court stands. Eventually the crowd overflowed
the grounds. With a proven track record of peak attendance, the All England Lawn Tennis and
Croquet Club signed a contract with Lawn Tennis Association to hold what was essentially Great
Britain’s National Championship at Wimbledon until 1972, at which point both parties agreed to
revisit the suitability of the ALETC as the Championship’s host. To players, wrote the revered
British Champion Fred Perry, “Wimbledon indeed is the Mecca of lawn tennis.” Perry went on
to note that the tournament was even more than that, however, for the late June and early July
event helped promote the best time to visit London and became just one more fashionable stop
for people with financial means and influence to visit Britain’s capital. Wimbledon established
itself during the late nineteenth century just as a host of other major sporting championships
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diffused from England and across the British Empire. The Championships thus served as a “great
missionary,” in Perry’s words, for tennis and for Britain’s athletic legacy more broadly. 76
The first Wimbledon to allow professionals to compete with amateurs proved a sweeping
success for IMG because Rod Laver, the firm’s lone tennis client at that point, lifted the trophy
on Championship Saturday. The next year proved even better for Laver, IMG, and the ALETC.
Here McCormack’s plan to develop international offices paid off because IMG division World of
Sports Ltd., run by Bob Ferrier, was already in place in London. Ferrier worked contacts
throughout the United Kingdom to move behind the scenes after McCormack first caught wind
that the International Tennis Federation and important national Tennis Associations would vote
to allow open competition between the sport’s top professionals and amateurs in the biggest
tournament venues. 77
McCormack directed his Trans World International team to develop a project to impress
the All England Club Committee members that was executable in a few weeks’ time. The
producers decided on a video to highlight the historic moment when one of the oldest sporting
tournaments in the world belatedly entered the contemporary world of commercial sports.
Cocktails of nostalgia and excitement flowed in the club’s boardrooms as committee members
quickly approved the pitch. Six months later, Jay Michaels of IMG’s Transworld International
Division screened the film to Herman David, Chairman of the All England Club Committee, and
his fellow board members at SW19. They heartily applauded; good news for Michaels because
his real purpose at that meeting was to gather information about how IMG might make
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Wimbledon into the most profitable sporting event in the world. He knew international
broadcasting held the key. 78
The previous year’s contract between the BBC and the All England Club had the
broadcaster pay £15,700 for “worldwide” radio and television rights while the ITV network paid
£10,750 for broadcasting rights throughout the United Kingdom. Michaels thought both
networks paid well below a fair price; however, he soon realized just how much power the BBC
wielded in Britain. Confusion existed about whether or not he could even ask around in Europe
for a better offer for the ALETC without first speaking with the recalcitrant BBC. What the
Wimbledon 1968 video bought IMG was the blessing of the Club’s owner to pursue interested
parties in the United States for Wimbledon broadcast rights. ABC, CBS, NBC, and SNI all
showed interest, but here again the BBC frustrated Michaels and IMG by refusing to relinquish
any space suitable for a camera broadcasting the tournament in the intimate Centre Court.
Without their own camera and crew, American networks had little control over their sports
production, and the sale of an event to a network became untenable from IMG’s point of view.
The All England Club would have to allow TWI to remove several prime Centre Court seats if
they wanted an American network to agree to pay a sizable broadcast fee. 79
Twenty years later at the 1989 Championships, McCormack sold $19.5 million in
television rights across at least fifty-four countries for the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet
Club. The club collected an additional $60,995 in radio rights. McCormack understood that a
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sale was only as good as the seller’s ability to collect payment from the buyer. He thus exercised
a great deal of flexibility in the price he asked different networks and media companies to pay
for Wimbledon broadcast rights. He gave the Honduran-based Canal 5 the lowest asking price at
$600 for exclusive broadcast rights in that Central American county—a deal Canal 5 apparently
thought was no good for them as their money remained outstanding a year later after IMG’s
repeated attempts to collect. Most companies did pay, however, because the financial stakes were
too high for IMG to simply brush off nonpayment. The lion’s share of funds payable to the Club
for the 1989 Wimbledon Tournament came from the United States market, where NBC paid $9.5
million for exclusive cable broadcast rights and HBO paid $3.25 million for pay-per-view
coverage rights. The German-based Universum Film AG (UFA) paid the same amount as HBO
for television broadcast rights on the European Continent. After IMG deducted their fee, the
broadcasting of the 1989 Wimbledon tournament netted the All England Lawn Tennis and
Croquet Club $18 million. A year later television and radio rights earned the All England Club
$21.5 million. The Club’s profits from media broadcasts continued to rise at the millennium. 80
At the same time that the very tennis federations who had belatedly embraced
professionalism signed massive television contracts, courted major corporate sponsorships, and
built historic tournaments into commercial juggernauts, some of the professional players who
made the tennis boom of the late 1960s and 1970s possible found themselves out in the cold.
Richard Savitt, a contemporary of Pancho Gonzales, looked jadedly at the state of tennis several
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years into the Open Era. Sure, a player would feel thrilled to play in front of a big stadium-sized
crowd for a big paycheck, but the growth of the game also came with a cost for the players. The
intimacy competitors enjoyed with their fellow players, with the fans, and with the members of
the host clubs found at the likes of the Los Angeles Tennis Club and the Berkley Tennis Club
was absent at the bigger tournaments in the Open Era. “The money wasn’t there, but the way of
life, who we met, and what we got to see can’t be replaced or can’t be equated with a dollar
amount,” Savitt said. Tennis used to foster community and solidarity through physical
competition, verbal banter, stewardship of club’s facilities, and the mutual pursuit of the beauty
of the human body in motion among players as collaborators in a game of ultimate skill. After
1968, at least in the mind of one player who peaked before tennis opened, tennis simply became
“like all other professional sports,” and that was something to regret. 81
Players also held certain misgivings when people over-identified them with their former
athletic accomplishments even after they had long retired from sports and instead wanted
recognition for their new business ventures. Savitt explained that tennis did not directly open
doors in the commercial world in the conventional sense of business executives at members and
men-only golf clubs hashing out deals over cigars and chips-shots on the links. For Savitt tennis
did, however, allow him to travel abroad to new places where he met different people he
otherwise would not have met. He thus returned to the United States with a more cosmopolitan
worldview that translated into a more competent, comprehensive, and flexible business acumen
than Savitt would have developed without the travel afforded by the tennis tours. The rub came
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when a business associate identified Savitt by something he did on the court thirty years ago
rather than what he did for an account yesterday. 82
In an individual sport like tennis, such an affront was especially common because
players’ bodies simply could not compete at a high level for very long, which forced them out of
the professional game, almost always before their mid-thirties. Before the game began to pay
players money enough to save for retirement in the mid-seventies, the body’s decision for early
retirement meant most players still had half of their working life ahead of them without the
ability or opportunity to work in the sport for which they had trained most of their life. Players
such as Pancho Gonzales, who competed for more twenty-five years, were certainly the
exceptions to the normal career of players; however, as Gonzales’s career and retirement makes
clear, two decades on or near the top of the game did not set a player up with the financial
resources necessary for retirement before the tennis boom of the seventies. But just as missing
out on the money that flowed into the new professional was a bitter pill for veterans of the
barnstorming tours to swallow, championship tennis after 1968 also afforded a host of new
players with a big income during the economic stagflation of the 1970s. McCormack’s and
Dell’s managed athlete was the prime reason.
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CHAPTER NINE
SEX, CIGARETTES, AND OPEN TENNIS
At the start of the Open Era in 1968, eight million people played tennis in the United
States. Many, if not most of these players were women. Such statistics may very well have
surprised sports marketing agents like Mark McCormack, who tended to bring a fair amount of
macho to their work, but to a steady number of topflight women tennis players, the game was
always one of their own making. 1
The first professional player of international renown was, after all, the French Champion
Suzanne Lenglen who electrified the game in the 1920s. But by the 1950s, the coast-to-coast
tours of the all-American boy Jack Kramer and the machismo Pancho Gonzales eroded some of
the game’s feminine origins in the minds of American sports fans. Women players generally
fared far worse financially than their male peers because the career options of women in the
fifties and sixties did not compare to the opportunities men enjoyed. That decline meant that
women athletes in particular gained from the opening of tennis to professionals in 1968. Female
professionals made the most of that opening and in so doing they did as much if not more than
their male peers to create and sustain the tennis boom of the late sixties and seventies. In the
highly visualized and sexualized world of professional sport, however, improved economic
outlook came with objectification.
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Since the game’s infancy in the late nineteenth century, women played tennis in such
large numbers, with such frequency, and with such visibility that popular culture long talked and
thought of tennis as a woman’s game. The most talked about female sportswoman around the
world in the early fifties was the tennis player Maureen “Little Mo” Connolly. As a teenager the
San Diegan won the United States Nationals in 1951—the youngest player to do so at that point.
Yet that same year, the seventeen-year-old found herself working as a copy girl for managing
editor Richard Pourade at the Union Tribune Publishing Company in San Diego. In 1953,
Connolly won all four major tournaments to become the first tennis player to earn the Grand
Slam since Don Budge. She brought a fifty-match winning streak in major tournaments into the
summer of her 1954 season when a horse riding accident effectively ended her career while she
was still a teenager. She had planned to turn professional after that season, but injury forced her
to retire and forgo Jack Kramer’s $100,000 guarantee for two years on his professional tour.
Connolly’s short career exemplified just how important it was for topflight women tennis players
to consider turning professional and trying to earn money. Even without an injury, if they played
only as amateurs they would still never earn much more than living expenses with no savings to
fall back on. Then came the limited prospect of low-wage menial work after their amateur
careers inevitably ended when they were still young women. 2
Youth mattered for more reasons than just the athlete’s ability to compete on the court.
Spectators wanted vitality in their athletes and held women players to a higher standard in that
regard. The popularity with the public women tennis players always enjoyed was a devil’s
2
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bargain that owed, to a considerable degree, to both the graceful movement of their bodies on the
court and their willingness to push the acceptable boundaries of fashion. Attractive looks rather
than playing well was what made women’s tennis popular in the public’s eyes. In tennis, sex sold
better than shots.
The most important fashion designer of sportswear in the twentieth century cited
Lenglen’s play and public life as the inspiration behind his aesthetic that fused athleticism and
sexuality. English born in 1911, Ted Tinling grew up around tennis and embraced the game to
the degree that he moved to France to serve as one of the inaugural chair umpires for the first
French Championships. Influenced by Parisian fashion, Tinling returned to England to set up his
own label while also working as an official at the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club.
Tinling’s position with the club set the stage for the most scandalous fashion moment in sports
history when the Californian Gertrude “Gussie” Moran, finalist in the Championship’s 1949
Women’s title match, broke tradition and protocol when she donned a short white skirt with
sheer white-lace panties underneath. 3
Tinling first became enamored with fashion in the 1920s when as a boy living in the
French Riviera, he came to know many of Europe and America’s wealthiest and most glamorous
people who wintered along the Côte d’Azur. As the sport of the Riviera, tennis had long tacked
to high fashion as the leisure class routinely bought haute couture designs from the top Paris
fashion houses that operated boutiques in the Riviera’s resort towns. With the help of Lenglen’s
stardom, Tinling put on his first shows of note in London during the early 1930s. By 1935 and
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1936, Tinling had established himself as a top designer in the select group of London designers
then making a name in women’s fashion on the world stage. Tinling enjoyed a banner year in
1938 with wedding dresses and gala gowns designed for the most prominent British citizens. The
next year Britain declared war on Germany, and the fashion trade, along with nearly all luxury
industries, ended until after World War II. 4
In the Museum at the International Tennis Hall of Fame in Newport, Rhode Island,
visitors can see and touch Tinling’s postwar sportswear legacy. The most significant articles such
as a drawing of Moran’s drawers and Billie Jean King’s 1973 Battle of the Sexes outfit are
locked away in cases, but the Hall of Fame’s Library and Archive holds an even more robust
collection of Tinling’s work in the form of photographs dated from 1949 to around 1980. A yearby-year reading of these photographs reveals not just how a tennis clothier changed his aesthetic
but the evolution of women’s sportswear more broadly in a world not just balkanizing during the
Cold War but also connecting in terms of culture and commerce. In 1956, for example, Tinling
cut Celanese satin and suede at an angled hipline for an East Asian-inspired ensemble called
“Girlfriends.” The overlapping tennis racquets sewn on the outfit symbolized cross-cultural
connections between women in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. As the Beatles learned the sitar
with the Maharishi and hippies throughout the world descended upon Goa to practice meditation,
Tinling drew similar inspiration from India in bedazzling tunic tops and pairing them with loose

4

Tinling, Love and Faults, 8-9, 177-80.

402
fitting pants. Southeast Asian inspired design continued to influence Tinling as his work gained
favor with fashion power brokers such as Vanity Fair in 1957. 5
Tinling likewise drew inspiration from Western antiquity in his midcareer years. He
crafted a series he dubbed the “Empire Line” that conjured Greek myths of female warriors into
playsuits, bras, and dresses that resembled Spartan tunics. Medieval myths also informed
Tinling’s aesthetic. From year to year he often put together a more conservative scalloped tennis
dress that resembled the dresses worn by princesses in the illustrations that filled the pages of
fairytale books. Tinling worked the most with cotton as white as the stone islands of the Aegean
Sea, but he wanted his women to look strong rather than passive. He thus emphasized diagonals,
hard corners, and square necklines in some of his designs. He also posed his models in confident
if not aggressive poses as in his 1958 show when the model Jean Clank held a racquet in her
cocked arm and flexed her other arm on her hip. 6 The expression on Tinling’s face and the
gestures of his body in watching the models move in these outfits exemplified his desire for
women who wore his clothing to exhibit strength. 7
Along with stylized Western pasts, Tinling also looked to the future for his designs. He
embraced new synthetic materials like “Terylene” that he fastened with the space-age sounding
5
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“Nyzippers.” Jumpsuits made of futuristic materials with names like “Orlon” reflected the
influence of the Cold War race for science and technological superiority. Organic inspiration
countered a strictly technologically-driven aesthetic, and that came through in what he called the
“Cocoon line” that encased the player in a single-piece bloomer. Likewise, some collections
featured maxi-dresses and lose fitting clothing that on occasion carried a fruit theme. In 1961 he
also experimented with covering up nearly all the player in a white fleece tennis coat that was so
organic, it resembled the skin of a New Zealand mountain goat. The collection of that same year,
however, also featured pairs of short shorts for the first time—a death knell to the covered
approach and a harbinger of more revealing outfits as the sexual revolution of the sixties began
in earnest. 8
In adding some sex appeal to his outfits, Tinling evoked the 1920s and the flapper of that
decade. His fondness for the bandeau popularized by Suzanne Lenglen during that decade
exemplified the graceful French Champion as his muse. For their part, he wanted his models to
draw inspiration from Lenglen’s charisma. They posed in sassy and provocative ways. In 1959,
for example, photographers captured one woman wearing a headband lifting up her skirt for the
camera lens. Models also gently bit their lower lips or the tip of a finger; they brushed their hair
behind the back of the neck. By 1962, the dresses needed no help from the models to reveal.
Skirts shortened, and necklines plunged. Bodices with deep scoops down the back created a hotto-trot housewife motif with a different consumer in mind than the young single girl Tinling
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targeted with his early work. The collections of the next several years reversed that trend,
however, and the height of shorts continuing to rise higher toward the midsection. New
accessories such as matching calf-length stockings and new novelties like embroidered flowers
also began to appear in the mid-1960s. The addition of little tennis racquets or bunny rabbits
about the décollleté or down around the bottom of the skirt continued over the years in pieces
that ranged from double-breasted striped suits to socks. 9
The details Tinling added to his designs with his star ascendant in the fashion world also
found expression in the specific details he started to put into his fashion shows. For example, in
1967 a shop created large skyscraper cutouts for his models to stroll past. The women often also
held two tennis balls in their hand or gripped a tennis racquet as they moved toward the gallery
while Tinling and his cohost read out the details of the model’s look. 10
In the late sixties that style assumed a heightened sexually provocative tone with the
debut of the miniskirt in his 1968 collection. The following year he introduced pantyhose and
stockings to cover the legs his clothes now laid bare. More than any other article of clothing,
however, Tinling’s undergarments garnered praise. Sketch after sketch of his panties revealed an
attention to the bows and lace because he knew the stretches and splits of the women players
wearing his underwear would lay bare the intimates for spectators and photojournalists alike.
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Women’s tennis afforded him this unique opportunity to create a line of clothing that linked
active wear with sexual excitement. In this, his clothes needed attractive female bodies. 11
The players he seized upon were the best and most visible professionals in the game.
Since the inception in 1970 of the well promoted and commercially successful Virginia Slims
Circuit, Tinling outfitted the fittest women in tennis. Martina Navratilova, Virginia Wade, Olga
Morozova, Nancy Gunter, Betty Stove, and Rosie Casals all wore his clothes on their tour
matches broadcast across the country and around the world. The prime time setting for most of
the tour’s matches meant Tinling designed outfits with the elegance a viewer expected to see in
an evening out about town. Black and white dresses, short skirts with high waistlines, and tops
that laid shoulders bare dominated, as well as strapless bras paired with dipped necklines to
accentuate the movements of the player when serving, retrieving shots, and stroking shots.
Tinling understood the game as more than a sport when he said “nighttime tennis is a theatrical
experience.” His designs thus stressed “glamour” and “grace” while simultaneously trying to
“slim” the player’s body to titillate spectators with an experience much like watching a ballerina
on stage. “Tinling designs with the spectators in mind,” said Jeanie Brinkham, who worked for
Philip Morris in the promotion of the Virginia Slims tour. Those spectators watched the players
move from the many seats of large indoor stadiums. Belts and buttons with rhinestone and sequin
strove to resemble the entertainment of Hollywood rather than the sweat of athletic competition.
Sex appeal rather than athletic accomplishment was first on people’s minds. 12
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To help heighten that sex appeal, Tinling studied the movement of women tennis players.
Between 1932 and 1969 he watched them compete in tournaments and on the practice courts,
where he took notes in order to design clothes that both functioned as athletic wear and captured
the attention of fans watching those women play. His photographs captured classic matches and
the way champions such as Helen Wills Moody, Dorothy Round, Helen Jacobs, and Joyce
Willing moved on the court. Suzanne Lenglen appeared in more of Tinling’s photographs than
any other player, a testament to the first worldwide professional tennis player’s impact on
modern sports fashion. The challenge of drawing on professional athletes for the design of
sportswear was not of inspiration but rather of applicability and scalability. What worked for the
athletic body did not easily translate to the everyday body. Tinling and designers compensated
for that discrepancy by covering rather than revealing. A more conservative approach to his
leisure wear for women matched the very functional and practical polo tops, track jackets, shorts,
and high-waist chinos Tinling designed for men. But designing practical clothing for men and
more loose-fitting clothing for mature women held little excitement for Tinling, who produced a
only few collections not inspired by and directed toward young vivacious women. Over his
career, Tinling’s style evolved from a flirty yet restrained “new look” of the fifties to a more
risky and sexualized mini-dress of the sixties into a sleek evening-out aesthetic for the seventies.
By removing material and revealing a little skin, just as Lenglen did four decades earlier, Tinling
announced the bolder position of women’s bodies in both the public’s space and in people’s
imaginations. Moreover, Tinling even commented on the restraints traditional tennis clothing
placed on women by constructing tennis dresses out of paper. Wearable not more than once if a
player was to move about and sweat, a dress of paper bordered on nakedness, a parody of athletic
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apparel without completely crossing into the obscene. 13 The style of women’s tennis then was
heavy on the sex and lighter on the substance.
That style reached the widest audience in a dying media’s last gasp to excite viewers
toward the end of the Swinging Sixties. Since 1909 British Pathé had produced newsreels that
routinely screened happenings in the sports world to movie palace goers. As television took
bigger bites out of movie attendance, one of the ways newsreel producers tried to push their
relevancy was by screening news too risky for network broadcasts. What could push traditional
boundaries more than showing the world just how sexy women could look at the hallowed
ground of Wimbledon? In the lead-up to the tournament, Tinling would march out a parade of
models wearing the shortest and tightest of his outfits. The cameras followed Tinling’s fingers as
he reached underneath the white mini-skirt to adjust a model’s hip-high hemline. The designer’s
own size at nearly six feet six inches conveyed a sense of masculine dominance reinforced when
the model might then stoop low to scoop up a tennis ball on the ground so as to give viewers a
better idea of the lace underwear’s coverage. Viewers’ eyes followed Tinling’s large hands as
they moved along the players’ posteriors as the designer worked to get just the right fit on his
athletic models. 14
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Along with media’s depiction of women wearing tennis fashions, the content of tennis
periodicals also reflected an evolving sexualization of women in the ever more important sports
media. Compared to general sport magazines such as Sports Illustrated, tennis-specific
periodicals long called attention to female competitors in article copy and pictures. During the
first half of the twentieth century, American Lawn Tennis, the major United States tennis
publication, spotlighted women players in cover photographs and feature stories several times
each year. When they were not emphasized on the cover, editors always selected at least one
women’s story for inclusion in each issue. These articles often played out fairytale tropes of
adolescent romance. 15
One example was sportswriter Hamilton Chamber’s coverage of Nancy Chafee’s 1948
girl’s championship. Chafee, a University of Southern California freshmen, learned her footwork
from dancing and her tennis rhythm from piano. From the fantasyland of Southern California,
Chafee’s blue eyes, sun-lightened hair, and tanned skin against her pure white jumper struck the
Philadelphia tournament gallery as those of a “Modern Cinderella.” Like the fairy tale character,
Chaffee held the liminal position between a girl and a woman: playing in her last junior
tournament and now making her own schedule; deciding for herself the tournaments she would
and would not compete in; allowing a new boyfriend back home to occupy her attention and
make her blush. 16
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While stories about women sprinkled the pages of American Lawn Tennis, the intended
readership was men over women. The leadership of the publication’s on-again-off-again parent
body, the United States Lawn Tennis Association, was literally a boy’s club. Most letters to the
all-male editors came from men, the subscription renewal form addressed “Gentlemen,” and
even established lady players such as Patricia Canning Todd were labeled as whiners.
Nonetheless, women regularly wrote articles for the publication, and male players were also
pilloried in the magazine’s pages. The real difference between representations of men and
women involved the increasingly sexualized portrayals of female athletes accompanying the
transition into the Open Era of professional tennis beginning in the fifties and finalized in 1968. 17
Tradition-bound amateur tennis associations struggled to keep their depictions of male
and female athletes relevant with changing times. In the summer of 1956 the International Lawn
Tennis Federation accepted the Soviet Union into membership just as the USLTA began a U.S.
sports publicity campaign in coordination with President Dwight Eisenhower’s Youth Program.
The Association hired Larry Fairhall, son-in-law of an emeritus USLTA president, to mark the
Association’s 75-year anniversary with $20,000 for a comic book that then USLTA President
Renville McMann said would sell millions of copies, a book written by Parke Cummings, and a
“Miss Tennis of 1956” contest. All went nowhere in promoting tennis, and the costs spiraled to
around $100,000 with little to show for it except the individual USLTA sections forced to pony
up $20,000 in un-recouped fees. The long-serving USLTA Treasurer Ellsworth Davenport
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offered his resignation over the debacle, but the Association’s executive committee demanded he
stay and stonewalled anyone who inquired about nepotism in the Jubilee mess that saw the
Association’s treasury fall from $66,000 in 1954 to $1,000 at the start of 1958 when the Wilson
Sporting Goods came to the rescue and purchased $15,000 worth of comic books. A close
reading of Tennis for Speed, Stamina, Strength and Skill revealed just how closed-off the
USLTA had become. 18
The comic featured two boys named Steve Granger and Red Martin. The latter had red
hair to avoid confusion. The pair venture outside their classroom one day at the end of their
freshman year contemplating what to do over their summer break. Lo and behold, their football
coach, the fedora and V-necked sweater dressed Bill Power, appears in his convertible to ask
them to go to a track meet with him. Power immediately produces a tennis racquet to seal the
deal. “I always pack my tennis rackets. You’ll find out how handy they can be,” he says to the
teenagers. 19
The racquets come in handy when the three visit a private tennis court, where they meet
longtime World War I Marine Corps veteran and former Heavyweight Boxing Champion Gene
Tunney. Tunney tells the boys that fighting requires stamina, but so does tennis. His time as a
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boxer and as a military man was fine, maintains Tunney, but he is glad that tennis is all he has
played since then, and he is proud that his sons play tennis. Leaving the legendary Tunney
behind, the boys ask their coach what it takes to maintain Tunney’s stamina. “Tennis,” Power
responds. 20
Coach Power then moves in for the close. He takes Granger and Martin on a
kaleidoscopic tour where they encounter different tennis stars, average joes playing the game, the
USLTA crest where an eagle clutches two racquets and two tennis balls in its talons, the
Kalamazoo College Tennis Courts in Kalamazoo, Michigan, where eighteen-and-under players
competed in the National Junior Championships, and the United States National Championship
at the West Side Lawn Tennis Club in Forest Hills, New York. Power then assigns one of the
four cardinal qualities a successful tennis player possesses, not coincidentally the title of the
comic book—speed, stamina, skill, and strength—to each of four tennis superstars: Vic Seixas is
fast; Tony Trabert can play all day without tiring; Bill Talbert has skill; and the Professional
Champion of the World Pancho Gonzales holds power. Before their eyes, the boys see their path
to tennis greatness if they only join “one of the 1500 member clubs of the United States Lawn
Tennis Association.” If club life is not for them, then school playgrounds, public parks,
municipal armories, or community centers might be the ticket. They are reminded that a fifteenyear-old Vincent Richards and a sixteen-year-old Maureen “Little Mo” Connolly became the
best tennis players in the world for their time. 21
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The comic concludes with a nod to the past and an eye to the future where the game
would continue to globalize. Pictures from across the world fill the boxes on the page with tennis
images from across the continents: Centre Court at the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet
Club (a Centre Court that looks nothing like the real court), players meeting royalty, Generalturned-President Dwight D. Eisenhower reading a speech, flags from around the world, players
celebrating getting on a plane, the Davis Cup raised high. Those are the images on the page, with
Coach Power, Granger, and Martin in the thick of all of it. “Since tennis is played in more
countries than any other sport you can travel abroad and play in….more than 33 countries where
the Davis Cup is competed for throughout the world. And the greatest honor of all is to become a
member of America’s Davis Cup team….And reach the final round in the worldwide contest of
international tennis supremacy!,” concludes coach on behalf of the Tennis Educational
Foundation and their patron organization, the United States Lawn Tennis Association. 22
The comic book medium fit with the USLTA’s message that the Davis Cup remained the
Association’s top priority in the postwar period. The men who sat on the USLTA’s Executive
Committee hindered their own sway over the future direction the game would take because they
ignored the impact women already had in growing the game. Since the early twentieth century,
efforts to promote tennis relied primarily on subscriptions to the American Lawn Tennis monthly
magazine published by Stephen Wallis Merrihew—periodically under the auspices of the
USLTA. One reason the Association agreed to bless Merrihew’s periodical was that the editorial
staff only had room for men. That bias existed because the USLTA itself did not want women in
any authoritative position over the game of tennis except playing on the court, where they could
22
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be controlled. With Stephen Wallis Merrihew and the USLTA’s break following Merrihew’s
1924 support of Bill Tilden in the face of the USLTA’s assaults on Tilden’s character as the
tennis player turned tennis correspondent, the Association’s ties with American Lawn Tennis
were severed irrevocably. 23
Merrihew continued to publish the popular American Lawn Tennis without the USLTA’s
approval. But by October 1942, at eighty years of age, he could no longer handle the rigors of
editing the magazine that he had founded and published for thirty-five years. For the next five
years until his death in 1947, Merrihew wrote regular columns for the magazine even though the
publishing responsibilities passed to the South Carolinian Dr. William Plumer Jacobs. Jacobs’s
unexpected death in 1948 left American Lawn Tennis without a reliable publisher. Consequently
the most respected source for tennis news and opinions floundered until the magazine’s final
issue appeared in October 1951. A periodical titled The Racquet: The Magazine of Tennis,
Badminton, Squash tried to attract the readership of the now defunct American Lawn Tennis with
limited success, publishing its first issue in November 1951 and running until August 1953,
when its subscription list was too small to warrant continued publication. 24
Voices readers had never tired of hearing were those of the players themselves. As with
Bill Tilden’s outspoken views, women players had long expressed their opinions on their sport in
the press. Unlike in other sports, in which women’s opinions were reported by male
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sportswriters, the opinions of women tennis players routinely took the form of their own
columns. 25 After Bill Tilden’s sexual proclivities alienated him from many former supporters,
the amateur champion-turned-professional Alice Marble assumed the duties of providing the
player perspective in American Lawn Tennis. In her monthly column “As I See It,” she opined on
a host of issues that ranged from mismanagement of Association resources on the part of the
USLTA to how professional players such as Don Budge and Fred Perry received invitations from
various city Chambers of Commerce to provide youth with athletic clinics as a means to “combat
child delinquency.” The photograph of Marble that accompanied her columns showed to all the
readers of that popular magazine a knowledgeable, erudite, and athletic woman capable of
challenging the old-guard men who still made the most important decisions in her sport. And
challenge them she did, not only in her writing but on citywide playing and lecture circuits,
where she not only entertained but also instructed on technical tennis issues that ranged from the
proper grip to use for the overhead stroke to more serious issues such as urban recreational
policy and sexism in sports. 26
Marble had one of the more remarkable life stories of any professional athlete in the
middle part of the twentieth century. Like so many top tennis players, she came from California,
but far from the sunshine and the starlets of Los Angeles. The fourth child of farmers in Plumas
County, Marble spent as much time as a preteen milking cows in the Sierra Foothills as she did
swinging a tennis racquet. The young Marble also met a cacophony of strangers, unusual for
25
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such an isolated location, who traveled through her father’s land to bathe in the sulphur springs
on the family farm. While Marble learned a work ethic there that served her later in her career,
she never could have developed as a player had her father and mother not decided to move the
family to San Francisco when Marble was still a preteen. 27
In 1919 sadness struck Marble’s family when an automobile accident incapacitated her
father at the same time that most of the family, and much of the city for that matter, fell ill with
influenza. Most of Marble’s relatives pulled through, but her father died from his injuries. His
death required Marble’s mother to work long hours cleaning offices in addition to her
homemaking to keep the family fed, and that hardship meant that Marble spent a great deal of
time under the supervision of her adolescent brothers. The boys relished playing in city parks,
and Marble had little choice in accompanying them to the Golden Gate Park baseball fields.
Marble quickly gained a reputation as a “tomboy” and an athlete more interested in ball games
during recess than in her schoolwork or chores. On one occasion she even made the
San Francisco Examiner when the Coast League Seals nine was a player short, and, in
desperation to field a full side, mistook Marble watching the game for a teenage boy they could
use on the diamond. She earned the spot. For the rest of her teenage years she could usually
count on an invitation to play with the males, no matter their caliber. 28
Athletic ability soon took Marble in a different direction. Her oldest brother Dan dropped
out of school right after their father died to help support his mother and siblings by working in
the lumber business. He always played handball to unwind after a long day of work, and by his
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late teenage years he was the number-one ranked player in Northern California. That success,
along with respectable work in the lumber trade, led Dan to frequent “fashionable clubs” in
San Francisco that offered facilities for individual sports such as tennis. Dan’s position as the
de facto head of household led him to exercise a great deal of influence over his younger
siblings, and he had grown tired of hearing about his younger sister playing all afternoon with
boys in San Francisco’s Recreation Park in the Mission District. Marble had grown from a little
girl to an athletically built woman of five feet seven inches and 150 pounds, and Dan expected
her to start acting like the young adult she had become. 29
Dan, however, recognized the athleticism of his sister. He soon settled on tennis as the
right sport for a young woman. Marble wrote that her “heart was broken” when he gave her a
tennis racquet with the warning that her baseball and basketball days were over. She claimed to
endure teasing from her old friends, but with encouragement from her history teacher, she went
to the Golden Gate Park courts, where she made new friends, including a coterie of athletic
young women not altogether different than herself in the Junior Tennis Club. After only four
months of playing the game, Marble won her first tournament, and within a year’s time she rose
to the top of the junior players in the San Francisco public parks. At sixteen she was invited to
play at the Berkeley Club in the California State Championship against the top females
throughout California. Unaccustomed to losing, Marble lost in the finals and almost quit the
sport. Her brother Dan, however, purchased a $45 junior membership for her to San Francisco’s
California Tennis Club, where Marble confronted the best competition in the Bay Area. Marble
still preferred to play in the more free-wheeling environment of the public parks, where she
29
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routinely competed against people from all backgrounds such as Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino
men. As she rose in the rankings, she credited the diversity of the people she played against as a
major factor for her fast success. 30
By 1932 Marble was the top player in California after having won the state women’s
championship. She relied upon the well-funded California amateur tennis associations to provide
her with travel expenses to play on the East Coast. She also benefited from the collected wisdom
of California coaches such as Eleanor “Teach” Tennant and the retinue of fellow California
players who formed a clique on the East Coast amateur circuit. That solidarity proved important
for Marble when the West Side Tennis Club lost her entry into the 1933 National Championship
at Forest Hills and refused to remake the draw. Had the famous San Francisco Champion
William “Little Bill” Johnston not intervened on his compatriot’s behalf, Marble would have
missed her first major tournament because of a miscommunication and potential prejudice on the
part of the Eastern USLTA section. Johnston’s support of Marble exemplified the tendency of
sectional differences to matter more than class and gender differences when it came to the tennis
players themselves. A West Coast player would support a fellow West Coast player, a Southern
player a Southern player. Likewise, compared to other sports, the amateur tennis associations
funded top women players to much the same degree that they funded top men’s players. That
support and camaraderie was most visible at the national level in the form of the Wightman Cup
team that pitted the best women players in the United States against the best women players in
England with the USLTA paying all expenses for the athletes representing America in that
competition. Marble first earned a spot on the squad in 1933, and she played her last Wightman
30
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Cup match in 1939. That experience helped her grow close to the handful of other top lady
players in the country and the chance to develop her game with those players led to her first
National Singles Championship in 1936. That victory gained her the financial support necessary
to travel to England for Wimbledon, where she won the singles championship in 1938 and 1939
before World War II halted that competition. 31
Yet the financial support that the USLTA provided could also sow seeds of discord
between the player and the directors of the Association. Earlier in her amateur career, when
Marble required hospitalization during the middle of the Wightman Cup team’s tour of Paris, not
only did the USLTA leadership not console the hurting player, but upon her return to the United
States and her subsequent medical treatment there, Wightman Cup Chairman Julian Myrick went
so far as to tell Marble and her coach Tennant that the Association wanted nothing more to do
with Marble because she had already “cost them a great deal of money” and proved to be a “bad
investment.” Tennant remained loyal to Marble, however, and provided room, board, and roundthe-clock care to her player over the next year as Marble recovered. Feeling strong enough to
play again, Southern California Tennis Association Secretary Perry T. Jones, acting on behalf of
the USLTA national office, notified Marble that the Association had refused her entry to
tournaments in the East Coast lawn tennis circuit. After much pleading, she eventually received a
hearing in front of a selection committee that took the form of a four-day tryout under the gaze of
five men who begrudgingly admitted she seemed fit enough to play in their tournaments. That
audition galvanized Marble to think more seriously about turning professional despite her

31

Ibid., 48-51, 60, 66-67, 73, 77-78, 80, 87, 93, 100, 103-04, 116-17.

419
renewed success in amateur tournaments in 1940. Wartime service entertaining troops as part of
the Bill Tilden, Don Budge, and Mary Hardwick Hare tour in the States and purported
clandestine activities in Europe delayed that professional career. 32
Marble’s decision to turn professional infuriated the USLTA directors. They ignored and
forgot how they abandoned her during her health struggles, only remembering their sponsorship
of Marble’s 1938 and 1939 European amateur trips, which they believed deserved the debt of
gratitude that she would remain an amateur throughout her playing career. Marble instead
diversified her money-making activities to include professional tennis tours, paid consultantships
with firms such as Wilson Sporting Goods Company, and clothing design lines. Her willingness
to tour professionally with men especially galled the male leaders of the USLTA. Marble set an
example of strength for women in her own work life; she also advocated for women in her
writing. While most of her writing presented straightforward arguments in favor of women tennis
players, on occasion she waded into more controversial waters as when she served as an early
editor of DC’s Wonder Woman comic and wrote “The Wonder Women of History” series that
earned her $50,000. Her personal letters too, like those to Doris Jane Hart, encouraged talented
young women players to stick with the game in the face of the uphill challenges they faced. 33
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No player benefited more from Marble’s help than African American lady champion
Althea Gibson, who faced even more discrimination than Pancho Gonzales. Gibson’s parents
were South Carolina sharecroppers who migrated to Harlem in 1930, three years after Gibson
was born. In this vibrant urban neighborhood, Gibson benefited from a law enforcement and
community organizing program called the Police Athletic League (PAL), in which law
enforcement officers provided urban youths with sporting goods and coaching. Gibson took to
paddle tennis and quickly excelled. Of the PAL programs across major U.S. cities in the midtwentieth century, Gibson remarked that they “set up these play streets to keep the kids or the
youths on the courts instead of in the courts.” Community leaders also came around and
befriended the young people. In Gibson’s case, the Big Band leader and tenor saxophonist Buddy
Walker looked after her block in Harlem. He quickly noticed Gibson’s racquet skills, her tall and
lanky physique, and her athleticism. He encouraged her to practice and practice. In spite of these
interactions with authority figures, the games Gibson grew up with in Harlem were more
informal and unstructured than recreational officials would admit. The games were of and on the
street. For her part, Gibson zealously guarded the concrete paddle tennis court where she had
taken to playing a modified game of lawn tennis. The winner stayed on the court. Gibson never
lost and did not see any reason to give up the spot she had earned by winning so that someone
else could get a turn. 34
After about two years of playing on paddleball and handball courts, Walker introduced
Gibson to friends at the leading New York City athletic club. The Cosmopolitan Tennis Club
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allowed Gibson honorary membership so she could train for the New York State Championships
sanctioned by the American Tennis Association (ATA). Upwardly mobile African Americans
founded the ATA in 1916 out of necessity because the USLTA sanctioned a de facto color line
by allowing member clubs in the organizations to exercise their own discretion in who they did
and did not admit to membership at their clubs. For their part, African American exercised far
greater racial tolerance in their own tennis organizations. In her first ATA New York State
Championship, the girl Gibson defeated in the finals was white. 35
In 1947 Gibson won her first ATA National Championship. She continued to hold that
title for the next decade. In the meantime, ATA officials lobbied the USLTA for Gibson’s
inclusion in USLTA events. Progress proved slow, but with a little help from Alice Marble, who
penned an open letter of support for Gibson’s cause, USLTA officials relented and allowed the
young African American champion to participate in USLTA-sanctioned events. Gibson’s first
tournament took place at the 369th Regiment Armory, located just off of Fifth Avenue on 143rd
Street in New York City. She won that Eastern Indoor Championship, which secured her
entrance into the National Indoor Championships held at another military drill pavilion—the
66th Street Armory on Park Avenue. Gibson did not lift that crown, but through her performance
on the court and the tireless behind-the-scenes efforts of her supporters at the Cosmopolitan
Tennis Club and in the ATA, she found most tennis tournaments open to her in the following
years. 36
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Marble helped make sure of that. She forcefully spoke out in favor of desegregating
tennis competition by allowing Althea Gibson to compete openly in USLTA-sanctioned
tournaments over the objections voiced by the individual clubs who hosted these tournaments. In
the same July 1950 issue of American Lawn Tennis that told readers about Gibson’s New York
public parks background, her schooling at Florida A & M university, and her dominance of the
American Tennis Association tournament circuit, Marble made a persuasive case for Gibson’s
entrance into the draw of the 1950 United States Championship, despite objections from some
members of the West Side Tennis Club that hosted the Forest Hills tournament. Before Marble’s
letter of support, Gibson’s chance of playing on those lawn tennis courts seemed unlikely to
happen in 1950, because the other East Coast elite clubs, where a player earned the necessary
qualifying points to secure a spot in Forest Hills, used their “invitational” discretion with
regularity to tailor-make their tournament to the liking of their membership. Marble’s rhetoric
appealed to the vanity of those club members—who from the beginning of the game in America
had viewed themselves as the stewards of the game. She convinced enough of them that a refusal
to allow Gibson to compete with the best players in the country undermined the competitive
spirit of tennis where the best players rose to the top of the rankings regardless of their social
standing. That such top players were now African American, Marble argued, made sense because
African Americans had already broken through as top athletes in “baseball, in football, or in
boxing.” The editorial concluded with Marble going beyond supporting Gibson with her words
by imparting her accumulated wisdom on the tennis court from years of playing in topflight
tournaments. Gibson had a practice partner and mentor in Marble almost everywhere she played

423
because Marble herself also had had to prove herself to the Association’s leadership a dozen
years before. 37
Gibson was up to that challenge. Throughout the fifties she made the most of what
competitive amateur tennis had to offer. International travel was first and foremost. In addition to
Wimbledon, Gibson traveled to Great Britain and the Continent for Wightman Cup matches,
where she helped the United States’ team capture that hardware in 1957 and 1958. She also
became a player in the United States’ global struggle against the Soviet Union when in 1955
State Department officials requested that she join Karol Fageros, Bob Perry, and Hamilton
Richardson on a goodwill tennis tour throughout Southeast Asia. Gibson agreed, and soon she
found herself playing her first match as a representative of the United States government in
Rangoon, Burma. Over the next half year, Gibson and her teammates played exhibition matches,
visited schools to instruct children, competed against local champions, and spread the message of
freedom as President Eisenhower and his foreign policy team feared the region was poised to tip
over to communism like dominos. Gibson’s teammates were all white: one from the South, one
from Florida, and one from California via the Midwest. Richardson was an NCAA Champion
and a Rhodes Scholar. The popular press and spectators alike pined for the buxom and blonde
Fageros, attention Fageros was happy to encourage when she donned her signature gold lamé
panties underneath her short tennis skirt. Gibson certainly stood apart from the rest of the team
and understood that her selection carried no small amount of politics as baggage. Pushing this
aside, however, she made the most of her time by winning the All Asian Championship in
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Calcutta, India, demolishing Fageros and all other local competition. She did not lose a match
until coming to Europe for the French Championship the following year in 1956. 38
Historians have noted the propaganda role popular entertainments assumed in the Cold
War. They have paid particular attention to dance, music, theatre, literature, radio, television, and
film. Compared to those topics, with a few exceptions, scholars have overlooked the role
sports—especially games like tennis that already held a high degree of popularity the world
over—played in the cultural Cold War. 39 In the countries of Western Europe bordering the
Soviet Union, for example, the United States Information Agency broadcast sports reporting, the
U.S. Army ran athletic events, and American Houses and Information Centers sprouted where
European youth could use complimentary sports equipment. In German-speaking countries, the
United States’ occupation changed both hearts and minds by introducing both the action of and
the word for joggers and bodybuilders. The triumvirate of American team sports—most notably
collegiate football, professional baseball, and Harlem Globetrotters basketball—projected both
American power and values to the rest of the world. 40
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The Olympics were the most significant but only one of the important international
sporting events where the United States and the Soviet Union competed against one another. 41
As a sport whose global popularity grew at the same time as tension between communism and
capitalism increased, tennis matches, every month, year after year, played between players of
different countries assumed tremendous political significance that rivaled if not eclipsed earlier
politicized matches such as the 1937 Davis Cup tie between Germany and the United States.
What had changed after World War II was that in the postwar world, tournaments between
players of all nationalities assumed the political and diplomatic symbolism previously reserved
only for Davis Cup matches that pitted the best of one country against the best of another in team
competition. 42
Tennis players in the Soviet Bloc suffered tougher times compared to their fellow
competitors from Western Europe and the United States. A European correspondent reporting on
the Davis cup squads of Yugoslavia and Hungary identified two types of Communist players,
“those who have gotten out and, alas!, those who haven’t.” What was known of the latter came
largely from what the former said, and therefore generalizations should be advanced with
caution. Some sensational stories of tennis families executed or sent to gulags for listening to
Wimbledon on pirated BBC radio stations lacks credibility, but the fact that, given the
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opportunity, most top Yugoslav and Hungarian players defected to the West suggests draconian
treatment of Soviet athletes compared to their international peers. Franjo Punčec left Yugoslavia
for Egypt in 1948. Pursued by communist enforcers, Vinicius “Vinny” and Magda Rurac
escaped from Romania using fake names, claiming they left because after a few years barred by
the communist party from competing in Western Europe, their government finally acquiesced to
them traveling to the West and playing, where they promptly realized life was better outside the
Iron Curtain. They eventually found their way to the United States. Helena Straubeova fled
Czechoslovakia for Italy, and Wladyslaw Skonecki left Poland under the threat of execution. In
1949 Jaroslav Drobny and Vladmir Cernik, Czechoslavokia’s two best male players, chose exile
when Cernik left his family behind to play and live in Western Europe while Drobny asked
Switzerland for asylum before becoming an Egyptian citizen married to the English player Rita
Jarvis Anderson. Dragutin Mitić’s flight from Yugoslavia was far more heartbreaking as he left
with his wife and son but had to leave his daughter behind. The Hungarian champion András
Ádám-Stolpa related how the regime preferred players with dependent children because officials
thought them less of a flight risk. Authorities barred Stolpa from competing at the French
Championships between 1949 and 1954, despite his having won the tournament in 1947, on
account that he might defect. 43
Soviet players who continued to play for their countries in international competitions did
so under the watchful eyes of party chaperones. The Hungarian men’s team was captained by a
man whose tennis aptitude was questionable but whose party loyalty was above reproach. Suzy
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Kormockzy, the top Hungarian woman in the late 1940s, reappeared on the international tennis
scene at the Monte Carlo tournament in 1952 after having been kept back from competition
outside the Soviet Union in the late 1940s and early 1950s. When the American player Gloria
Butler saw Kormockzy she found the Hungarian cold, a shadow of her former self. Only in the
women’s locker room, clear of earshot from the Hungarian player chaperone and party-hardliner,
did Kormockzy open up to Butler about her life since they last played. Davis Cup competition,
more than individuals traveling to tournaments in other countries, raised the seriousness with
which Communist bloc countries took their tennis. In 1949 Hungary hosted the Belgium Davis
Cup squad in Budapest. Soldiers ushered spectators to their seats underneath flowing standards
of the Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi. Except on the tennis court, the Belgian players could not
interact with the Hungarian players: guards kept the teams separated in the locker room; at the
after-match dinner, each squad had a table kept at such a distance apart that conversation proved
impossible. “It is a sad thing to consider that in this world where sportsmen are again getting
together to compete against each other in a spirit of friendly rivalry, that there should still be fine
talents that are being wasted, and still places where men are not free to take part in the world of
sport, how, when, and where they choose,” remarked an American player. 44 But what that player
missed was that United States’ own record on inclusivity and sensitivity in tennis could also have
used improvement.
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Proper projections of gender relations and racial balance were foremost on the minds of
Washington powerbrokers fighting the cultural Cold War. 45 That context meant that while
amateur tennis offered opportunities for international travel to exotic places and prestigious
sporting clubs, players also faced drawbacks. Money was the biggest concern. In Gibson’s case,
she supplemented her income by teaching gym class in the Department of Health and Physical
Education at Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri. Gibson felt that such instruction as
an un-tenured assistant instructor was clearly below her status as a national champion. She
needed the money, however, as well as income out of the prying eyes of USLTA officials who
patrolled the boundaries of amateurism with an iron fist in a velvet glove. Having won the
French Championship, Wimbledon twice, and the United States Championship twice in singles,
in addition to several doubles titles, Gibson had nowhere left to go in the amateur ranks by 1959.
Needing money, she signed a contract with Abe Saperstein, the owner of the Harlem
Globetrotters. Gibson and Fageros agreed to play warmup matches before the Globetrotters took
the court against the Washington Generals. In a year of barnstorming, Gibson won more than one
hundred matches to Fageros’s four, a feat that exemplified the Washington Generals’ team logo
featuring a tall and long-limbed Globetrotters star towering over a squat and ineffectual Generals
player. Such dominance did not mean financial security, though. After the end of the
barnstorming tour, Gibson entered the Professional Indoor Championship in Cleveland in 1960
where she bested Pauline Betz and established herself as the best of the best. But once again she
had nowhere to go, as the money for a professional tennis player was to be made in the
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barnstorming tours. Promoters did not think Gibson would draw the crowds. With few options
left to her in tennis, Gibson made the remarkable switch to professional golf—which may have
had small purses in 1960, but was the only contest in the world of sports where an athletic
African American woman could support herself. 46
During the Cold War, sporting celebrities from developing countries in South America
also became pawns in a global struggle between the democracy and capitalism of the United
States and the communism and state-centeredness of the Soviet Union. Tennis players
predictably gravitated to the West because the United States, Western Europe, and countries
closely tied to British Empire such as Australia held the major tennis tournaments open to
international competition while the Soviet Union tended to hold athletic competitions within a
more close-knit group of countries directly in the Soviet sphere. Maria Bueno, a world renowned
champion from Brazil, recalled first coming to the United States for the Orange Bowl Junior
Tournament in Florida in 1957. She relished her time there, but soon came to like California
even more, which she would make her second home when she was not playing tournaments or
visiting family in Brazil. No amateur or professional tennis player in the fifties or sixties placed
the Soviet Union in such high regard. 47
International sports celebrities such as Bueno had an outsized impact on the attitudes of
their compatriots, who took great pride in their athletes’ success in worldwide competitions. The
intensity of local pride shown all the brighter in developing countries that previously experienced
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little success in international tournaments. When Maria Bueno returned to Brazil after winning
her first Wimbledon Singles Championship in 1959, throngs greeted her as their conquering
darling. The government issued a special airmail stamp in honor of her victory. Her hometown of
Sao Paolo erected two statues of her, each thrice her real size, which they placed in prominent
spaces in the city—including one in the city’s main plaza. Even after their champions took up
residences in other countries, developing nations in South America embraced the athletic
achievements of tennis players born in their country, as was the case of Peruvian-turnedAmerican Alex Olmedo following his 1959 Wimbledon Mixed-Doubles Championship with
Bueno. 48
Pan-Latin American support of brown athletes was the exception rather than the rule. The
first truly widespread support for a Hispanic athlete did not appear until the tragic death of
Pittsburgh Pirates superstar and Puerto Rican native Roberto Clemente in 1973. 49 At the same
time that Pancho Gonzales won the United States Tennis Championship in 1949, a Cuban
women’s society called the Lyceum and Lawn Tennis Club met in Havana with seemingly no
knowledge of the Hispanic competitor on one of tennis’s biggest world stages. Admittedly, the
primary purposes of that group was to empower women through cultural edification and to give
Castillian elites a place to meet and mingle in the Cuban capital; nonetheless, the fact that a
group comprised of a large number of self-described “Tennis de Señoritas” did not actually
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follow a major Latino Champion said something about lawn tennis’s lingering ties to elitism and
the way women were ignored. 50
Frustration with the men of the amateur associations controlling much of the money in
tennis inspired a new generation of women players and promoters to develop professional tennis
on their own terms. The most influential of these women was Gladys Heldman, who grew up
Gladys Medalie in New York City, the daughter of the powerful New York Appellate Court
judge George Medalie. Unlike most figures who helped usher in professional tennis, Heldman
did not play tennis as a junior. After high school she attended Stanford University, where she
graduated magna cum laude with a history major. There she met Julius Heldman, and they
married in 1942, the day after he finished his Ph.D. in physical chemistry. The young couple
went on to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where Julius Heldman worked to enrich uranium for the
United States atomic weapons program. After the war, the couple moved to Berkeley, California,
with the nearby National Laboratories in Livermore and Berkeley. The Heldmans resided
conveniently next to the Berkeley Tennis Club where the once nationally-ranked Julius Heldman
began playing again. Gladys Heldman picked up the game there after the birth of their second
child. She struggled at first but took lessons with local teaching pro Tom Stowe, who taught her
the fundamentals. With her technique then in place she started playing games with any local lady
she could find, as well as frequent sets with her husband. By the time the family moved to Long
Beach, Gladys Heldman ranked number twelve in California and improved even faster in
Southern California with more frequent tournaments and better competition. By 1949 she felt
50
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ready to tour the country on the amateur tournament circuit and played the National Mixed
Doubles Championship with her husband. That same year Julius Heldman’s work for the Shell
Oil Company moved the family to Houston, where they quickly assumed leadership positions in
the tennis community there—Julius as president of the Houston Tennis Association and Gladys
as publisher of the Houston Tennis News bulletin that she quickly grew from sixty-two
subscribers to more than one thousand. Two years later she received “Tennisdom’s Woman of
the Year” award at Boston’s Longwood Cricket Club that honored her achievements: putting
together a Texas tennis players versus other players in the United States team competition;
publishing a Texas Tennis magazine, The Round-up; sponsoring junior clinics; organizing the
Houston Junior Tennis Association; keeping the Houston city challenge ladder; chairing the
Junior Wightman Cup team, and promoting “Tennis Week” across Southeast Texas. All that
experience served Heldman well in the national tennis work she soon assumed. 51
That work took the form of speaking both for women in the sport of tennis and for the
vitality of professionalism in the game as a whole moving into the future. Heldman did this first
by publishing her own magazine that emphasized vivid images of men and women playing the
game, and later by helping found and run what became the contemporary women’s professional
tennis tour. Under Merrithew’s guidance, American Lawn Tennis had displayed many
illustrations when compared with other sports publications in the first half of the twentieth
century, but by the early 1950s many other magazines of general entertainment value featured
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better photographs on slicker pages. 52 With the commercial failure of The Racquet in 1951, the
USLTA abandoned any affiliation with a monthly tennis magazine in favor of an annual
yearbook that collated season-ending player rankings, tournament results, and the major business
of the association. Heldman welcomed the Association’s total break with tennis periodicals
because she could then freely publish articles and photographs of edgier women players she
correctly assessed her primarily male readership wanted, while at the same time keeping the
focus of most pages of World Tennis magazine on men’s tennis by running roughly double the
stories and photos of the men’s game compared to the women’s game. 53
Heldman made sure to keep the control of her magazine in the hands of women. As editor
and publisher she retained final copy approval for herself, but she rarely exercised veto
prerogative on her writers and her staff because she employed so many women who knew all too
well the specific challenges women athletes faced in the fifties and sixties. Gloria Butler, for
example, covered tennis throughout Europe and worked tirelessly to promote women in the sport
in her reporting. Sarah Palfrey Danzig, a former champion who married the New York Times
sportswriter Allison Danzig, did the same from her account executive position in the World
Tennis publishing office. From a subscription point of view, what changed with Heldman
publishing the top tennis periodical was the number of subscribers, which increased from 4,500
readers of American Lawn Tennis to 6,600 readers of the first print run of World Tennis. By the
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end of 1953 Heldman counted 15,000 subscribers. Heldman replaced an outmoded two-color
journal presentation with a glossy full-color magazine. More significantly she changed the size
of the women’s photographs, which grew considerably larger and reveled more in capturing
women athletes in sexually suggestive poses with each passing year. Every move and muscle of
the more recognized female stars was now on display for the reading public, and it was a woman
who edited and published those images. 54
The growing professionalization of the sport also made women players increasingly
visible on the court. Prior to 1968, women professionals such as Suzanne Lenglen, Alice Marble,
Gussy Moran, and Althea Gibson, occasionally played with the half-dozen professional men who
earned a living by barnstorming across the United States, Australia, and Europe, dueling one
another rather than being seeded in an amateur tournament draw. The peripatetic touring lifestyle
brought with it real dangers: burnout from hundreds of days on the road; low gate receipts that
could halt a tour mid-stretch or stillbirth a tour the coming year; and the forfeiture of amateur
status, effectively limiting one’s competitive tennis outside of the very few professional tour
spots. The dangers of turning professional were more acute for women than for their male
colleagues; they received little compensation and prize money for their victories and next to
nothing for losing a match. Limited opportunities and money explained why women more often
than men appealed for reinstatement in the amateur ranks—as Moran did in November 1953.
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Heldman tried to counter the inequality in her editing of World Tennis. More importantly she put
her money and her management skills together in promoting women’s professional tennis. 55
Heldman had a terrific vantage point from which to view the ILTF’s and the USLTA’s
belated experiment with Open Tennis. She reported on the first Open Wimbledon and the first
U.S. Open, quickly learning what worked and what needed improvement. By the fall of 1969 she
thought the USLTA was moving in the right direction by appointing Joseph F. Cullman III,
Phillip Morris Chairman of the Board, to chair the U.S. Open, but the place of women players on
the professional tennis tours needed a complete overhaul. Lamar Hunt and World Championship
Tennis signed only male professionals, and the faltering position of George MacCall’s National
Tennis League meant the handful of professional women MacCall signed made only a fraction of
their guarantees. Most topflight women players thus tried to straddle professional and amateur
tennis by way of the dubious “registered player” classification that ILTF had adopted in order to
secure enough votes for Open Tennis. Heldman’s voice was one of many opining that any
distinction the USLTA, the ILTF, or any tennis organization made that called a person who made
money from their tennis game anything other than a professional was unsuitable and
unsustainable. 56
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The concept of the association-approved player was the last vestige of the amateur
Association’s longstanding attempt to control the flow of money into and out of the game.
Heldman further bristled at that control because she saw how classism fused with racism and
misogyny into a capricious cocktail of discrimination. In her playing career, Heldman once
partnered with Althea Gibson during a Florida tournament, only to find that when the pair tried
to play together again in 1952 the Longwood Cricket Club and the Essex Country Club
disallowed the partnership because of the color of Gibson’s skin. Although she was ranked in the
nation’s top ten, the USLTA allowed member clubs to bar Gibson’s entry in tournaments from
1950 to 1954. Gibson’s incredible talent and persistence eventually made her too valuable for the
Association and the U.S. State Department to keep off the court. A dozen years later, however,
Heldman still had to call on the USLTA to “throw out” member clubs that continued to
discriminate against African Americans and women. 57
One club that never engaged in racial or gender discrimination was the Los Angeles
Tennis Club. Those courts served as the setting for an important moment in sports history one
final time. Since Pancho Gonzales’s regular training at the club in the early 1950s, top male
talent played there far less than in previous years. Stan Smith and Bob Lutz were the last two
players of any international class to come out of the junior development program led there by
Perry T. Jones. By 1970 Jones had spent half a century leading Southern California tennis, and
his health was failing. The eighty-year-old felt he had no choice but to relinquish his
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responsibilities in leading the Southern California Tennis Association, the Southern California
Tennis Patron’s Association, and the Pacific Southwest Tournament—all of which he ran out of
his office at the Los Angeles Tennis Club. Always fond of Jack Kramer and rightly aware of
Kramer’s success running profitable professional tennis, Jones asked Kramer to take over the
management of the tournament that brought so much money into the coffers of Southern
California tennis. Kramer accepted, and Jones died on September 16, 1970, five days before the
forty-fourth start of the tournament he had created. In his last tournament Jones still enforced a
short-hair requirement of all the male competitors. 58
Heldman never knew Jones, but Billie Jean King did, and she did not shed a tear when he
passed. As a junior player she fulminated at Jones’s paternalistic approach to developing players
even though she directly benefited from his tutelage, organization, and the funds his Pacific
Southwest Tournament funneled to the Southern California Tennis Association’s top young
talent. For example, after an afternoon of training at the Los Angeles Tennis Club, Jones
gathered the players together for a photograph but kept King out of the picture because she could
not afford to wear the white tennis dress he insisted the lady players don. King saw classism mix
with sexism during Jones’s reign at the Los Angeles Tennis Club, noting that Pancho Gonzales,
Jack Kramer, and other top professionals in the world who trained at the Los Angeles Tennis
Club when they were not touring, went out of their way to develop male players such as Dennis
Ralston without paying the slightest attention to talented women such as King. The replacement
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of Jones with Kramer at the Club and as the director of the Pacific Southwest simply traded one
chauvinist for another in the mind of King and her fellow women players. 59
Kramer confirmed their view when he set the tournament’s purses at $12,500 for the
men’s singles champion compared to $1,500 for the women’s singles winner. Those figures
insulted the women and hurt the “business” of their “careers,” in King’s words. No stranger to
sexism in the commercial world, Heldman agreed with the women professionals’ misgivings.
She put her resources to work for them. Through her World Tennis company, she offered the socalled “Original Nine” $1 contracts to compete in an event outside the sanction of the USLTA to
be played in Houston where Heldman had recently moved her company’s offices. Previously
players like King and Rosemary Casals played matches as contract professionals under George
MacCall, only to have their registered player status restored by the USLTA that allowed for them
to enter Association-sanctioned tournaments. Initially they expected the same treatment because
Jack Kramer told them he did not intend to make a fuss over their withdrawals from the Pacific
Southwest Tournament. Heldman and the players then received notice that because of opposition
raised by the Southern California Tennis Association (in which Jack Kramer held a leadership
position), the USLTA decided not to sanction the Houston tournament, meaning that any player
who went ahead and played that event would very likely lose a chance to play in any future
tournament—including the U.S. Open—under the auspices of the Association. Eight players—
Peaches Bartkowiz, Rosemary Casals, Judy Tegart Dalton, Billie Jean King, Kerry Melville,
Kristy Pigeon, Nancy Richey, and Valerie Zeigenfuss—decided to defy that ruling and play the
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Houston event. Heldman called on friend and fellow tennis fan Joseph Cullman III, Chairman of
the Board of Phillip Morris, to furnish part of the $5,000 purse for the players. On Wednesday,
September 23, 1970, eight women took to the courts of the Houston Racquet Club to, in the
words of one participant, play “professional tennis.” “This is not a women’s liberation
movement,” said Billie Jean King at the time. 60 That came later.
The Houston Invitational Tournament proved a smashing success for Phillip Morris,
Heldman, and the women professionals. With the example set that a women’s-only field of
players could make money and garner media attention, Heldman went to work on Cullman. The
two knew each other from their days paired as a mixed doubles team. Later Heldman impressed
Cullman with her insights into improving the U.S. Nationals when she used the influence World
Tennis wielded to help secure the post of U.S. Open chairmanship for Cullman. As a business
pair they quickly realized the business opportunity lurking in their partnership. Heldman could
advance the cause of women’s tennis while Cullman found a marketing niche for Morris’s
women’s line of cigarettes. While roughly a hundred women made a living as tennis
professionals, Morris targeted the upswing in public interest for tennis during the late seventies
and early eighties. The new women’s tennis tour fit like a glove with the tobacco company’s
larger marketing campaign that championed the recent achievements in the women’s movement
in order to exploit women as consumers. A year after Houston, women tennis professionals
played fourteen tournaments on the Virginia Slims Tour. Fourteen years later, Heldman
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remarked with great pride that the partnership between women’s professional tennis and Virginia
Slims amounted to “the most successful sports sponsorship ever.” 61
Philip Morris first launched their Virginia Slims cigarette line in 1968. They pitched the
product as “a new category for women smokers.” Through an aggressive advertising campaign in
“national weeklies, women’s magazines and general interest publications,” through targeting
young women for free packs, and through broad-based public opinion polling that asked
respondents their opinion about “women’s role in society,” Morris made their Virginia Slims
brand into the cigarette most popular with women. Society wanted women slim, and women
wanted to think of themselves as trim. Part of this larger marketing strategy to equate their
cigarettes with the desires women held for their own bodies helped Morris to see the need for
celebrity endorsements of their product. As athletes, women tennis players fit especially well
with Morris’s plan because of both the glamour of their sport and the high international profile
they maintained when compared to other female athletes. The very bodies of these athletes
matched Morris’s actual product, and it was their slim bodies when compared with those of other
female athletes that made women tennis players popular with women (who wanted to be them)
and men (who wanted to be with them) alike. When a new line of Superlslims cigarettes
debuting in the late 1980s, the already strong link between the athletic female tennis body and
the skinny cigarette was further reinforced. That was a win-win from big tobacco’s perspective. 62
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Tennis as a sport had always rewarded players with youthful proportions. The total
athleticism that top-level tennis required seldom made for athletes whose bodies overdeveloped
in a specific way. That legacy notwithstanding, champions such as Tracy Austin, Chrissie Evert,
and Steffi Graf represented a trend toward younger, leaner, and sexier women players after 1960.
Contrary to her more matriarchal and proto-feminist portrayal in the sports media and by
historians, Billy Jean King, the mover and shaker in women’s professional sports, endorsed this
more overt sexualization of young female athletes. King’s position first and foremost as a
businesswoman, at least in the view of International Management Group founder and her agent
Mark McCormack, meant that the major influencer in women’s professional sports might not
have liked playing into corporate sponsors’ demands for sex to sell; however, she also
recognized the reality that that approach made for a successful women’s tennis tour and for her
own pocketbook. 63
Billie Jean King was the player and promoter who did more to bring about women’s
professional tennis than anyone else. Her book, We Have Come a Long Way: The Story of
Women’s Tennis, is the standard account packed with details about women in the sport. King’s
memory, however, slips on several of the key points involving the creation of professional
women’s sports. Most notably, she does not mention International Management Group, ProServ,
Mark McCormack, Donald Dell, or any of the other sports agents who generated so many
contract dollars for women professional tennis players—no player more than King herself. King
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correctly identifies 1970 to 1973 as the key stretch in all of women’s tennis. She rightly praises
her fellow players and Gladys Heldman as the individuals who did the most to make the
women’s tour happen, while likewise noting that without Cullman’s personal interest in tennis
and leadership at Phillip Morris, the Virginia Slims Tour could not have happened. Likewise,
while King did not care much for Jack Kramer personally, she does give him some credit for
pioneering the circuit format and player self-government that would matter a great deal in open
tennis for both men and women. And King, of course, recognizes the signal importance of her
Battle of the Sexes showdown with Bobby Riggs—though she’s a little harsher here on Bobby
than she was otherwise, especially given that sexist showmanship aside, Riggs did understand
that a spectacle would help grow women’s tennis rather than stymie it. 64
The glaring weakness of We Have Come A Long Way is not omission of key people, fact,
or slightly biased interpretation. Rather, King ignores the larger reason why women’s tennis
succeeded in the public’s eye—sex appeal. In nearly two hundred pages, sexuality is never
discussed. Private records and other sources reveal the women players knew how important sex
appeal was to the financial stability of their tour. Since Victorian times, through Suzanne
Lenglen, the barnstorming tours of the 1950s, and into the Open Era, sex always sold women’s
tennis to the masses. In the 1970s and 1980s the professionalization of the sport made that
sexualization more explicit as the game’s popularity grew.
In a video she made for the Women’s Tennis Association titled “You’ll Go a Long Way
Baby,” King narrated the evolution of women’s tennis from the amateur days of earning a dinky
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trophy and “beautiful bus pass” with a sarcastic tone and trophy and pass in hand. The viewer
then travels full speed ahead to the final stop of $14 million in prize money offered by Virginia
Slims in 1987. King attributed this success less to Morris and more to players who are “cute”
with “great legs.” Moreover, she reminds her player colleagues just how important putting on
makeup and jewelry, and sexing-up their outfits are to their careers and their sisterhood as
touring professionals. Herself a U.S. Open semi-finalist at the age of sixteen, Chris Evert Lloyd
agreed that beauty beat brawns. “Most of the women tennis players are very attractive, and I
think people are coming out to see that too,” said Evert in support of King’s advice to the new
members of the Women’s Tennis Association. 65
For the players the reality of a higher pubic profile came with the commercial stability of
a tournament schedule that spanned the globe and lasted the entire year. Since her days playing
the Riviera, Frenchwoman Suzanne Lenglen had titillated spectators when her breasts came out
on court during her athletic movements. Fifty years later, Billie Jean King did not discourage
much the same faux pas when she told a sports reporter, “if you’re well endowed, show it.” The
difference five decades made was that while both Lenglen and the professional players of the
1970s played in front of a packed Madison Square Garden crowd, the apparatus of the Virginia
Slims World Championship Tour and its successor in the Women’s Tennis Association meant
that professionals in the 1970s played in those tournaments year after year rather than for only a
single night. That happened because players like Billie Jean King smoked Virginia Slims. 66
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Heldman, by contrast, felt sensitive when people questioned her alliance with the tobacco
industry. Virginia Slims initially put up under $50,000 per tournament in prize money for the
first year or two of their sponsorship of professional women’s tennis. By 1972 the women
professionals played one tournament for $100,000 in prize money, and a year later the Tour
added a second $100,000 event. After a decade the $250,000 in prize money per tournament
became the norm for Virginia Slims to continue with naming rights for the Women’s
Professional Tour, and Heldman said she would have preferred they up that to $350,000 or even
$1,000,000 per tournament. She likewise went after any company who would support women
athletics with money. Cosmetics brands, liquor brands, and even Caesar’s Palace Casino in
Las Vegas contributed sizeable sponsorships to create the Virginia Slims Tour’s prize pool. The
companies thought their investments bought them good publicity with consumers, especially
women consumers, who watched professional tennis in big numbers. Heldman’s conviction
remained steadfast in bringing women’s professional tennis—and women professionals across all
industries for that matter—equality with the pay standard men enjoyed. In that she made real
initial progress precisely because she did not let criticism dissuade her, admitting she would take
money from the National Rifle Association, asbestos producers such as Johns Manville, and even
pro-life groups if they wanted to sponsor women’s professional athletics. Openness to strange
bedfellows delivered the greatest pay equity in professional sports after only two and a half years
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of the Virginia Slims Tour. In fact, by 1973 women professionals had the two $100,000
tournaments on their calendar; the best event their male peers played for offered only $50,000. 67
A typical Virginia Slims Tournament was played in Philadelphia in 1973 with thirty-six
ladies in the draw competing for $50,000 in prize money. After two rounds of preliminaries that
paid $270 and $450 respectively, half of the players remained, each of whom earned at least
$720 for making the second round of the tournament. From there the pay increased
exponentially, with the quarter-finals paying $1,530, the semi-finals $3,000, $6,300 for the
runner-up, and $10,800 for the champion. Doubles featured a handful of other players in addition
to the singles players, with considerably less prize money paid at only $900 for the winners.
Such pay disparity between singles and doubles was a pattern set during the pre-Open Era
professional tournaments by promoters such as Jack March, and that prize money disparity
continued during the first decade of open competition. The greater emphasis on singles rather
than doubles explains why so many of the top players forgo doubles at tournaments today.
Having said that, the structure of the women’s professional tour varied somewhat from earlier
professional tournaments and the contemporary men’s tour in that early round losers in Virginia
Slims events earned a comparatively higher dollar amount than a male player who lost in the first
round of their tour event. Well-run tournaments on the women’s side such as the Philadelphia
Tournament also featured a back-draw that allowed first-round losers to compete for additional
prize money in a consolation bracket. Players on the women’s tour competed every bit as hard as
the players on the men’s tour, but after years of limited pay compared to their male peers,
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women professionals and the woman who promoted their tour felt an obligation to give one
another at least a livable wage. 68
Along with moderate equity in prize money, another way Heldman structured the
Virginia Slims Circuit differently than the men’s professional tour was in levying a 5 to 10
percent assessment on money that entered the women’s professional tour. Those assessments
took the form of a 10 percent withdraw of the tournament purse for Women’s Professional
Tennis expenses—$4,920 in the case of the $50,000 Philadelphia Tournament—and in a 5
percent assessment on Women’s International Tennis Federation (WITF) members’ earnings
from tournament purses, endorsements, and appearance fees. WITF financial records show
difficulty in collecting endorsement and appearance fees from the individual incomes players
earned as celebrity athletes on their own time, but Heldman managed to get around $20,000 for
the prize monies that she pooled in a surplus account for distribution during tight times on the
tournament calendar. Heldman and her husband frequently personally fronted cash for
everything from car rentals to telephone calls, to larger expenses such as prize money advances.
More than enough deposits came in to keep the Heldmans in their home, but the novelty of
running a women’s professional tour meant the WITF boss had to accept frequent cash
shortages. Ingratitude from former professional players and from friends who knew her best,
wrote Heldman after she retired from managing the professionals, was what saddened her the
most during her many years involved in tennis. Different than the pre-Open Era barnstorming
tours when the promoter Jack Kramer far outpaced his players in terms of personal income,
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Heldman’s bank balance from her work as tour director tended to sit closer to $10,000 compared
to the six-figure mark Kramer earned. 69
Women’s International Tennis Federation financial records for the 1972 to 1973 financial
year reported 750 members who supported women’s professional tennis by paying dues. That
remarkably high figure for an organization founded just two years earlier by Heldman and nine
women professional players owed both to the resonance of Heldman’s personal appeal to friends
she cultivated over the years who wanted to see tennis grow and to the low dues the WITF
collected. Membership came in two varieties: full, which required dues of $5; and associate,
which required dues of $1. Heldman welcomed men to join as associate members, and many did,
including the highest profile professional players such as Rod Laver; however, with the
exception of her husband Julius, she tried to keep full memberships to women so that her
organization never lost track of its principal mission to promote the visibility and viability of
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women’s tennis in the Open Era. The low dues policy, that collected only about $1,000 per
financial year, also meant that a dozen or so key members in the WITF’s formative years would
shoulder a far greater financial burden than the hundreds on the rolls. The WITF’s role as the
prime manager of the women’s professional tennis tour meant that the most established players
fronted cash to Heldman in the form of prize money splits and percentages of their
endorsements. Heldman then disbursed what they literally called a “Slush Fund” to aspiring
women professionals in need. In the first full season of the women’s pro tour, Heldman paid
advances to and travel expenses for more than a dozen non-topflight professionals to encourage
more robust draws in Virginia Slims events. 70
Women professionals certainly competed against one another as fiercely as did the men,
but in the early years of the WITF, women professionals showed greater solidarity than their
male peers. With agents such as McCormack and Dell encouraging their clients to think more
and more about money, male stars began to skip tournaments for exhibition matches that
guaranteed a high payout simply for showing up. Whether or not the fix was in on those matches
remains uncertain, but spectators who attended certainly considered the quality of play at those
matches and the effort of the top stars below what they gave in tournaments. Heldman decried
the “appearance money that the top men pros and their agents demand and get” as the “worst
offense” in the sport. The amounts tournaments paid ranged from $50,000 to $300,000 to ensure
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the cooperation of the game’s best. World Championship Tennis took that a step further by
operating a “Bonus Pool” that compensated male professionals with “race horses, diamonds, an
oil well, stocks or $25,000 in cash.” Women professionals may not have liked the gimmicks of
their male peers, but the WCT never posed a major threat to women’s professional tennis. In
fact, Virginia Slims tournaments earned better television ratings than most WCT tournaments.
Virginia Slims Tour financials compared favorably to Lamar Hunt’s WCT and the International
Tennis Federation’s Grand Prix. 71
The success of women’s tennis infuriated the men who ran the USLTA. They wanted the
women professionals back under their control. In 1971 USLTA President Robert Colwell went
after the eight women professionals who had withdrawn from the 1970 Pacific Southwest
Tournament to play the Houston Racquet Club matches. The USLTA sought to restrict their
activities because their ongoing privately funded tournaments kept the Association from
collecting the 6 percent sanction fee. Heldman outflanked Colwell by convincing Cullman to pull
Phillip Morris advertising dollars from the United States Open if the Association penalized the
women professionals. The USLTA quickly removed “experimental” restrictions on the women
professionals for the upcoming 1972 season, but that resolved little. Heldman wanted the most
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money for her players while the USLTA wanted the most money for itself. Either paying or
avoiding sanction fees meant more for one at the expense of the other. Litigation loomed. 72
Heldman’s position as the head of the tour made her the prime target. She personally put
up the initial $1,000 to incorporate what became the Women’s International Tennis Federation
and the Women’s Pro Tour. The USLTA did not forget or forgive that investment because the
Association respected Heldman’s knowledge of the game and her ability to make professional
tennis profitable. In fact, after the 1970 Houston Tournament the USLTA continued to pay
Heldman what amounted to a consulting fee for her guidance when it came to women’s tennis.
Heldman’s interactions with the Association’s leadership convinced her that the USLTA did not
intend to promote women’s professional tennis as vigorously as men’s professional tennis. She
found her suspicions confirmed when the USLTA ignored her counsel for prize money parity
and continued to keep women off the Executive Committee that decided most Association
policy.
In 1972 she severed her ties with the USLTA in order to remove any conflicts of interest
in making the Virginia Slims Tour totally independent of the Association’s influence. At first the
USLTA did not seem to mind Heldman’s decision to go it alone because the men who ran the
Associations did not believe in the popularity of women’s sports as Phillip Morris did. They did
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not care about women’s professional tennis; they just wanted Heldman and her big-tobacco
backers to pay the 6 percent sanction fee. She refused, and the Association sued. 73
Heldman’s plans for the 1973 Virginia Slims Tour required her to shed other
responsibilities along with her USLTA work. In 1972 she sold World Tennis to CBS in order to
focus more of her energy on managing the women’s professional tour. She made money in the
sale and remained a contributor to the magazine, but without ownership of World Tennis
Heldman no longer had the public forum or the same access to business capital she leveraged so
effectively in getting the Virginia Slims Tour off the ground. With between eighteen and twentytwo tournaments and at least $500,000 in prize money posted for the start of the 1973 tour, she
appeared in a U.S. District Court defending herself against the men who ran the game. 74
The case came down to the legality of how Heldman had started the women’s
professional tour. Heldman maintained that she offered the women players professional contracts
because the USLTA planned to suspend them for playing at the Houston Racquet Club instead of
at the Los Angeles Tennis Club. The court disagreed, maintaining the USLTA never explicitly
issued the “threat of suspension” to the players. That distinction justified the Court’s ruling that
Heldman wrongly manipulated the women professional players in claiming that the USLTA
would have suspended them if they played in a non-USLTA-sanctioned event. In reaching the
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conclusion that Heldman offered “naught but imperfect shadows of self-interested conjecture,”
the Court ignored the USLTA’s six decades of suspending players for the smallest of infractions,
a history that almost certainly would have resulted in the vindication of Heldman’s claims to
player suspensions, especially given the growing popularity and growing dollars entering
women’s professional tennis. In a letter dated December 16, 1971, from USLTA President
Robert Colwell to “The Top U.S. Women Players” that specifically threatened potential
ineligibility for “Wimbledon, Forest Hills, Federation Cup and Wightman Cup competitions”
should the USLTA not secure sanction fees from the women’s tour professional tournaments, the
Court’s reasoning in refusing to grant a preliminary injunction revealed a fear of gender equality
that outweighed the evidence of the case. Incredulity directed at Heldman appeared throughout
the opinion with the Court seemingly having no qualms that the professional tournaments the
USLTA planned to sponsor offered less prize money to the women professionals than what
Heldman had secured for the players. 75
Heldman and her codefendant King failed in their petition to secure a preliminary
injunction against the USLTA’s plans to prohibit Virginia Slims professionals from competing in
Association-sanctioned tournaments. The pair discussed the loss with the players. All of them
expressed gratitude for all that Heldman had done for women’s tennis while some asked
Heldman to release them from their contracts on the Virginia Slims Circuit in order to play
USLTA and ILTF-sanctioned tournaments. Heldman decided that women’s professional tennis
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stood the best chance of growing if she stepped away from managing what she had started. Her
resignation as director of the Virginia Slims Circuit appeased the USLTA to the degree that they
decided not to ban women professionals from participating in sanctioned tournaments. Women’s
professional tennis would go on to flourish but without the real founder of that movement and
without the acknowledgement in later years of the impact Heldman had on the sport by the
athletes whose very careers she had sacrificed so much to make. 76
At the same time women’s professional tennis suffered another set-back. On May 13,
1973, the San Diego Country Estates in Ramona, California, played host to an exhibition match
between Bobby Riggs and Margaret Court. The Estates developers believed the spectacle could
help sell prospective units. In that they got more than they bargained for as limousine after
limousine brought the most prominent entertainers and celebrities from throughout California up
an unfinished road, past the unfinished golf course, and to the one finished tennis court for the
match. Star running back for the Buffalo Bills O.J. Simpson attended and predicted the numberone woman in the world Court would clean up the crusty old Californian Riggs. Bill Cosby
likewise predicted a Court victory, as did Court’s colleagues on the women’s tour like Rosemary
Casals, who remarked on camera that “Bobby Riggs is living on his past…and I’d be surprised if
he wouldn’t have a coronary right there.” When asked the straightforward question, “Do you
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have anything nice to say about Bobby Riggs at this point?” by broadcaster Brent Musburger,
Women’s Tennis Tour promoter Gladys Heldman answered equally straightforwardly, “No, not
really.” Male former professional players disagreed with Bill Talbert and Pancho Segura, who
both predicted a Riggs win. After the first set a Riggs victory seemed more and more likely with
him “soft balling Margaret to death,” in Segura’s analysis. Riggs completed the so-called
“Mother’s Day Massacre” with a straight-set win over the best woman professional in the
world. 77 All seemed lost until Billie Jean King won the most talked about match in tennis
history.
Contemporary viewers, commentators, and even historians have all pointed to the
significance of Billie Jean King’s 1973 win over Riggs in the “Battle of the Sexes” while at the
same time largely missing the tennis business context of that famous match. 78 The Riggs versus
King showdown was long on sideshow and short on the day-to-day substance of what women
tennis professionals had recently achieved. In getting to play for big audiences, the players on the
Virginia Slims Tour also benefited from the deep social and cultural legacies that had long
considered tennis a sport fit for women athletes. That history meant that women professionals
after 1968 found the financial backing and media contracts for a robust tennis tour of their own
that, while not equaling the men’s tour in terms of resources, revenue, and returns on the players’
labor, nonetheless rivaled the men’s tour. Women’s professional tennis far outpaced the
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professional opportunities for women in other sports, only recently opened to them with the
passage of Title IX in the Education Amendments of 1972. 79
Less recognized is that women tennis players were the only female athletes the major
entertainment agencies agreed to represent. That representation reached a turning point in 1983
when the U.S. Women’s International Tennis Association (WITA) officially embraced the
sexualization of their athletes hitherto commonly practiced but not publicly stated by the player
unions. ProServ’s success with making Elizabeth Sayers, a tennis champion unknown outside of
her home country of Australia, into a global sex symbol prompted that change. Through a
“complete beauty makeover” and photoshoot, Sayers saw her exhibition and corporate event
income climb from virtually nothing to more than a quarter of a million dollars in just a few
months irrespective of any success she enjoyed in competitive tournaments. The WITA noticed
the upswing in both Sayers’s exposure and more importantly her income, and they worked to
replicate that success in many of the other players the union represented. In moving to sex over
shots, the WITA did not have much of a choice if they wanted to continue to represent the
financial best interests of their player members. 80
The excitement over women’s athletics that came a decade earlier when Billie Jean King
beat Bobby Riggs in the Battle of the Sexes helped the fledgling Virginia Slims Circuit expand in
the mid-1970s, but by the early 1980s women’s tennis needed a new injection of excitement
because the expansion of and quality of play on the men’s tour had prompted the majority of
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spectators to prefer the faster tennis present at World Championship Tennis and International
Grand Prix events. Youth, smooth athletic movements, and beauty became the attributes players
now needed—at least more than ever before—to strive for on the court. And off the court, the
WITA issued a year-end calendar that displayed the athletes looking their best. Agents, like the
Association leaders, also tried to push their player clients to a new level of sexiness because an
attractive athlete was easier to sell to advertisers, who themselves believed that sex sold. As the
former player-turned-agent Donald Dell remarked about Virginia Slims and WITA players, they
were “a pleasure to watch for more reasons than the quality of their tennis.” 81
The increased visibility in the public’s eye that televised tours gave female players meant
that those women could expect to negotiate bigger and better endorsements and licensing
contracts with companies. More than their male counterparts on tour, however, women players
had to make sure they looked their best each and every time they stepped out onto the court.
Agents such as Mark McCormack and Donald Dell noted that a handsome player like Eliot
Tetlscher stood to benefit in terms of marketability from his good looks. Furthermore, agents told
male clients like Jimmy Connors, John McEnroe, or Brad Gilbert that their on-court misbehavior
cost them corporate sponsorships, as companies did not like risking a marketing campaign on an
athlete known for erratic behavior in the spotlight. But those same agents never told a male
player that he needed to change something about his body in order to improve his marketability;
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the male player’s body that produced his on-court performance belonged to the player and,
perhaps, his coach. 82
By contrast, sports agents regularly told women players to shape-up their bodies. The
reasons for that double standard were two-fold: first, sports agents knew that when it came to
marketing a woman player, companies and sponsors valued attractiveness more than victory.
Second, despite not earning a living competing on the court, male sports agents still felt they
knew more about sports than the women who actually got paid to play each and every day. In
confronting one of his women player clients over her recent weight gain, Dell asked, “How are
you going to be a top ten player when you are fifteen pounds overweight?” In that rhetorical
question, the agent meant that any change in her appearance that detracted from her on-court sex
appeal could cost her even more money with sponsors than a drop in the rankings and subsequent
drop in tournament prize money might cost her. “Name one player in the top ten who’s even
three pounds overweight,” asked Dell. With that demand, he drove the point home. 83
Tennis and Transition
Looks mattered, but so did a good story in the sport of tennis. For much of tennis history,
spectators wanted the underdog to take on the establishment. Since Suzanne Lenglen made the
first international professional tour in 1926, anyone who made money in the game before 1968
was treated as a pariah or traitor by the men of the amateur associations who ran the game.
Women, people from the working classes, migrants, ethnic and racial minorities, people from all
walks of life became professional tennis players if they had the talent. With the transition of Dr.
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Richard Raskind to Dr. Renée Richards, professional tennis crossed one final barrier—that of sex
itself.
From childhood, tennis, gender identity, and sexuality intermingled. Raskind spent many
hours on the courts where the adolescent practiced strokes and found a first girlfriend in a fellow
player. Brief and awkward intimate encounters with both a female sibling and a female summer
camper contributed to a great deal of gender confusion by the time Raskind turned sixteen. By
then one of the only times the teenager felt comfortable was playing tennis, where Raskind’s
athletic six foot and one inch gave a decisive advantage over the many friends he met through
the game. But youth tennis also gave Raskind the opportunity to think about transitioning when,
after having played an amateur tournament on the U.S. Military Academy’s West Point courts,
Raskind found his way to the local bookshop and noticed a copy of Lili Elbe’s posthumously
published memoir Man Into Woman. Raskind bought the book and fled to a hotel bathroom,
where he read all about the Danish artist Einar Wegener’s transsexual awakening and the first
attempt at sexual reassignment surgery. In 1951 Raskind brought this expanded horizon with him
to Yale. Freshman year in New Haven challenged Raskind, who felt disoriented save for his
amateur tennis career. Regular practice trips to New York to play on the indoor courts of the city
also gave Raskind the opportunity to visit Greenwich Village, where the teenager frequented a
“transvestite revue” at Club 82. While Raskind had gone out before as Renée, the personal
freedom college provided catalyzed that transition. Under the pretense of practicing tennis at
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Forest Hills, Raskind left for Manhattan to audition for the Satin Slipper Revue. At the home of
the revue’s owner, Renée had her first complete sexual encounter. 84
At the same time, Christine Jorgenson returned to New York City having undergone
sexual reassignment surgery in Denmark. Newspaper publicity surrounding Jorgenson’s
transition catalyzed city and nation-wide conversations about transsexuality. The grace with
which Jorgenson embraced her newfound visibility encouraged Raskind to consider his own
identity. Over time his story would come to rival Jorgenson’s in influencing public discussions
about transgender people. 85
That experience, combined with collegiate tennis triumphs, complicated Raskind’s sexual
identity. As the top player in a sport very popular on his Ivy League campus, Raskind felt
obligated to maintain a heterosexual relationship. At the same time, he attended therapy with a
psychiatrist to discuss his sexuality and future plans to play tennis professionally. Toward the
end of his time at Yale, he traveled to England and Paris to compete in the Prentice Cup, where
he solicited prostitutes with “success.” After Europe Raskind began medical school in Rochester,
New York, and there Renée reappeared. Tennis touring momentarily suppressed her because on
trips to cities such as Miami and Havana, Raskind spent evenings with prostitutes. Sex in
committed relationships did not happen for Raskind, and that frustration renewed his need for
therapy. Once again a busy schedule, this time as a resident at Lenox Hill Hospital in New York
City along with his amateur tennis career, left Raskind with little time for Renée. That changed
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with the death of Raskind’s mother. He mutilated his genitals, cross-dressed more frequently,
and encouraged his pregnant girlfriend to have an abortion so that they could avoid marrying.
The end of that relationship effectively meant the beginning of Raskind’s life as Renée . 86
Raskind underwent hormonal therapy while also serving in the United States Navy. That
treatment ended without Raskind’s consent, and incompleteness spurred him to drive across the
country stopping in small towns as Renée before returning to New York City to direct the
residency program at Manhattan Eye and Ear Hospital. Dr. Dick Raskind excelled as an eye
surgeon and as a teacher of eye surgeons, but the surgery the physician wanted for himself had to
be completed outside the United States. Raskind left his New York life behind, traveled to
Europe, and then on to Casablanca, Morocco, intending to undergo sexual reassignment surgery.
As a physician, however, he decided against the procedure there and returned to New York to
resume his medical career in Manhattan, where he married and had a son. At the same time, he
continued to compete at the highest level of amateur tennis making the quarter-finals and the
finals at the U.S. National Championship. Family life did little to solve Raskind’s complicated
gender identity, however, and he separated from his wife. He also resumed his hormone
treatments, dressed as Renée every night, and finally underwent the surgery, this time in
America. In 1975 at Physician’s Hospital in Queens Dr. Roberto Granato performed what
paperwork called a “sex change” to give Richard Raskind the anatomy of Renée Richards. Dr.
Richards continued as Dr. Raskind in the medical profession, but over the following months and
years Raskind changed all identifying and legal documents to Renée Richards. The paperwork
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included changing USLTA tournament registrations from the men’s draw to the women’s draw,
and that change was what made Renée Richards famous. 87
Most of the women tennis players did not support Richards’s right to compete in their
tournaments and on their tour. They felt uncomfortable competing against a big and strong
player many knew from the men’s amateur tennis circuit. Of greater concern to women’s
professionals was their belief that Richards’s presence undermined their own tacit willingness to
sexualize their sport in order to appeal to male viewers. They thought Richards a sideshow.
Gladys Heldman disagreed and wrote in defense of Richards because she was undergoing similar
mistreatment at the hands of the women professionals on whose behalf she worked tirelessly. 88
Forced out of the tour she founded, Heldman still worked long hours to grow women’s
tennis and to champion women in the workplace. That her ouster from Virginia Slims came, at
least in part, by the established players meant Heldman felt even closer to outsiders than ever
before. She pushed Women’s 35 Professional Tennis events despite the reluctance of sponsors to
pay dollars for what they considered senior tennis. She established the Avon Futures Tour that
developed players for the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA)—the union of topflight women’s
tennis professionals founded in 1973 by Billie Jean King after Heldman’s departure. The
partnership between the beauty products company and women’s professional tennis proved so
successful that the WTA agreed to Avon replacing Virginia Slims as the premiere players’ tour
sponsor in 1979 until Virginia Slims renewed their primary sponsorship four years later. That
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success dovetailed Heldman’s new efforts to help talented women secure management positions
at major firms. All the while Heldman continued to write about tennis as a guest editorialist for
CBS-owned World Tennis and in a variety of other publications. 89
Women’s Tennis Association members planned to boycott the 1976 Hawaiian
Tournament on their schedule because of Richards’s intention to participate, until Heldman
stated her intention to play the tournament herself, along with her tennis group from Houston, in
solidarity with Richards. The women professionals relented and decided to play alongside
Richards. Heldman lost money, though, for her support of Richards. After her $2.25 million sale
of World Tennis to CBS in 1972 and her withdrawal from the day-to-day management of the
Virginia Slims Tour in 1973, Heldman founded and ran Heldman and Associates, an executive
search firm that helped secure women executives upper management or board of director
positions for the biggest companies in America. Her willingness to speak out for Richards cost
her consultancy at least one corporate client and perhaps more. But for supporting Richards,
Heldman voiced no regrets. “Gladys kept silent about Renée Richards, because it might have
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cost her a fee,” Heldman said, that was an outcome she would not accept. Her tombstone could
instead list her very real accomplishments: placing women clients on thirty boards of Fortune
500 companies (a 50 percent increase in the number before Heldman and Associates); building
World Tennis to a subscriber base of 125,000 at the time of the CBS sale; and shepherding
women’s professional tennis through the tumultuous first decade of Open Tennis competition.
The fact that a person with such an impressive list of accomplishments recognized the legitimacy
of gender transitioning and sexual reassignment surgery of a professional tennis player as an
important moment goes a long way in explaining why Heldman herself had such an outsized
impact on sports history in the United States. She saw potential where other people did not. She
championed causes long kept on the outside. Late in life she even co-wrote a book of tennis
instruction with Pancho Segura and Pancho Gonzales. She remained active with various
professional tennis projects as well as other causes and avocations. When she had a few quiet
minutes to herself at her Houston or Santa Fe homes, she spent them with her cats Virginia and
Slim. 90
Renée Richards became a household name in the United States in the summer of 1977
when she sued the USLTA (by that time the USTA) over their refusal to allow her to enter the
women’s draw of the 1977 U.S. Open. The case hinged on how the Association, and by
extension professional sports organizations, determined the sex of an athlete. Never in their long
history had the USLTA administered a “sex determination test” beyond simply looking at an
athlete. On Richards they performed a “sex chromatin test,” the so-called “Barr body test” that
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ruled her genetically more man than woman. The WTA backed the use of the Barr body test, as
did various affidavits from professional players who stated they did not want to play against
Richards. The history of tennis as a sport in which women had long played dominant roles
informed the Supreme Court of New York’s decision to rule in Richards’s favor. Great tennis
players, more than in other professional sports, had never needed the strength men seemed to
have when compared to women. Billie Jean King’s affidavit that Richards “does not enjoy
physical superiority or strength so as to have an advantage over women competitors in the sport
of tennis” applied contemporary context to that history. The court noted that King spoke from
experience because she had “defeated male tennis professional Bobby Riggs on national
television.” 91
Richards retired from professional tennis in 1981 after four seasons of professional
tennis. The forty-seven-year-old resumed her medical practice in New York City, where she rose
to direct the ophthalmology department at the Manhattan Eye, Ear, and Throat Hospital. At the
same time Richards began coaching Martina Navratilova, herself no stranger to ostracism.
Communism spurred Navratilova to flee her native Czechoslovakia, and she defected to the West
in New York City in 1975 having traveled to the United States to play in the United States Open.
During the next half-decade Navratilova established herself as one of the top players on the
WTA tour, renowned for her attacking style of play and intense rivalry with Chris Evert. In 1981
the press outed Navratilova and her lover Rita Mae Brown, the author of the classic lesbian
Bildungsroman, Ruby Fruit Jungle. While Richards and Navratilova always treated each other
with courtesy on the professional tour, the shared public vitriol each faced on account of their
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sexuality increased the bond between the two that took the form of an athlete and coach
arrangement. For the next year Richards traveled with and coached Navratilova to the latter’s
best season up to that point with singles titles in the Australian Open, the French Open, and
Wimbledon. That summer Richards told Navratilova she planned to step away from coaching,
and the two parted amicably with Richards returning to practice medicine full-time and
Navritolova sitting out the 1982 U.S. Open before resuming her dominance of women’s
professional tennis. After one of her major finals wins, Navratilova took the microphone and
said, “I’d just like to thank one person. I’d like to thank my coach, Renée Richards. Without her,
I would never have won.” 92
On the whole women tennis players proved far more successful when compared to their
female peers in other professional sports. That trend continues to this day, where half of the top
ten highest-paid professional tennis players are women, and seven out of the top ten highest-paid
female athletes in the world are tennis players. 93 Before her March 8, 2016, press conference
announcing her positive test for performance-enhancing drugs and the subsequent pull of major
endorsement contracts with companies like Nike and Cannon Camera, Russian Champion Maria
Sharapova had earned more money than any other male or female tennis player. More
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importantly, no woman entertainer in the world matched her income. 94 In a related vein, in 2007
Wimbledon became the last tennis tournament in the world to offer equal prize money for
women and men competitors. That move, long overdue in the minds of many, made tennis the
first sport in world history to offer women pay equality. 95
Contemporary male professionals have on occasion spoken out against that pay equality.
In one notable example, the longtime and on-again-off-again world number one, Serbian Novak
Djokovic, implied that tournaments and their corporate and tennis federation sponsors do not
offer equal pay for equal work. “I think that our men’s tennis world, ATP world, should fight for
more, because the stats are showing that we have much more spectators on the men’s tennis
matches.” Male players like Djokovic are not wrong when they stress that their matches take
longer to play—that is, three out of five sets rather than two out of three sets in many cases—but
suggestions from ATP leaders that the greater depth on the men’s tour means that women players
“ride the coattails” of their male peers is that of contemporaries not steeped in the cultural
legacies and business histories of the game in which they earn a living. 96
Lack of awareness of those legacies is on the one hand excusable, because even the best
sports journalists and historians to examine those histories have missed and misunderstood the
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devil’s bargains women players made in order to make money in the game. 97 The crux of that
compromise was a willingness to put themselves out in public in the most sexualized of ways in
order to attract the most fans, the most media attention, and the most sponsorship dollars so as to
earn the most money from their work on the court. Likewise, physical attractiveness mattered a
great deal when entertainment agents at firms such as IMG marketed their clients to potential
sponsors. Historians have explored the “emotional labor” of female entertainers from circus
performers to the child movie star Shirley Temple. 98 In consciously consenting to the demands
of agents, tour sponsors, outfit designers, and tournament officials, women tennis players joined
women from other spheres of entertainment in that they put nearly all of themselves on the line
each time they played for a public audience.
Women’s tennis in the age of professional entertainment was about sex. And it sold better
than the men’s game. In this, the sport came full circle to its genesis in the late nineteenth
century.
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CONCLUSION
PANCHO’S RACKET AND PROFESSIONAL TENNIS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
The history of tennis can be understood in the context of three specific eras. Period one
began in 1873 with the first lawn tennis match hosted by the British military officer Walter
Wingfield in Wales. The game moved from there to America, Australia, and around the world
but remained an exclusively amateur sport until the Frenchwoman Suzanne Lenglen and her
American promoter C. C. Pyle organized the first international professional tour around the
United States in 1926. The cardinal characteristic of the second era—which began in 1926 and
concluded in 1968—was competition between tradition-oriented associations that wanted the
game to remain exclusively an “amateur pursuit” and professional players and promoters whose
embrace of tennis touring was both an attempt to earn a living from the sport and a challenge to
the authority over the game exercised by the tradition-minded amateur associations. Finally, after
1968, steady pressure from the professionals and occasional mismanagement by the amateur
associations’ leaders spurred the opening of competition between professionals and amateurs that
has continued into the present. Money became the defining feature of this third period, but, as
this study has advanced, money matters always marked tennis as a sport both apart from, and, in
that way, crucial for understanding the history of sports and commercial entertainment in the
twentieth century.
Twentieth-century popular culture was structured around radio, motion pictures,
television, music, and athletics. Historians have taken sports the least seriously of those five
entertainments, while among the sports historians, elite individual sports such as tennis have
468
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received far less attention than other kinds of athletics. Overlooking the game impoverishes
understanding of sports in general because tennis’s immediate antecedent, royal tennis, set a
precedent for modern international sport competitions with the first championship of a world
sport in 1740—nearly a century and a half before boxing held the next world championship
among a sport in 1882. 1
Missing the way tennis both shaped and was shaped by broader currents in the history of
the United States and world history in the twentieth century is easy to do from my own
experience. Having visited the fifty states and all the major cities within those states, I
encountered many of the playgrounds, athletic fields, recreation centers, and parks built by the
New Deal, though I did not know it at the time. On research trips for this project I often pitched a
tent in parks and campsites close to archives in order to keep costs low. I did this, unaware that
agencies like the Civilian Conservation Corps and National Youth Administration built or
improved many of those grounds. It was only after having returned from those trips with memory
cards full of pictures of archival records that I realized I literally lived on the legacy of the New
Deal’s recreational revolution. The same goes for the sport of tennis. In 2001 I began playing the
game on the eight public courts of Reservoir Park, in Quincy, Illinois, without the slightest idea
of how rare those courts or a park district program or public high school program would have
been seventy years before.
The recreational revolution did not usher in Open Tennis overnight but it did lay the
groundwork for professionals and amateurs playing together on the world’s largest and most
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lucrative stages within a generation. Throughout that quarter-century period the USLTA
remained stalwart in its opposition to Open Tennis. In October 1955, USLTA President Col.
James H. Bishop sat for an interview with the editors of World Tennis magazine and spoke for
the Association as a whole when he gave the reasons he could never see competition between the
likes of the Pancho Gonzales, Jack Kramer, Pancho Segura, and the top amateur players
sponsored by the Association. First, Bishop argued, the International Lawn Tennis Federation
that governed tennis around the world had no plans for Open Tennis, and the USLTA would
never think to step outside the prevailing opinion within that organization. Second, Bishop
related that after visiting the scores of private clubs that make up the USLTA, he could not find a
single member of those clubs willing to put any effort into the inception and sustainment of Open
Tennis. Third, Bishop confided that ticket revenue at USLTA-sanctioned tournaments had
dwindled as a percentage of total Association revenue, and that proportional change made the
USLTA more beholden to local Tennis Patrons groups to balance the budget of the National
Office in New York City. Fourth, any endorsement of professionalism by the association, Bishop
feared, would have United States tax agents auditing the Association’s books because how could
an organization whose charter maintained the promotion of amateur tennis support the entrance
of money into the game? After all, no USLTA official, the people who put in the work to grow
the game of tennis, in Bishop’s view, received any compensation except very limited travel
expenses for all of the great work they did, so how could players expect compensation? 2
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Bishop and his peers on the Executive Committee may very well have believed those
reasons. The reality of tennis after the recreational revolution took hold, however, differed a
great deal from the views of the USLTA leadership. When it came to silence for Open Tennis on
his rounds around the country clubs, Bishop heard what he wanted to hear. Just as the USLTA
was comprised of member clubs, so too was the International Lawn Tennis Federation made up
of member nations. A real push from one of the big three tennis nations—the United States, the
United Kingdom, or France—could make Open Tennis happen quickly. Plenty of letter writers
opined to World Tennis magazine and throughout the sports press in favor of Open Tennis. The
current USLTA leadership paid those present views no mind just as they maintained a pall of
silence regarding the views of at least one of their former presidents who, during the 49th Annual
Meeting of the Association, “urged the adoption of an open tournament.” The silence the
Association maintained on the matter even extended to speech they could not but nonetheless
tried to control. On one occasion the Executive Committee asked for the proof pages of the
forthcoming tennis book, Kings of the Court. After reading that work’s last chapter, which
endorsed Open Tennis, USLTA officers first tried to prevent the publication. When that failed,
they removed their previous support of a work they otherwise found commendable. 3
If the USLTA really believed in growing the game of tennis at all levels, then they would
have done well to listen to the positions advanced by the advocates of Open Tennis whose
arguments made more sense. In particular, Open Tennis exponents offered the example of Open
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Golf in America to argue in favor of the positive impact professionals and amateurs competition
together would hold if tennis went the same way as golf. The total number of golfers increased
three-fold in the years immediately following the sanctioned competition between amateur and
professional golfers that began in 1895. Given the similarities between the two sports in terms of
venue, economics, and the social position of players, little reason existed not to expect a similar
tripling of tennis players in the short-term following Open Tennis. Comparisons with golf went
nowhere with the Executive Committee of the USLTA for the simple reason that the men who
ran tennis in America were not that interested in seeing the game grow so much as they were
interested in seeing the tennis they wanted to see at the private country clubs to which they
belonged. 4
The recreational revolution helped sweep Bishop to the top of the Association because
his platform to “make Yakima, Washington feel that they were just as much a part of the USLTA
as the West Side Tennis Club” came across to the Eastern country clubbers who ran the
Association as a bone they could throw to the sections where tennis was growing and still
maintain the key seats in the Executive Committee that controlled the organization’s finances.
Bishop could thus point to the most minor reforms of the amateur code—sporting goods
company employees were no longer barred from USLTA tournaments, college professors and
physical education teachers could now play amateur tournaments, university netters could work
for a summer stipend at a seasonal camp, the so-called “eight weeks rule” of tournament play
4
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ended, and professional athletes from other sports could potentially play in an amateur tennis
tournament—while still maintaining the sine quo non of the National Office in the “Eastern
Grass Court Circuit” for amateur players beholden to those clubs for lodging, meals, and
transportation to and from tournaments. Bishop, a patsy president, thus appeased both sides when
he called the Davis Cup and National Championships at Forest Hills “necessary evils” far from
the “Hinterlands” that became the real “seed-bed for growing tennis.” 5
Television, transportation, Sunbelt suburbanization, and postwar consumer prosperity
took professional sports nationwide in a way and to a degree never before seen in the United
States. 6 Individual sports like tennis and golf returned the favor by creating for Americans the
illusion, in the words of one historian, of a “classless society” where the poor competed on equal
footing with the rich at the very moment where so many different goods were available for
Americans to differentiate themselves by class. 7 Whereas women in the twenties, thirties, and
forties asserted their own agendas and needs along with that of their spouses, families,
communities, and nations, the immediate postwar years saw a new commitment from more or
less everyone in the nation to prioritize the needs of returning veterans in front of anyone else. 8
Whether fact or fantasy, traditional manliness and patriarchy were on the skids for decades in the
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minds of many American men. 9 Military training and martial combat corrected (one could say
vastly overcorrected) this trend of emasculation for many men, who suddenly found their lives
filled with purpose and their bodies possessed of the ultimate power to decide life and death.
With the camaraderie bred in combat and mimicked in physical training, little wonder then that
sports became a ubiquitous part of American postwar culture when men returned home, started
families, and looked for something physical and associational to mimic what they had known
every day for the last four years. 10
The decade after Americans had celebrated victory in the Pacific by stringing up effigies
of the Japanese Emperor along famous streets of entertainment such as Hollywood Boulevard
proved a pivotal stretch in the larger history of political economy in the United States. Resisters
to initiatives brought about during the New Deal coalesced into a group of conservatives who
wanted expanded flexibility for entrepreneurship by loosening government regulation of
companies and markets. Some of these conservatives did not object to the expanded “welfare
capitalism” established during the New Deal because more money in the pockets of more
consumers meant a greater market for the goods and services they sold. While many workers
stayed put in the cities where they built military equipment for the War, a great many others left
cities such as Los Angeles, Hartford, and Detroit to go back to their previous homes in the rural
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South and Midwest. They returned with money in their pockets as well as higher expectations for
both earnings and the entertainments they had enjoyed in the big cities of their war work. 11
The tennis professional and sports promoter Jack Kramer saw business potential in the
these relocated postwar consumers. He planned a barnstorming tour to bring professional tennis
to every part of the United States. Players whose on-court careers the war sidelined, Kramer
knew he could sign on the cheap. Enticing up-and-coming amateurs proved crucial to holding the
public’s interest, just as finding the most exciting names in the sport was in the smaller tours of
the twenties and Depression years. The pace at which they traveled from stop to stop put Jack
Kramer’s Tennis Tour on an entirely new footing from any previous professional sports tour. In
that movement, first nationally and then internationally, when Jack Kramer’s World Tennis
Incorporated went from county to county, tennis promoters and players such as Kramer, Bobby
Riggs, Pancho Gonzales, Ted Schroeder, Pancho Segura, and Tony Trabert formed a troupe of
athletes and did the equivalent for sports what their contemporaries in literature and jazz did in
making “the fifties,” in the words of one investigator of American Studies, into “the great
expansion of mass and popular culture.” 12
The failure of professional tennis before 1968 to expand beyond the barnstorming tour
format first pioneered by Suzanne Lenglen and C.C. Pyle in 1926 was not based on reason but on
the raw emotion of International Lawn Tennis Federation members, USLTA officials, and their
counterparts in regional amateur tennis associations. That emotion coalesced in a stalwart effort
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against the democratization of the game brought on principally by the recreational revolution’s
public park courts that brought so many new players from different backgrounds into the game—
players whose sense of deference to the men and whose private country clubs and founded and
grew the game in America for the first three quarters-of-a-century did not quite reach the level
the old-guard believed they were owed by the newcomers. What the professional players and
promoters did was to keep tennis played for money constantly before the public across the
United States and increasingly around the world. Those professional tours, far more than the
amateur tournaments that took place year after year in the same club venues, increased public
interest in the sport. By the time a new generation of entrepreneurs became interested in the
profitability of global sports in the late 1960s, Jack Kramer’s World Tennis Incorporated
demonstrated that professional tennis could turn a profit if organized the right way.
That new generation of sports marketers, who appeared on the scene in 1968, were
capable of transitioning amateur tennis into an international professional sport. Sports marketers
such as Mark McCormack and Donald Dell, tour promoters such as Lamar Hunt, Association
leaders such as Slew Hester, sports publishers such as Gladys Heldman, and player-promoters
such as Billie Jean King transformed—some might argue revolutionized—the sport into what the
public in the seventies called “the tennis boom.” 13 These men and women appeared on the scene
at the historic moment and capitalized on those circumstances. This study has sought to tell the
stories of institutions, policies, and, most of all, people who contributed to the preconditions for
the professionalization of tennis. Their stories are less well known and generally less happy but
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altogether necessary if we are to understand why more people come to the United States Open
than any other sporting event held year after year.
Most of the money made from the labor of tennis players, as with other professional
athletes, took place off the field. Advertising agencies sold the images of players to companies
who believed celebrity endorsements helped them sell more of their products, and tennis players
served the cause of mass consumerism best when marketers reduced the complicated individual
to character traits—determined, fiery, consistent, graceful. Writers of trade-press tennis
technique books also favored the same simplification when they argued that each professional
player exemplified one unique body movement that translated into a certain style of game. For
example, Simon and Schuster’s 1967 bestseller Tennis the Professional Way emphasized that the
player who specialized in one certain style of play stood the greatest chance of making it big:
Pancho Gonzales could not win without his serve; Tony Trabert knew strategy; the all-American
wonder-boy Jack Kramer possessed the overall game. 14 Such simplistic analysis that attributed a
player’s professional success to a single attribute helped sales but hurt chances of appreciating
who these on-court entertainers were and where they came from.
Sportswriters and fans alike routinely practice their own version of historical obfuscation
in proposing hypothetical match-ups between players from different eras. Sports-talkers pit the
2016 Golden State Warriors against the 1996 Chicago Bulls, the 2016 Chicago Cubs against the
1908 New York Yankees, and the 2004 New England Patriots against the 1985 Chicago Bears in
anachronistic match-ups. Tennis too has its own fantasy matches where “tennis experts” rank the
14
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Greatest of All Time (GOAT). 15 Such imaginative comparisons are fun but of little value beyond
friends who share a similar fondness for the distraction from the problems of life that sports have
always provided. This work, by contrast, has laid out the circuitous route through geographic
space, through social classes, ethnic diversity, and national borders that tennis took in the century
that it evolved from a game that forbade professionals from playing a professional game more
popular in the world at large than within the United States. In the twenty-first century tennis’s
popularity with Americans continued to lag far behind that of the ubiquitous team sports of
football, baseball, and basketball, according to public opinion polling. 16 Such opinions, however,
miss the fact that because the sport of tennis had tried to keep money out of it for so long, when
money did finally enter the game in staggering amounts with Open Tennis in 1968, that money
came at such a torrent and with such a host of innovations that the influence of professional
tennis spilled over into other professional sports.
This study began with the great tennis champion and social activist Arthur Ashe, who had
firsthand experience with that influence. In preparing and promoting his history of African
American athletes, Ashe also tried to make clear to audiences just how big a business sports was
in the United States. For example, at Yale University on February 11, 1991, he told those
assembled: “Sports in America is a $65 billion industry today, and it’s still growing. The top ten
most watched television shows ever are sports programs with the exception of an episode of
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‘Dallas’…Sports are an addiction for us. An astute businessman like Lawrence Tisch, who owns
CBS, elected to bet $1.1 billion that sports would make his network number one.” 17
Ashe spoke at the end of the Cold War, just months before the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the survival of the United States as the world’s lone superpower through cultural rather
than military force, and the dominance of a connected world economy with the trade and control
of information the lynchpin. In the analysis of senior Cold War and diplomatic historian Walter
LaFeber, no figure better represented the ascendance of a “new global capitalism” than an
athlete—the Chicago Bulls shooting-guard and cultural superstar Michael Jordan, whose agent
David Falk licensed the Airman into the most branded and highest paid athlete in world
history. 18 Falk’s early experience in the entertainment industry began when he worked as a
junior agent at the ProServ entertainment company during the 1970s. What LaFeber’s account
ignores, however, was that Falk gained the marketing, sales, and legal insights he later applied to
negotiating licensing on Jordan’s behalf when he worked with tennis players represented by
ProServ. During his decade at ProServ, Falk handled accounts in basketball and football, but he
also worked as the junior agent for Arthur Ashe and Stan Smith, as well as the lead agent for
Gene Mayer. From its founding in 1970 by Yale University All-American turned Davis Cup
captain Donald Dell, ProServ, in both a name drawn from the first shot in tennis and in action,
stressed the athletes from individual sports over those of team sports. The agency put its most
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experienced employees and most promising young hires in charge of servicing the elite athletes
from individual rather than those from team sports. 19
ProServ’s agents were not alone in making money by managing the image of the athlete
off the field rather than the performance of the athlete inside the ballpark. Just as historians have
argued about politicians around 1970, image was everything for professional athletes. 20 ProServ
and the upstart Advantage International, which followed in 1983 when Dell’s former partners
Lee Fentress and Frank Craighill founded their agency, convinced many corporations that
attaching an athlete to their brand would help sell more products. 21 But the true pioneer and
ultimately more consequential player in commodifying and monetizing sports heroes was a
lawyer named Mark McCormack and the International Management Group he founded. That
agency, more than any other firm in the latter third of the twentieth century, threaded different
strands of entertainment into a single stream of profit. Making the celebrity athlete into the center
of that work meant that a form of capitalism—not of industry but of entertainment and leisure—
became a highly profitable and fast growing sector in the world economy’s broader transition
from secondary production to tertiary services in the 1970s. The degree to which sports
marketing agencies who worked with global athletes may or may not have influenced firms in
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other economic sectors toward greater capital mobility, creative accounting practices, and tax
sheltering remains in need of further research. 22
Far clearer is that entertainment agents accomplished the triumph of the celebrity athlete
over the hearts, minds, and pocketbooks of many in the United States and throughout the world.
Professional promoters such as George McCall, Jack Kramer, and Lamar Hunt developed better
promoted tours like the Grand Prix and World Championship Tennis, they organized grander
tournaments like the WCT Finals in Dallas, and they incentivized the construction of bigger
stadiums for the most recognized celebrity athletes to battle in. In terms of tennis, 1968 marked a
watershed moment when the oldest and most exclusive amateur tennis tournaments invited longtime touring professionals such as Pancho Gonzales, Rod Laver, and Arthur Ashe to compete on
their previously amateur-only courts. The All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club, the host
for Wimbledon, the most famous of these tournaments, asked Mark McCormack and IMG to
turn the Championships into a commercial dynamo. IMG delivered and helped set a precedent
for the marketing of later world-class sporting events. A decade later, the United States Tennis
Association built the largest tennis complex in the world for their own National Championships
that pushed the profitability of individual sports to a new level. 23
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The players whose on-court performance peaked in 1968 mostly made a fortune. So too
did the agencies who marketed the players’ appeal to consumers to a smattering of old-guard and
upstart companies who made everything from sneakers to processed beef. Others were not so
fortunate. Pancho Gonzales’s nearly two-decade run at the top of the game caught up with him.
While he still produced dramatic moments on the court, forty years of age and years of strife
with fans, tour managers, tennis officials, and other players led agencies like IMG to turn him
down when he approached them for representation. 24 Likewise, the growing power of the tennis
players’ unions also boded poorly for veteran players like Gonzales whose long time in tennis
came in the earlier barnstorming days that separated amateurs and professionals and thus differed
markedly from the demands and directions mid-career and young players wanted their contracts
and negotiations with tournament officials, sponsors, and governing bodies to go. 25
Other players also struggled to secure their share of the money that poured into tennis
with Open Tennis in 1968 and the subsequent boom that lasted for the next decade. In this effort,
many individuals from traditionally marginalized groups actually gained a remarkable degree of
success. The legacy of women in the sport of tennis combined with the efforts of feminist
activists in the sixties and seventies to raise the consciousness of women. Politically these efforts
yielded Title IX. Commercially these efforts created the best funded and most publicly visual
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troupe of women athletes in the world with the Virginia Slims Women’s Tennis Tour. But unlike
the standard version of the fusion of women athletics and political consciousness told by
journalists and historians, the reality of the women’s tennis tournament told through previously
unexamined sources tells a more complicated story where women players consented to the
commercialization of their bodies pushed by entertainment agents, media moguls, tennis
promoters, and even their fellow players. 26 Moreover, as the highly publicized and litigated 1977
court case that pitted the transgender ophthalmologist and tennis champion Dr. Renée Richards
against the United States Tennis Association, a player’s tennis ability was not the only criteria
tennis officials used to screen who they thought deserved to play on the game’s biggest stage at
the U.S. Open. 27 More than the individual players and their personalities, it was the combination
of the agent-marketed and -managed athlete, the new tours with robust media contracts, and the
larger-than-life tournaments with big stadiums and big lists of corporate sponsors that made
tennis and professional sports into commercial juggernauts that scaled the globe.
Open competition between amateur and professional tennis players has now taken place
for a longer time than between when Lenglen first toured America as a professional and 1968
when amateurs first played professionals at the French Open. Further developments such as the
so-called “car park press conference” and the player-led reform of the Association of Tennis
Professionals have taken place after the material studied in these chapters and have received able
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treatment by sports journalists, but the events of most consequence for professional tennis in the
twentieth century took place before the 1990s and the twenty-first century. 28
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